Young v. State: Nevada Adopts a Unified Juror-Bias Standard Under NRS 16.050 and NRCrP 17(6), Partially Overruling Sayedzada; Clarifies “Larceny from the Person” Instruction

Introduction

In Young (Andrew) v. State, 141 Nev., Advance Opinion 47 (Oct. 16, 2025), the Supreme Court of Nevada (en banc) affirms in part and reverses in part a multi-count theft-related judgment arising from a series of wallet thefts targeting elderly victims in Clark County. The opinion resolves two significant issues with statewide implications:

It reshapes Nevada’s juror-bias doctrine by adopting a unified, ground-based approach under NRS 16.050 and NRCrP 17(6), and expressly overrules the Nevada Court of Appeals’ decision in Sayedzada v. State, 134 Nev. 283, 419 P.3d 184 (Ct. App. 2018), to the extent Sayedzada mandated category-driven analysis (actual/implied/inferable) that renders juror assurances irrelevant or dictates per se excusal.
It reaffirms and enforces the narrow scope of “larceny from the person” under Terral v. State, 84 Nev. 412, 442 P.2d 465 (1968), as clarified in Ibarra v. State, 134 Nev. 582, 426 P.3d 16 (2018), holding that an instruction equating “from the person” with mere “reach, inspection, observation, disposition, or control” misstates Nevada law.

The case arises from a pattern of thefts between June and August 2020, during which Andrew Young, often with an accomplice, surreptitiously removed wallets from the purses or pockets of nine victims aged 60 or older and then used (or attempted to use) their payment cards. Verdicts returned guilty on most counts; two fraudulent-use counts resulted in acquittals. Young received large habitual criminal sentences on nine counts, resulting in an aggregate life term with parole eligibility after 90 years.

Summary of the Opinion

Juror bias: The Court holds that trial courts must assess challenges for cause under NRS 16.050 and NRCrP 17(6) without letting the labels actual, implied, or inferable bias dictate distinct procedures or outcomes. Juror assurances of impartiality remain relevant. Sayedzada is overruled to the extent it required category-driven analysis rendering juror statements irrelevant or suggesting the category controls whether excusal is mandatory.
Application: Based on a juror’s note offering monetary assistance to elderly victims, the district court properly canvassed the juror, credited assurances of impartiality, and denied a mistrial; no abuse of discretion occurred.
Jury instructions: An instruction that allowed “from the person” to include property within a victim’s reach/observation/etc. was a plain misstatement of Nevada law. Prejudice existed only for one larceny-from-the-person count (count 2), where the purse was on a chair next to the victim; that conviction is reversed. Other larceny-from-the-person counts stand because the purses were held or worn.
Sufficiency of the evidence: Surveillance footage, corroborated by investigative testimony (including identification based on a prior in-person encounter and distinctive features), provided sufficient evidence for the burglary and theft-related convictions.
Evidentiary rulings (unpreserved): No plain error in brief references arguably touching on other acts, officer narration of surveillance, identification testimony, or hearsay; any errors were fleeting, clarified, or harmless given overwhelming evidence.
Habitual criminal adjudication: Seven qualifying felony convictions were established, even crediting Young’s challenges to some priors; no separate hearing was required absent denial under NRS 207.016(3); under Almendarez-Torres, prior convictions need not be found by a jury. Ineffective-assistance claims are not considered on direct appeal.
Cumulative error: Only the instructional error on count 2 was prejudicial; the remaining errors were minor; the evidence of guilt was strong. No cumulative error.
Disposition: Affirmed in part; reversed as to count 2 (larceny from the person, 60+); remanded to strike count 2 and enter an amended judgment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Juror impartiality and mistrial standards

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), and Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982): Define the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, emphasizing a juror’s capability and willingness to decide based solely on the evidence.
Sorce v. State, 88 Nev. 350, 497 P.2d 902 (1972): Abuse-of-discretion review for mistrials; mistrial may be warranted where jurors are biased and will not deliberate honestly.
Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 17 P.3d 397 (2001); Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779, 121 P.3d 567 (2005): Trial courts have broad discretion in for-cause rulings and are best positioned to assess demeanor.
Hall v. State, 89 Nev. 366, 513 P.2d 1244 (1973); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2007): Mid-trial juror issues are analyzed under the same cause standards as voir dire; the remedies differ.
Nelson v. Commonwealth, 589 S.E.2d 23 (Va. Ct. App. 2003): Abuse-of-discretion standard for seated juror cause challenges.
State v. Rojas, 868 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993): Illustrates the risk of juror sympathy where a case turns on the complainant’s credibility (distinguished in Young where victims’ credibility was not dispositive of identity).

