Without an Applicant, No De Novo Appeal: Non‑Applicant Standing to Challenge Vermont Environmental Permit Denials after In re Lake Bomoseen

Without an Applicant, No De Novo Appeal: Non‑Applicant Standing to Challenge Vermont Environmental Permit Denials after In re Lake Bomoseen Association and Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust Denial

1. Introduction

The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in In re Lake Bomoseen Association and Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust Denial (Lindsey C. Waterhouse, Appellant), 2025 VT 59, confronts an unusual but increasingly important problem in environmental law: can a supporter of a denied environmental permit, who is not himself an applicant, keep the application alive on appeal when the actual applicants decline to pursue it?

The Court answers that question firmly in the negative. It holds that:

  • The Environmental Division cannot conduct a de novo appeal from a permit denial when no permit applicant is present to carry the statutory burden of proof; and
  • A non‑applicant supporter of a denied permit does not have statutory standing as a “person aggrieved” under 10 V.S.A. §§ 8502(7), 8504(a) where he has only generalized recreational and policy interests, and where no court order could result in a permit that anyone would actually be able or willing to use.

The Court also clarifies that a pro se individual cannot, without proper authorization and third‑party standing, appeal on behalf of an organization to challenge rulings that only affect that organization, such as the denial of its motion to be represented by a non‑attorney.

The decision therefore ties together several strands of Vermont law: the limited jurisdiction and de novo procedures of the Environmental Division, the meaning of “person aggrieved” in environmental appeals, the constitutional bar on advisory opinions, and strict limits on third‑party and non‑attorney representation of organizations.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The case arises from a joint application by:

  • Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust (LBPT),
  • Lake Bomoseen Association (LBA), and
  • SOLitude Lake Management,

for an aquatic nuisance control permit under 10 V.S.A. § 1455(c) to apply pesticides in Lake Bomoseen to control Eurasian watermilfoil. The Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) denied the application after concluding that the proposed treatment did not satisfy the statutory “acceptable risk to the nontarget environment” standard.

Lindsey C. Waterhouse, a Fair Haven resident, frequent user of the lake, retired bioenvironmental engineer, and board member of LBPT, had publicly supported the permit at the agency level. When ANR denied the permit, none of the co‑applicants appealed. Waterhouse, however, filed a pro se appeal to the Environmental Division, purporting to act as a “person aggrieved” under 10 V.S.A. § 8504.

The Environmental Division:

  • Dismissed Waterhouse’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and lack of standing because no permit applicant appeared in the de novo appeal and Waterhouse himself could not show a concrete, particularized, and redressable injury.
  • Denied LBPT’s motion to be represented by a non‑attorney (Waterhouse), and its resulting motion to intervene, after finding that LBPT had not satisfied the standards for lay representation of an organization.

On appeal, Waterhouse argued:

  1. The Environmental Division had jurisdiction to hear his appeal without participation by the permit applicants and erred in finding he lacked standing as a “person aggrieved.”
  2. The court wrongly denied LBPT’s motions for non‑attorney representation and intervention.

The Vermont Supreme Court:

  • Affirmed the dismissal of Waterhouse’s appeal, holding:
    • The Environmental Division could not conduct a de novo review of the permit denial without any applicant present, because 10 V.S.A. § 1455(d) places the burden on the applicant to demonstrate compliance with substantive criteria.
    • Waterhouse lacked statutory standing as a “person aggrieved” under 10 V.S.A. § 8502(7) and § 8504(a) because:
      • His interests in Lake Bomoseen were generalized recreational and policy interests, not “particularized” in the statutory sense; and
      • The courts could not redress his alleged injury (continuing impairment of the lake) because no permit applicant was before the court to receive and implement any permit, and Waterhouse conceded he could not use the permit himself.
  • Dismissed Waterhouse’s challenges to the denial of LBPT’s motions, holding that he lacked standing to raise LBPT’s rights on appeal.

Having resolved the case on jurisdiction and standing grounds, the Court expressly declined to address Waterhouse’s remaining objections to the Environmental Division’s rulings.

3. Factual and Procedural Background

3.1 The Permit Application

Eurasian watermilfoil, an invasive aquatic plant first identified in Lake Bomoseen in 1982, had become a persistent problem. LBPT, LBA, and SOLitude Lake Management jointly applied to ANR for an aquatic nuisance control permit under 10 V.S.A. § 1455(c) to use pesticides in the lake to control this species.

