Windom v. Florida: No Sixth Amendment “Evolving Standards of Decency”; Rule 3.112 Not Retroactive; Strict Limits on Successive Capital Postconviction Relief Reaffirmed

Introduction

In Curtis Windom v. State of Florida, the Supreme Court of Florida denied a fifth successive motion for postconviction relief and a related habeas petition filed after the Governor signed a death warrant. The Court’s per curiam opinion, issued August 21, 2025, addresses two principal issues: (1) whether “evolving standards of decency” and later-adopted capital counsel qualifications (Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.112) can retroactively establish a Sixth Amendment violation in the face of earlier adverse Strickland rulings; and (2) whether an expedited warrant-litigation schedule violates due process, particularly where the condemned prisoner asserts a need to present “newly discovered” mitigation—here, clemency materials reflecting some victims’ family members opposed execution.

The Court’s resolution is emphatic: (i) the Eighth Amendment “evolving standards of decency” doctrine does not translate into a new or retroactive Sixth Amendment right for timeliness purposes under Rule 3.851(d)(2)(B), and Rule 3.112 does not create independent rights nor apply retroactively to privately retained counsel representing a defendant in the early 1990s; (ii) expedited litigation under a death warrant, with notice and an opportunity to be heard, does not violate due process; (iii) victims’ family clemency statements opposing a death sentence are not a gateway to relief—they are untimely, likely inadmissible, and in any event would not outweigh the substantial aggravation; and (iv) a habeas petition cannot be used to relitigate Strickland and Brady theories that were or could have been raised previously.

The decision reinforces the Florida Supreme Court’s recent line of cases tightening timeliness, procedural default, and admissibility requirements in end-stage capital litigation, and it formally declines to extend the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine to the Sixth Amendment.

Summary of the Opinion

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the summary denial of Windom’s successive Rule 3.851 motion and denied his habeas petition, stay request, and motion for oral argument. The Court held:

Sixth Amendment/Competency of Counsel (Claim 1): Untimely under Rule 3.851’s one-year bar and not rescued by the retroactive-right exception. The “evolving standards of decency” doctrine applies to Eighth Amendment analysis, not the Sixth. The claim is also procedurally barred as a repackaged version of issues decided in Windom’s initial postconviction litigation (Windom II). On the merits, Strickland governs; Rule 3.112’s standards (adopted after Windom’s trial and extended to privately retained counsel in 2002) are prospective, create no independent rights, and cannot establish per se ineffectiveness. The Court again endorsed the earlier finding that counsel’s decision not to present mental-health evidence avoided opening the door to highly prejudicial “drug-dealing/motive” evidence.
Due Process/Scheduling (Claim 2): No due process violation in the postconviction court’s abbreviated schedule during warrant litigation; notice and an opportunity to be heard were provided. Similar due process challenges have been repeatedly rejected in recent cases. The related “emergency” newly discovered evidence claim—based on some victims’ family members’ clemency statements opposing execution—was rejected as untimely and, alternatively, unlikely to change the outcome given strong aggravation (including prior violent felony and CCP) and probable inadmissibility at trial.
Habeas Petition: Denied as procedurally barred. Habeas cannot serve as a vehicle to relitigate or raise issues that were or could have been presented on appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings, including prior violent felony aggravation and alleged Brady/Strickland violations.

The Court ordered the mandate to issue immediately and will entertain no rehearing.

Case Background

In 1992, a jury convicted Curtis Windom of three counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted first-degree murder arising from a midday shooting spree. The jury unanimously recommended death for the murders, and the trial court found two aggravators for each: cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), and prior violent felony. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences (striking CCP for two victims but upholding the death sentences based on remaining aggravation). See Windom v. State (Windom I), 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1012 (1995).

In initial postconviction proceedings, the court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief; the Florida Supreme Court affirmed and also denied habeas relief. See Windom v. State (Windom II), 886 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2004). A later successive motion alleging a Brady violation about a State witness’s pending charge was rejected as untimely and procedurally barred. See Windom v. State (Windom III), No. SC16-1371, 2017 WL 3205278 (Fla. July 28, 2017). Multiple federal habeas efforts likewise failed.

