“All Means All” Under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii): The Eleventh Circuit’s Strict Finality Doctrine in Curlee v. AT&T Mobility Services

I. Introduction

In Amanda Curlee v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC, an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision dated November 21, 2025, the court once again confronted a deceptively technical—but practically critical—question of federal civil procedure: when is there a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in a multi-party lawsuit where the plaintiff has attempted to voluntarily dismiss claims by stipulation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)?

The case arises from a putative Title VII pregnancy-discrimination class action originally brought by Cynthia Allen against her employer, AT&T Mobility Services, LLC (“AT&T Mobility”), and a related entity, AT&T Services, Inc. (“AT&T Services”). After extensive procedural maneuvering—including amendment of the complaint, a denied class-certification motion, a failed Rule 23(f) appeal, a settlement, and attempted intervention by putative class member Amanda Curlee—the Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction. The reason: the underlying action had never been validly dismissed because the Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation was not signed by all parties who had appeared in the case.

Although the opinion is marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” it is important as an application and clarification of the Eleventh Circuit’s recent, precedential decision in City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Hospital Holdings, L.P., 82 F.4th 1031 (11th Cir. 2023). Together, these cases establish a stringent rule:

A stipulated dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is ineffective unless it is signed by every party that has ever appeared in the action, even if that party was later dropped by amendment or appeared only to contest personal jurisdiction.
An ineffective Rule 41 stipulation cannot create the “final decision” required by § 1291, depriving the court of appeals of jurisdiction.

This commentary examines the decision’s background, summarizes the holding, and analyzes the court’s reasoning and its implications for federal litigation practice, especially in multi-defendant and class-action contexts.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Original Pregnancy-Discrimination Class Action

Cynthia Allen filed a putative class action in the Northern District of Georgia alleging that:

AT&T Mobility Services, LLC was her employer, and
AT&T Services, Inc. was the “policy writer” responsible for employment policies that allegedly discriminated against pregnant employees,

asserting pregnancy-discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Key early steps:

AT&T Services waived service and appeared in the action.
AT&T Services moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).

Before the district court ruled on that motion, Allen filed an amended complaint naming only AT&T Mobility as defendant, thereby dropping AT&T Services from the operative pleading.

B. Class Certification, Denied Review, and Settlement

Allen later moved for class certification. The district court denied the motion. Allen sought interlocutory review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), but the Eleventh Circuit declined to permit that discretionary appeal.

Allen then settled her individual claims with AT&T Mobility. The settling parties—Allen, her co-plaintiff, and AT&T Mobility—filed a joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). That stipulation:

Was signed by Allen, her co-plaintiff, and counsel for AT&T Mobility,
Did not include AT&T Services as a signatory, and
Identified AT&T Mobility as the only defendant party to the stipulation.

AT&T Services, though earlier sued, served, and represented by some of the same counsel, did not sign the stipulation in any capacity.

C. Intervention by Putative Class Member Amanda Curlee

After the Allen–AT&T Mobility settlement, Amanda Curlee—a putative class member who alleged she would have fallen within the proposed class definition—moved to intervene in the district court. Her stated goal was to:

Intervene in order to appeal the denial of class certification.

The district court granted her motion to intervene. Curlee then:

Filed a notice of appeal challenging the district court’s class-certification ruling.

On that first trip to the Eleventh Circuit, the court dismissed Curlee’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Allen v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 104 F.4th 212 (11th Cir. 2024). The key point there was that Curlee had never litigated her own claims in the district court when the class-certification decision was made; she sought to appeal an order that did not directly adjudicate her own claims.

However, in that opinion, the Eleventh Circuit also flagged—but did not finally resolve—another jurisdictional problem: whether Allen’s stipulation of dismissal was valid given that AT&T Services, a previously named defendant who had appeared in the case, had not signed the stipulation. 104 F.4th at 215.

D. Dismissal of Curlee’s Complaint-in-Intervention and Second Appeal

On remand, AT&T Mobility moved to dismiss Curlee’s complaint-in-intervention for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing in essence that Curlee could not independently maintain the action in federal court once Allen’s individual claims were gone. The district court agreed and dismissed Curlee’s complaint-in-intervention.