Juror bias categories and Sayedzada overruled in part

Sayedzada v. State, 134 Nev. 283, 419 P.3d 184 (Ct. App. 2018): Adopted Torres’s tripartite framework (actual, implied, inferable bias) and suggested juror assurances become irrelevant for implied/inferable bias; also suggested the bias category can control whether excusal is mandatory.
United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997): Federal articulation of bias types, which Nevada now declines to adopt as a procedural template given its distinct statutory/rule framework.
Statutory and Rule context: Nevada’s NRS 16.050(1) and NRCrP 17(6) enumerate grounds for cause without differentiating processes by bias labels; the Legislature repealed earlier categorical bias statutes (former NRS 175.100, 175.105) in 1967, replacing them with the broader fairness standard in NRS 175.036(1).

Larceny-from-the-person scope

Terral v. State, 84 Nev. 412, 442 P.2d 465 (1968): “From the person” requires the property to be on/attached to the person or in actual possession; the offense targets pickpockets, purse snatchers, and similar invasions of personal privacy and carries felony treatment regardless of value.
Ibarra v. State, 134 Nev. 582, 426 P.3d 16 (2018): Clarifies Terral, emphasizing that “immediate presence” or constructive possession is insufficient for larceny-from-the-person under NRS 205.270.

Evidentiary standards and error review

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979): Sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard.
Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 956 P.2d 1378 (1998); McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 825 P.2d 571 (1992): Reinforce sufficiency and credibility assessment by the jury.
Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 412 P.3d 43 (2018): Defines plain error and its prejudice requirement; NRS 178.602 codifies review of unpreserved error.
Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 182 P.3d 106 (2008); Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 30 P.3d 1128 (2001): Evidentiary discretion; limiting instructions and their scope; Petrocelli hearings for NRS 48.045(2) other-acts evidence.
Burnside v. State, 131 Nev. 371, 352 P.3d 627 (2015): Officer/detective identification testimony based on prior contact and/or other admitted identification evidence is permissible; narration can assist the jury in understanding complex surveillance footage.
Tabish v. State, 119 Nev. 293, 72 P.3d 584 (2003): Harmless error analysis applies to hearsay.
Belcher v. State, 136 Nev. 261, 464 P.3d 1013 (2020): Invited error doctrine.

Habitual criminal adjudication

NRS 207.010(1)(b): “Large habitual criminal” requires seven prior felony convictions.
NRS 207.016(3): A separate hearing is required only if the defendant denies a prior conviction; otherwise not.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998): Prior convictions can be found by a judge; Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), acknowledges criticism but leaves Almendarez-Torres intact absent a direct challenge.

Legal Reasoning

1) Juror bias and mistrial

The Court emphasizes that Nevada’s framework for for-cause juror challenges is statutory/rule-based. Under NRS 16.050 and NRCrP 17(6), the question is whether any ground exists showing the juror cannot “adjudicate the facts fairly,” not which label of bias applies. The Court:

Rejects Sayedzada to the extent it imposes categorical procedures where juror assurances are “irrelevant” for implied/inferable bias or where the category alone dictates mandatory excusal.
Requires a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry: the court may consider the juror’s conduct, statements, background, relationships, and any situational facts (NRCrP 17(6)(M)-(O)). If bias is found under any rationale, the juror must be excused; otherwise, the juror may serve.
Applies this unified test to Juror No. 11, who expressed sympathy and offered personal funds to victims. Given that the occurrence of thefts was undisputed, the case hinged on identity (not complainant credibility). The juror’s history of helping crime victims, coupled with clear assurances of impartiality and willingness to follow instructions, supported a finding of no bias. The district court’s on-the-record canvass and demeanor assessment warranted deference. No abuse of discretion.

2) Defense argument in the juror’s presence

Defense counsel, after questioning, asserted in front of the juror that it was “blatantly obvious” the juror was not impartial. The trial court did not invite this and promptly halted further argument. Any potential prejudice stemmed from invited error—precluding relief on appeal.

3) Sufficiency of the evidence

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could find Young committed the charged burglaries and theft-related offenses. Surveillance videos, a contemporaneous in-person police encounter, and distinctive identifiers (e.g., clothing, draped jacket, unusual gait) tied Young to the conduct. Intent for burglary may be inferred from conduct and circumstances (e.g., entry, coordinated actions, immediate exit).

