Z.J. v. R.M. and the Meaning of “Mental Distress” in Ohio’s Menacing-by-Stalking Statute

Belief in Future Mental Distress as Sufficient Injury Under R.C. 2903.211(A)(1): A Commentary on Z.J. v. R.M., 2025-Ohio-5662 (Supreme Court of Ohio)

Introduction

In Z.J. v. R.M., 2025-Ohio-5662, the Supreme Court of Ohio resolves a longstanding conflict among the courts of appeals over what a petitioner must prove about “mental distress” to establish a violation of Ohio’s menacing-by-stalking statute, R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), for purposes of obtaining a civil stalking protection order under R.C. 2903.214.

The core question was narrow but consequential: does the statute require proof that the victim actually experienced mental distress, or is it enough that the victim believes the offender will cause mental distress in the future?

By a majority opinion authored by Justice Hawkins, the court holds that:

  • A victim’s belief that the offender will cause mental distress is sufficient to show a violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), just as a belief in future physical harm is.
  • Accordingly, a petitioner seeking a civil stalking protection order under R.C. 2903.214 need not prove actual mental distress; the belief that the respondent will cause mental distress suffices.

Chief Justice Kennedy dissents, joined in separate dissent by Justice Brunner (whose analysis is not reproduced in the provided text), arguing that the statute is “grievously ambiguous,” that the rule of lenity applies, and that actual mental distress is required to trigger criminal liability and, by extension, a civil stalking protection order.

The case is significant both doctrinally and practically. Doctrinally, it is a highly textualist, grammar-intensive construction of a criminal statute, applied in a civil protective-order context. Practically, it broadens the availability of civil stalking protection orders when mental distress is at issue and clarifies the elements of the offense of menacing by stalking statewide.

Summary of the Opinion

Parties and Factual Background

The parties, Z.J. (petitioner/appellee) and R.M. (respondent/appellant), are long-acquainted men whose relationship deteriorated after R.M. had an affair with Z.J.’s wife. For over 30 years they had known each other through family connections and shared church attendance. Once the affair came to light, interactions between them became frequent and hostile:

  • During child-exchange events between Z.J. and his then-wife, R.M. behaved provocatively, daring Z.J. to hit him.
  • On another occasion, R.M. parked near Z.J.’s home, revved his motorcycle until Z.J. came outside, then left.
  • In a grocery-store encounter, R.M. sought out Z.J. and his girlfriend and directed personal insults at them (R.M. admitted he was intentionally being an “asshole”).

Z.J. also engaged in hostile conduct, including repeatedly accusing R.M. of being a pedophile in person and on social media and confronting him at church. The record depicts a mutual escalation, but the legal focus is on whether R.M.’s conduct violated the menacing-by-stalking statute as interpreted by the courts below.

Procedural History

  1. Ex parte order. Z.J. initially obtained an ex parte civil sexually-oriented-offense protection order naming himself and his two minor children as protected parties.
  2. Full hearing and magistrate’s decision. After a two-day hearing, the magistrate:
    • Rejected the sexually-oriented-offense basis as to the children (insufficient evidence of a sexual offense).
    • Granted a civil stalking protection order in favor of Z.J. against R.M.
    • Interpreted R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) to require only that the petitioner believe the respondent intends to cause mental distress.
  3. Trial court. R.M. objected, arguing among other things that the statute required proof that Z.J. had actually suffered mental distress. The trial court, relying on what it viewed as binding precedent, largely overruled the objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision (with narrow modifications unrelated to the issue).
  4. Fifth District Court of Appeals. The Fifth District affirmed, citing its prior decision in Bloom v. Macbeth, 2008-Ohio-4564 (5th Dist.), which had held that a petitioner need not have experienced mental distress so long as the offender’s conduct caused a belief that physical harm or mental distress would occur. One judge concurred in judgment only, explicitly disagreeing with Bloom and arguing that actual mental distress is required.
  5. Certified conflict. The Fifth District certified a conflict with:
    • Smith v. Wunsch, 2005-Ohio-3498 (4th Dist.)
    • Caban v. Ransome, 2009-Ohio-1034 (7th Dist.)
    • State v. Payne, 2008-Ohio-5447 (9th Dist.)
    which had required actual mental distress under R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). The Supreme Court accepted the certified conflict.

The Certified Question

The Supreme Court agreed to resolve:

Whether R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) requires a victim to actually experience mental distress or only believe that the stalker will cause the victim physical harm or mental distress, for a court to issue a civil stalking protection order.