Curlee appealed that dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit, acting sua sponte, raised the lingering jurisdictional question:

Did Allen’s joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal effectively dismiss her claims against AT&T Mobility even though it was not signed by AT&T Services?

As the court explains, the parties did nothing on remand to fix this foundational problem with finality. The ensuing opinion is devoted almost entirely to that question.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit dismisses Curlee’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The key holdings are:

No Final Decision Under § 1291: A decision is “final” only when all claims of all parties have been resolved. Because the stipulated dismissal of Allen’s claims was procedurally defective, those claims remained pending in the district court. Thus, there was no final judgment or final decision to support appellate jurisdiction.
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) Requires Signatures of All Parties Who Have Appeared: Following City of Jacksonville, the court reiterates that a stipulated dismissal is effective under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) only if it is signed by all parties who have ever appeared, including those later dropped from the complaint or those who appeared solely to contest personal jurisdiction.
AT&T Services Was a “Party Who Appeared”: AT&T Services became a party when sued and subjected to an “authority-asserting measure” (service, or in this case, waiver of service) that set a deadline to respond. It “appeared” by waiving service and filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Its limited-purpose appearance still counts as an appearance for Rule 41 purposes.
The Stipulation Was Ineffective: Because AT&T Services never signed the stipulation—and because the stipulation’s text and signature blocks show that counsel acted only on behalf of AT&T Mobility—the purported Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) dismissal of Allen’s claims was ineffective.
Remedy: Appeal Dismissed: With Allen’s claims still pending in the district court, there was no final judgment as to all claims and parties. The Eleventh Circuit therefore lacked jurisdiction and dismissed Curlee’s appeal.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Legal Framework: § 1291 and Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)

1. The Final Judgment Rule – 28 U.S.C. § 1291

Section 1291 provides that federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” A decision is “final” when it:

Ends the litigation on the merits, and
Leaves nothing for the district court to do but execute the judgment,

and, in the Eleventh Circuit’s formulation, when all claims of all parties have been resolved.

Multi-party and multi-claim litigation can therefore create traps: if some claims or parties remain unresolved (or are improperly dismissed), an appeal may be jurisdictionally premature.

2. Voluntary Dismissal – Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action without a court order by filing:

“a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.”

This is intended to permit consensual, self-executing dismissals, sparing the court and parties from litigating a dismissal motion.

However, Curlee—applying City of Jacksonville—treats that language as mandatory and strict:

“All parties” means all parties who have ever appeared in the case—not merely those that are still named in the operative complaint.
There is no textual exception for parties who appeared solely to challenge jurisdiction or who have been later “dropped” by amendment.

If even one such party fails to sign the stipulation, the Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) mechanism does not operate, and the case is not dismissed.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Sua Sponte Jurisdictional Review: S.E.C. v. Carrillo, Vital Pharms., and Amodeo

The panel notes that it must evaluate its appellate jurisdiction sua sponte (on its own initiative), citing:

S.E.C. v. Carrillo, 325 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003), for the principle that appellate courts are obligated to confirm their jurisdiction even absent party challenge.
Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2022), and United States v. Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 970 (11th Cir. 2019), for the standard of review: appellate jurisdiction is reviewed de novo.

These cases reinforce that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent or waiver; the court must independently find a statutory basis.

2. The Controlling Precedent: City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Hospital Holdings, L.P., 82 F.4th 1031 (11th Cir. 2023)

City of Jacksonville is the linchpin. There, the Eleventh Circuit:

Confronted another flawed Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation that was not signed by all parties who had appeared.
Held that such a “procedurally irregular” stipulation is ineffective and cannot create finality for purposes of appeal. 82 F.4th at 1036.
Emphasized that “[a]ll means all” in the phrase “all parties who have appeared,” and that this includes parties who previously appeared but were “removed from an action” by amendment or otherwise. Id. at 1038.
Rejected arguments for implied or partial application of the rule, noting there is “simply no language that qualifies the clause ‘all parties who appeared.’” Id.

In Curlee, the panel treats City of Jacksonville as dispositive on two central points:

The stipulation is procedurally irregular if any party that has appeared fails to sign, and
Such an irregular stipulation is legally ineffective in terminating the action.