Section 1455(d) authorizes ANR to issue such a permit only if “the applicant demonstrates” that specific statutory criteria are satisfied, including that the pesticide use presents an “acceptable risk to the nontarget environment.”

ANR concluded that the proposed treatment did not meet those substantive standards and therefore denied the permit.

3.2 Waterhouse’s Appeal and the Co‑Applicants’ Silence

Waterhouse had submitted comments supporting the permit application. Although he did not own lakefront property, he:

  • Lived in the Town of Fair Haven near Lake Bomoseen,
  • Used the lake extensively for recreation and subsistence (fishing, boating, hunting, family gatherings), and
  • Served as a current LBPT board member and former LBA board member.

After ANR’s denial, none of the three co‑applicants appealed. Within thirty days, however, Waterhouse filed a pro se notice of appeal to the Environmental Division, identifying himself as a “person aggrieved.”

The Environmental Division immediately questioned how a non‑applicant, apparently acting independently of the applicants, could maintain an appeal of a permit denial that the applicants themselves had chosen not to challenge. ANR moved to dismiss, arguing:

  • The absence of any permit applicant rendered the case “procedurally moot,” and
  • Waterhouse lacked standing to bring the appeal.

3.3 LBPT’s Attempt to Enter the Case

In response, LBPT’s president, Luca Conte (a non‑attorney), moved to appear on behalf of LBPT and for LBPT to intervene. He explained that LBPT had initially decided not to “proactively appeal” and had instead planned to “await a decision” in Waterhouse’s case.

At a November 2024 hearing before the Environmental Division:

  • Waterhouse and several others appeared.
  • The president of LBA, Elizabeth Bird, stated that LBA was not participating in Waterhouse’s appeal.
  • No representative of SOLitude Lake Management appeared at all.
  • Conte, despite Waterhouse’s statements that he would attend, did not appear for LBPT.

The court reminded LBPT that:

  • Organizations generally must be represented by licensed attorneys.
  • Under Vt. Agency of Natural Resources v. Upper Valley Regional Landfill Corp., 159 Vt. 454, 621 A.2d 225 (1992), an organization may only be represented by a non‑attorney if it obtains leave of court and demonstrates, among other things, that:
    • The lay representative is duly authorized by the organization, and
    • The representative has adequate legal knowledge and skills such that the representation will not unduly burden opposing parties or the court.

The Environmental Division directed LBPT either to:

  • File a motion for leave to be represented by a non‑attorney compliant with Upper Valley, or
  • Retain counsel and file a supplemental motion to intervene.

Thereafter, a motion was filed bearing Conte’s signature, asking that Waterhouse—a non‑attorney—be allowed to represent LBPT.

3.4 The Environmental Division’s Rulings

In January 2025, after briefing, the Environmental Division:

  1. Dismissed Waterhouse’s appeal, holding:
    • The court “lack[ed] jurisdiction” to hear a de novo appeal of the permit denial in the absence of the co‑applicants, who bore the statutory burden of proof.
    • Given the applicants’ absence, Waterhouse also lacked standing as a “person aggrieved” under 10 V.S.A. § 8504(a) and § 8502(7) because he had not shown a concrete, particularized, and redressable injury.
  2. Denied LBPT’s motion for non‑attorney representation, finding that LBPT:
    • Had not adequately shown that Waterhouse was authorized to represent it, and
    • Had not demonstrated that Waterhouse possessed sufficient legal ability to represent LBPT without imposing undue burdens.
  3. Denied LBPT’s motion to intervene, because LBPT had no approved representative and had not retained counsel.

The Environmental Division treated all other motions as moot.

3.5 Appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court

Waterhouse appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, acting pro se. He argued:

  • The Environmental Division misunderstood the nature of its de novo review and wrongly concluded it lacked jurisdiction in the absence of the permit applicants.
  • He automatically had standing as a “person aggrieved” under 10 V.S.A. § 8504(a) and possessed a “right to be heard.”
  • The court erred in denying LBPT’s motions, emphasizing his qualifications as a retired bioenvironmental engineer and long‑time lake user and volunteer.

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and declined to disturb the Environmental Division’s decision.

4. Analysis

4.1 The Environmental Appeals Framework and De Novo Review

The Environmental Division is, as the Court reiterates, “a court of limited jurisdiction.” Under 10 V.S.A. § 8504(h), when an appeal is taken from an ANR decision, the Environmental Division:

  • Holds a de novo hearing on the appealed issues; and
  • Applies the same substantive standards that governed the decision below, but without deference to ANR’s conclusions.