Holding

The court, in a majority opinion by Justice Hawkins, holds:

  • The text and grammatical structure of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) show that the verb “believe” modifies both “physical harm” and “mental distress.”
  • Therefore, a victim’s belief that an offender will cause mental distress is sufficient; the victim need not already have suffered mental distress.
  • Because R.C. 2903.214(C)(1) requires only a showing that the respondent has violated R.C. 2903.211, a petitioner for a civil stalking protection order need only show:
    • a pattern of conduct, and
    • a knowing causation of the victim’s belief that the offender will cause physical harm or mental distress.

Judgment: The court affirms the Fifth District’s judgment, resolving the conflict in favor of the “belief-based” interpretation for both physical harm and mental distress.

Chief Justice Kennedy dissents, joined conceptually by Justice Brunner. Kennedy would hold that the statute is grievously ambiguous and, under the rule of lenity, must be construed to require actual mental distress for liability (while still allowing belief in future physical harm).

Detailed Analysis

I. Statutory Framework

A. Menacing by stalking – R.C. 2903.211(A)(1)

The relevant portion of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) reads (ellipsis and emphasis as in the opinion):

No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person . . . or cause mental distress to the other person . . . .

The second sentence of that division provides an evidentiary clarification:

In addition to any other basis for the other person's belief that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person . . . or mental distress to the other person . . . , the other person's belief or mental distress may be based on words or conduct of the offender that are directed at or identify a corporation, association, or other organization that employs the other person or to which the other person belongs.

Two key features:

  • The statute criminalizes certain conduct (a “pattern of conduct”) coupled with a knowing mental state and specified consequences to the victim (fear of physical harm or mental distress).
  • The same language defines the offense for criminal prosecution and also serves as the factual predicate for civil stalking protection orders under R.C. 2903.214.

B. Civil stalking protection orders – R.C. 2903.214

R.C. 2903.214(C)(1) allows a person to petition for a civil stalking protection order (CSPO) by filing a petition alleging that the respondent engaged in a violation of R.C. 2903.211 against the person to be protected.

The statute thus uses the same underlying offense definition—menacing by stalking—as the basis for:

  • criminal liability under R.C. 2903.211, and
  • civil injunctive relief via a protection order under R.C. 2903.214.

Violation of a CSPO is itself a separate criminal offense under R.C. 2919.27(A)(2) and (B), which further heightens the importance of correctly defining the elements of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).

II. Precedents and Prior Case Law

A. Conflicting appellate interpretations

Before Z.J. v. R.M., Ohio’s appellate courts had split into two camps over the “mental distress” element of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).

1. Cases requiring actual mental distress

  • Caban v. Ransome, 2009-Ohio-1034 (7th Dist.)
    The Seventh District closely parsed the statutory text and concluded that:
    • The phrase “to believe” in R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) modified “physical harm” but not “mental distress.”
    • The repetition of “to the other person” after both “physical harm” and “mental distress” suggested that the General Assembly intended “belief” to attach only to physical harm.
    • Therefore, for mental distress, the statute required proof that the offender actually caused mental distress to the victim, not merely that the victim believed it would occur.
  • Smith v. Wunsch, 2005-Ohio-3498 (4th Dist.)
    The Fourth District, though not engaging in detailed textual analysis, evaluated whether the offender’s pattern of conduct caused the victim mental distress, treating actual distress as an element.
  • State v. Payne, 2008-Ohio-5447 (9th Dist.)
    Similarly, the Ninth District examined whether the evidence proved that the offender’s conduct caused mental distress, assuming that actual distress is required.

These cases collectively stand for the proposition that, while the statute clearly allows a “belief in future physical harm” to suffice, it requires “actual mental distress” for the mental-distress prong.

2. Cases allowing belief in future mental distress

  • Bloom v. Macbeth, 2008-Ohio-4564 (5th Dist.)
    The Fifth District held that a petitioner need not have experienced mental distress so long as the respondent’s conduct caused the petitioner to believe the respondent would cause physical harm or mental distress in the future. It effectively treated “physical harm” and “mental distress” in parallel as objects of the victim’s belief.
  • State v. Horsley, 2006-Ohio-1208 (10th Dist.)
    The Tenth District assumed, without explicit grammatical analysis, that the statute prohibits conduct that causes a victim to believe the offender will cause mental distress, and evaluated the evidence accordingly.