Thus, the attempt to voluntarily dismiss Allen’s claims by stipulation failed, and her claims against AT&T Mobility remain pending.

3. When Does Party Status Attach? Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999)

To determine whether AT&T Services was a “party” for Rule 41 purposes, the panel cites Murphy Brothers, in which the Supreme Court held that:

A defendant becomes a “party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure.”

Here:

Allen sued AT&T Services as a named defendant.
AT&T Services signed and returned a waiver of service, which—like formal service—set a deadline by which it had to answer or file a Rule 12 motion.

Therefore, AT&T Services plainly was a “party” within the ordinary understanding of that term (“[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought,” citing Black’s Law Dictionary).

4. What Constitutes an “Appearance”? Prod. Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau and Insurance Corp. of Ireland

The opinion also examines what it means to “appear” for purposes of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Historically, federal practice distinguished between:

General appearances, submitting to the court’s jurisdiction, and
Special appearances, made solely to contest personal jurisdiction.

Earlier versions of Rule 41’s voluntary dismissal provision excluded special appearances—i.e., a defendant who appeared only to contest personal jurisdiction was not required to sign a stipulation of dismissal. However:

The 1946 amendments to Rule 41, combined with Rule 12’s abolition of the technical distinction between general and special appearances, eliminated that carve-out. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment.
Prod. Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 490 (5th Cir. 1974), recognized this development, and was later overruled on unrelated grounds by Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 (1982).

In Curlee, the Eleventh Circuit uses those authorities and the Advisory Committee Notes to conclude:

Any formal participation in the case—such as filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction—constitutes an “appearance” under Rule 41.
The modern text of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) contains no limitation excluding special or limited-purpose appearances.

Thus, AT&T Services “appeared” in the action by:

Waiving service, and
Filing its Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

5. Black’s Law Dictionary Definitions

The court also relies on Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) to ground its interpretation in ordinary legal usage:

“Party”: “One by or against whom a lawsuit is brought.”
“Appearance”: “Taking part in a lawsuit, whether by formally participating in it or by an answer, demurrer, or motion.”

These definitions further undercut Curlee’s and AT&T Mobility’s attempt to narrow “party” or “appearance” to exclude AT&T Services.

6. The Prior Appeal: Allen v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 104 F.4th 212 (11th Cir. 2024)

In the prior appeal, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Curlee’s attempt to appeal the denial of class certification, holding that:

She lacked standing to appeal that order because it did not adjudicate her own claims (which were not yet litigated).

There, the court already doubted the finality of Allen’s claims, explicitly questioning:

“was [Allen’s] stipulation of dismissal valid and effective, even though it was not signed by an earlier-dismissed defendant, AT&T Services, Inc.?” 104 F.4th at 215.

On this second appeal, the court finally answers that question in the negative, applying City of Jacksonville to hold the stipulation invalid.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. AT&T Services Was a “Party” Within the Meaning of Rule 41

Curlee argued that AT&T Services was not a “party” under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) because:

It had only appeared to contest personal jurisdiction; and
It had been dropped from the amended complaint.

The Eleventh Circuit rejects this argument categorically:

Allen sued AT&T Services as a named defendant.
AT&T Services waived service and thereby became subject to a deadline for responding, satisfying the “authority-asserting measure” criterion from Murphy Brothers.
Lawyers appeared for AT&T Services and filed a motion to dismiss.

These steps clearly rendered AT&T Services a “party” in the case. The panel underscores that “party status attaches” when a defendant is subjected to such an authority-asserting measure and required to respond.

2. AT&T Services “Appeared” in the Action

The court next holds that AT&T Services did “appear” within the meaning of Rule 41, even though it did so solely to challenge personal jurisdiction. Using the Black’s definition and the historical background of Rule 41:

An appearance includes participating in the case via a motion (such as a motion to dismiss).
Modern Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) contains no carve-out for special or limited-purpose appearances; the 1946 amendments removed the prior exception.

Accordingly, AT&T Services’ filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction unequivocally qualifies as an “appearance,” triggering Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)’s requirement that it sign any stipulation of dismissal.

3. Parties Dropped by Amendment Still Count as “Parties Who Have Appeared”

Curlee also argued that AT&T Services did not need to sign the stipulation because it had been “eliminated” from the case when Allen filed an amended complaint naming only AT&T Mobility.

