“Unusually Dangerous” Arms and the Second Amendment:
The Second Circuit’s Nuanced Analogue Test in Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rights v. Lamont & Grant v. Rovella

Introduction

On 22 August 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided companion appeals that directly challenge Connecticut’s post-Sandy Hook restrictions on “assault weapons” and “large capacity magazines” (LCMs). Plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions, arguing that these weapons are “in common use” and therefore absolutely protected by the Second Amendment. Relying on the Supreme Court’s modern framework from District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), McDonald v. Chicago (2010), NYSRPA v. Bruen (2022), and United States v. Rahimi (2024), the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to enjoin enforcement.

Most significant is the court’s articulation of an “unusually dangerous” test—derived from the historical phrase “dangerous and unusual”—and its detailed explanation of how to conduct “nuanced analogical reasoning” when exact historical twins for a modern regulation are impossible. The decision aligns the Second Circuit with other post-Bruen rulings (First, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, D.C. Circuits) that uphold state restrictions on military-style semiautomatic rifles and high-capacity magazines.

Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their Second-Amendment claims; Connecticut’s laws are consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous arms, and the balance of equities/public interest also favors the State.
• Key Doctrinal Move: The panel (Judges Walker, Livingston, Nathan) re-casts the “dangerous and unusual” limitation recognised in Heller as a single compound concept—“unusually dangerous”—supported by English and American history. Judge Nathan’s concurrence elaborates on the linguistic and historic basis (hendiadys).
• Bruen Step 1: Court assumes (without deciding) that AR-15-type rifles, “other” firearms with braces, and >10-round magazines are “arms” in common use and presumptively protected.
• Bruen Step 2: Applying a nuanced analogue approach, the court concludes that targeted bans on assault weapons/LCMs mirror historical regulations of Bowie knives, dirks, launcegays, and later machine-guns—each adopted after those weapons were used to terrorise the public and inflict multiple casualties.
• Preliminary-injunction factors: Even presuming constitutional injury, Plaintiffs did not carry their burden on irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest; an injunction would unleash a “flood” of restricted weapons with irreversible consequences.

In-Depth Analysis

1. Precedents and Authorities Cited

a. Supreme Court Canon

• Heller (2008) – Individual right; “common use” and “dangerous and unusual” caveat.
• McDonald (2010) – Incorporation against the states; right is not “second-class.”
• Bruen (2022) – Two-step text-and-history test; rejects means-end scrutiny.
• Rahimi (2024) – Validates §922(g)(8); clarifies “relevantly similar” analysis and rejects “law trapped in amber.”

b. Second Circuit & Sister Circuits

• NYSRPA v. Cuomo (2d Cir. 2015) – Pre-Bruen approval of same CT statute (partly overruled methodologically).
• Bianchi v. Brown (4th Cir. 2024 en banc) – Assault-weapon ban upheld; “combat rifles outside scope.”
• Ocean State Tactical v. Rhode Island (1st Cir. 2024) – LCM ban sustained.
• Bevis v. City of Naperville (7th Cir. 2024) – Upholds Illinois assault-weapon ban.
• Hanson v. DC (D.C. Cir. 2024) – Extra-large magazine ban affirmed.

c. Historic Sources

• Statute of Northampton (1328); Blackstone’s Commentaries; Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown.
• 19th-century state Bowie-knife, dirk, and concealed-carry laws (e.g., Alabama 1839, Tennessee 1838).
• National Firearms Act 1934 – machine-gun & short-barrel shotgun restrictions.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step One – “Arms” & Presumptive Coverage

Rather than decide hard questions about “common use,” the panel assumed coverage and moved to Step Two—thus avoiding premature doctrinal entrenchment and emphasising the dispositive historical record.