Thus, by the time of Z.J. v. R.M., Ohio had a relatively mature but inconsistent body of appellate law on this question.

B. Prior recognition of the conflict – Fondessy v. Simon

The Supreme Court had already recognized this precise interpretive conflict in Fondessy v. Simon, 2013-Ohio-5096, but ultimately dismissed that case as improvidently certified in 2014 (2014-Ohio-4638). Then-Justice (now Chief Justice) Kennedy dissented from the dismissal, cataloguing the split and warning of:

  • uncertainty for trial courts and litigants, and
  • unequal treatment of similarly situated parties across appellate districts.

Z.J. v. R.M. is the court’s eventual response to that unresolved conflict.

C. General interpretive authorities cited

The majority situates its analysis within a strongly textualist interpretive framework, citing:

  • Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (1902) – the classic Ohio formulation: courts ask not what the General Assembly intended to enact, but what is the meaning of what it did enact.
  • Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 2003-Ohio-1099 and Summerville v. Forest Park, 2010-Ohio-6280 – when statutory language is plain and unambiguous, courts must apply it as written.
  • Wayt v. DHSC, L.L.C., 2018-Ohio-4822 and Ceccarelli v. Levin, 2010-Ohio-5681 – statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo.
  • Vossman v. AirNet Sys., Inc., 2020-Ohio-872 and Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc. v. Testa, 2018-Ohio-5207 – statutes must be read as a whole, not word by word in isolation.

The majority also leans heavily on usage and grammar authorities—Chicago Manual of Style, Garner’s Modern English Usage, and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary— to analyze sentence structure and parallelism in R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).

The dissent likewise invokes textualist tools and the treatise by Scalia & Garner (Reading Law), but concludes that the statute remains “grievously ambiguous,” thus triggering the rule of lenity.

III. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The core textual issue: What does “believe” modify?

Everything turns on the grammar of this part of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1):

… shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person . . . or cause mental distress to the other person . . . .

Two competing readings emerged in the lower courts:

  1. Two different injuries:
    • The offender, by a pattern of conduct, knowingly causes:
      1. the victim to believe the offender will cause physical harm, or
      2. the victim to suffer actual mental distress.
    • Here, “believe” only modifies the physical-harm clause; “cause mental distress” stands as an independent alternative object of “shall knowingly.”
  2. Two parallel beliefs:
    • The offender, by a pattern of conduct, knowingly causes the victim to believe the offender will:
      1. cause physical harm to the victim, or
      2. cause mental distress to the victim.
    • Here, “believe” modifies both “physical harm” and “mental distress” in a parallel structure.

The majority adopts the second reading; the dissent deems both plausible and concludes that the statute is ambiguous.

B. Majority’s grammatical analysis

Justice Hawkins approaches the statute as essentially a simple sentence with a complex object. The majority’s key points:

  1. Subject–verb–object structure.
    • Subject: “No person”
    • Verb: “shall knowingly cause”
    • Immediate object: “another person”
    But because “cause” is a transitive verb (it requires an object that completes the idea), the sentence is incomplete unless we know what the other person is being caused to do or believe. The phrase “to believe that the offender will cause …” supplies that.
  2. The role of “to believe.”

    Without “to believe,” the portion “shall knowingly cause another person” is grammatically incomplete. Thus, the object of “cause” is:

    another person to believe that the offender will cause …
    which must then carry through to the rest of the sentence.
  3. Parallelism in the back half.

    The second half of the sentence, beginning with “that the offender will cause,” sets out what the victim believes the offender will do. It contains two parallel phrases:

    • “cause physical harm to the other person,” and
    • “cause mental distress to the other person.”

    Both begin with “cause,” creating a symmetrical, parallel construction. Under standard principles of parallelism (drawn from Garner and the Chicago Manual of Style), parallel units are understood to be of equal grammatical and semantic status. Therefore, the belief in what “the offender will cause” applies equally to physical harm and mental distress.

  4. The function of “the other person.”

    The statute first uses “another person” (indefinite) and then repeats “the other person” with a definite article. The majority treats this as a “continuity” signal:

    • The “other person” in both the physical-harm and mental-distress clauses is the same person introduced as “another person.”
    • This consistency supports reading “to believe” as governing the entire sequence of consequences the offender might cause to that person (physical harm or mental distress).

