“Circling Cars & Pocketed Hands” – The Sixth Circuit’s Refined Test for Linking Pedestrians to Nearby Stolen Vehicles
(United States v. Lavonce Makiri Smith, 2025)

1. Introduction

United States v. Lavonce Makiri Smith, No. 24-1655 (6th Cir. 2025) confronted the familiar—yet often litigated—question of what quantum of facts permits officers to seize and frisk an individual under the Fourth Amendment. The events unfolded after a stolen Chrysler 200 repeatedly circled an accident scene in a high-crime Grand Rapids neighborhood. When three young men walked toward an unmarked police vehicle, Detective Jonathan Wu suspected an imminent carjacking. A stop-and-frisk ensued, revealing a handgun in Lavonce Smith’s pocket. Smith sought suppression, arguing the officers’ inference that he emerged from the Chrysler was an unsupported “hunch” tinted by racial bias.

The district court credited Wu’s testimony and denied suppression; Smith entered a conditional plea preserving appellate review. The Sixth Circuit, in a precedential opinion by Judge Gilman, affirmed. Most notably, the panel articulated a refined rule: Where officers observe distinctive behavior connecting pedestrians to a nearby stolen vehicle, the association itself—combined with corroborating conduct—can supply reasonable suspicion, even when the pedestrians are no longer inside the vehicle.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The investigative stop and protective frisk satisfied Terry v. Ohio because Detective Wu had a particularized, objective basis to suspect that Smith and associates were preparing to commit a carjacking or robbery.
• Main Findings:
  • The totality of circumstances—stolen car repeatedly circling, temporal and spatial proximity of pedestrians to that car, their obscured hands, spread-out formation, eye contact, and Smith’s shouted words—surpassed the “low” threshold for reasonable suspicion.
  • The district court’s credibility findings withstood clear-error review despite Smith’s argument that cognitive bias infected Wu’s perceptions.
  • Attempts to dissect each factor (hoodies, high-crime area, eye contact, etc.) improperly engaged in a “divide-and-conquer” analysis forbidden by precedent.
• Outcome: Conviction and 51-month sentence remain intact; motion to suppress properly denied.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) – Baseline authority for stop-and-frisk; reiterated the “specific, articulable facts” requirement.
• Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) – Allowed consideration of high-crime locale and unprovoked flight; cited regarding permissible reliance on neighborhood conditions.
• United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) – Provided “totality of circumstances” framework; referenced for the low bar (“moderate chance of wrongdoing”).
• United States v. Pacheco, 841 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2016) – Rejected “divide-and-conquer” parsing of individual suspicion factors; heavily invoked to refuse Smith’s piecemeal criticism.
• United States v. McCallister, 39 F.4th 368 (6th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2011) – Supplied language on “commonsense judgments” and low threshold.
• Brooks v. Tennessee, 626 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2010) – Cited for near-immunity of district-court credibility findings.
• United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2010) – Recognized that presence in high-crime area can inform reasonable suspicion.

Collectively, these cases empowered the panel to synthesize a permissive yet bounded rule: The critical link between a stolen vehicle’s occupants and proximate pedestrians may rest on inference rather than direct observation, so long as objective facts reasonably support that inference.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review – Factual findings: clear error; legal conclusions: de novo. Evidence viewed in prosecution’s favor (Gunter). Ability to affirm on any ground (Binford).
2. Credibility of Detective Wu – The panel emphasized Brooks: absent internal inconsistency or contradiction by extrinsic evidence, credibility determinations are “virtually never” clear error. Smith’s bias argument lacked such contradictions.
3. Totality Framework Applied
   • Stolen Chrysler’s Behavior: high-speed pass, running stop sign, circling block thrice, parking 100 yards away.
   • Temporal-Spatial Proximity: three men appear yards from Chrysler moments after it parks.
   • Corroborating Conduct: hoods up in warm weather, pocketed hands, spreading formation, eye contact, Smith’s verbalization toward Wu.
   • High-Crime Context & Vehicle Type: location notorious for carjackings; unmarked police Dodge considered carjacking target.
   These combined into an “objective mosaic” justifying an investigative detention.
4. Rejecting the “Divide-and-Conquer” Tactic – Parsing each datum would distort the gestalt view mandated by Pacheco.
5. Protective Frisk – Once reasonable suspicion of violent crime (carjacking) existed, officers could frisk for weapons (cf. Terry and Michigan v. Long).

3.3 Anticipated Impact

The decision subtly but materially recalibrates Fourth Amendment doctrine within the Sixth Circuit:

• Association with Vehicles: Officers may treat pedestrians’ apparent association with a nearby vehicle—especially one reported stolen—as a distinct suspicion factor, even in absence of direct observation of exit/entry.
• Emphasis on Vehicle “Casing” Behavior: Repeated circling, slow drive-bys, and focused attention on potential victims supply articulable facts of incipient violent crime.
• Cognitive Bias Arguments: Defendants face an uphill battle at the appellate level when attacking officer testimony solely on alleged perceptual bias without contradictory evidence.
• Practical Policing Guidance: The opinion encourages officers to articulate why pedestrians are linked to vehicles and to note corroborating behaviors, while cautioning courts against after-the-fact atomization of facts.
• Litigation Strategy: Defense counsel must marshal extrinsic evidence (video, contemporaneous statements, etc.) to overcome the deference accorded to credibility findings.

4. Simplifying Complex Concepts

• Reasonable Suspicion – A commonsense, fact-based belief that crime is afoot, requiring less certainty than “probable cause.” Think of it as a “specific hunch backed by facts.”
• Clear-Error Review – Appellate court defers to trial judge’s factual findings unless left with a “definite and firm conviction” of mistake.
• Totality of Circumstances – Courts must view all facts together, not isolate them, much like assessing a mosaic instead of single tiles.
• Divide-and-Conquer Fallacy – Illegitimate technique of dismantling the fact mosaic to claim no single piece proves suspicion.
• Protective Frisk – A limited pat-down of outer clothing for weapons when officers reasonably fear the suspect is armed and dangerous.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Lavonce Makiri Smith consolidates and clarifies Sixth Circuit jurisprudence on investigative detentions involving pedestrian-vehicle linkage. The panel re-affirmed that (1) inference-based association between individuals and nearby stolen cars can be an articulable fact, (2) the “low bar” of reasonable suspicion remains intact, and (3) attempts to neutralize each suspicion factor in isolation will fail when the combined picture suggests impending violent crime. The opinion thus equips law-enforcement officers with a clearer blueprint and signals to litigants that future challenges must attack the mosaic, not merely its tiles. While critics may worry about reinforcing subjectivity in police perceptions, the Court anchors its rule in objective, record-based facts, preserving the delicate balance between public safety and Fourth Amendment liberty.