Relying on In re Poole, 136 Vt. 242, 388 A.2d 422 (1978), the Court underscores that a de novo hearing is not an “on the record” review; it is “as though no action whatever had been held prior thereto,” and “all of the evidence is heard anew.”

In turn, the relevant substantive provision here is 10 V.S.A. § 1455(d), which authorizes ANR to issue an aquatic nuisance control permit if—and only if—“the applicant demonstrates” that certain criteria are met, including an “acceptable risk to the nontarget environment.”

This statutory structure is critical to the Court’s jurisdictional analysis:

  • The burden of proof in both the agency proceeding and the de novo appeal rests on the applicant.
  • Thus, for the Environmental Division to conduct a de novo permit‑denial appeal, there must be an actual permit applicant before the court to present evidence and attempt to satisfy § 1455(d).

Waterhouse argued that because the Environmental Division can consider evidence already in the ANR record, his appeal should have been allowed to proceed even without the applicants. The Supreme Court rejects this premise: whatever the evidentiary sources, the statutory burden remains on “the applicant,” and no one else can unilaterally step into that role.

In short, the Court effectively holds: without a participating applicant, the Environmental Division has nothing to adjudicate in a de novo permit‑denial appeal and therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear it.

4.2 Standing as a “Person Aggrieved” under 10 V.S.A. §§ 8502(7), 8504(a)

Even assuming the Environmental Division could have entertained a non‑applicant appeal, the Court holds that Waterhouse failed to establish standing as a “person aggrieved.”

4.2.1 Difference Between “Right to Appeal” and Standing

Waterhouse argued that because 10 V.S.A. § 8504(a) allows “any person aggrieved” to appeal ANR decisions, he “automatically” had standing and a “right to be heard.”

The Court rejects the conflation of filing capacity with standing, relying on Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 166 Vt. 337, 693 A.2d 1045 (1997) and Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 726 A.2d 477 (1998):

  • Standing is not the same as the mere ability to file a notice of appeal; it is:
    “gauged by the specific common‑law, statutory or constitutional claims that a party presents.”
  • A plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate standing on the face of the complaint or notice; otherwise, the court lacks subject‑matter jurisdiction.

Citing Brod v. Agency of Natural Resources, 2007 VT 87, the Court reiterates that without standing, any judicial decision would be an impermissible advisory opinion, which Vermont courts are constitutionally prohibited from issuing.

4.2.2 “Person Aggrieved”: Particularized Interest and Redressability

The definition of “person aggrieved” in 10 V.S.A. § 8502(7) has two prongs:

  1. The person must “allege[] an injury to a particularized interest protected by” the relevant law; and
  2. The injury must be one that “can be redressed by the Environmental Division or the Supreme Court.”

Drawing on In re Snowstone LLC Stormwater Discharge Authorization, 2021 VT 36, the Court defines a “particularized interest” as one that:

“sets the interests of the would‑be party apart from the general interests of others.”

In Snowstone, neighbors of a quarry had standing because the proposed stormwater system would direct polluted runoff onto their land—an impact different from that on the general public.

For redressability, the Court adopts the formulation from In re Acorn Energy Solar 2, LLC, 2021 VT 3: the plaintiff must show that “the court can remedy [the injury] by granting the sought‑after relief.”

4.2.3 Application to Waterhouse

On the particularized interest prong, the Court holds that Waterhouse’s interests are too generalized:

  • He lives near, but not on, Lake Bomoseen; he owns no shoreline property.
  • He uses the lake for recreation and subsistence—family gatherings, fishing, hunting, boating—activities widely shared by many Vermonters and visitors.
  • His professional expertise and volunteer roles (retired bioenvironmental engineer, board member of LBPT, former LBA board member) reflect important policy interests but do not distinguish him from other environmentally concerned members of the public.

The Court emphasizes that generalized recreational and policy interests in environmental quality—even if sincere and longstanding—do not by themselves establish the sort of “particularized” interest required by § 8502(7).

On redressability, the Court’s reasoning is equally decisive. Even if:

  • Waterhouse prevailed in the Supreme Court,
  • The case were remanded to the Environmental Division, and
  • The Environmental Division ultimately granted a permit,

there would still be no one to whom the permit could be meaningfully issued:

  • No original permit applicant was participating in the appeal.
  • Waterhouse himself conceded he could not use any issued permit.
  • He offered no evidence that any applicant—or any other qualified entity—would step in to implement the permit.

