“Officer-Discretion Vagueness” and the End of the 25-Foot Buffer:
The Seventh Circuit Reins-in Police Authority & Universal Injunctions in Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. Rokita

Introduction

Indiana’s 2023 “buffer law” (I.C. § 35-44.1-2-14) made it a Class C misdemeanor to approach within 25 feet of an on-duty police officer once the officer ordered the person to stop. Several national and local news organizations sued, alleging constitutional infirmities. The district court enjoined enforcement; the State appealed. On 5 August 2025, the Seventh Circuit—in an opinion by Judge Pryor, joined by Judges Easterbrook and Brennan—affirmed the preliminary injunction and, in doing so, set two new guideposts:

1. “Officer-Discretion Vagueness.” Even a distance-specific buffer law is void for vagueness when it gives officers unfettered discretion to decide when to trigger criminal liability.
2. Post-CASA scope of injunctive relief. In light of the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision limiting “universal” injunctions (Trump v. CASA), lower courts must reassess whether statewide relief is necessary to give complete relief to the named plaintiffs.

Besides vindicating press-freedom interests, the ruling offers the most comprehensive appellate treatment of buffer-zone statutes since Morales and clarifies Article III standing requirements for pre-enforcement challenges framed as vagueness claims. This commentary breaks down the decision and its broader ramifications.

Summary of the Judgment

• Standing & Mootness. The court held that plaintiffs—journalistic organizations whose members gather news near police activity—had Article III standing and that the passage of a “second buffer law” (I.C. § 35-44.1-2-15) did not moot the suit because Indiana plans to enforce both statutes.
• Likelihood of Success. The panel agreed that plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their Fourteenth-Amendment vagueness claim. The statute invites arbitrary enforcement by giving police absolute discretion to decide when to issue the “do-not-approach” order that triggers criminal liability.
• Other Injunction Factors. Because constitutional rights and speech interests are at stake, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest weigh in plaintiffs’ favor.
• Scope of Relief. The panel affirmed the injunction as to the plaintiffs but remanded for the district court to reconsider the breadth of the injunction under CASA, which cautions against relief extending beyond the parties.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

1. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) – Key framework for vagueness: statutes must supply minimal guidelines for enforcement. The buffer law fails this benchmark.
2. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) – Invalidated anti-gang loitering ordinance due to “absolute discretion” vested in police; heavily relied on to analogize the buffer statute’s defect.
3. Bell v. Keating, 697 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2012) – Seventh Circuit precedent on dispersal ordinances; used to emphasize that undefined terms like “annoyance” promote arbitrary arrests.
4. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) – Classic “moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman” language—quoted to dramatize the buffer law’s breadth.
5. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S.Ct. 2540 (2025) – Recent Supreme Court limitation on universal injunctions; dictates remand on scope.
6. Nicodemus v. City of South Bend, 137 F.4th 654 (7th Cir. 2025) – Earlier decision upholding First-Amendment challenges but not addressing vagueness; contrasted to show the different lens.
7. Other supporting authorities: Winter v. NRDC (injunction factors), Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (partial redressability), Massachusetts v. EPA, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds (standing/redressability), and numerous statutory-interpretation cases.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Standing. Journalists face a “credible threat” of prosecution; affidavits show chilled speech and altered newsgathering. Overlap with a different Indiana “emergency incident” statute does not negate redressability, because removing one layer of criminal exposure is meaningful relief.
2. Mootness. Enactment of a narrower second buffer statute does not repeal the first; State conceded it would enforce both.
3. Due-Process Vagueness.
   • Statute’s distance requirement (25 ft) is objective, but the trigger—an officer’s order to stop approaching—lacks any standard.
   • This “blank check” mirrors Morales: criminality hinges on an officer’s unreviewable judgment.
   • The State’s attempt to analogize to statutes with implicit constraints fails because buffer law contains no textual cabining (e.g., threats, interference, violence).
4. Other Injunction Elements. Chilling of First-Amendment newsgathering is per se irreparable; public has an interest in constitutional policing and free press.
5. Scope Post-CASA. Recognizing Supreme Court’s new limits, the panel directs reconsideration: does statewide injunction furnish relief essential to the plaintiff press organizations? Potentially yes, because press relies on citizen sources, but district court must develop record.

C. Impact & Forward-Looking Consequences

• Vagueness Doctrine Revitalized. The decision clarifies that objective measurements (e.g., 25 ft) do not salvage a law if the enforcement trigger is standardless. Other states with buffer, loitering, or dispersal ordinances may face renewed challenges.
• Police-Recording Jurisprudence. While Nicodemus upheld buffer laws on First-Amendment grounds, Reporters Committee demonstrates that vagueness can still topple them. Legislatures must add clear, narrow criteria (threat, interference, safety risk) before imposing distance-based restrictions.
• Universal-Injunction Scrutiny. The remand signals that every ongoing or future injunction must grapple with CASA. Plaintiffs and courts must build records explaining why relief cannot be limited to parties.
• Press-Freedom Strategy. Media entities now have an Appellate roadmap: blend First-Amendment and Fourteenth-Amendment theories; assert chilling evidence; and leverage the “additional layer of criminal liability” argument for redressability.
• Training & Policy for Law Enforcement. Agencies in the Seventh Circuit must revise crowd-control protocols; absence of statutory standards may expose officers to personal-capacity § 1983 suits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Void-for-Vagueness

A constitutional doctrine under the Fifth/ Fourteenth Amendments: criminal laws must (1) tell ordinary people what is illegal and (2) prevent arbitrary enforcement. If either prong fails, the statute is “void.”

Pre-enforcement Challenge

Litigation filed before anyone has been prosecuted, arguing that the mere existence of the statute chills lawful behavior. Plaintiffs must show credible threat of enforcement.

Preliminary Injunction

Early court order preserving the status quo when plaintiffs show likelihood of success, irreparable harm, favorable equities, and public interest. It is provisional; the case continues.

Universal (Nationwide/Statewide) Injunction

Relief that protects non-parties. After CASA, federal courts must justify such breadth or narrow the injunction to parties.

Redressability

Standing element requiring that court action will likely lessen plaintiff’s injury—not necessarily eliminate all risk (partial redress is enough).

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Reporters Committee v. Rokita stakes out a robust principle: a buffer-zone statute that delegates the decision to create the zone to the unbridled will of an officer is unconstitutional, even if the zone’s size is crystal-clear. By branding such statutes “officer-discretion vague,” the court supplies litigants with a potent doctrinal hook distinct from First-Amendment arguments.

Equally significant is the decision’s pragmatic nod to CASA. Courts must now balance plaintiffs’ need for full relief with newfound limits on equitable power. The remand invites careful, evidence-based tailoring of injunctive scope—likely a recurring theme in future civil-rights litigation.

For lawmakers, the message is plain: if public-safety concerns demand police buffer zones, enact explicit standards (threat, interference, safety hazard) and procedural safeguards. For journalists and civil libertarians, the ruling is a reminder that the vigilance of the press—and the courts—remains the most reliable check against statutes that, however well-intentioned, vest too much authority in the “moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on the beat.”

© 2025 – Comprehensive commentary prepared for educational purposes.