“Continuous Coercion” & the Role of Personal History:
State v. Joan L. Stetzer, 2025 WI 34 – New Parameters for Wisconsin’s Coercion Defense

1. Introduction

On 3 July 2025 the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued State v. Joan L. Stetzer, 2025 WI 34, a decision that simultaneously clarifies two unsettled questions about the statutory coercion defence (Wis. Stat. §§ 939.45(1) & 939.46(1)):

1. Continuity Requirement: The elements of coercion must exist throughout the entire duration of an on-going offence (e.g., drunk-driving), not merely at its inception.
2. Personal-History Relevance: A defendant’s past experiences—including patterns of domestic abuse and interactions with law-enforcement—may be considered when assessing whether her belief that illegal conduct was “the only means” of avoiding imminent death or great bodily harm was reasonable.

The judgment arises from a tragic domestic-violence backdrop: Dr. Joan Stetzer, an anaesthesiologist, fled her home during a violent attack by her husband, was stopped for drunk driving, and claimed statutory coercion. The trial court credited the coercion initially but held that—once she passed a police car—its protection expired. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and now the Supreme Court, in a 5–2 line-up (Justice Dallet for the majority; Justice Ziegler concurring in part; Chief Justice Karofsky in dissent), cements two doctrinal guideposts certain to reverberate across Wisconsin criminal practice.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court answered Yes to both certified questions:

• For on-going crimes (like operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, “PAC”), every element of § 939.46(1) must remain satisfied the entire time the defendant is engaged in the proscribed conduct.
• Evidence of the defendant’s personal history may be relevant—and is admissible—for the objective “reasonable belief” inquiry.

Applying those holdings, the majority affirmed the conviction because:

“At least when Stetzer passed the police car, she knew beyond a reasonable doubt that there were means of safety other than continuing to drive.” (¶15, ¶36)

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• State v. Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 554 (1975)
  Early comparison between coercion and self-defence; majority borrows its “objective-reasonable man test.”
• State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199 (1996) & State v. Nollie, 2002 WI 4
  Both involved on-going possession offences. The Court analogised: once the threat dissipates, the privilege ends.
• United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2009) and Greenwood v. State, 237 P.3d 1018 (Alaska 2010)
  Out-of-state authority emphasising cessation of the illegal act as soon as coercion/necessity ends.
• State v. Johnson, 2021 WI 61 & other self-defence cases
  Provide doctrinal basis for considering “personal characteristics and histories” in the reasonableness calculus.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Text & Structure
   • § 939.45(1) grants a defence when “conduct occurs under circumstances of coercion.”
   • § 939.46(1) defines those circumstances; therefore, if any element lapses, so too does the defence.
   • Linguistically, the present-tense “occurs” and “causes” denote a continuous condition.
2. Contextual Harmonisation
   • The majority parallels self-defence and defence-of-others statutes (§ 939.48).
   • In both settings the privilege terminates once danger subsides.
3. Policy Concerns
   • A contrary rule would create “no meaningful limiting principle,” allowing drivers to cross state lines under perpetual coercion (¶23).
   • Continuous requirement balances victim protection with public-safety (OWI/PAC) interests.
4. Personal-History Admissibility
   • Recognising domestic-violence dynamics, the Court holds that history can inform the viewpoint of a “person of ordinary intelligence and prudence in the defendant’s position.”
   • Yet, objectivity remains: history is probative, not dispositive.
5. Application to Facts
   • Trial court’s critical findings: (a) Stetzer saw a police car; (b) she was near known safe locations;
   therefore a reasonable person would not believe driving further while intoxicated was the “only means.”
   • Evidence sufficient under Poellinger standard.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Tighter Scope of Coercion Defence
  Defence counsel must track temporal continuity and advise clients to cease unlawful acts the moment an objectively safe alternative surfaces.
• Domestic-Violence Litigation
  Personal-history relevance opens evidentiary doors for battered-partner defendants, but proof must still satisfy an objective test. Expect more expert testimony (e.g., about trauma, coercive control).
• OWI / PAC Cases
  Rare but recurring “safe-harbour” drunk-driving arguments now face a high evidentiary hurdle: driver must show no reasonable avenue of escape (police, open businesses, neighbours, etc.) at each point of travel.
• Bench vs. Jury Trials
  The Court emphasised that sufficiency-of-evidence review is identical (¶16); strategic choice between bench and jury remains significant where complex defences are raised.
• Appellate Preservation
  Justice Ziegler’s concurrence signals potential future scrutiny of when a coercion instruction should be given; prosecutors may more aggressively contest its submission.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Coercion Defence (Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1))

• Threat by another (non-coconspirator).
• Defendant reasonably believes committing crime is the only way to avoid imminent death/great bodily harm.
• The threat causes the criminal act.
• Burden shifts: State must disprove at trial—beyond a reasonable doubt.

4.2 “Imminent” vs. “Immediate”

Imminent = Danger is about to occur; immediate = danger is occurring right now. For domestic-violence victims, threats may remain “imminent” even after physical separation because the abuser’s reach and prior violence loom large.

4.3 Continuous Act Principle

Crimes like OWI/PAC are continuing offences; each second behind the wheel is a new violation. Under Stetzer, the coercion elements must be satisfied each second. Once a safe alternative appears, continuation voids the defence.

4.4 Objective Reasonableness with Subjective Lens

Courts ask what a “prudent person” would think in the defendant’s shoes. The shoes include history of abuse, police mistrust, medical career ramifications, etc., but the yard-stick remains objective society-wide prudence.

5. Conclusion

State v. Stetzer forges a dual precedent:

1. It cements a continuity rule—the coercion shield lasts only while all statutory elements exist, curtailing expansive “escape” theories for continuing crimes.
2. It recognises that personal history matters, aligning coercion with self-defence jurisprudence and acknowledging domestic-violence realities.

Practitioners must therefore build more granular timelines of threat and safe alternatives, while prosecutors must marshal proof that—at some definable moment—a reasonable person would perceive other avenues of safety. Future litigation will test how robustly courts allow expert testimony on trauma to colour “objective” reasonableness, and whether the concurrence’s cautionary note curtails overly generous instruction of the defence. For now, Wisconsin criminal law takes a measured step: tightening the gateway to coercion, but broadening the lens through which reasonableness is viewed.