After the Governor signed a death warrant in July 2025, Windom filed his fifth successive motion asserting (1) unconstitutional deprivation of competent counsel under evolving standards and Rule 3.112; and (2) a due process violation stemming from an expedited case management schedule. He also lodged an “emergency” motion claiming newly discovered mitigation based on 2013 clemency materials showing some victims’ family members opposed execution. The circuit court summarily denied all relief; this appeal followed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): The controlling standard for ineffective assistance claims requires showing deficient performance and prejudice. The Court reaffirmed that Strickland governs Sixth Amendment claims, notwithstanding later-adopted Florida counsel qualification standards.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002): Establish the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” framework. The Court emphasized that this doctrine has never been applied to the Sixth Amendment and declined to extend it.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.112 and its Commentary; In re Amendments (1999, 2002): Adopted minimum standards for capital counsel; extended to privately retained counsel in 2002. The official commentary states the rule was “not intended to establish any independent legal rights,” and the Florida Supreme Court has treated the rule as prospective. See also Cox v. State, 966 So. 2d 337, 358 n.10 (Fla. 2007) (no per se ineffectiveness from a standards mismatch).
Rule 3.851(d)(2)(B) retroactive-right exception; Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 2013); Waterhouse v. State, 82 So. 3d 84 (Fla. 2012): The retroactive-right timeliness exception cannot be used to create a new fundamental right; it applies only when a right has already been recognized and held retroactive.
Procedural bars in successive litigation: Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2023); Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1990): Repackaging a previously litigated claim with a new gloss is barred; issues that could have been raised earlier but weren’t are also barred.
Standard of review and summary denial: Rogers v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257 (Fla. 2025); Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025): De novo review applies, and summary denial is proper where the record refutes the claim, or it is untimely, legally insufficient, or procedurally barred.
Due process in warrant litigation: Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993); Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016); Zakrzewski v. State, No. SC2025-1009, 2025 WL 2047404 (Fla. July 22, 2025); Bell v. State, No. SC2025-0891, 2025 WL 1874574 (Fla. July 8, 2025); Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385 (Fla. 2025): Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard; Florida courts have consistently upheld expedited schedules in warrant cases when these minima are met.
Newly discovered evidence standards: Dailey v. State, 279 So. 3d 1208 (Fla. 2019); Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000): Two-prong test: due diligence and probability of a different result; inadmissible evidence cannot justify relief.
Weight of aggravation: Bright v. State, 299 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2020): The prior violent felony aggravator is among the weightiest in Florida’s capital scheme.
Penalty-phase reassessment and lesser sentence: Davis v. State, No. SC2024-1128, 2025 WL 1970014 (Fla. July 17, 2025): In the penalty context, newly discovered evidence must probably yield a less severe sentence.
Prior violent felony aggravator and contemporaneous convictions: Windom I, 656 So. 2d at 440; Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1151 (Fla. 2014): Contemporaneous capital convictions can qualify as “prior violent felony” aggravation for each count at sentencing.
Habeas limitations: Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158 (Fla. 2013); Gaskin v. State, 361 So. 3d 300 (Fla. 2023); Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1992): Habeas cannot be used to litigate or relitigate claims that were or could have been raised previously.
Brady in postconviction: District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009); Dailey, 279 So. 3d at 1217: The State’s Brady obligations do not extend into postconviction proceedings.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sixth Amendment counsel-competence claim: untimely, barred, and meritless

Windom argued that today’s “evolving standards of decency” and Rule 3.112’s stringent qualifications for capital counsel show his 1992 trial lawyer was unconstitutionally inadequate. The Court rejected this on three independent grounds:

Timeliness: Rule 3.851(d)(1) imposes a one-year bar absent narrow exceptions. The retroactive-right exception, Rule 3.851(d)(2)(B), did not apply because the “evolving standards” doctrine has never created a Sixth Amendment right and cannot be invoked to invent a new right—a proposition the Court previously articulated in Carroll and Waterhouse. The newly discovered evidence exception, Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A), also did not apply.
Procedural bars: The “lack of standards for capital counsel” theory and closely related Strickland claims (failure to investigate mental health, alleged intoxication) were raised and rejected in Windom’s initial postconviction litigation (Windom II). Using new verbiage to relitigate the same issues is barred (Barwick/Medina), and in any event the claim could have been raised by 2002 when Rule 3.112 was extended to privately retained lawyers.
Merits: Rule 3.112 expressly does not create independent rights and applies prospectively to counsel appointed or retained on or after July 1, 2002; it cannot support per se ineffectiveness (Cox). The controlling standard remains Strickland, under which Windom’s claims were already adjudicated in Windom II. There, the Court found no prejudice from counsel’s decision not to present mental-health evidence because doing so would have “opened the door” to highly damaging evidence that Windom was a drug dealer with a motive to kill two victims he believed were informants. Evidence of planning and execution on the day of the murders also undercut insanity or brain-damage theories. Nothing in the present motion alters that calculus.

Notably, the Court expressly declined Windom’s invitation to extend the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” framework to the Sixth Amendment—a clarification likely to guide future litigants considering similar arguments.

2) Due process claim to warrant-schedule: rejected; no violation from expedited timetable

The postconviction court required filing within roughly five days of notice of the death warrant. The Supreme Court held that due process in warrant proceedings demands notice and an opportunity to be heard, both of which Windom received. The opinion cited recent cases consistently rejecting similar challenges to expedited schedules. After more than three decades of litigation, the Court found his case had been thoroughly reviewed at every stage.

3) “Newly discovered evidence” based on clemency statements: untimely, inadmissible, and not outcome-determinative

Windom argued he learned at the Huff hearing that some victims’ family members opposed execution, and he styled this as newly discovered mitigation. The Court concluded:

Untimely: The views of the victims’ family members were ascertainable long before the warrant through due diligence, particularly since these statements were created for a 2013 clemency proceeding.
Admissibility and impact: Even assuming “newness,” such sentencing preferences are generally inadmissible at trial; and the opinion reiterated that inadmissible evidence cannot support newly discovered evidence relief (Sims). Further, even if admissible at penalty, the probability of a lesser sentence was low given substantial aggravation—especially the prior violent felony aggravator, which is among the most weighty in Florida, and CCP as to Johnnie Lee—compared to Windom’s mitigation profile. As stated in Windom I, the weight of the aggravation outweighed the limited mitigation presented. It is the qualitative weight, not the count of factors, that controls.