The Eleventh Circuit finds this argument foreclosed by City of Jacksonville:

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) requires signatures from “all parties who have appeared.”
In City of Jacksonville, the court held that “all means all” and includes parties who once appeared but were later “removed from an action,” regardless of the mechanism or reason. 82 F.4th at 1038.

Thus, even though AT&T Services no longer appeared in the operative complaint, it remained within the class of “parties who have appeared” for purposes of Rule 41. Its signature was therefore indispensable.

4. Counsel for AT&T Mobility Did Not Sign on Behalf of AT&T Services

Alternatively, AT&T Mobility argued that some of the attorneys who signed the stipulation had also appeared for AT&T Services earlier in the case, and that their signatures should be treated as including AT&T Services.

The Eleventh Circuit rejects this as inconsistent with the record:

The stipulation expressly lists the parties to it; AT&T Services is not among them.
The attorneys signed as “[a]ttorneys for [d]efendant,” and the only defendant identified is “Defendant AT&T Mobility.”
There is no indication in the document that counsel intended to act on behalf of AT&T Services in executing the stipulation.

The court characterizes it as “incontrovertible” that no one signed the stipulation on behalf of AT&T Services. Therefore, the stipulation fails the plain-text requirement of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).

5. Consequence: The Stipulation Was Ineffective; No Final Judgment; No Appellate Jurisdiction

Given that:

AT&T Services was a “party who appeared,” and
It did not sign the stipulation,

the court concludes, in line with City of Jacksonville, that the stipulation is procedurally irregular and ineffective. As a result:

Allen’s claims against AT&T Mobility remain pending in the district court.
There is no “final decision” under § 1291, because not all claims of all parties have been resolved.
The court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear Curlee’s appeal, and must dismiss.

The panel emphasizes that the defect is curable: the parties remain free to achieve finality by:

Executing a new, valid stipulation signed by all parties who have appeared, or
Obtaining a court order dismissing the remaining claims, or
Proceeding through an amended complaint or other mechanism that produces a final adjudication of all claims and parties.

D. Impact and Practical Consequences

1. Reinforcement and Extension of City of Jacksonville

While Curlee itself is unpublished, it concretely applies and subtly extends City of Jacksonville in two ways:

It reaffirms that “[a]ll means all” for Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), including parties dropped by amendment.
It clarifies that limited-purpose appearances—e.g., appearances solely to contest personal jurisdiction—are still “appearances” triggering the signature requirement.

Practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit should assume that any defendant that has ever been formally involved in the case—served or waiving service, and participating through counsel—must sign a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation for it to be effective.

2. Risks for Multi-Defendant Cases and Class Actions

The decision has significant implications in complex litigation:

Multi-defendant litigation: When settling with fewer than all defendants, counsel must either:
- Use a Rule 41(a)(2) court-ordered dismissal for partial settlements, or
- Carefully ensure that every defendant who has ever appeared signs the stipulation (even those dismissed by amendment or whose motions remain pending).
Class actions: As seen here, class actions often involve:
- Multiple, related corporate defendants,
- Partial jurisdictional challenges, and
- Settlements limited to some parties.
Any misstep in obtaining proper signatures can leave “zombie” claims technically pending in the district court, thwarting appeals and potentially undermining settlement finality.

3. Strategic and Administrative Consequences

For litigants:

Due diligence on party history is essential. Before filing a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation, counsel must:
- Review the entire docket to identify all parties that ever appeared,
- Obtain signatures (or formal appearances) for each, or else opt for a Rule 41(a)(2) motion.
Shared counsel does not solve the problem unless the stipulation unambiguously expresses that counsel signs on behalf of each represented party.

For courts:

Docket management may become more complicated when invalid stipulations lead to unrecognized pending claims.
District judges may wish to scrutinize Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) filings to prevent misunderstood finality and unnecessary appeals.

4. Potential Tension with Practical Realities

The court’s strict textual approach promotes clarity and doctrinal consistency, but it also:

Creates a technical trap for parties who assume that dropping a defendant in an amended complaint fully removes it from the case, including from procedural requirements like Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
Can produce inefficient outcomes—such as dismissal of appeals on purely procedural grounds, requiring additional rounds of filings to secure finality.