4) Evidentiary challenges (unpreserved)

No plain error was shown:

Other-acts references were fleeting/vague (e.g., “had problems before”) and not elicited by the State; overwhelming independent evidence mitigated any prejudice.
Detectives’ statements that they watched a lot of video did not necessarily imply uncharged conduct; they reasonably referred to numerous cameras covering the charged events.
Opinion (e.g., “smooth,” “experienced”) was clarified as based on observed conduct in the charged videos; the State further negated reliance on uncharged acts.
“Records check” testimony was clarified as tied to a citation for a charged offense, not prior crimes.
No Petrocelli hearing or limiting instruction was required where the State did not offer other-acts evidence under NRS 48.045(2) and no such objection was lodged.
Narration and identification testimony were proper: an officer with prior in-person contact may identify a defendant; detectives may identify based on other properly admitted identification evidence; narration aided the jury’s understanding of multi-camera, multi-location footage.
Hotel registration testimony—even if hearsay—was not preserved after an opportunity to lay foundation, and was harmless given the video evidence showing collaborative conduct in the elevator and immediate exit.

5) Jury instructions

Larceny-from-the-person (Instruction No. 10): Plain error. By allowing conviction if property was within reach/observation/control, the instruction contradicted Terral/Ibarra, which require the property to be on or attached to the victim, or held in actual physical possession. Prejudice existed only for count 2 (purse on a chair next to the victim), so that count is reversed. Burglary tied to that conduct stands because a theft still occurred; other larceny-from-the-person counts stand where purses were being held/worn.
Other instructions (Nos. 13, 14, 22, 23): Nos. 13 and 14 were requested by the defense (invited error), and none was clearly erroneous or prejudicial; Nos. 22 and 23 have been previously approved in Nevada caselaw (Blake; Guy).

6) Habitual criminal adjudication

The State’s proof supported at least seven qualifying felonies, even after crediting Young’s arguments about some priors (four Pennsylvania convictions and consolidations of Nevada convictions). No hearing under NRS 207.016(3) was required because Young did not deny any prior convictions. Under Almendarez-Torres (still controlling), a judge may find prior convictions—so no Apprendi violation. Ineffective-assistance claims are not reached on direct appeal.

7) Cumulative error

With only one prejudicial error (the larceny-from-the-person instruction on count 2) and strong evidence on the remaining counts, cumulative error does not warrant broader relief.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. Juror-bias doctrine in Nevada: a unified, statutory/rule-based standard

Trial courts will no longer use a category-driven framework (actual/implied/inferable) to dictate different analytic pathways or per se outcomes. Labels remain descriptive, but the operative inquiry is whether any enumerated ground under NRS 16.050 and NRCrP 17(6) shows the juror cannot adjudicate fairly.
Juror assurances of impartiality are relevant and may be credited where consistent with the totality of circumstances. This empowers trial judges to conduct focused canvasses and to make nuanced, case-specific determinations without fear that a category label will nullify a juror’s sworn assurances.
Defense and prosecution should build detailed records during voir dire and mid-trial canvasses that map to NRCrP 17(6)’s textual grounds (e.g., enmity or bias to either party; state of mind substantially impairing performance of duties; conduct/responses suggesting inability to follow law).
Expect fewer reversals premised solely on categorical presumptions and more deference to trial judges’ on-the-ground assessments.

B. Larceny-from-the-person: instruction and charging practice

Pattern or local instructions tracking “immediate presence,” “reach,” or “control” language must be revised. Those formulations are appropriate to robbery or certain constructive-possession settings, not to NRS 205.270.
Prosecutors should charge larceny-from-the-person only where proof shows the property was on/attached to the person or held at the time of the taking (e.g., pickpocketing; removing a wallet from a purse being worn or held). Where a purse is set down (e.g., chair beside a victim), the correct charge is typically grand/petty larceny or burglary, not larceny-from-the-person.
Defense counsel should scrutinize “from the person” elements and request appropriate instructions limiting the offense consistent with Terral/Ibarra; erroneous “immediate presence” language is reversible where prejudicial.

C. Evidence presentation in theft/burglary cases

Officer/detective narration and identification can be admissible and helpful when grounded in prior contact and/or previously admitted identification evidence; narration should be used to synchronize multi-camera timelines and clarify actions/mannerisms.
References implying other acts should be tightly cabined; prosecutors should avoid eliciting them, and defense counsel should object contemporaneously to preserve issues and trigger limiting instructions or Petrocelli hearings where applicable.