From this grammatical analysis, the majority concludes that the only coherent reading is that the offender must not cause the victim to believe that the offender will cause physical harm or mental distress.

C. The second sentence as contextual confirmation

The majority then looks to the second sentence of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) for confirmation. That sentence concerns what can count as a “basis for the other person’s belief” and for proof of mental distress. Key steps in the majority’s reasoning:

  1. “The other person’s belief.”

    The second sentence opens with:

    In addition to any other basis for the other person's belief that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person . . . or mental distress to the other person . . . ,

    This phrase, says the court, mirrors the structure of the first sentence and again identifies two possible beliefs: belief that the offender will cause physical harm, and belief that the offender will cause mental distress.

  2. Grammatical coherence if belief modifies both harms.

    The majority shows that if one tries to separate belief from mental distress (so that belief relates only to physical harm while “mental distress” stands alone as actual distress), the second sentence becomes grammatically “nonsensical” or “syntactically violent.” For example, it would read essentially:

    In addition to any other basis for the other person's … mental distress to the other person …

    which is linguistically awkward and incomplete. By contrast, reading “belief” as modifying both “physical harm” and “mental distress” yields a smooth and natural construction.

Thus, for both the first and second sentences, the majority finds that a belief in future mental distress is one of the specifically contemplated bases for liability.

D. Rejection of R.M.’s and the dissent’s textual counterarguments

1. Response to Caban and the “to the other person” repetition

R.M. relies on the Seventh District’s logic in Caban v. Ransome, which stressed the repeated phrase “to the other person” as indicating that “to believe” applies only to physical harm. The majority responds:

  • Repetition alone does not determine what “believe” modifies.
  • Breaking the sentence at the point suggested by Caban produces an:
    • acceptable clause for physical harm (cause another person to believe the offender will cause physical harm), but
    • a problematic clause for mental distress (cause mental distress to the other person, without a clear subject linkage or antecedent).
  • That reading disrupts the natural flow from “shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause…” through both types of harm.
2. Rule of lenity and policy arguments

R.M. argues, and the dissent agrees, that:

  • the statute is ambiguous, and
  • under the rule of lenity, any ambiguity in a penal statute must be resolved in favor of the accused.

The majority’s response:

  • The statute is not ambiguous; it is simply syntactically complex. Once grammatical and contextual tools are applied, a single coherent reading emerges.
  • The rule of lenity (R.C. 2901.04(A), and cases like State v. Elmore, 2009-Ohio-3478) is a tool of last resort when a “reasonable doubt” about the meaning remains after “all the legitimate tools of interpretation” have been exhausted.
  • Because the majority finds the text clear when properly parsed, it declines to consider policy arguments or resort to lenity.

The majority also invokes R.C. 1.02(F)—which permits courts, when logic requires, to read “and” as “or” and vice versa— to respond to the dissent’s concern that the “belief or mental distress” wording in the second sentence introduces a contradiction. If necessary to maintain coherence, “or” can be understood in an inclusive or even conjunctive sense.

E. The dissent’s contrasting approach (Kennedy, C.J.)

Chief Justice Kennedy’s dissent accepts that the majority’s reading is possible but insists it is not obviously superior. Her core points:

  1. Two grammatically plausible readings of the first sentence.

    She offers a diagrammatic breakdown in which, after “shall knowingly,” the sentence splits into two branches:

    • “cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm …” and
    • “cause mental distress to the other person.”
    Both are grammatically acceptable, giving rise to genuine ambiguity.

  2. The second sentence is “self-contradictory.”

    Kennedy focuses on the second sentence’s structure:

    • The dependent clause references bases for the other person’s belief that the offender will cause physical harm or mental distress.
    • The main clause, however, allows certain evidence to prove the other person’s “belief or mental distress.”

    In her view, this shows the statute distinguishes between “belief” (tied to physical harm) and “mental distress” (as an actual condition), not two types of belief. The phrase “belief or mental distress” unambiguously treats them as different categories.

  3. Grievous ambiguity and the rule of lenity.

    Because:

    • both readings of the first sentence are grammatically viable, and
    • the second sentence is, in her words, “incoherent and unambiguously self-contradictory,”

    Kennedy concludes that R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) is “grievously ambiguous.” Under the codified rule of lenity (R.C. 2901.04(A)), criminal statutes must be interpreted strictly against the state, and only clearly proscribed conduct can result in liability. Therefore:

    • a belief that physical harm will occur (imminent or future) suffices, but
    • for mental distress, the accused must have actually caused mental distress, not merely a belief that such distress will occur.
  4. Practical and absurdity concerns.