The Court also rejected a piggyback as-applied constitutional challenge to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme as procedurally barred.

4) Habeas petition: procedural bars and reaffirmation of prior rulings

Windom’s habeas petition repackaged earlier claims (e.g., that counsel’s inexperience and failures deprived him of Sixth Amendment counsel; and that the prior violent felony aggravator could not apply to the Lee count). The Court refused to revisit Windom II and earlier rulings, citing the well-settled rule that habeas is not an additional appeal or a vehicle to relitigate claims that were or could have been raised. It reiterated that contemporaneous convictions can serve as “prior violent felony” aggravation for multiple counts, and reaffirmed the heavy weight of that aggravator (Gonzalez; Bright).

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

No Sixth Amendment “evolving standards” hook: The opinion cements that the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” doctrine cannot be repurposed as a Sixth Amendment timeliness lever under Rule 3.851(d)(2)(B). Defendants cannot bootstrap evolving professional standards into a new constitutional right for retroactive application in Florida capital postconviction practice.
Rule 3.112 remains prospective and non-self-executing: Counsel-qualification rules do not create per se ineffectiveness or independent causes of action, and they cannot retroactively unsettle convictions long since final. Strickland remains the yardstick.
End-stage litigation discipline: The decision aligns with a body of 2025 Florida cases upholding compressed warrant schedules where notice and opportunity exist, reducing the effectiveness of eleventh-hour litigation maneuvers absent genuinely new and admissible evidence with a demonstrable probability of altering the outcome.
Victims’ family sentencing preferences as mitigation: The Court’s treatment signals that such statements—especially when generated for clemency—are rarely a viable foundation for judicial relief. They tend to be inadmissible at trial; and even if considered for mitigation, they are unlikely to overcome strong aggravators like prior violent felonies and CCP.
Procedural bar enforcement: The Court’s strict application of procedural bars and its refusal to revisit prior adverse Strickland and Brady rulings will influence strategic decisions by capital defense teams: the need to develop and litigate all available claims early, and to frame any later submissions within recognized, narrow timeliness exceptions supported by admissible, outcome-probable new evidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strickland standard: To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show (1) deficient performance (lawyer errors falling below reasonable professional norms) and (2) prejudice (a reasonable probability that, but for those errors, the result would have been different).
“Evolving standards of decency”: A principle used to interpret the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment in light of contemporary norms. It does not apply to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Rule 3.851 timeliness and exceptions: Florida capital postconviction motions must generally be filed within one year. Exceptions exist for newly discovered facts that could not have been found with due diligence, and for newly announced constitutional rights held to apply retroactively. Neither allows creating a new right.
“Opening the door” evidence: Strategic choices about what to present can avoid allowing the State to introduce otherwise inadmissible or highly prejudicial evidence. Here, not presenting mental-health evidence avoided allowing the State to present damaging motive/drug-dealing evidence.
Newly discovered evidence test (Dailey/Sims): The evidence must be truly new despite due diligence and must be admissible and likely to produce an acquittal (or, in penalty-phase terms, a lesser sentence). Inadmissible evidence cannot warrant relief.
Victim impact vs. victim sentencing opinions: Victim impact evidence (describing harm) can be admissible; recommendations from victims’ families about whether a defendant should receive death are generally inadmissible and thus of little legal use in court.
Prior violent felony aggravator: One of Florida’s weightiest aggravating factors. Contemporaneous convictions can serve as “prior” violent felonies for aggravation purposes when sentencing on multiple counts.
Habeas limits: State habeas is not a second appeal or a device to reargue postconviction claims that were or could have been raised earlier.

Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Windom’s case is a robust reaffirmation of the structural limits governing capital postconviction litigation in Florida. It declines to extend the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine into the Sixth Amendment and forecloses attempts to use Rule 3.112 as a retroactive basis for per se ineffectiveness. It underscores strict enforcement of Rule 3.851’s timeliness and procedural-default rules, particularly under a death warrant. The Court also clarifies that victims’ family clemency statements opposing execution are not a viable basis for newly discovered evidence relief and, even if considered, would not outweigh heavy aggravation such as prior violent felonies and CCP.

For practitioners, the opinion is a reminder that capital litigation success hinges on early, comprehensive record development under Strickland; that later-evolving professional standards do not rewrite past cases; that warrant-phase schedules will be swift but constitutionally adequate with notice and an opportunity to be heard; and that only genuinely new, admissible, and outcome-altering evidence can justify relief at this stage. In the broader legal landscape, the decision provides clarity on the non-transferability of Eighth Amendment doctrinal tools to Sixth Amendment claims and fortifies the finality of long-ago adjudicated capital cases under Florida law.