“Turning a Blind Eye”: United States v. White & Herndon – Sixth Circuit Re-Affirms the High Bar for Franks Hearings on Omissions and Clarifies “Deliberate Ignorance” in Money-Laundering Conspiracies

1. Introduction

United States v. Robin Herndon, consolidated with United States v. Teeauna White (Nos. 24-1045/1272), arises from the prosecution of the “Money Gang Meal Clique,” a coast-to-coast narcotics enterprise headed by Maurice McCoy. White (McCoy’s partner) and Herndon (his cousin) were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit money laundering, stemming from elaborate banking maneuvers designed to obscure drug proceeds and finance an opulent lifestyle—including the purchase of an eight-bedroom California home.

On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, White attacked multiple district-court rulings: the denial of her motion to suppress two search warrants, refusal to grant a Franks hearing, admission of certain evidence and expert testimony, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and supposed judicial bias. Herndon challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence. In a lengthy unpublished opinion (filed July 30 2025) the Sixth Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Search Warrants Upheld. Both the iCloud and residential warrants were supported by probable cause; the panel found no material misstatement or omission and deemed the information non-stale.
High Threshold for Franks Hearings Reiterated. When the attack is premised on omissions, defendants must satisfy a “higher bar”—showing intentional or reckless material omission essential to probable cause. White failed to do so.
Evidentiary Rulings Proper. McCoy’s prior drug conviction was admissible to prove White’s knowledge; DEA expert testimony conformed to Rule 16 disclosures; no due-process violation occurred in witness examination.
Judicial Conduct. The trial judge’s stern management did not amount to bias demanding recusal under 28 U.S.C. §455(a).
Sufficiency of Evidence. Ample circumstantial and direct proof showed Herndon’s deliberate ignorance of illicit proceeds and his voluntary participation in the laundering scheme.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) – foundational standard for challenging search-warrant affidavits; Sixth Circuit stressed the elevated burden when omissions (not misstatements) are alleged (Fowler line of cases).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) – “totality-of-the-circumstances” probable-cause test; applied to uphold both warrants.
United States v. Sheckles, 996 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2021) & Sanders en banc (2023) – emphasized deferential review of magistrate probable-cause findings.
Fowler, 535 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2008); Young, 847 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2017) – “higher bar” for omission-based Franks attacks, relied upon to deny hearing.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) – standard for judicial bias recusal; court found no “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.”
United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1999) – “wilful blindness” satisfies knowledge element in money laundering; echoed in sufficiency analysis.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Probable Cause & Staleness – The affidavits enumerated continuous criminal activity, fresh social-media flaunting of cash, and meaningful corroboration of informants. Because the laundering conspiracy was ongoing and evidence sought was “enduring” (records, luxury items), information was not stale.
Omissions Not Material. Even if White’s business-income theory were inserted, the affidavit would still support probable cause—commingling legitimate funds does not launder away criminality.
Admission of McCoy’s Prior Conviction. Permissible to demonstrate White’s knowledge of cash’s criminal provenance, not propensity; Rule 403 balancing favored admission with limiting instruction.
Expert Testimony. Rule 16 was satisfied by bullet-point disclosure; testimony regarding burner phones, coded language, and multiple devices was within scope, and duplicative testimony nullified any prejudice.
No Prosecutorial Misconduct. Cooperating witness’s statement about potential punishment, viewed in context, was not “indisputably false”; Napue line of cases therefore inapplicable.
Judicial Impartiality. Court’s stern treatment amounted to routine courtroom administration; admonishments were largely outside jury and accompanied by neutrality reminders.
Sufficiency & Deliberate Ignorance. Herndon’s own statements (“did not want to know where the money was from”), structured cash deposits under $10k, and coordinated travel with couriers allowed a rational jury to infer knowledge and agreement.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Although unpublished, the opinion consolidates and clarifies several recurring principles in federal criminal practice within the Sixth Circuit:

Elevation of the Franks Omission Standard. Practitioners must recognize that omission-based challenges face steeper hurdles; mere failure to include arguably exculpatory details rarely triggers a hearing.
Commingling Funds ≠ Safe Harbor. The panel underscores that legitimate business veneers do not preclude probable cause for money-laundering searches.
“Deliberate Ignorance” Jury Instructions. The court endorses using wilful-blindness language where evidence shows purposeful avoidance of criminal source knowledge, confirming prosecutors’ ability to rely on circumstantial proof.
Trial-Court Management. Judicious but stern control of the courtroom will seldom justify recusal so long as comments are tied to counsel conduct, not case merits.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Franks Hearing: A mini-trial to test whether a search-warrant affidavit contained deliberate falsehoods or omissions essential to probable cause. Defendants must make a prima facie showing before a judge grants such a hearing.
Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Suspicion: Probable cause requires a “fair probability” that evidence or contraband will be found—higher than reasonable suspicion but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Structured Deposits: Splitting cash deposits into amounts below $10,000 to evade Currency Transaction Report filing—often a “red flag” for money laundering.
Deliberate Ignorance/Wilful Blindness: A legal doctrine treating “I chose not to know” the illicit source of funds as equivalent to actual knowledge.
Rule 404(b) Evidence: Prior “bad acts” cannot prove character but can establish knowledge, intent, or absence of mistake; courts must balance probative value against unfair prejudice.

5. Conclusion

United States v. White & Herndon reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s rigorous standards governing suppression motions, evidentiary challenges, and sufficiency reviews in money-laundering prosecutions. The decision—though non-precedential—provides a lucid roadmap for law-enforcement affidavit drafting, highlights the difficulty defendants face in securing Franks hearings based on omissions, and clarifies that wilful blindness can satisfy the knowledge element of §1956 conspiracies. It also signals appellate tolerance for firm judicial control of proceedings, provided comments do not betray actual bias. Future litigants should heed the court’s message: disguising proceeds behind business façades or intentional ignorance will not shield actors from liability, and suppression strategies must clear a formidable doctrinal bar.