Article 227 of the Constitution of India: The High Court's Power of Superintendence

The Power of Superintendence: An Analysis of Article 227 of the Constitution of India

Introduction

Article 227 of the Constitution of India vests in every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This power is of profound significance in the Indian judicial system, serving as a cornerstone for ensuring that judicial and quasi-judicial bodies function within the bounds of their authority and in accordance with the law. While distinct from appellate jurisdiction, the supervisory role under Article 227 is crucial for the administration of justice, providing a mechanism for course correction and upholding the rule of law. This article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of Article 227, examining its historical evolution, nature, scope, limitations, and its interplay with other constitutional and statutory provisions, drawing upon key judicial pronouncements.

Historical Evolution and Constitutional Framework

The power of superintendence vested in High Courts is not a novel concept introduced by the Constitution of 1950. Its origins can be traced back to the colonial era. As observed in Waryam Singh And Another v. Amarnath And Another[6] and reiterated in Shameeda Khatoon v. Gulam Sabir[15], the material part of Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. Section 107 conferred upon High Courts the power of superintendence over all courts subject to their appellate jurisdiction. Subsequently, Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, continued this power, although sub-section (2) of Section 224 sought to limit it by stating that nothing in the section should be construed as giving the High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior court which was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. The Supreme Court in Waryam Singh[6] noted that the omission of a provision analogous to sub-section (2) of Section 224 of the 1935 Act from Article 227, coupled with the express inclusion of "tribunals" within its ambit, effectively restored and expanded the High Court's power of judicial superintendence, not confining it merely to administrative oversight.

The constitutional entrenchment of Articles 226 and 227 places them beyond the reach of ordinary legislative powers of Parliament and State Legislatures. As affirmed in Surendra Singh v. State Of Bihar[10], citing Umaji Keshao Meshram And Others v. Radhikabai[4], these articles can only be curtailed or excluded by a constitutional amendment. This principle was also echoed in Tarnmanna D. Battal & Ors., Etc. v. Miss Renuka R. Reddy & Ors. Etc.[12], referencing the L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India[LCK] case, which held that the power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure.

Notably, Article 227(4) explicitly excludes the High Court's power of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.[13] The supervisory jurisdiction over administrative tribunals, which was affected by the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, was largely restored by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, bringing most tribunals (other than military tribunals) back under the High Court's supervision.[14]

Nature and Scope of Power under Article 227

Supervisory, Not Appellate

A consistent thread running through judicial interpretations is that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate. The Supreme Court in Garment Craft (S) v. Prakash Chand Goel (S)[1] reiterated that this power is not meant for reappraising evidence or substituting the findings of inferior courts unless there is a conspicuous error or lack of evidence. Similarly, in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.[8], it was emphasized that the High Court should not act as an appellate court under Article 227. This distinction was also highlighted in Nagendra Nath Bora And Another v. The Commissioner Of Hills Division And Appeals, Assam And Others[2] and firmly established in Radhey Shyam And Another v. Chhabi Nath And Others[5]. The purpose is not to review the decision for its correctness in the same way an appeal does, but to ensure that the subordinate court or tribunal acts within its authority.[16]

Judicial and Administrative Superintendence

The power of superintendence under Article 227 encompasses both administrative and judicial superintendence. The Supreme Court in Waryam Singh[6], disagreeing with the contention that Article 227 confers only administrative superintendence, clarified that it includes judicial superintendence as well. This was further affirmed in Shameeda Khatoon[15]. The High Court, under this power, can correct errors of jurisdiction and errors of law apparent on the face of the record, apart from ensuring procedural propriety.[14]

Grounds for Interference

The High Court's intervention under Article 227 is warranted in specific circumstances. These generally include:

  • Jurisdictional Errors: Cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested by law.[14], [19]
  • Errors of Law Apparent on the Record: This refers to manifest and patent errors of law, as distinguished from a mere mistake of law or an erroneous decision on a point of law that is debatable.[2], [14], [19] It is not for correcting every error of law.[17]
  • Grave Miscarriage of Justice or Flagrant Violation of Law: Intervention is justified where there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, leading to substantial injustice.[1], [16], [18] As stated in D. N. Banerji Vs. P. R. Mukherjee (cited in Mohd. Musthfa[16] and Smt. Suranti Devi[18]), "Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere."
  • Patent Perversity: Where findings are perverse, based on no evidence whatsoever, or where an order is arbitrary or capricious.[14], [17], [19]
  • Violation of Principles of Natural Justice: If the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.[17], [19]
  • Failure to Perform Duty: To ensure that courts and tribunals do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner.[14], [16]

