Adjudication of Resistance in Execution: A Critical Analysis of Order XXI Rules 97 & 101 CPC

Adjudication of Resistance in Execution: A Critical Analysis of Order XXI Rules 97 & 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

1. Introduction

Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) constitutes a self-contained code governing execution of decrees. Rules 97 to 106, inserted and re-modelled by the 1976 and 2002 amendments, represent a decisive legislative attempt to shift all post-decretal possession disputes into the execution forum and eliminate prolix collateral litigation. Among these, Rules 97 and 101 occupy the epicentre: Rule 97 empowers a decree-holder or auction purchaser to complain of “any” resistance or obstruction, whilst Rule 101 enjoins the executing court to decide all questions— including title—arising between the parties to such resistance and expressly bars a separate suit. This article critically analyses the statutory architecture and the interpretative trajectory of Indian courts, with particular focus on the leading authorities supplied in the reference materials.

2. Statutory Framework and Legislative Evolution

  • Rule 97: Enables the decree-holder to approach the executing court when resisted by “any person”. Sub-rule (2) obligates the court to “proceed to adjudicate”.
  • Rule 99: Reciprocal right of a dispossessed stranger to complain of wrongful dispossession.
  • Rule 101: Mandates that all questions “including right, title or interest” arising in proceedings under Rules 97 or 99 be determined by the executing court itself.
  • Rule 103: Declares that orders under Rules 98 or 100 shall have the force of a decree and be appealable as such.

Prior to 1976, third-party claims were relegated to independent suits (old Rule 63). The amendments— guided by the Supreme Court’s consistent call for procedural economy—abolished that remedy, elevating the executing court into a plenary forum for deciding even complex title disputes[1].

3. Key Jurisprudential Themes

3.1 Locus Standi: The Breadth of “Any Person”

The expression “any person” in Rule 97 has been expansively construed. In Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal (1997) 3 SCC 694, the Supreme Court held that a stranger with an independent right in possession may seek adjudication without first being dispossessed, rejecting the High Court’s insistence on a post-dispossession remedy under Rule 99[2]. Likewise, Shreenath v. Rajesh (1998) 4 SCC 543 and Silverline Forum Pvt Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust (1998) 3 SCC 723 extended the umbrella to tenants, sub-tenants and other occupational claimants, thereby thwarting attempts to evade adjudication through semantic exclusions.

An important caveat is introduced by Rule 102: transferees pendente lite are ipso jure bound by the decree and may not raise substantive defences beyond establishing their status as such (Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, 2008 7 SCC 144)[3].

3.2 Scope of Adjudication under Rule 101 vis-à-vis Section 47 CPC

Section 47 compels the executing court to decide “all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree”. Rules 97/101 operate in a narrower factual band—resistance to delivery of possession—but confer a wider subject-matter competence by expressly including title disputes. The Supreme Court in Vidur Impex & Traders Pvt Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments Pvt Ltd. (2012) 8 SCC 384 reiterated that where the dispute concerns a transferee pendente lite, Rule 102 read with Section 52 TPA forecloses substantive adjudication, yet questions of validity of obstruction remain cognisable under Rule 101[4]. The recent decision in Periyammal (dead) v. Rajamani (2025 SC) clarifies that Section 47 is a general provision, whereas Rules 97/101 constitute a special code for execution of possession decrees and hence prevail in case of overlap[5].

3.3 Nature and Finality of Orders

By virtue of Rule 103, an order passed after adjudication under Rules 98 or 100 enjoys the status of a decree. This has three corollaries:

  1. It is directly appealable under Section 96 CPC (N.K. Prakash Gupta v. Rukmaniyamma, 1999 Kant HC)[6].
  2. It attracts res judicata, precluding fresh suits (Babulal v. Raj Kumar, 1996 3 SCC 154)[7]).
  3. No second forum by way of an independent declaratory suit is maintainable (Shashi Devi Sharma v. Amarchand Goel, 2011 Del HC)[8]).

4. Synthesis of the Primary Reference Materials

4.1 Brahmdeo Chaudhary: Removing the Pre-Dispossession Fetish

The Court underscored that Rule 97 is meant to address all resistance, whether by a judgment-debtor or a third party, and that compelling a stranger first to surrender possession before ventilating rights would violate natural justice. The decision realigned procedural law with substantive fairness by harmonising Rules 97 & 99.

4.2 Shreenath and Silverline Forum: Tenants and Sub-Tenants within the Fold

Both decisions repudiated the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s restrictive view in Usha Jain, holding that the 1976 amendment intended to empower executing courts to decide objections of tenants resisting eviction decrees. The Supreme Court thereby fortified the phrase “any person” against textual attenuation.

4.3 Vidur Impex: Intersection with Lis Pendens and Injunctions

Though primarily dealing with impleadment under Order I Rule 10, the Court’s affirmation that transferees in breach of an injunction are barred from substantive defence echoes Rule 102’s exclusionary policy. The decision illustrates how execution jurisprudence interacts with the broader equitable doctrine of lis pendens.

4.4 Usha Sinha: The Rigour of Rule 102

The Supreme Court clarified that transferees pendente lite cannot invoke Rules 98–100 because Rule 102 explicitly withholds that protection; the only justiciable issue is whether they are indeed such transferees. This demarcation safeguards decree efficacy against strategic alienations.

5. Doctrinal Convergences and Divergences

  • Convergence: All Supreme Court authorities converge on (i) liberal inclusion under Rule 97, (ii) plenary adjudicatory power of the executing court, and (iii) finality of orders under Rule 103.
  • Divergence: High Courts occasionally manifest discord— e.g., Kerala’s call for legislative intervention to permit pre-delivery resistance by strangers under Rule 99 (Ajith Kumar M.R. 2008)[9]); yet such views stand harmonised post-Brahmdeo Chaudhary.

6. Contemporary Challenges and Reform Proposals

Despite doctrinal clarity, practical impediments persist: crowded execution lists, fragmented factual inquiries, and appeals against decrees under Rule 103 prolong litigation. Scholars advocate (i) specialised execution benches, (ii) time-bound frames for Rule 97 inquiries, and (iii) digital inventory of pending execution to curtail delays. The Kerala High Court’s suggestion to amalgamate Rules 98 & 100 into Rule 101 (see Babu Raj v. Vasanthi Devi, 2008 Ker HC) merits serious legislative attention for textual simplification.

7. Conclusion

Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC embody the Legislature’s resolve to prevent decree-holders from being trapped in an “endless and costly litigation spiral” and to furnish a one-stop forum for all possession-related disputes. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has faithfully advanced that objective, balancing decree-holder rights with fair hearing to occupiers while maintaining the doctrinal discipline imposed by lis pendens and Rule 102. Future reforms should focus on procedural efficiency without diluting the robust adjudicatory mandate vested in the executing court.

Footnotes

  1. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to Act 104 of 1976 emphasised elimination of “mischief of multiplicity of proceedings”.
  2. Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 694.
  3. Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144.
  4. Vidur Impex & Traders Pvt Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments Pvt Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384.
  5. Periyammal (dead) v. Rajamani, (2025) SC (forthcoming).
  6. N.K. Prakash Gupta v. Rukmaniyamma, 1999 (ILR Karnataka) 623.
  7. Babulal v. Raj Kumar, (1996) 3 SCC 154.
  8. Smt. Shashi Devi Sharma v. Amarchand Goel, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 700.
  9. Ajith Kumar M.R v. Vasanthi Devi, 2008 (1) KLT 318.