“No Lay Representation & No Straw-Man”:
Skurdal v. Walker and the Supreme Court of Montana’s Firm Reaffirmation of Judicial Immunity and Rejection of Sovereign-Citizen Arguments

1. Introduction

In R. Skurdal v. J. Walker, 2025 MT 174, the Supreme Court of Montana confronted a barrage of “sovereign-citizen” style claims brought by a self-represented litigant, Rodney Owen Skurdal, against Yellowstone County Justice of the Peace Jeanne M. Walker and Yellowstone County itself. The heart of the matter was Judge Walker’s refusal to allow Skurdal—who is not a licensed attorney—to appear as counsel for a criminal defendant at an initial appearance. After the district court dismissed the action on immunity grounds, Skurdal appealed. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, issuing a detailed opinion that:

• Re-states that only licensed attorneys may represent criminal defendants in Montana courts;
• Explains and applies the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity codified at § 2-9-112, MCA;
• Declares frivolous certain “sovereign citizen” theories relating to judicial bonds, name-capitalisation (“straw-man”) and admiralty jurisdiction; and
• Confirms that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile in light of immunity.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Swanson, C.J.) addressed three issues:

1. Lay Representation: Judge Walker properly barred Skurdal from representing Ronald Trow because non-lawyers have no right to appear on behalf of others in criminal matters. (§§ 46-1-103 & 45-2-101, MCA; Wheat v. United States).
2. Judicial & Governmental Immunity: Judge Walker’s decision was a judicial act within her jurisdiction; therefore, § 2-9-112, MCA, affords absolute immunity to both her and Yellowstone County. The Court rejected arguments that missing “bonds” or name formatting stripped jurisdiction.
3. Leave to Amend: Because immunity is immunity from suit—not merely a defense—any amendment would be futile; dismissal with prejudice was proper.

3. In-Depth Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) – non-lawyers cannot represent criminal defendants.
• Guill v. Guill, 2014 MT 316 – reiterates Montana’s prohibition on lay representation of others.
• Steele v. McGregor, 1998 MT 85 – absolute immunity protects judicial decision-making.
• Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) – two-part test for judicial immunity (nature of act + jurisdiction).
• Section 2-9-112, MCA – statutory codification of judicial immunity.
• Sparks v. Johnson, 252 Mont. 39 (1992) – § 25-31-601, MCA, limited to civil actions in justice court.

These precedents formed a seamless doctrinal chain: first, establishing the bar against lay representation; second, cementing the broad protection afforded judges; and finally, illustrating futility of amendment when immunity applies.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

a) Right to Counsel vs. Lay Advocacy

The Sixth Amendment and Art. II, § 24 of the Montana Constitution assure defendants the “assistance of counsel.” The Court drew a bright line between “counsel” (a duly licensed attorney) and any other advocate. Statutory language allowing “any person” to appear in civil justice-court matters (§ 25-31-601, MCA) does not extend to criminal cases governed by Title 46, MCA. Hence, Judge Walker merely enforced existing law.

b) Judicial Immunity Applied

Under Stump, a judge is immune unless (i) the act is non-judicial in nature or (ii) the judge acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Here, removing an unauthorized individual from counsel table squarely fits the “orderly conduct of proceedings” power (§ 3-1-111, MCA). Jurisdiction existed because the charged offense—aggravated DUI, third offense—is a high misdemeanor falling within justice-court concurrent jurisdiction (§ 3-10-303(1)(c), MCA). Consequently:

• Judge Walker enjoys absolute immunity.
• Yellowstone County enjoys derivative immunity under § 2-9-112(1), MCA.

c) Futility of Amendment

Because immunity bars the suit altogether, no re-pleading could cure the defect; Rule 15 leave would be pointless. The Court expressly linked immunity’s purpose—shielding judges from vexatious litigation—to the decision to dismiss with prejudice.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Although the holding accords with long-standing doctrine, the opinion carries fresh precedential weight in three respects:

1. Clarifies that sovereignty/bonding “theories” do not defeat jurisdiction. The Court’s explicit denouncement will aid lower courts in swiftly disposing of such claims.
2. Affirms caption formatting conventions. By declaring all-caps names legally insignificant, the Court prevents future litigants from turning typographic style into jurisdictional skirmishes.
3. Strengthens immunity jurisprudence. The opinion illustrates how quickly immunity can be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, minimizing litigation costs for government entities.

Practitioners defending judges or municipalities can now cite Skurdal for immediate dismissal of suits rooted in sovereign-citizen arguments or challenging lay-representation rulings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Judicial Immunity: A shield that protects judges from being sued for money damages when they perform functions typical of judges (ruling on motions, controlling the courtroom) as long as they have legal authority over the case.
• High Misdemeanor: In Montana, a misdemeanor punishable by more than six months but not more than one year. Justice courts share jurisdiction with district courts over these offenses.
• Sovereign-Citizen “Straw-Man” Theory: An Internet-propagated notion that a person’s legal obligations attach only to a fictitious corporate entity indicated by capital letters; universally rejected by courts.
• Futility Doctrine (Rule 15): Courts may deny amendments when they would not change the legal outcome—e.g., where a defendant is absolutely immune.

5. Conclusion

Skurdal v. Walker does not create novel doctrine so much as it fortifies existing pillars of Montana law: licensed counsel is required in criminal court, judges enjoy absolute immunity for judicial acts, and fringe “no-bond / straw-man” theories are meritless. By publishing a meticulous opinion, the Supreme Court equips trial courts with a citable, step-by-step rebuttal to sovereign-citizen pleadings, thus promoting judicial efficiency and protecting the integrity of criminal proceedings. Going forward, litigants and self-helpers alike have unambiguous notice that attempts to litigate using lay representation or pseudo-legal theories will be summarily dismissed.