    Kennedy also raises pragmatic questions:

    • How can a petitioner realistically prove that the respondent knew his conduct would cause the victim to believe that he or she will suffer a mental condition severe enough to qualify as “mental distress” under the statute at some unspecified future time?
    • The statutory definition of “mental distress” (R.C. 2903.211(D)(2)) requires:
      • a mental condition involving temporary substantial incapacity, or
      • a condition that would normally require psychiatric/psychological or other mental-health services.
    • Under the majority’s reading, an offender who actually causes such severe mental distress could theoretically escape liability if the victim did not also believe future harm would occur. Kennedy calls that an “absurd result.”

Kennedy would resolve the conflict by holding that:

R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) requires a victim either to believe that physical harm is imminent or to experience mental distress before a court may issue a civil stalking protection order.

IV. Impact and Future Implications

A. Unification of Ohio law on menacing by stalking

First and foremost, Z.J. v. R.M. resolves a multi-district conflict and establishes a statewide, binding interpretation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1):

  • Belief standard for both harms. For both physical harm and mental distress, it is sufficient that the offender’s pattern of conduct knowingly causes the victim to believe that the offender will cause the harm.
  • No requirement of actual mental distress. A victim does not need to demonstrate that he or she already suffers from a qualifying mental illness or condition to prove a violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).

This interpretation will govern:

  • criminal prosecutions for menacing by stalking statewide, and
  • civil stalking protection order proceedings brought under R.C. 2903.214.

B. Lowering the threshold for civil stalking protection orders

By holding that belief in future mental distress is enough, the decision arguably:

  • Expands access to civil protection. Victims may obtain CSPOs before their mental health degrades to the point of “substantial incapacity” or the need for psychiatric/psychological treatment.
  • Aligns mental distress with physical harm. The statute now treats fear of serious psychological harm on equal footing with fear of physical violence.
  • Encourages early intervention. Courts can intervene earlier in escalating harassment or stalking situations, particularly where patterns of conduct foreseeably threaten emotional well-being but have not yet resulted in diagnosable illness.

At the same time, this broader reading may raise concerns about:

  • Subjectivity. “Belief” in future mental distress is inherently subjective. Trial courts retain responsibility to assess whether the belief is actually caused by the respondent’s knowing pattern of conduct and is reasonably grounded.
  • Potential misuse in interpersonal disputes. Given the mutual hostility evident in this case, practitioners may anticipate more attempts to weaponize CSPO proceedings during contentious divorces or family conflicts, with parties each claiming fear of future mental harm.

C. Implications for criminal prosecutions under R.C. 2903.211

Although Z.J. v. R.M. arose from a civil CSPO context, the court’s interpretation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) applies equally to criminal prosecutions:

  • Prosecutors may now charge menacing by stalking based on proof that:
    • the defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct,
    • knowingly, and
    • caused the victim to believe that the defendant will cause either physical harm or mental distress.
  • They do not have to prove the victim has already developed a qualifying mental condition.

This may expand the range of conduct that can be prosecuted, especially where:

  • the conduct is intimidation or harassment aimed at causing psychological harm, or
  • the victim’s mental health is threatened but not yet clinically compromised.

However, the mens rea (“knowingly”) and the requirement of a “pattern of conduct” remain important safeguards. The prosecution must still show that the defendant was aware that his conduct would probably cause the victim to hold such a belief.

D. Practical guidance for courts and practitioners

In light of Z.J. v. R.M., practitioners and trial courts should adjust their approach in several respects:

  • Pleading and proof.
    • Petitions and indictments alleging mental distress under R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) should focus on:
      • the respondent’s pattern of conduct,
      • evidence that the respondent knew the conduct would likely cause the victim to fear future mental harm,
      • the victim’s testimony or other evidence of that belief.
    • Medical or psychological expert evidence of actual mental illness is no longer needed to satisfy the statute, although it may remain relevant to sentencing, damages, or credibility.
  • Judicial findings.
    • Trial courts should explicitly find that:
      • a “pattern of conduct” exists;
      • the respondent acted “knowingly”; and
      • the conduct caused the victim to believe that the respondent will cause physical harm or mental distress.
    • If the belief is arguably unreasonable or manufactured, courts must scrutinize causation and credibility.

