Commissions of Inquiry (Central) Rules, 1972 – A Critical Analysis

Commissions of Inquiry (Central) Rules, 1972: Doctrinal Foundations, Judicial Elucidation, and Contemporary Challenges

1. Introduction

The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter “the 1952 Act”) constitutes a pivotal legislative instrument enabling the Union and State Governments to establish fact-finding bodies for definite matters of public importance. In 1972 the Central Government, acting under its rule-making power in Section 12 of the 1952 Act, notified the Commissions of Inquiry (Central) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter “the 1972 Rules”). These Rules systematise procedural safeguards, delineate evidentiary mechanisms, and operationalise Sections 4, 5, 8, 8-B and 8-C of the parent Act. Fifty years on, the Rules remain the principal procedural code for central inquiries, repeatedly tested and refined through constitutional adjudication. This article undertakes a doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis of the 1972 Rules, integrating leading precedents from the Supreme Court and High Courts of India.

2. Legislative Context and Objectives

2.1 The 1952 Act

Section 3(1) empowers the “appropriate Government” to appoint a Commission “by notification in the Official Gazette” whenever it deems an inquiry necessary, or when mandated by a legislative resolution.[1] Sections 4 and 5 vest civil-court-like powers and additional coercive powers in the Commission, while Section 8 authorises the Commission to regulate its own procedure subject to the Rules.

2.2 Need for Uniform Procedure

Early commissions functioned with ad hoc procedures, resulting in heterogeneous practices and litigation over natural-justice standards. The 1972 Rules sought to:

  • create a uniform, legally certain framework for Central Commissions;
  • codify principles of audi alteram partem reflected in Sections 8-B and 8-C;
  • balance inquisitorial fact-finding with individual rights; and
  • promote transparency through public notices and affidavit mechanisms.

3. Structural Anatomy of the 1972 Rules

3.1 Initiation and Public Participation

Rule 5(2)(b) obliges publication of a press note inviting the public to file affidavits within a stipulated period. The Supreme Court affirmed the democratic value of this requirement in the Sirpurkar Commission litigation arising from the Hyderabad encounter deaths, emphasising that Rule 5(2)(b) “facilitates an inclusive evidentiary record.”[2]

3.2 Affidavits, Discovery, and Oral Evidence

Rules 5(4)–5(6) create a sequenced process: filing of affidavits, scrutiny by the Commission, followed by oral examination. The order in which witnesses are examined became contentious in Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry, where the Court construed Rule 5(5)(a) in tandem with Section 8-B to hold that persons whose conduct was in question should ordinarily be examined at the end of the inquiry.[3]

3.3 Natural-Justice Guarantees: Rules 4, 6 & 7

Rules 4 and 6-7 replicate the statutory imperatives of Sections 8-B and 8-C:

  • Notice of possible adverse findings – mandatory before reputational prejudice may occur;
  • Right of representation – appearance through counsel or authorised representatives;
  • Right of cross-examination – circumscribed by the Commission’s discretion yet judicially enforceable.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Md. Ibrahim Khan v. Susheel Kumar held that Rules 4 and 5 are “identical in substance” to Sections 8-B and 8-C, underscoring their constitutional salience.[4]

3.4 Evidentiary Powers

Rule 3 read with Section 4 empowers Commissions to issue summons, administer oaths, and requisition documents—features repeatedly relied upon in anti-corruption inquiries (e.g., State of Karnataka v. Union of India).[5]

4. Judicial Interpretation of the 1972 Rules

4.1 Constitutional Validity and Separation of Powers

In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, the Supreme Court upheld the 1952 Act despite challenges that it conferred “arbitrary” executive power. The Court stressed that inquiry reports lack binding force, thus preserving judicial exclusivity.[6] The 1972 Rules, being procedural, were implicitly validated as subordinate legislation necessary to effectuate the Act without infringing Article 14.

4.2 Federal Dimensions

State of Karnataka v. Union of India clarified that Section 3 permits concurrent Central and State inquiries provided there is no subject overlap, and cited Rule 5(2)(b) to indicate how public notice prevents duplicative proceedings.[5] The case reaffirms the constitutional accommodation of strong Centre oversight within a quasi-federal model.