Step Two – Historical Analogy

1. Identification of Technological & Societal Novelties
   • Mass shootings by lone actors using semiautomatic rifles + LCMs are a 20th-/21st-century phenomenon (first ≥10-fatality shooting in 1949).
   • AR-15s fire rapidly, penetrate walls, defeat body armor, and produce catastrophic wound channels.
   • “Other” firearms with braces exploit a statutory loophole by morphing pistols into pseudo-rifles.
2. Need for Nuanced Analogue
   Because no 18th-/19th-century weapons matched today’s fire-rate and magazine capacity, the court compared regulatory principles: legislatures historically singled out weapons that provoked terror by enabling quick, mass killing.
3. Historical Predicate Regulations
   • Bowie/dirk laws: concealed-carry bans, sales taxes, outright prohibitions after “Sandbar Fight” killings.
   • Affray laws: forbade riding armed “in terrorem populi” with “dangerous OR unusual” weapons.
   • Machine-gun/NFA 1934: severe federal and state constraints once gangland violence escalated.
4. Comparability Metrics
   • How: targeted bans/taxes on specific weapon classes while preserving common alternatives.
   • Why: to avert public terror and rapid multiple-victim harm; identical justification animates Connecticut’s 2013 & 2023 statutes.

“Unusually Dangerous” vs. “Dangerous and Unusual”

The panel re-phrased the traditional descriptor as a hendiadys: two terms joined by and/or to express a single idea—extraordinary danger. Judge Nathan showed that Blackstone used “dangerous or unusual,” that later treatises alternated freely, and thus that Plaintiffs’ literalist arithmetic (dangerous plus unusual) misreads history. The result: popularity alone does not constitutionalise a weapon; legislators may still interdict arms whose lethal characteristics far outstrip self-defence needs.

3. Impact & Future Significance

• Clarifies Bruen Methodology: Confirms that step-two analogical reasoning can consider broader regulatory traditions when technology and threats evolve.
• Refines Weapon-Type Doctrine: “Unusually dangerous” test offers lower courts a historically rooted lens that avoids mere statistical headcounts.
• Harmonises Circuits: Places Second Circuit with five other circuits upholding assault-weapon/LCM bans, reducing likelihood of an immediate circuit split but sharpening issues for potential Supreme Court review (Harrel statement by Justice Thomas already signalled interest).
• Legislative Guidance: States may craft firearms regulations targeting specific technical features that amplify lethality, provided ample alternatives for ordinary self-defence remain.
• Litigation Strategy: Plaintiffs must marshal historical proof, not just sales figures, to challenge weapon-specific regulations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Assault Weapon

A semiautomatic firearm that (i) accepts a detachable magazine and (ii) possesses one (or two) listed military-style features (folding stock, pistol grip, flash suppressor, etc.). Connecticut’s list also includes many models by name.

Large Capacity Magazine (LCM)

Any feeding device able to hold more than 10 rounds of ammunition; facilitates sustained fire without reloading.

Semiautomatic vs. Automatic

Semiautomatic: fires one round per trigger pull but automatically chambers the next round. Automatic: continues firing while trigger is depressed.

Hendiadys

A rhetorical device where two words joined by and (or) convey one idea (“dangerous and unusual” = “unusually dangerous”).

Nuanced Analogue Test

When exact historical twins are lacking, courts compare how and why a modern law burdens self-defence with historic regulations aiming at similar evils.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision in Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rights v. Lamont and Grant v. Rovella establishes an influential precedent: legislatures may prohibit “unusually dangerous” modern firearms and accessories without running afoul of the Second Amendment, so long as ample alternatives remain and the regulations fit within a historically grounded tradition of disarming weapons that threaten mass carnage and public terror. By marrying careful historical exegesis with pragmatic recognition of technological change, the court supplies lower tribunals and lawmakers with a clear doctrinal map for navigating the post-Bruen landscape.

Whether the Supreme Court will ultimately endorse this “unusually dangerous” formulation remains to be seen, but the opinion provides a comprehensive, text-and-history-driven defence of assault-weapon and LCM bans—fortifying the view that the people, through their elected representatives, retain constitutional leeway to protect public safety from the most lethal tools of modern violence.