Thus, the Court concludes that no judicial order could actually remedy the injury Waterhouse alleges—the continued impairment of Lake Bomoseen by watermilfoil. Any ruling in his favor would be essentially advisory, with no concrete effect on the ground.

Because Waterhouse fails both the particularized‑interest and redressability components, he is not a “person aggrieved,” and the Environmental Division correctly dismissed his appeal for lack of standing.

A footnote in the opinion clarifies that although the trial court considered both statutory and constitutional standing, Waterhouse’s briefing to the Supreme Court only substantively addressed statutory standing; the Court therefore confines its analysis to that question.

4.3 Distinguishing In re DJK, LLC WW & WS Permit

Waterhouse relied on In re DJK, LLC WW & WS Permit, 2024 VT 34, to argue that non‑applicant appeals to the Environmental Division are “common practice.” In DJK, neighbors appealed a wastewater permit issued to a developer, alleging:

  • That the permitted system extended onto their property, and
  • That they suffered a taking and were denied procedural due process.

The Court distinguishes DJK in two ways:

  1. The nature of the injury:
    • In DJK, the appellants alleged a direct invasion of their property rights and violations of constitutional procedural rights.
    • By contrast, Waterhouse alleges generalized environmental and recreational harms from the denial of a permit, not a direct personal injury such as a taking of property.
  2. The role of the permit applicant:
    • In DJK, the permit applicant (DJK) itself was a party to the appeal, so the Environmental Division could conduct a full de novo review with an applicant present.
    • In Lake Bomoseen, no permit applicant appeared or sought to participate; Waterhouse stood alone.

Far from validating Waterhouse’s position, DJK simply illustrates that non‑applicants with their own direct injuries can appeal permits, especially where constitutional rights and property interests are at stake and where an applicant remains in the case.

4.4 Third‑Party Standing and the LBPT Motions

The second major piece of the opinion concerns Waterhouse’s attempt to challenge, in the Supreme Court, the Environmental Division’s refusal to:

  • Allow LBPT to be represented by a non‑attorney (Waterhouse), and
  • Permit LBPT to intervene.

Critically, LBPT did not itself appeal these rulings. Only Waterhouse did.

4.4.1 General Rule: No Third‑Party Standing

The Court reiterates the basic rule, drawing on cases including In re John L. Norris Trust, 143 Vt. 325, 465 A.2d 1385 (1983); Hinesburg Sand & Gravel; and Baird v. City of Burlington, 2016 VT 6:

  • The appellant must show that his own rights or interests were adversely affected by the judgment.
  • As a rule, a party may not rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.
  • Third‑party standing is disfavored and allowed only in narrow circumstances, typically where:
    • The appellant has a close relationship with the third party, and
    • The third party is unlikely or unable to assert its own rights.

In Baird, for example, a plaintiff could not challenge a trespass ordinance on behalf of people who had actually been cited or prosecuted under it, when she herself had not been targeted and those others could bring their own suits.

4.4.2 Application to Waterhouse and LBPT

Applying these principles, the Court holds that Waterhouse lacks standing to litigate LBPT’s rights on appeal:

  • The Environmental Division’s rulings on non‑attorney representation and intervention injured LBPT, not Waterhouse personally.
  • Waterhouse did not show:
    • That he was formally authorized to represent LBPT in the Supreme Court; or
    • That LBPT was unable or unlikely to assert its own rights (for example, through counsel or by filing its own appeal).

Without that showing, the Court treats Waterhouse’s attempt to raise LBPT’s issues as an impermissible effort to litigate another entity’s legal rights. It therefore declines to address whether the Environmental Division correctly applied Upper Valley in rejecting LBPT’s motion for non‑attorney representation, or whether the denial of intervention was proper.

The upshot is that the merits of LBPT’s corporate representation issues remain unresolved at the Supreme Court level in this case; the Environmental Division’s rulings stand simply because no party with standing chose to appeal them.