4.3 Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness

The Supreme Court’s trilogy in Kiran Bedi (1988 provisional order, 1989 final judgment) constitutes the leading exposition on Rules 5(5)(a), 6 & 7. The Court quashed contempt proceedings against officers compelled to testify prematurely, holding that the Rules must be harmonised with Section 8-B so that potentially incriminated individuals testify only after the evidentiary foundation is laid.[3] Subsequent High-Court decisions, including Vasam Surender, treat Kiran Bedi as authoritative on the sequencing of witnesses.[7]

4.4 Continuing Relevance: Telangana Encounter Inquiry

The Telangana High Court in Konda Narsimha Reddy upheld the Sirpurkar Commission’s invocation of Rule 5(2)(b) and clarified that a witness cannot self-designate as “independent”; classification of witnesses lies within Commission discretion exercised under Rules 4–6.[2][8]

4.5 Executive Commissions Outside the Act

In Andaleeb Sehgal v. Union of India the Delhi High Court accepted that the executive may appoint fact-finding bodies de hors the 1952 Act, yet recognised that once the Government invokes Section 11 to extend certain Rules to such bodies, the natural-justice safeguards of Rules 4–7 become mandatory.[9]

5. Intersection with Wider Constitutional Doctrines

5.1 Article 14 and Reasonable Classification

The “intelligible differentia” test articulated in Dalmia governs selection of inquiry subjects; Rule-based procedure shields against arbitrary targeting by guaranteeing notice, representation, and cross-examination.

5.2 Article 21 and Fair Procedure

Although Commissions lack penal jurisdiction, their findings can damage reputation and liberty interests. The Rules operationalise Maneka Gandhi’s expanded due-process reading of Article 21 by embedding fair-hearing norms in an inquisitorial setting.

5.3 Legislative–Executive Harmony

M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India teaches that repugnancy arises only upon “irreconcilable conflict.” The 1972 Rules, clearly procedural, do not trench upon State law; instead, they facilitate harmonious operation of inquiries within List I competences.[10]

6. Critical Appraisal and Prospective Reforms

  • Delays and Cost Overruns: High-profile inquiries (e.g., Liberhan Commission) expose the absence of strict timelines. Amending Rule 10 to mandate periodic judicial review of extensions may enhance efficiency.
  • Implementation Deficit: Reports are often tabled but not actioned. A new Rule could require the appropriate Government to issue an Action Taken Report within six months of tabling.
  • Data Protection and Privacy: Digital dissemination of affidavits under Rule 5 necessitates privacy guidelines consistent with K.S. Puttaswamy (2017).
  • Overlap with Statutory Regulators: Sector-specific regulators (SEBI, CVC) sometimes investigate identical issues. A consultative mechanism prior to notification, perhaps embedded in Rule 3-A, could mitigate duplication.

7. Conclusion

The Commissions of Inquiry (Central) Rules, 1972 encapsulate the Indian State’s commitment to transparent, participatory, and procedurally fair fact-finding. Judicial decisions from Dalmia to Kiran Bedi and the recent Telangana encounter cases have preserved the delicate balance between inquisitorial efficacy and individual rights envisaged by the framers of the 1952 Act. While the Rules have withstood constitutional scrutiny, evolving governance realities call for targeted amendments to bolster timeliness, enforceability, and privacy safeguards. Such refinements will ensure that Commissions remain credible instruments for democratic accountability in the decades ahead.

Footnotes

  1. Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, s. 3(1).
  2. Konda Narsimha Reddy v. State of Telangana, 2021 (Dec.) Tel HC.
  3. Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry (1989) 1 SCC 494.
  4. Md. Ibrahim Khan v. Susheel Kumar, 1982 AP HC.
  5. State of Karnataka v. Union of India (1977) 4 SCC 608.
  6. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar 1958 AIR SC 538.
  7. Vasam Surender v. State of Telangana, 2021 Tel HC.
  8. Commissions of Inquiry (Central) Rules, 1972, r. 5(2)(b) interpreted in Sirpurkar Commission proceedings.
  9. Andaleeb Sehgal v. Union of India, 2006 (Delhi HC).
  10. M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979) 3 SCC 431.