Younger-Based Dismissals Are NOT § 1915(g) “Strikes” & Strikes Are Counted Only as of the Filing Date: Burrell v. Shirley, 4th Cir. 2025

1. Introduction

In Burrell v. Shirley, No. 23-6791 (4th Cir. Jul. 1, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit clarified two critical facets of the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s three-strike provision (28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)):

1. A dismissal grounded in Younger v. Harris abstention does not count as a “strike.”
2. Even a dismissal that would otherwise qualify as a strike cannot be tallied if it occurred after the prisoner filed the action in which § 1915(g) is invoked.

The appellant, Virginia inmate Joel Aaron Burrell, challenged the district court’s denial of in forma pauperis (IFP) status on the basis that he supposedly had three prior “strikes.” The Fourth Circuit held that Burrell actually had only one strike when he filed his complaint and therefore vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding #1 – Younger abstention ≠ strike. A federal court’s abstention under Younger does not involve any merits determination; therefore, such a dismissal is not a dismissal “for failure to state a claim,” nor is it “frivolous or malicious” within § 1915(g).
• Holding #2 – Timing of strike assessment. Strikes are counted as of the date the prisoner files the suit or appeal at issue. A later dismissal—even if fitting § 1915(g)’s wording—cannot be retroactively added to the prisoner’s tally for that case.
• Disposition. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying IFP status and dismissing the complaint, granted Burrell IFP status for the appeal, and remanded the matter for merits adjudication.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607 (4th Cir. 2013).
  Established that courts “look to the actual grounds” of dismissal rather than mere labels. Guided the majority to focus on the substantive reason for Burrell’s prior dismissals.
• Taylor v. Grubbs, 930 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2019).
  Confirmed strikes must be counted “as of the moment the complaint is filed.” Provided the doctrinal backbone for rejecting the post-filing Anderson dismissal as a strike.
• Brunson v. Stein, 116 F.4th 301 (4th Cir. 2024).
  Held that dismissals under the Heck bar are strikes because they rest on plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable claim. Helped illustrate why Younger-based dismissals differ: the court never evaluates the complaint’s legal sufficiency.
• Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2006) & Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
  Reinforced that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to exhaust are not strikes—analogous reasoning applied to Younger.
• Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2017).
  Persuasively treated a dismissal entered after plaintiff ignored leave-to-amend orders as a strike; adopted by the Fourth Circuit regarding Burrell’s Anderson lawsuit.
• Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S. 595 (2020).
  Clarified that a dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a strike regardless of prejudice, but emphasized that granting leave to amend mid-litigation does not itself yield a strike. The panel reconciled Lomax with its Anderson analysis.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Substance over form. Per Blakely, the court inspected the true basis of prior dismissals. Mere referencing of § 1915A(b)(1) language in the order dismissing “Unknown” did not convert a Younger-based abstention into a Rule 12(b)(6) merits dismissal.
2. Functional comparison. The panel likened Younger abstention to jurisdictional or exhaustion-based dismissals—each prevents merits adjudication and therefore falls outside § 1915(g).
3. But-for causation in Anderson. Although labeled “non-compliance,” the Anderson dismissal’s precipitating force was an earlier finding that the complaint failed to state a claim; had Burrell amended, dismissal would not have issued. Under Harris, that constitutes a strike in principle.
4. Temporal cut-off. Relying on § 1915(g)’s text (“prior occasions”) and Taylor, the court declared strikes must exist before the action is filed, so Anderson—dismissed six days after Burrell sued—could not be counted in this particular proceeding.

3.3 Likely Impact on Future Litigation

• Narrower Strike Accounting. District courts across the Fourth Circuit must exclude Younger abstention dismissals when tabulating strikes, shrinking many prisoners’ strike tallies.
• Heightened Record Scrutiny. Clerks and judges must examine the substantive grounds of prior dismissals—not merely docket notations citing § 1915A or Rule 12(b)(6).
• Timing Vigilance. Courts must look at the calendar: any qualifying dismissal that post-dates the new filing cannot be used to deny IFP status in that case, though it will count in later suits.
• Strategic Litigation Behavior. Prisoner-plaintiffs may hasten filings before potentially adverse rulings in other pending cases; conversely, defendants may seek prompt resolution of motions to dismiss to mature strikes earlier.
• Uniformity Beyond the Fourth Circuit. Given parallel reasoning from the Ninth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits, the decision fortifies an emerging consensus and may deter forum-shopping.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

In forma pauperis (IFP)

Permission to sue or appeal without prepaying court fees because of indigence; governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) & Three-Strike Rule

1996 statute aimed at curbing excessive prisoner litigation. After three qualifying dismissals (“strikes”), a prisoner must prepay full filing fees unless under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Strike

A prior case or appeal dismissed as (1) frivolous, (2) malicious, or (3) for failure to state a claim. Certain other dismissals—jurisdictional, exhaustion-based, Younger abstention—do not qualify.

Younger Abstention

Doctrine requiring federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state criminal (or certain civil) proceedings when the state forum provides an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims.

Failure to State a Claim (Rule 12(b)(6) / § 1915A(b)(1))

Dismissal on the merits of the complaint’s legal sufficiency—assumes all factual allegations true but finds no violation of law can be shown.

5. Conclusion

Burrell v. Shirley delivers two concrete teachings: First, abstention-based dismissals—particularly those under Younger—fall outside § 1915(g)’s definition of a strike because they bypass merits analysis. Second, the three-strike calculus is fixed at the moment of filing; courts may not retroactively add later dismissals to bar a prisoner’s IFP application in that same case. The decision sharpens the Fourth Circuit’s PLRA jurisprudence, promotes doctrinal coherence with sister circuits, and ensures that indigent prisoners are not prematurely stripped of access to the courts. Practitioners and courts alike must now pay closer attention to both the nature and the timing of prior dismissals when applying the PLRA’s gatekeeping mechanism.