Section 32 of the Registration Act, 1908 – Scope, Interpretation and Jurisprudential Developments

Section 32 of the Registration Act, 1908 – Scope, Interpretation and Jurisprudential Developments

1. Introduction

Section 32 of the Registration Act, 1908 (“the Act”) constitutes the procedural fulcrum of India’s deed-registration regime. By demarcating the class of persons competent to present a document for registration, the provision endeavours to insulate the system against impersonation, fraud and uncertainty of title.[1] A century of case-law demonstrates that non-compliance may vitiate the very foundation of a transfer, notwithstanding substantive validity inter partes. The present article analyses the legislative text, doctrinal rationales and key judicial pronouncements, with particular emphasis on the recent Supreme Court judgment in Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar[2] and its interaction with allied provisions such as Sections 33–35.

2. Legislative Framework and Purposive Context

Section 32 provides that, save for the exceptional situations envisaged in Sections 31, 88 and 89, every document “whether such registration be compulsory or optional” shall be presented at the proper office “(a) by some person executing or claiming under the same, (b) by the representative or assign of such person, or (c) by the agent of such person … duly authorised by power of attorney executed and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned.”[1]

The provision is nested within Part VI (“Of presenting documents for registration”) and is structurally complemented by:

  • Section 33: stipulating the form of powers of attorney recognisable for purposes of clause (c);
  • Section 34: obliging the registering officer to enquire into execution and identity of presenters;
  • Section 35: providing the mechanism of admission or denial of execution.

Collectively, these sections constitute a statutory bulwark “carefully designed to prevent forgeries and the procurement of conveyances by fraud or undue influence.”[18]

3. Historical Evolution

3.1 Early Privy Council and High Court Approach

The Privy Council in Ishri Prasad v. Baijnath[18] and Bharat Indu v. Harnid Ali Khan[19] took a strict constructionist stance: improper presentation is not a mere procedural irregularity remediable under Section 87 but a jurisdictional defect that renders the registration void ab initio. Subsequent High Courts, e.g., Ram Mohan Lal v. Tasadduq Husain[14], reiterated that authentication envisaged by Section 33 is condition precedent to valid presentation under clause (c).

3.2 Incremental Liberalisation and Equitable Considerations

With the advent of welfare-oriented property jurisprudence, certain courts displayed greater flexibility, treating the requirements as directory where substantial compliance occurred. However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against diluting the statutory mandate, most recently in S.N. Raja v. Ramaiah[13], affirming that Section 32 does not insist on the purchaser’s presence but uncompromisingly requires authorised presentation by or on behalf of the executant.

4. Jurisprudential Analysis of Core Components

4.1 Presentation by “Person Executing” – Clause (a)

The term “person executing” has been construed literally to mean the individual whose signature embodies the act of transfer. In H.P. Puttaswamy v. Thimmamma the Supreme Court clarified that the physical absence of the transferee at registration does not impeach validity where the transferor himself presents the deed.[13]

4.2 Agents and the Authentication Conundrum – Clauses (b) & (c)

The most litigated facet concerns presentation by agents. Section 33 insists that a power of attorney must, depending on the principal’s residence, be executed before and authenticated by designated authorities. Failure thereto is fatal:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Rajni Tandon definitively rationalised the interface of Sections 32 and 33. The Court held that where the agent is himself the executant, clause (a) is attracted; therefore, authentication under Section 33 is immaterial.[2] The ruling distinguishes between:

  1. an agent executing and presenting the document (falls under 32(a)); and
  2. an agent merely presenting a document already executed by the principal (must satisfy 32(c) read with 33).

Post-Rajni Tandon, High Courts such as Kerala in K.J. Abraham v. Mariamma Itty[7] have applied the distinction, thereby reducing procedural vetoes in common conveyancing while preserving safeguards where the agent is only a presenter.

4.3 Registrar’s Duties under Section 34 vis-à-vis Section 32

The Gujarat High Court in J.D. Pathak v. V.B. Barot[8] meticulously catalogued the enquiries mandated by Section 34(3). The Registrar must (i) verify execution, (ii) establish identity, and (iii) satisfy himself of the agent’s authority. Absence of such enquiry vitiates registration, and the Registrar’s jurisdictional error cannot be cured by Section 87.

