“A Six-Month Benchmark for Accounting Violations & Fitness-to-Practice Condition”
Commentary on In the Matter of Charles M. Dalziel, Jr.

1. Introduction

In In the Matter of Charles M. Dalziel, Jr. (Supreme Court of Georgia, 22 July 2025, S25Y0775) the Court addressed attorney discipline arising from an experienced securities lawyer’s mishandling of a client retainer, threatening communications, and indiscreet grievance responses. While the Bar pressed multiple Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) violations—including improper fee conversion and confidentiality breaches—the Court ultimately grounded discipline on a single, incontestable infraction: failure to provide a prompt accounting of client funds under Rule 1.15(I)(c).

The principal issues were:

• Whether Charles M. Dalziel violated professional duties by (i) withholding an accounting, (ii) failing to refund “unearned” fees, and (iii) disclosing client confidences.
• What sanction is proportionate, particularly given allegations of alcohol abuse and mental-health concerns.
• How to apply the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and relevant Georgia precedent.

This decision crystalises two important points: (1) a failure to deliver a requested accounting—even without proven fee conversion—can warrant a six-month suspension; and (2) where mental competency is in doubt, reinstatement may be conditioned on professional certification of fitness to practice. Together, they supply a new benchmark for disciplinary cases focused solely on Rule 1.15(I)(c) accounting violations.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court accepted in substantial part Special Master Adam M. Hames’s findings that Dalziel violated Rule 1.15(I)(c) by ignoring repeated requests for a retainer accounting. It was less convinced that the record proved fee conversion or an impermissible confidentiality breach, but elected not to resolve those questions because relief would be the same: a suspension.

Key holdings:

• Violation confirmed – Rule 1.15(I)(c) (accounting obligation).
• Discipline imposed – Six-month suspension effective immediately.
• Condition precedent to reinstatement – Certification by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist that Dalziel is mentally competent to practice law.
• No ruling on other alleged violations – The Court “questioned” but did not decide fee conversion (Rules 1.15 & 1.16) or confidentiality (Rule 1.6) because doing so would not affect the sanction.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (1996) – Established Georgia’s regular reliance on the ABA Sanctions Standards. Guided the Special Master’s aggravation/mitigation framework.
• In the Matter of Coleman, 278 Ga. 864 (2005) – Accepted a six-month suspension for failing to provide an accounting; Court cites Coleman as a direct analogue and precedent for the sanction length.
• In the Matter of Veach, 310 Ga. 470 (2020) – Used by the Special Master for comparison where conversion of client funds justified a one-year suspension; Court distinguishes Veach because Dalziel’s wrongdoing was limited to accounting, not proven conversion.
• In the Matter of Cleveland, 317 Ga. 515 (2023) – Footnote clarifies wrongful retention of fees is normally charged under Rule 1.16(d) (public reprimand cap), highlighting that disbarment-level Rule 1.15 charges require careful pleading.
• In the Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. 255 (2023) & Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 316 Ga. 855 (2023) – Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court retains ultimate discretion and owes less deference to fact-finders in attorney-discipline cases than in ordinary appeals.
• In the Matter of Lank, 300 Ga. 479 (2017) – Referenced for post-suspension reinstatement procedure and reminder of duties under Bar Rule 4-219(b).

Collectively, these cases furnished a sliding scale of discipline (public reprimand → six-month suspension → one-year suspension → disbarment) predicated on the nature of the fiduciary breach and any proven client harm, allowing the Court to slot Dalziel’s conduct neatly at the six-month mark.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review – The Court reiterated it reviews disciplinary findings de novo on law and discipline, while giving deference to fact-finding unless “clearly erroneous.” However, ultimate sanction power is a non-delegable judicial function.

2. Violation Analysis – The record “amply supports” a Rule 1.15(I)(c) violation: W.G. requested an accounting multiple times; Dalziel deflected for months; an invoice arrived only when Dalziel demanded additional funds.

3. Aggravation & Mitigation (ABA Standards 9.0)

• Aggravators: selfish or dishonest motive, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, substantial practice experience, threatening messages.
• Mitigators: no prior discipline, personal/emotional problems.
• Mental-health/alcohol issues not mitigating because no sustained treatment (ABA 9.32(i)).

4. Proportionality – Using ABA Standard 4.12 (suspension when lawyer “knows or should know” he mishandles client property), the Court found a six-month bar aligns with Coleman and balances injury, remorse deficit, and mental-health concerns.

5. Unresolved Allegations – The Court purposely left undecided conversion and confidentiality issues, signalling that when one clear violation suffices for an appropriate penalty, judicial economy and due-process caution counsel restraint.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Creates a clear disciplinary benchmark – A stand-alone Rule 1.15(I)(c) accounting violation, absent clear conversion, now presumptively attracts a six-month suspension in Georgia.
• Reinforces the mental-health linkage – By conditioning reinstatement on psychological certification, the Court underscores practitioner wellbeing as integral to public protection—a practice likely to appear in future cases involving substance abuse or mental impairment.
• Signals charging discipline precision – The Court’s footnotes critique over-pleading conversion under Rule 1.15 when facts fit Rule 1.16(d), nudging the Bar toward plea-specific accuracy.
• Sets boundaries on grievance-response disclosures – Although unresolved here, the opinion’s cautionary language (“strongly disapprove of personal insults”) foreshadows stricter scrutiny of lawyers who weaponise grievance responses.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 1.15(I)(c) – Requires lawyers to promptly (i) deliver funds clients are entitled to, and (ii) render full accountings upon request. Think of it as the lawyer’s “bank-statement duty.”
• Rule 1.16(d) – Upon termination, the lawyer must protect client interests, including refunding any unearned advance fee. It’s a “graceful exit” rule.
• Conversion vs. Accounting Failure – “Conversion” is stealing or using client money; “accounting failure” is not telling the client how their money was used. Conversion is graver and can lead to disbarment.
• ABA Sanctions Standards – A nationally recognised grid for matching misconduct categories (e.g., client property, candor, competence) with presumptive sanctions, adjusted by aggravating and mitigating factors.
• Conditioned Reinstatement – A disciplinary order can require proof of mental fitness before the lawyer can practice again, similar to a driver needing a medical release to regain a licence.

5. Conclusion

Dalziel is consequential not for its facts—which involve a relatively modest $3,650 retainer—but for the doctrinal clarity it offers. The Supreme Court of Georgia has articulated that:

1. A persistent refusal to provide a requested client accounting (Rule 1.15(I)(c)) merits a six-month suspension—even absent proven fee conversion or demonstrable client loss.
2. In cases featuring possible mental impairment, fitness-to-practice certification is a suitable prerequisite for reinstatement.
3. The Court will focus on the most evident violation sufficient to justify discipline, reserving more serious findings for when the evidentiary record unmistakably demands them.

Practitioners should take heed: meticulous trust-account record-keeping and prompt, courteous accountings are not merely best practices—they are now anchored to a clear disciplinary baseline. Moreover, lawyers confronting mental-health or substance-related struggles must seek sustained treatment early; disciplinary authorities will consider treatment history in mitigation but will not excuse misconduct on unrehabilitated impairment alone.