“The Constitutional-Officer Shield”: Alabama Supreme Court Re-Affirms Absolute Immunity for Sheriffs and Their Deputies
Commentary on Ex parte James E. Underwood & Braden Miles, SC-2024-0263 (26 June 2025)

1. Introduction

On 27 June 2025 the Supreme Court of Alabama issued its opinion in Ex parte Underwood & Miles, granting a writ of mandamus that compels the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss negligence claims brought by John Long against former Walker County Sheriff James E. Underwood and Deputy Braden Miles. The litigation arose out of a tragic 2017 high-speed pursuit in which a fleeing motorcyclist collided with Long’s vehicle, severely injuring him and killing the suspect. Long alleged (a) negligent pursuit by Deputy Miles and (b) negligent policy-making and training by Sheriff Underwood.

The pivotal question was whether Alabama’s doctrine of “constitutional-officer immunity”—a strand of State immunity grounded in Art. I §14 and reinforced by Art. V §112—bars individual-capacity tort actions seeking monetary damages when the challenged acts were undertaken within the “line and scope” of official duties. The Court answered “yes” for both the sheriff and his deputy, thereby reaffirming and slightly fortifying a line of authority that places sheriffs (and, by alter-ego extension, deputy sheriffs) beyond the reach of state-law damages claims for on-duty conduct.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Walker Circuit Court declined to dismiss Long’s negligence claims; Underwood and Miles petitioned for mandamus relief.
• The Supreme Court held that:
  • Sheriffs are constitutional executive officers under Art. V §112 and, when acting within the scope of their duties, enjoy absolute immunity from damages suits under Art. I §14.
  • Deputy sheriffs are considered the sheriff’s alter ego; therefore the same immunity attaches to them when performing official tasks.
  • No pleaded facts suggested either defendant acted outside the scope of employment; none of the narrow Parker/Aland exceptions (injunctive or declaratory relief, bad-faith ultra-vires conduct, etc.) applied.
• Mandamus was granted; the trial court is directed to dismiss all remaining state-law claims against both defendants.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Parker v. Amerson, 519 So 2d 442 (Ala. 1987): foundational modern case identifying sheriffs as constitutional executive officers immune from damages. Supplies the five “Parker/Aland exceptions.”
• Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So 2d 209 (Ala. 1991): first express extension of sheriff’s immunity to deputy sheriffs, invoking the “alter-ego” doctrine.
• Boshell v. Walker County Sheriff, 598 So 2d 843 (Ala. 1992): plurality confirming immunity where claims “arise out of execution of official duties.”
• Ex parte Davis, 930 So 2d 497 (Ala. 2005): clarifies dichotomy between constitutional officers (absolute immunity) and statutory officers (state-agent immunity).
• Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So 3d 895 (Ala. 2011): reiterates automatic immunity for deputy sheriffs so long as acts occur within the line and scope of duty.
• Ex parte Pinkard, 373 So 3d 192 (Ala. 2022): distinguishes state-agent immunity for statutory officers; cited to show that the present doctrine remains unaffected.
• Constitutional anchors: Art. I §14 (state may not be sued) and Art. III §§42(b-c) (separation of powers) & Art. V §112 (executive department composition).

The Court leans heavily on these precedents to establish an unbroken doctrinal chain. Each case incrementally shaped the scope of immunity—first for sheriffs, then for deputies, and eventually distinguishing constitutional from statutory actors. The result is a practically absolute shield unless one of a handful of narrow exceptions is pleaded and proven.

3.2 Legal Reasoning Applied

1. Textual Basis: The Court locates authority in §112 (making the sheriff an executive officer) and §42 (separation-of-powers). Interference by damages awards would allow the judiciary to “impermissibly encroach” on executive power.
2. Line-and-Scope Inquiry: The complaint itself alleges negligent pursuit (for the deputy) and negligent policy-making (for the sheriff). Both tasks are paradigmatic core duties of their offices; no allegation indicates frolic, detour, or personal motive.
3. Alter-Ego Doctrine: A deputy “stands in the sheriff’s shoes” when exercising police powers (§36-22-3(a)(4)). Therefore immunity that protects the principal extends to the agent.
4. Exception Analysis: None of the five Parker/Aland exceptions (compel, ministerial, unconstitutional enforcement, bad-faith/ultra-vires, or declaratory construction) permit a damages claim here. The complaint seeks only compensatory relief, not equitable or mandamus-style relief.
5. Mandamus Standard: A writ issues when (a) a clear legal right exists in the petitioner, (b) respondent duty is important and ministerial, (c) no adequate remedy exists on appeal. Here the “clear legal right” is the immunity from suit.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Tort Litigation Against Law-Enforcement Pursuits: Victims of third-party collisions during police chases face a higher bar; negligence claims against the pursuing officers are effectively foreclosed unless bad faith or ultra-vires conduct can be pleaded with specificity.
• Policy-Making Accountability: The decision tightly insulates sheriffs from damages arising out of training or pursuit-policy choices. Administrative or electoral remedies replace judicial remedies.
• Deputy Sheriff Status Clarified: Although some academic debate has surfaced (see Justice Cook’s concurrence citing §36-22-3(b) 2011 amendment), the majority position remains that deputies receive identical immunity. Future litigants may test the “in compliance with the law” proviso, but Underwood leaves the question open.
• Separation-of-Powers Reinforcement: The opinion underscores Alabama’s robust version of the doctrine, cautioning lower courts against entertaining damages claims that could intrude upon executive prerogatives.
• Mandamus Use: The Court once again employs mandamus early in litigation to terminate claims mooted by immunity, signalling to trial courts to police their dockets aggressively where constitutional-officer immunity is implicated.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• State Immunity (Art. I §14): A constitutional bar preventing the State of Alabama from being a defendant in court. Courts interpret this broadly to include individuals whose acts are legally the State’s acts.
• Constitutional Officer vs. Statutory Officer: Officers expressly named in §112 (e.g., sheriffs, governor) versus those created by statute (e.g., university police chiefs). The former enjoy stronger, “absolute” immunity; the latter receive the more malleable “state-agent” immunity.
• Mandamus: An extraordinary appellate writ ordering a lower court to do something (or stop doing something) where the petitioner has a clear legal right and no other adequate remedy.
• Line and Scope of Duty: Acts performed on the job, as part of official responsibilities—not personal errands or frolics.
• Alter-Ego Doctrine: Legal fiction treating a deputy sheriff’s acts as the sheriff’s own; hence, their immunities rise or fall together.
• Parker/Aland Exceptions: Limited circumstances where §14 does not bar suit (primarily injunctions, mandamus, declaratory relief, or ultra-vires/bad-faith acts).

5. Conclusion

Ex parte Underwood & Miles does not blaze new doctrinal trails; rather, it cements a formidable wall around Alabama sheriffs and their deputies against state-law damages suits. Rooted in constitutional text and a long line of precedent, the Court’s decision affirms that on-duty negligence claims—absent allegations of bad faith or ultra-vires conduct—cannot proceed. The opinion simultaneously highlights unresolved tension between pre-existing case law and the 2011 statutory amendment to §36-22-3(b), a tension flagged by Justice Cook but left for another day.

Practitioners should note: plaintiffs injured in events linked to sheriff-department conduct must either (1) find a federal foothold (e.g., viable §1983 claim), (2) plead and prove one of the Parker/Aland exceptions with particularity, or (3) pursue policy change through legislative, administrative, or electoral means. For now, the “Constitutional-Officer Shield” stands firm, and trial courts are instructed to dismiss barred claims at the threshold.

Commentary prepared for educational purposes. © 2025.