“Same-Day Medical Emergencies & Last-Chance Agreements” — The Third Circuit’s Guidance on FMLA Notice in Walker v. SEPTA

Introduction

The Third Circuit’s non-precedential opinion in Isaiah Walker v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, No. 24-2275 (3d Cir. July 8 2025), delivers a pointed reminder: employees confronted with sudden medical crises can satisfy the Family and Medical Leave Act’s (FMLA) notice requirement even when they communicate nothing more than “I have to go to the hospital” and promptly file an FMLA form later the same day.

Isaiah Walker, a SEPTA bus operator living with sickle-cell anemia, was terminated under a “last-chance” attendance agreement after accruing too many points in SEPTA’s no-fault policy. The District Court granted summary judgment for SEPTA, concluding that Walker’s June 7 2021 call-off failed to give adequate FMLA notice. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Walker’s ADA claims but vacated summary judgment on his FMLA interference and retaliation claims, holding that genuine factual disputes exist over whether Walker’s call and same-day FMLA application were sufficient notice. The Court underscored two central ideas:

The FMLA’s notice burden is “not particularly onerous.”
An absence later designated as FMLA leave cannot lawfully be counted under a no-fault attendance policy, even where a last-chance agreement is in play.

Summary of the Judgment

• Result: ADA dismissal affirmed; FMLA dismissal vacated; case remanded.
• Key Holding: A reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Walker triggered his FMLA rights by (i) calling dispatch to say he “had to go to the hospital” and (ii) submitting an FMLA request hours later, thereby prohibiting SEPTA from assigning attendance points that led to termination.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Lichtenstein v. UPMC, 691 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2012) — The anchor precedent for notice sufficiency; confirmed that an employee need not utter “F-M-L-A” so long as the employer receives enough information to think FMLA may apply.
Capps v. Mondelez Global, 847 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2017) — Listed the prima-facie elements of FMLA interference and reiterated the low bar for notice.
Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2014) — Clarified that in retaliation claims, the employee must merely “invoke” FMLA rights.
Erdman v. Nationwide, 582 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2009) — “Firing an employee for a valid request for FMLA leave may constitute interference or retaliation.”
Regulatory authorities: 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.303 (notice of unforeseeable leave) & 825.220(c) (FMLA leave cannot be a negative factor).

The panel read these precedents together to emphasize that observable urgency (hospitalization) plus prompt administrative follow-through generally suffices. The Court also cited Budhun v. Reading Hospital, 765 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2014), signaling that remaining elements of the claims are best addressed by the District Court on remand once the notice hurdle is cleared.

2. Legal Reasoning

Summary-Judgment Lens: Pursuant to Celotex, the Court viewed the record in Walker’s favor, as required.
Notice Analysis:
- Walker’s call — “I have to go to the hospital” — conveyed a sudden, serious health issue.
- He filed an FMLA application the same day. Under §825.303(a), an employee must give notice “as soon as practicable.”
- SEPTA’s dispatcher coded the leave as “NO_BABYSITTER,” but Walker testified he mentioned hospitalization. That credibility dispute is for a jury, not summary judgment.
- SEPTA later approved FMLA leave for June 7-8, implicitly confirming the leave was indeed FMLA-qualifying.
- Once designated as FMLA leave, §825.220(c) forbids counting the absence in a no-fault system.
Last-Chance Agreement Not a Shield: The points that triggered termination arose directly from the June 7 absence. Because those points should have been nullified once FMLA leave was approved, the agreement cannot be weaponized to override federal rights.

3. Impact of the Decision

Although the disposition is “not precedential” under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, it will likely carry persuasive weight for district courts and employers within the Circuit, particularly in industries that rely heavily on attendance-point systems (transit, manufacturing, healthcare). Key anticipated effects include:

Employer Policy Revisions: No-fault attendance programs must contain explicit carve-outs for absences later deemed FMLA-covered.
Dispatcher/Front-Line Training: Employers will need to ensure that initial call-off personnel recognize potential FMLA triggers and record them accurately.
Litigation Strategy: Plaintiffs can survive summary judgment by producing minimal evidence of medically urgent scenarios plus timely paperwork.
Last-Chance Agreements: Companies may reevaluate these agreements to clarify that federally protected leave cannot count toward automatic discharge thresholds.

In short, Walker arms employees and unions with strong arguments that the FMLA trumps rigid points systems, even when an employee is on their “last chance.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

FMLA Interference vs. Retaliation
- Interference: Employer obstructs or penalizes the exercise of FMLA rights (e.g., counting protected absences as points).
- Retaliation: Employer takes adverse action because the employee sought or used FMLA leave (e.g., termination following the request).
“Notice” Under §825.303: Employees need only give enough facts to suggest a serious health condition and put the employer on inquiry notice. Saying “I’m at the hospital—flare-up of my sickle cell anemia” is generally enough.
No-Fault Attendance Policy: A system that assigns points for absences without regard to cause. The FMLA requires employers to neutralize those points for protected leave.
Last-Chance Agreement: A disciplinary contract where the employee agrees that any further infraction (often measured by points) results in discharge. Such agreements cannot waive statutory rights like the FMLA.
Summary Judgment: A procedural device where the court decides a case without trial if no factual disputes exist. Courts must view evidence in the non-movant’s favor.

Conclusion

Walker v. SEPTA reinforces two intertwined principles:

The threshold for providing FMLA notice during unforeseen medical emergencies is intentionally low; a brief, urgent report coupled with expedient paperwork can be enough.
Once an absence is recognized as FMLA-protected, employers must erase any associated disciplinary points, even when a last-chance agreement or no-fault system is poised to trigger termination.

For practitioners, the case is a tutorial on defeating summary judgment when notice is contested and a cautionary tale for employers who rely on automated attendance policies. For employees, it serves as affirmation that the FMLA’s shield remains robust—even at the eleventh hour of employment.