E. Potential constitutional and policy questions

Although not addressed in the opinion, the broadened reach of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) may prompt:

  • First Amendment challenges where the pattern of conduct consists largely of speech (e.g., insulting or accusatory social media posts), especially in cases like this one involving mutual provocation.
  • Vagueness or overbreadth challenges focused on whether a law that criminalizes causing a belief in future mental distress provides sufficient notice and objective standards.

The majority’s heavy reliance on textual grammar, rather than legislative purpose or policy, means those issues remain for future litigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Menacing by stalking (R.C. 2903.211(A)(1))

Menacing by stalking is an offense that occurs when:

  • A person engages in a pattern of conduct (two or more actions closely related in time),
  • Knowingly (the person is aware that their conduct will probably cause a certain result), and
  • Causes another person to:
    • believe the offender will cause physical harm, or
    • believe the offender will cause mental distress.

After Z.J. v. R.M., “mental distress” in this context refers to what the victim believes the offender will cause in the future, not to a mental condition the victim already has at the time of the offense.

2. Civil stalking protection order (CSPO) – R.C. 2903.214

A CSPO is a court order that can:

  • forbid the respondent from contacting or approaching the petitioner,
  • restrict the respondent’s presence at certain locations, and
  • impose other conditions to protect the petitioner.

To obtain a CSPO, the petitioner must allege and prove that the respondent’s conduct violates R.C. 2903.211. The standard of proof is civil (preponderance of the evidence), not criminal (beyond a reasonable doubt), but the underlying statutory elements are the same.

3. “Mental distress” under R.C. 2903.211(D)(2)

Although the majority does not dwell on it, the statute defines “mental distress” as:

  • any mental illness or condition that involves some temporary substantial incapacity, or
  • any mental illness or condition that would normally require psychiatric, psychological, or other mental-health services, even if no treatment is actually sought or received.

The dissent emphasizes this definition to argue that proving a belief in such a serious future condition is conceptually difficult. The majority, however, treats mental distress as one of the harms the victim can reasonably fear, paralleling fear of physical harm.

4. “Certified conflict” between appellate districts

Under the Ohio Constitution and Appellate Rules, when one court of appeals concludes that its decision conflicts with a decision of another district on the same question of law, it can “certify” the conflict to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court then decides whether a real conflict exists and, if so, resolves it. That process ensures uniform statewide interpretation of Ohio statutes.

5. Rule of lenity – R.C. 2901.04(A)

The rule of lenity is a principle of criminal statutory interpretation:

  • When a criminal statute remains grievously ambiguous after applying all legitimate interpretive tools,
  • Courts must interpret it strictly against the state and in favor of the accused.

Chief Justice Kennedy argues that R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) reaches this level of ambiguity and thus requires reading “mental distress” as an actual condition rather than a feared future harm. The majority disagrees, finding no such ambiguity after its grammatical analysis.

6. R.C. 1.02(F): Interchangeability of “and” and “or”

Ohio’s general definitional statute, R.C. 1.02(F), provides that:

“And” may be read “or,” and “or” may be read “and” if the sense requires it.

The majority relies on this to address the phrase “the other person’s belief or mental distress” in the second sentence of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). To the extent the “or” causes interpretive difficulty, the court suggests it may be read conjunctively or inclusively to preserve coherent meaning.

Conclusion

Z.J. v. R.M. is a pivotal decision in Ohio’s stalking jurisprudence and statutory interpretation. At its core, the court announces and applies a clear rule:

Under R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), a victim’s belief that an offender will cause mental distress is sufficient to establish a violation of the menacing-by-stalking statute, just as a belief in future physical harm is sufficient. Actual mental distress need not be shown for purposes of criminal liability or for obtaining a civil stalking protection order.

The court reaches this conclusion through an exacting textual and grammatical analysis of the statute’s two key sentences, resisting appeals to legislative intent or policy and rejecting the application of the rule of lenity. It thereby unifies conflicting appellate precedents and clarifies the elements of menacing by stalking statewide.

The dissents underscore that reasonable textualists can disagree on whether the statute is truly unambiguous, and they highlight significant practical and conceptual concerns about proof and potential absurd results. Nonetheless, unless and until the General Assembly amends R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), Ohio law now firmly treats fear of serious mental harm as a prospective injury on par with fear of physical harm, broadening the reach of both criminal liability and civil protective relief in stalking cases.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Judge(s)

Hawkins, J.

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