D. Habitual criminal sentencing practice

NRS 207.016(3) hearings are mandatory only upon a denial of prior convictions; absent denial, the court may proceed on certified records.
Almendarez-Torres remains operative in Nevada sentencing: judges can find the fact of prior convictions. Counsel should litigate only genuinely disputed facts beyond the existence of the conviction if seeking to implicate Apprendi.

E. Juror sympathy notes: calibrating responses mid-trial

Young distinguishes sympathy in cases where the occurrence of harm is undisputed and identity is the issue, from cases turning on complainant credibility (e.g., certain sexual assault cases). Trial courts should tailor canvasses accordingly, exploring whether sympathy implies premature judgments or an inability to follow instructions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1) Juror bias: actual, implied, inferable (labels) vs. Nevada’s current approach

Labels:
- Actual bias: a juror admits or displays partiality that prevents impartial decision-making.
- Implied bias: relationships or circumstances that, as a matter of law, typically disqualify a juror (e.g., close relation to a party).
- Inferable bias: facts suggesting a significant risk of partiality even if not amounting to a per se rule.
Young’s rule: Regardless of labels, Nevada courts assess cause challenges under NRS 16.050 and NRCrP 17(6). Juror assurances are relevant; trial courts decide based on the totality whether the juror can adjudicate fairly. If the court finds bias under any theory, the juror must be excused.

2) Plain error review

Applies when the appellant did not object in the trial court.
Requires an error that is clear from a straightforward reading of the record and current law, and that affects substantial rights (i.e., causes actual prejudice or a grossly unfair outcome).

3) Larceny from the person (NRS 205.270) vs. immediate presence

Larceny-from-the-person requires the item to be on/attached to the victim or in actual physical possession at the time of the taking.
Immediate presence, reach, observation, or constructive control is not enough for this offense (though it may satisfy other crimes, such as robbery or general larceny).
Examples:
- Qualifies: Removing a wallet from a purse being worn on the shoulder or held in hand.
- Does not qualify: Taking a purse from a chair next to the victim.

4) Officer/detective narration and identification

Permissible where based on prior direct contact or other lawfully admitted identification evidence.
Useful to explain complex, multi-camera timelines, movements, and mannerisms otherwise difficult for jurors to synthesize.

5) Petrocelli hearing and limiting instruction

Petrocelli hearings are required when the State seeks to admit other-acts evidence under NRS 48.045(2) for a non-propensity purpose (e.g., motive, intent, identity), and a defense objection triggers the court’s gatekeeping.
Limiting instructions are appropriate when evidence is admitted for a limited, permissible purpose; if the State is not offering other-acts evidence under 48.045(2), neither is required.

6) Habitual criminal sentencing

NRS 207.010(1)(b) (“large habitual”): requires seven prior felony convictions.
NRS 207.016(3): a separate hearing is required only if the defendant denies a prior conviction.
Under Almendarez-Torres, a judge may find the fact of prior convictions; no jury finding is constitutionally required for that fact alone.

7) Invited error

A party cannot complain on appeal about an error it induced or invited (e.g., requesting an instruction later challenged as erroneous; making argumentative statements in front of a juror over the court’s protocol).

Conclusion

Young v. State is a consequential en banc decision that clarifies two recurring trial issues in Nevada criminal practice. First, it replaces a category-driven juror-bias framework with a unified, statutory/rule-based analysis grounded in NRS 16.050 and NRCrP 17(6), restoring the centrality of the trial judge’s totality-of-the-circumstances assessment and the relevance of juror assurances. In doing so, the Court partially overrules Sayedzada’s categorical approach and underscores that bias labels do not dictate procedure or per se outcomes.

Second, the Court reinforces Terral and Ibarra’s narrow conception of “larceny from the person,” rejecting instructions that dilute the element by importing “immediate presence” or “reach/control” concepts. That correction resulted in the reversal of one larceny-from-the-person count where the property was not on the victim’s person, while leaving intact other counts that aligned with the statute’s intended coverage (pickpocketing/purse snatching).

The remainder of the opinion offers practical guidance: contemporaneous objections matter; officer/detective identification and narration may be appropriate when anchored in proper foundations; and habitual criminal adjudications hinge on documented priors, not jury findings, absent denial. Ultimately, the decision affirms the convictions except for count 2, and remands for entry of an amended judgment, while establishing durable procedural rules likely to guide voir dire, mid-trial juror inquiries, and instruction drafting in Nevada courts for years to come.