Limitations on the Exercise of Power

The power under Article 227, though wide, is subject to certain self-imposed limitations by the judiciary:

  • To be Exercised Sparingly: This is a recurring theme in numerous judgments. The power is to be exercised "most sparingly and only in appropriate cases."[6], [8], [11], [7], [16]
  • Not for Correcting Mere Errors: It is not intended to correct every error of fact or law committed by a subordinate court or tribunal, especially if the body acted within its jurisdiction.[1], [2], [8], [17], [19] The High Court does not sit as a court of appeal to re-evaluate evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the lower court.[1]
  • Not an Unlimited Prerogative: The power does not vest the High Court with an unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal.[16], [18]
  • Alternative Statutory Remedy: The existence of an alternative statutory mode of redressal may operate as a restraint on the exercise of this power.[17] However, the power under Article 227 is in addition to powers of revision conferred by other legislation.[14] (citing Baby v. Travancore Devaswom Board[Baby]).
  • Conduct of the Petitioner: Laches or unreasonable delay in approaching the court, and the conduct of the petitioner, are relevant factors that the High Court may consider in exercising its discretion.[11]
  • Private Disputes: In Shalini Shyam Shetty And Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil[7], the Supreme Court cautioned that Article 227 is not appropriate for adjudicating pure property disputes between private parties, such as landlord-tenant matters, absent any infringement of statutory or public duty.

Article 227 vis-à-vis Article 226

While often invoked together, Articles 226 and 227 are distinct in their scope and purpose. Article 226 confers upon High Courts an original jurisdiction to issue certain writs (habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari) for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for "any other purpose." Article 227, on the other hand, is primarily a power of judicial and administrative superintendence.[4], [7]

The Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai And Others[3] had held that judicial orders of civil courts were amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, and that the amendment to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) did not curtail these constitutional powers. However, the position regarding Article 226 and civil court orders was later reconsidered in Radhey Shyam And Another v. Chhabi Nath And Others[5]. The three-judge Bench in Radhey Shyam overruled Surya Dev Rai to the extent that it held judicial orders of civil courts were amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. It was clarified that a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is not available against judicial orders of a civil court. However, the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 remains available, though it is to be exercised distinctively and not as an appellate power.[5] The court in Radhey Shyam reaffirmed the distinction laid down in Umaji Keshao Meshram[4] between the nature of proceedings under Article 226 and Article 227.

Despite the distinction, the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 when challenging an order of a subordinate court is sometimes described as akin to revisional jurisdiction, and provisions of the CPC may be applicable to such proceedings as far as possible.[24]

Article 227 and Statutory Provisions

The power under Article 227, being constitutional, cannot be fettered or ousted by ordinary legislation. As held in Surya Dev Rai[3], amendments to procedural laws like Section 115 of the CPC do not affect the High Court's power under Article 227. This power is an independent constitutional remedy. The powers of the High Court under Article 227 are considered to be in addition to any powers of revision conferred on it by other legislation.[14]

In the context of special statutes, such as rent control acts, the availability of statutory appeal mechanisms might influence the High Court's discretion in entertaining a petition under Article 227, but it does not extinguish the power itself. For instance, in Sundari Ammal, Tuticorin District Another v. Kandappan Tuticorin District[23], the maintainability of a revision under Article 227 against a Rent Controller's order was considered in light of statutory appeal provisions.

