“Good-Cause” Requires Genuine Engagement: The West Virginia Supreme Court Affirms Trial-Court Discretion to Deny Continuances in Abuse & Neglect Dispositions

Introduction

In In re T.D., H.D., A.D., and I.D.-J., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (decision filed 26 June 2025) confronted a common but thorny procedural question in child-abuse and neglect litigation: when may a circuit court deny a parent’s request to continue a dispositional hearing, particularly where the parent has been granted an improvement period but has shown minimal compliance? Petitioner-Mother K.D. challenged the circuit court’s refusal to continue two dispositional hearings and its alleged refusal to extend her post-adjudicatory improvement period. The Court, applying Rule 7(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and relevant precedent, affirmed termination of her parental rights and, in doing so, crystallised two practical rules:

A continuance in an abuse-and-neglect disposition is warranted only upon a demonstrable showing of good cause, and a parent’s unexplained non-appearance or non-compliance falls short of that standard.
Trial courts retain discretion to proceed to disposition before the statutory maximum duration of an improvement period when evidence shows there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be remedied in the near future.

Background of the Case

Parties: Petitioner Mother K.D.; four minor children T.D., H.D., A.D., and I.D.-J.; West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS); Guardian ad litem.
Initiation: DHS filed petitions in April 2023 alleging inadequate housing, exposure to domestic violence, and maternal drug use/sales.
Adjudication (Aug 2023): Mother stipulated to neglect (failure to provide housing). Court adjudicated abuse/neglect and granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period (PIP).
PIP Requirements: Maintain appropriate housing, negative drug screens, psychological & substance-abuse evaluation, parenting classes, MDT cooperation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court affirmed the February 9 2024 dispositional order terminating Mother’s parental rights, concluding:

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying continuances of the December 2023 and February 2024 dispositional hearings because the Mother failed to establish “good cause” as required by Rule 7(b).
The Mother’s assertion that the court “denied” her motion for an extension of the PIP was factually unsupported; the trial court in substance granted extra time (from December to mid-January) conditioned on immediate entry into inpatient drug treatment, which the Mother ignored.
Given persistent positive drug screens, missed psychological evaluations, refusal of inpatient treatment, and non-appearance at two pivotal hearings, the circuit court correctly found no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect could be remedied and that termination was in the children’s best interests.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Influences

The opinion is concise but relies heavily on earlier West Virginia authority:

In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223 (1996) – reiterated that granting a continuance is a discretionary call, reviewable only for abuse of that discretion.
In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89 (2011) – set the dual appellate standards: clear-error review for factual findings, de novo for legal conclusions.

By reaffirming these cases within the context of Rule 7(b), the Court signals that procedural discretion in abuse-and-neglect matters remains broad, especially where parental participation is minimal.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Good-Cause Standard (Rule 7(b))
– Continuances “shall be granted only for good cause.”
– The Mother’s no-show, despite arranged remote access and repeated notice, evidenced lack of diligence, not good cause.
– Prospective statements (“I could have appeared” or “perhaps I could have persuaded the court”) are speculative and cannot retroactively fabric-ate good cause.
Improvement Period Extensions
– West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(6) & (9) set maximum timeframes; they do not guarantee parents the full allotment.
– A trial court may cut an improvement period short when the record demonstrates sustained non-compliance and no reasonable prospect of correction.
– Here, the court effectively extended the PIP (deferral of disposition) but conditioned it on immediate inpatient treatment—an opportunity the Mother repudiated.
Best Interests & Reasonable Likelihood Test
– Termination requires (1) no reasonable likelihood that conditions can be remedied and (2) that the child’s welfare demands termination.
– Ongoing drug use, rejection of treatment, missed psychological assessment, lateness to parenting classes, and pervasive minimisation combined to satisfy both prongs.

C. Anticipated Impact on Future Cases

Practical Effect:
1. Parents who request continuances must link the request to concrete steps already undertaken (e.g., documented enrollment in rehab, proof of transportation problems) rather than aspirational promises.
2. Circuit courts are empowered—indeed encouraged—to maintain the pace of proceedings to avoid drifting beyond statutory timelines, especially where delay offers no realistic benefit to the child.
3. Counsel will likely bring more robust evidence to demonstrate “good cause,” knowing that unsupported assertions of potential compliance will not suffice on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Improvement Period (PIP): A court-supervised period (normally up to 6 months) during which a parent must correct the conditions that led to abuse/neglect. Extensions are possible but not automatic.
Continuance: A postponement of a scheduled court hearing. In abuse/neglect cases, Rule 7(b) allows continuances only when necessary and supported by “good cause.”
Reasonable Likelihood: A statutory test asking whether, in the near future, the parent can realistically correct the problematic conditions. If the answer is “no,” the court may terminate parental rights.

Conclusion

In re T.D. is not a radical departure from West Virginia jurisprudence but rather a forceful restatement of two intertwined propositions: parents bear the burden to engage meaningfully in their own rehabilitation, and trial courts need not accommodate repeated delays when such engagement is absent. By tying the “good-cause” requirement to demonstrable parental effort—and by clarifying that statutory time caps do not equate to guaranteed time—the Supreme Court delivers a clear message that the child-centered objectives of abuse-and-neglect proceedings must prevail over speculative or dilatory tactics. Practitioners should advise clients that actions, not intentions, will determine whether the door to reunification remains open.