4.4 Invalid Presentation: Consequences and Curability

Andhra Pradesh High Court decisions in Sivakoti Dasaradharam[5] and Captain Paida Janardhana Reddy[24] emphasise that registration founded on incompetent presentation is a nullity, not a voidable act. Conversely, curable defects under Section 87 pertain only to procedural lapses occurring after valid presentation.

5. Intersection with Substantive Property Law

5.1 GPA Sales and the Imperatives of Registered Conveyance

The landmark ruling in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana held that SA/GPA/Will transactions do not convey title; only a duly executed and properly presented sale deed can do so.[9] Section 32 thereby acquires renewed significance: it is the gatekeeper that denies informal mechanisms of transfer any semblance of legitimacy by insisting on authenticated presentation.

5.2 Leases and the Evidentiary Embargo

In Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop & Sons, the Supreme Court refused Rent Act protection to an unregistered lease, stressing that Section 32 et seq. form part of a mandatory statutory matrix; non-presentation within four months eradicates evidentiary value under Section 49.[10]

5.3 Unilateral Cancellation Deeds

Following Satya Pal Anand v. State of M.P.[11] and Latif Estate Line India Ltd.[12], the Registrar’s administrative role under Section 32 cannot extend to accepting deeds that extinguish another’s rights without their participation. Presentation by one party to the original conveyance does not satisfy clause (a) where the document purports to rescind the earlier instrument; mutuality is implicit in the requirement of “person executing”.

6. Contemporary Challenges and Reform Proposals

  • Biometric Verification: Section 32-A (inserted 2001) mandates affixing photographs and fingerprints to combat impersonation.[16]
  • Digital Registration: E-governance initiatives must retain the essence of Section 32 enquiries, perhaps via video identification and Aadhaar-based authentication.
  • Preventing Multiple Registrations: Courts have lamented the absence of statutory mechanisms to block repetitive fraudulent deeds.[15] A unique-property-ID ledger linked to Section 32 presentation protocols could mitigate the risk.

7. Conclusion

A century after its enactment, Section 32 continues to anchor India’s registration jurisprudence. The Supreme Court’s purposive harmonisation in Rajni Tandon clarifies that the provision is neither an anachronistic technicality nor an impediment to genuine transactions; rather, it is a calibrated instrument that balances transactional efficiency with systemic integrity. As property dealings grow in complexity, faithful adherence to the statutory triad of Sections 32–34, fortified by technological safeguards, remains indispensable for ensuring indefeasible titles and reducing litigation.

Footnotes

  1. The Registration Act, 1908, s. 32.
  2. Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar & Anr. (2009) 14 SCC 782.
  3. Sri Sri Sri Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Babu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat AIR 1954 SC 316.
  4. Jugraj Singh & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh & Ors. (1970) 2 SCC 386.
  5. Sivakoti Dasaradharam & Ors. v. Sivakoti Yoganandam & Ors. 1996 (2) ALD 643 (AP HC).
  6. Sekar Mudaliar v. Shajathi Bi 1986 SCC OnLine Mad 167.
  7. K.J. Abraham v. Mariamma Itty 2016 (2) KHC 514.
  8. J.D. Pathak v. V.B. Barot & Anr. 1982 SCC OnLine Guj 141.
  9. Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana & Anr. (2012) 1 SCC 656.
  10. Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop & Sons & Ors. (2000) 6 SCC 394.
  11. Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2016) 10 SCC 767.
  12. Latif Estate Line India Ltd. v. Hadeeja Ammal 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 215.
  13. S.N. Raja v. Ramaiah 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 40.
  14. Ram Mohan Lal v. Tasadduq Husain AIR 1932 All 593.
  15. Hira Lal v. Registrar, Panipat & Ors. 2015 (183) PLR 497.
  16. Registration (Amend.) Act 48 of 2001 inserting s. 32-A.
  17. Ishri Prasad v. Baijnath (1906) 28 All 707 (PC).
  18. Bharat Indu v. Harnid Ali Khan (1920) 47 IA 177 (PC).
  19. Captain Paida Janardhana Reddy v. State of A.P. 2020 SCC OnLine AP 37.