“Successive Replacement” under Alaska’s Ranked-Choice Voting
Comprehensive Commentary on Alaska Democratic Party and Anita Thorne v. Director Carol Beecher, et al.
Supreme Court of Alaska, Opinion No. 7776, 25 July 2025
1. Introduction
In Alaska Democratic Party & Anita Thorne v. Director Carol Beecher, et al. the Alaska Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, how vacancies on a ranked-choice general-election ballot must be filled when more than one “top-four” primary candidate timely withdraws. The dispute arose after the Division of Elections (“Division”) elevated Eric Hafner, a federally-incarcerated sixth-place finisher, onto the 2024 U.S. House general-election ballot following the withdrawals of the third- and fourth-place primary candidates. The Alaska Democratic Party (“ADP”) sought an injunction to keep him off the ballot, arguing that Alaska Statute 15.25.100(c) allows only one replacement—the fifth-place finisher.
The Superior Court rejected the challenge, and because of pressing election deadlines the Supreme Court issued a brief affirmance order on 12 September 2024. Opinion No. 7776 now supplies the detailed reasoning, establishing what this commentary calls the “Successive Replacement Doctrine”: when multiple top-four primary candidates withdraw at least 64 days before the general election, the Division must successively replace each vacancy with the next-highest available vote-getter (fifth, then sixth, etc.).
2. Summary of the Judgment
- Holding: AS 15.25.100(c) requires the Director of Elections to fill successive vacancies on the general-election ballot whenever (i) more than one top-four primary candidate timely withdraws and (ii) lower-placing primary candidates remain available. Thus, placing both the fifth- and sixth-place finishers (Howe and Hafner) on the ballot was lawful.
- Relief: The Court affirmed denial of ADP’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief.
- Key Rationale:
- The text of § 100(c) is ambiguous because “candidate who received the fifth most votes” can reasonably be read either as a static descriptor (only the original fifth-place candidate) or a relational descriptor (the next-highest remaining candidate after withdrawals).
- Ballot Measure 2’s voter-approved purpose—to increase voter choice—favours a construction that maximises the number of candidates on the general ballot.
- Alaska precedent presumes ballot-access statutes should be liberally construed to expand, not restrict, voter and candidate rights.
- Dissent: Justice Carney found the statute unambiguous (“
fifth means fifth
”) and would have barred any candidate other than the original fifth-place finisher from being elevated.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
- Guerin v. State (2023) – Held that § 100(c)’s replacement mechanism applies to special elections. The majority distinguished it because Guerin involved a late withdrawal (inside 64 days) whereas the present case involves timely withdrawals.
- Martin v. Dicklich (Minn. 2012) – Minnesota Supreme Court treated analogous vacancy language as ambiguous when susceptible to two legitimate readings; Alaska relied on this reasoning to declare § 100(c) ambiguous.
- O’Callaghan v. State (1992) & Municipality of Anchorage v. Mjos (2008) – Both illustrate Alaska’s “ballot-access canon”: when statutory ambiguities affect eligibility, courts should decide in favour of access.
- Vogler v. Miller (1982), Carr v. Thomas, and others – Recognise the constitutional dimensions of the right to vote and appear on the ballot, reinforcing the policy that access restrictions be narrowly read.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
- Ambiguity Determination – The Court applied its sliding-scale interpretive
approach. Because § 100(c) can plausibly bear two meanings, it is ambiguous.
Key textual tension: the statute mandates that “the vacancy shall be filled
” (suggesting an obligation for every vacancy) yet names only “the candidate who received the fifth most votes
,” which seems singular. - Purpose & Voter Intent – Looking at the 2020 Official Election Pamphlet, the Court found Ballot Measure 2’s chief aim was to expand voter choice. It inferred that voters expected four live options whenever feasible.
- Policy Canon – Consistent with O’Callaghan and Mjos, any interpretive tie must go to greater ballot access; hence, successive replacements prevail.
- Rejection of ADP’s “one-and-done” reading – The majority found that limiting replacements to a single candidate would (i) leave uncontested seats possible, (ii) thwart the statutory duty to “fill” vacancies, and (iii) conflict with the initiative’s expansion of voter choice.
3.3 Impact of the Decision
- Administrative Certainty – The Division now has a clear rule: continue down the primary results list until each timely vacancy is filled or no candidates remain.
- Election Strategy – Parties and candidates must anticipate that withdrawals can elevate lower-tier rivals; strategic withdrawals may therefore become rarer.
- Litigation Posture – The decision sets a controlling precedent, likely discouraging future suits attempting to limit ballot access under § 100(c).
- Statutory Drafting Lessons – Legislators (and initiative drafters) are reminded that numerical descriptors (“fifth”) can create ambiguity when tied to dynamic events like withdrawals.
- Potential Constitutional Reverberations – By reaffirming the ballot-access canon, the Court signals robust protection of participatory rights under the Alaska Constitution, potentially influencing challenges beyond election law (e.g., initiative processes, recall standards).
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)
- Voters rank candidates 1, 2, 3, 4. If no one gets >50 % of first-choice votes, the last-place candidate is eliminated and those ballots transfer to each voter’s next preference. Repeat until someone has a majority.
- Top-Four Primary
- Instead of party primaries, all candidates run together; the four with the most votes move to November. Party labels still appear but do not control advancement.
- Ballot Vacancy & Replacement (
AS 15.25.100(c)
) - If a top-four candidate withdraws (or dies, resigns, etc.) ≥ 64 days before Election Day, the Director “shall” replace the candidate. After this case, the Director must keep replacing until four candidates remain or the list is exhausted.
- Sliding-Scale Statutory Interpretation
- An Alaska doctrine: the clearer the statutory text, the stronger the contrary evidence must be to overcome it. Ambiguity opens the door to purpose, history, and policy analysis.
- Ballot-Access Canon
- A judge-made rule that when statutory language on candidacy or voting is ambiguous, courts should choose the interpretation that increases, not limits, access for voters and candidates.
5. Conclusion
The Alaska Supreme Court’s opinion crystallises a new doctrinal rule: the “Successive Replacement Doctrine.” By deeming § 15.25.100(c) to mandate replacement of each timely withdrawn top-four candidate with the next available primary finisher, the Court favours maximal voter choice and administrative efficiency. The decision also reinforces Alaska’s strong pro-access jurisprudence, signalising that future challenges seeking to narrow voter or candidate options face an uphill battle.
Justice Carney’s dissent underscores the enduring tension in statutory interpretation between textual literalism and purposive, rights-protective interpretive canons. Yet the majority’s holistic reading, anchored in voter intent when adopting Ballot Measure 2, now guides election administration—and the strategic calculations of Alaska’s political actors—for elections to come.
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