4.5 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s reasoning is grounded in, and consistent with, a line of Vermont cases on jurisdiction, standing, environmental appeals, and lay representation of organizations. In addition to cases already discussed, important precedents include:

  • Housing Our Seniors in Vermont, Inc. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development, 2024 VT 12
    Used for the standard of review: dismissals for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo, with all factual allegations by the nonmoving party taken as true.
  • Murray v. City of Burlington, 2012 VT 11 (mem.)
    Cited for the principle that on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, courts must accept all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and may dismiss only when it appears beyond doubt that no set of facts would entitle the plaintiff to relief.
  • Brod v. Agency of Natural Resources, 2007 VT 87
    Emphasizes that standing and subject‑matter jurisdiction are intertwined in Vermont; without standing, the court’s decision would be an advisory opinion and therefore unconstitutional.
  • In re DJK, LLC WW & WS Permit, 2024 VT 34
    Distinguished, as explained above, because it involved:
    • Non‑applicants who alleged direct violations of their property and due‑process rights;
    • A challenge to a permit issuance (not a denial); and
    • A participating permit applicant.
  • In re Snowstone LLC Stormwater Discharge Authorization, 2021 VT 36
    Provides the crucial definition of “particularized interest” and illustrates how neighbors adversely affected by stormwater runoff onto their own land have standing, in contrast to generalized users of public resources.
  • In re Acorn Energy Solar 2, LLC, 2021 VT 3
    Clarifies that redressability requires not just an abstract favorable ruling, but a remedy that will actually address the alleged injury.
  • Vt. Agency of Natural Resources v. Upper Valley Regional Landfill Corp., 159 Vt. 454, 621 A.2d 225 (1992)
    Establishes a four‑factor test for when a corporate or organizational entity may be represented by a lay person rather than a licensed attorney. Those factors include:
    • Formal authorization of the representative;
    • Representative’s competence and legal knowledge;
    • Nature and complexity of the case; and
    • Risk of burden or prejudice to other parties and the court.
    The Environmental Division applied Upper Valley in denying LBPT’s motion; the Supreme Court does not revisit the application because of Waterhouse’s lack of standing.
  • PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Systems, LLC, 2025 VT 50
    Cited for the proposition that in any case before the Supreme Court, the appellant bears the burden of establishing standing to raise a claim on appeal.
  • Lowell v. Department for Children & Families, 2024 VT 46
    Reminds that the interest of an injured party generally inures solely to that party; others may not claim relief based on those rights absent special circumstances.
  • Baird v. City of Burlington, 2016 VT 6 and In re John L. Norris Trust, 143 Vt. 325 (1983)
    Both reinforce the strong presumption against third‑party standing and the requirement that a litigant generally assert his own legal rights, not those of others.

Collectively, these cases provide the doctrinal scaffolding for the Court’s conclusions on standing, jurisdiction, and representation.

4.6 Impact and Future Implications

4.6.1 Limits on “Supporter” Appeals of Permit Denials

Most environmental standing disputes arise when opponents challenge permits that have been granted. Lake Bomoseen addresses a mirror‑image scenario: a supporter of a denied permit seeks to challenge the denial when the permit applicant itself is content not to pursue the matter.

The decision sends a clear signal:

  • Supporters of a permit, who are not applicants and lack a distinct property or legal interest, will almost never have standing to appeal a denial.
  • Even if they could show a particularized interest (for example, as riparian property owners whose use of their land is adversely affected by the absence of a control permit), they would also need to show redressability—i.e., that some applicant stands ready and willing to implement a permit if granted.

This sharply limits the ability of third‑party supporters to keep a permit application alive once the actual applicants decide not to appeal.

4.6.2 Necessity of Applicant Participation in De Novo Environmental Appeals

The opinion makes it practically and legally necessary, in permit‑denial appeals, that at least one permit applicant remain an active party:

  • Under statutes like 10 V.S.A. § 1455(d), only “the applicant” can satisfy the burden of proof on the substantive criteria.
  • The Environmental Division’s de novo jurisdiction is effectively premised on having such an applicant before it; without one, there is no statutory case to try.

Practitioners should therefore ensure that:

  • At least one co‑applicant files a timely appeal to the Environmental Division; or
  • A new or substituted applicant is properly added and recognized before or during the appeal, if state law and procedural rules permit.

Relying on allied “supporters” to prosecute an appeal, while original applicants stand aside, is no longer viable under Vermont law.

4.6.3 Narrowing of Recreational and Policy‑Based Standing

For environmental organizations and concerned citizens, the Court’s treatment of Waterhouse’s recreational and professional interests is sobering:

  • Frequent, meaningful use of a public natural resource (like a lake) for recreation and subsistence does not, by itself, create a “particularized interest” under § 8502(7), at least where that use is typical of many members of the public.
  • Professional expertise or volunteer leadership in environmental organizations likewise does not create a special legal interest distinct from that of other citizens.