Still, from the court’s perspective, such strictness enforces statutory and rule-based jurisdictional limits and prevents parties from manufacturing or assuming appellate jurisdiction in the absence of true finality.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Final Decision” Under § 1291

In plain terms, a decision is “final” when:

The district court is completely finished with the case, and
There is nothing left to resolve for any party or any claim.

If any claim remains pending—even unintentionally, as here—an appeal to the court of appeals is usually premature unless there is a specific exception (like certification under Rule 54(b) or a statutory interlocutory appeal).

2. Voluntary Dismissal by Stipulation – Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is a way for everybody to agree to end the lawsuit without asking the judge for an order. To be effective:

Every party that has ever participated in the case (by filing something through a lawyer or otherwise) must sign the dismissal document.
If just one such party does not sign, the rule does not operate, and the case is not effectively dismissed.

3. “Party” and “Appearance”

Party: If you are named in the lawsuit and served (or waive service) and must respond, you are a party.
Appearance: If you take part in the lawsuit in any formal way—filing an answer, a motion to dismiss, or another substantive paper—you have “appeared.” This is true even if your participation is only to argue that the court lacks jurisdiction over you.

4. Special vs. General Appearances – Why They No Longer Matter Here

In older practice:

A general appearance meant you accepted that the court had power over you.
A special appearance meant you came in only to argue that the court had no power over you.

Modern federal rules have abolished this distinction. If you appear to argue lack of jurisdiction, that limited involvement still counts as an “appearance” for procedural rules like Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).

5. Intervention and Putative Class Members

A putative class member is someone who would be included if a class were certified, but is not yet a party to the lawsuit. Intervention is a procedure allowing non-parties to join a case to protect their interests.

In this case, Curlee intervened late:

At the point she tried to appeal class certification, she had not litigated her own claims in the district court.
On the second appeal, even after her complaint-in-intervention was dismissed, the court found that the entire case lacked a final judgment because of the flawed stipulation relating to Allen’s claims.

VI. Overall Significance and Evaluation

The Curlee opinion does not break new doctrinal ground so much as it solidifies and operationalizes the Eleventh Circuit’s strict, text-driven approach to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), as articulated in City of Jacksonville. Its main contributions are:

Confirming that defendants who appear solely to contest personal jurisdiction are still “parties who have appeared” and must sign any stipulation of dismissal.
Reinforcing that parties removed by amendment still count for Rule 41 purposes unless and until the action is fully and properly terminated as to all claims and all parties.
Illustrating how a seemingly technical defect in a stipulation can deprive the court of appeals of jurisdiction, even after substantial district-court proceedings and a prior appeal.

Substantively, the case is about Title VII class claims; procedurally, it is a cautionary tale about finality and voluntary dismissals. The Eleventh Circuit emphasizes that jurisdiction is non-negotiable: courts cannot overlook procedural irregularities if those irregularities mean that a “final decision” has not actually been rendered.

For practitioners, the lesson is straightforward but critical:

In the Eleventh Circuit, do not rely on a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation unless you can confidently say that every party that has ever entered an appearance in the case—no matter how limited that appearance—has signed.
If that is not feasible, use alternative mechanisms: a Rule 41(a)(2) motion for dismissal by court order, a Rule 54(b) partial final judgment where appropriate, or other dispositive orders resolving all claims.

VII. Conclusion

Curlee v. AT&T Mobility Services underscores a stringent rule of federal appellate jurisdiction in the Eleventh Circuit: a voluntary dismissal by stipulation under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is effective—and capable of producing a “final decision” under § 1291—only if it is signed by all parties who have appeared, including those dropped by amendment and those who appeared solely to contest personal jurisdiction.

Because AT&T Services had appeared in the case and did not sign the stipulation, Allen’s claims were never properly dismissed, leaving the action unresolved and depriving the Eleventh Circuit of jurisdiction over Curlee’s appeal. The case illustrates the centrality of procedural precision to appellate jurisdiction and serves as a practical warning to litigants in complex, multi-party and class-action litigation to attend meticulously to Rule 41’s signature requirements when attempting to terminate an action by stipulation.