Re-visiting India’s Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: Legislative Philosophy, Jurisprudential Trajectory and Contemporary Challenges

Re-visiting India’s Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: Legislative Philosophy, Jurisprudential Trajectory and Contemporary Challenges

Introduction

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA or “the Act”) constitutes India’s foremost civil legislation aimed at safeguarding women against multifarious forms of violence occurring within domestic spheres.[1] Nearly two decades after its enactment, the Act has generated a robust body of jurisprudence that has clarified, expanded, and, at times, curtailed the contours of its protection. This article critically analyses the legislative design of the PWDVA and maps its doctrinal evolution through leading decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts, with particular attention to the reference materials supplied.

Legislative Intent and Constitutional Context

The PWDVA was enacted to operationalise Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of the Constitution, and to domesticate India’s international obligations under CEDAW and allied instruments.[2] Parliament intentionally crafted a hybrid mechanism providing civil reliefs (Sections 18–23) enforceable through criminal sanctions (Section 31) so that victims obtain swift, inexpensive and holistic remedies beyond the strait-jacket of Section 498-A IPC or Section 125 CrPC.[3]

Statutory Architecture

  • Section 2(a): “Aggrieved person” – any woman in a domestic relationship who alleges domestic violence.
  • Section 2(f): “Domestic relationship” – includes marriage, relationships in the nature of marriage, consanguinity, adoption and joint family residence.
  • Section 2(s): “Shared household” – expansively defined to protect residential security.
  • Section 3: Enumerates physical, sexual, verbal/emotional and economic abuse.
  • Sections 17–22: Substantive civil reliefs (right to reside, protection, monetary relief, custody, compensation).
  • Sections 26–29: Concurrent jurisdiction with civil/family courts and statutory appeals.

Jurisprudential Evolution

1. Right to Residence and the Concept of “Shared Household”

In S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra, the Supreme Court restricted the term “shared household” to property in which the respondent husband possesses a legal or equitable interest, thereby excluding homes exclusively owned by in-laws.[4] The Court cautioned against converting the Act into a vehicle for unlimited property claims by daughters-in-law.
Critique: While the decision curtails potential misuse, it arguably dilutes Section 17(1), which grants an unqualified right of residence to every aggrieved woman. Subsequent High Court dicta (e.g., Ishpal Singh Kahai) have sought to temper Batra by emphasising purposive interpretation, but the precedent continues to influence trial courts.

2. Temporal Applicability and Continuing Domestic Wrongs

V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot adopted a purposive construction, holding that the Act applies even to acts of violence predating 26 October 2006, provided the parties remain in a domestic relationship and the effects of violence persist.[5] This approach, echoed by the Allahabad High Court in Preetam Singh, accords with the doctrine of continuing wrongs and advances the Act’s protective object.

3. Respondent Profile: From “Adult Male” to Gender-Neutral Liability

Initially, Section 2(q) confined “respondent” to adult males, subject to a proviso enlarging it to certain female relatives. Two seminal rulings recalibrated this formulation:

  • Sandhya Manoj Wankhade (2011) held that the proviso enables arraying female relatives as respondents, thus partially neutralising gender restrictions.[6]
  • Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora (2016) struck down the words “adult male” as unconstitutional under Article 14, rendering the Act fully gender-neutral regarding perpetrators.[7]

The decisions collectively ensure that women are protected against violence emanating from any family member, while affirming constitutional equality.

4. Live-in Relationships and “Relationships in the Nature of Marriage”

The Act’s inclusivity is tested in cases involving non-traditional unions:

  • D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal laid down indicia (cohabitation, pooling of resources, societal projection as spouses, legal capacity etc.) for determining relationships “in the nature of marriage”.[8]
  • Indra Sarma v. V.K.V Sarma clarified that a relationship with a person who is already married lacks the necessary “degree of permanence” and hence falls outside Section 2(f).[9]
  • Lalita Toppo v. State of Jharkhand affirmed that even where Section 125 CrPC is unavailable, a woman in a de-facto/domestic relationship may seek monetary relief under Sections 20–22 of the Act.[10]

These rulings balance moral conservatism with socio-legal realism, although critics argue that exclusion of “adulterous” relationships from protection undermines vulnerable women.

5. Procedural Dimensions: Jurisdiction, Appeals and Limitations

Section 29 provides a statutory right of appeal to the Sessions Court within thirty days. The Kerala High Court in Karthikeyan v. Sheeja underscored that parties must exhaust this remedy before invoking supervisory writ jurisdiction.[11] Recently, the Supreme Court in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan clarified that the limitation under Section 468 CrPC triggers only upon breach of a Magistrate’s order (Section 31), not upon filing the original application, thereby preserving prosecutorial efficacy.[12]

6. Relief Framework and Enforcement Challenges

Despite a comprehensive bouquet of reliefs, enforcement gaps persist. Appellate courts have occasionally imposed onerous conditions on hearing appeals (e.g., deposit of maintenance pending appeal). The Delhi High Court in Brijesh Gupta v. Shikha Gupta deemed such pre-conditions improper in light of the Supreme Court’s caution in Shalu Ojha, thereby reaffirming access to justice.[13]

Critical Appraisal

The jurisprudence reveals a dynamic interplay between textual fidelity and purposive advancement of women’s rights. Notably:

  • The post-Batra dialogue demonstrates judicial anxiety over potential abuse yet underscores the need for legislative clarification on matrimonial housing.
  • Severance of gendered language in Harsora aligns domestic-violence jurisprudence with constitutional egalitarianism, but raises implementing agencies’ capacity concerns when female respondents (e.g., mothers-in-law) are arraigned.
  • Ambiguity surrounding live-in relationships persists. The stringent tests of Indra Sarma may leave certain economically-dependent partners unprotected, inviting legislative attention.
  • Procedural hurdles—service of summons, multiplicity of forums under Section 26, and enforcement of residence orders—continue to impede the Act’s transformative potential.

Conclusion

The PWDVA has emerged as a cornerstone of India’s gender-justice framework. Judicial interpretation has progressively expanded its reach—temporally (Bhanot), relationally (Velusamy, Lalita Toppo), and constitutionally (Harsora). Nevertheless, restrictive readings of “shared household”, exclusion of certain live-in arrangements, and procedural inefficiencies call for calibrated legislative refinement and administrative strengthening. Future reform must reconcile property rights with residential security, ensure uniform procedural safeguards, and extend unequivocal protection to all women trapped in domestic subordination, consonant with constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity and personal liberty.

Footnotes

  1. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
  2. Statement of Objects and Reasons, PWDVA 2005; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 1979.
  3. Vaishali Abhimanyu Joshi v. Nanasaheb Gopal Joshi, (2017) SC.
  4. S.R. Batra and Another v. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169.
  5. V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot, (2012) SCC Cri 102.
  6. Sou. Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade, (2011) SCC Cri 21.
  7. Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) SCC OnLine SC 1118.
  8. D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469.
  9. Indra Sarma v. V.K.V Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755.
  10. Lalita Toppo v. State of Jharkhand, (2018) SCC OnLine SC 2301.
  11. Karthikeyan v. Sheeja, 2008 SCC OnLine Ker 381.
  12. Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan, (2022) 15 SCC 50.
  13. Brijesh Kumar Gupta v. Shikha Gupta, Delhi High Court, 2015.