Unlike some federal environmental standing doctrines that recognize “recreational use” as a qualifying interest when tied to a specific, regularly visited site, Vermont’s “particularized interest” requirement as applied here is narrower. It strongly favors:

  • Property‑based interests (such as landowners adjacent to or impacted by a project), and
  • Direct legal or constitutional injuries (takings, due‑process violations, etc.).

4.6.4 Consequences for Organizational Representation and Strategy

The case also carries important lessons for organizations like LBPT and LBA:

  • Organizations must plan early for legal representation:
    • If they intend to litigate, they should retain counsel or be prepared to satisfy the demanding Upper Valley standards for lay representation.
    • They should not assume that allied individuals will be able to litigate on their behalf without explicit authorization and compliance with procedural rules.
  • Organizational decisions not to appeal agency denials will generally end the dispute:
    • Members or directors will not be able to revive the application through their own appeals unless they can independently establish both a particularized interest and redressability.

4.6.5 Reinforcement of the Bar on Advisory Opinions

Finally, the decision reinforces Vermont’s strong prohibition on advisory opinions outside the limited context where they are constitutionally permitted.

By emphasizing both standing and the absence of any applicant to receive a permit, the Court makes clear that:

  • Courts will not decide the legal correctness of ANR’s denial standards in the abstract.
  • There must be a real controversy in which a decision will have concrete, practical consequences for the parties.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction
    The court’s power to hear and decide a particular kind of case. If a court lacks this power, it must dismiss, no matter how strong the arguments on the merits.
  • De Novo Hearing
    A “new” hearing in which the court considers evidence and issues fresh, without deferring to the earlier decision. It is not limited to checking whether the agency “got it right” on the existing record; the court builds and evaluates its own record.
  • Standing
    A legal requirement that a person bringing a case must be sufficiently affected by the issues. In Vermont, no standing means no jurisdiction—the case cannot go forward.
  • “Person Aggrieved” (10 V.S.A. § 8502(7))
    Someone who:
    • Claims an injury to a specific, individualized interest protected by environmental law; and
    • Whose injury the court can actually fix through its decision.
    General concerns about environmental quality shared with the public are not enough.
  • Particularized Interest
    An interest that is different from what the public at large experiences. Examples include a neighbor whose land is directly affected by runoff or noise, or an owner whose property is taken or encumbered.
  • Redressability
    The court’s ability to fix the harm through the relief requested. If even a favorable decision would not change anything in practice (for example, because there is no applicant to use a permit), then the injury is not redressable.
  • Third‑Party Standing
    The ability to sue or appeal on behalf of someone else’s rights. Courts usually do not allow this; a party must assert its own rights and injuries unless special conditions are met (authorization, close relationship, and inability of the third party to assert its own rights).
  • Lay (Non‑Attorney) Representation of Organizations
    Corporations and organizations typically must be represented by licensed lawyers. Vermont allows exceptions only in narrow circumstances (evaluated under Upper Valley) where, among other things, the lay representative is clearly authorized and competent and will not unduly burden the process.

6. Conclusion

In re Lake Bomoseen Association and Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust Denial establishes two key principles in Vermont environmental law:

  1. No de novo appeal from a permit denial can proceed in the Environmental Division without a participating permit applicant who can carry the statutory burden of proof.
  2. Non‑applicant supporters of a denied permit ordinarily lack standing as “persons aggrieved” when they assert only generalized recreational or policy interests and cannot show that any court order would actually lead to an implementable permit.

The Court also reaffirms strict limits on third‑party standing and non‑attorney representation of organizations: a pro se individual cannot piggyback on an organization’s interest to revive claims the organization did not itself appeal.

In the broader legal context, the decision:

  • Confirms Vermont’s commitment to concrete, justiciable controversies and its constitutional bar on advisory opinions.
  • Sharpens the contours of environmental standing under chapters 1455 and 8504, narrowing the role of generalized environmental and recreational interests in appellate litigation.
  • Signals to permit applicants, citizen groups, and environmental organizations that strategic decisions about whether to appeal and how to secure representation will often determine whether any court can review an agency’s environmental decision at all.

As invasive species, climate impacts, and contested management strategies proliferate, this decision will likely become a central reference point in Vermont for who may, and may not, challenge—or attempt to revive—environmental permitting decisions in court.

Case Details

Comments