Procedural Aspects and Exercise of Power

The power under Article 227 is discretionary and cannot be claimed as of right by any party.[11] The High Court exercises this power based on the facts and circumstances of each case. Procedural aspects, such as the requirement for writ petitions under Article 227 to be heard by a Division Bench, can be regulated by High Court rules or specific enactments, as seen in the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986, upheld in Umaji Keshao Meshram[4]. The applicability of provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to proceedings under Article 227, particularly when challenging orders of subordinate courts, has also been judicially recognized.[24]

Observations made by the High Court while deciding petitions under Article 227, especially concerning ongoing inquiries or disciplinary proceedings, are generally intended not to influence the independent decision-making of the concerned authorities.[9] Petitions are often styled as being under both Articles 226 and 227, and the court may choose to dispose of them primarily under Article 227 if the issues pertain to supervisory correction of subordinate court/tribunal orders.[21]

Conclusion

Article 227 of the Constitution of India is a vital tool in the hands of the High Courts to maintain judicial discipline and ensure that all courts and tribunals within their territorial jurisdiction act within the confines of law and dispense justice fairly. Its nature as a supervisory power, distinct from appellate jurisdiction, means it is exercised with caution and restraint, reserved for correcting jurisdictional errors, patent illegalities, perversities, or grave miscarriages of justice. The judiciary, through a catena of decisions, has meticulously carved out the contours of this power, balancing the need for intervention against the autonomy of subordinate judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. Despite challenges and evolving interpretations, particularly in its relationship with Article 226 and statutory remedies, Article 227 remains an indispensable part of India's constitutional framework, safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process and upholding the rule of law.

References

  1. Garment Craft (S) v. Prakash Chand Goel (S). (2022 SCC CIV 2 424, Supreme Court Of India, 2022)
  2. Nagendra Nath Bora And Another v. The Commissioner Of Hills Division And Appeals, Assam And Others (1958 AIR SC 0 398, Supreme Court Of India, 1958)
  3. Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai And Others (2003 SCC 6 675, Supreme Court Of India, 2003)
  4. Umaji Keshao Meshram And Others v. Radhikabai, Widow Of Anandrao Banapukkar And Another (1986 SUPP SCC 1 401, Supreme Court Of India, 1986)
  5. Radhey Shyam And Another v. Chhabi Nath And Others (2015 SCC 5 423, Supreme Court Of India, 2015)
  6. Waryam Singh And Another v. Amarnath And Another (1954 AIR SC 215, Supreme Court Of India, 1954)
  7. Shalini Shyam Shetty And Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil . (2010 SCC 8 329, Supreme Court Of India, 2010)
  8. Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. . (2001 SCC 8 97, Supreme Court Of India, 2001)
  9. VIJAY KUMAR G. SULAKHE v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (Karnataka High Court, 2018)
  10. Surendra Singh v. State Of Bihar (Patna High Court, 1990)
  11. N.M Nayak v. Chhotalal Hariram (Bombay High Court, 1967)
  12. Tarnmanna D. Battal & Ors., Etc. v. Miss Renuka R. Reddy & Ors. Etc. (Karnataka High Court, 2009)
  13. Subhash Chandra Sarkar v. Union Of India And Others Opposite Parties. (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 1971)
  14. Ramesh Chand Tiwari v. Board Of Revenue & Ors. (Rajasthan High Court, 2005)
  15. Shameeda Khatoon v. Gulam Sabir (Patna High Court, 2016)
  16. Mohd. Musthfa v. D.D.C. And Others (Allahabad High Court, 2019)
  17. Sir Sobha Singh & Sons (P) Ltd . v. Kamal Nursery And Another (Delhi High Court, 2019)
  18. Smt. Suranti Devi v. State Of U.P. And 2 Others (Allahabad High Court, 2017)
  19. P. Palaniappan Petitioner v. Coop. Land Development Bank Ltd. (1994 SCC ONLINE MAD 468, Madras High Court, 1994)
  20. Chloride India Ltd. v. District Of Judge, Puri (1996 SCC ONLINE ORI 51, Orissa High Court, 1996)
  21. Riaz Ahmed v. Munir Ismail Mohammed And Others (1991 SCC ONLINE BOM 329, Bombay High Court, 1991)
  22. Poosarilar Ekambaram Pillai v. Visalakshmi And Others (1990 SCC ONLINE MAD 142, Madras High Court, 1990)
  23. Sundari Ammal, Tuticorin District Another v. Kandappan Tuticorin District (2006 MLJ 1 17, Madras High Court, 2005)
  24. Baby v. Jose (Kerala High Court, 2012)
  25. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 (as referenced in Tarnmanna D. Battal)
  26. Baby v. Travancore Devaswom Board, (1998) 8 SCC 310 (as referenced in Ramesh Chand Tiwari)