Introduction

In Williams v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Brandon Williams’s convictions for the malice murders of Natalie Nation and her son, Cole Nation. The centerpiece of the appeal was an evidentiary challenge: whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting, under Georgia’s residual hearsay exception (OCGA § 24‑8‑807), a statement Natalie made to a longtime friend a week before her death. In that statement, Natalie recounted that Williams had previously choked her until she lost consciousness and then “brought [her] back to life.”

The Court held that the statement was properly admitted under Rule 807 because it bore equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, concerned a material fact, and was more probative on the pertinent point than other reasonably available evidence. The decision consolidates and clarifies Georgia precedent on the use of Rule 807 to admit a domestic‑violence victim’s accounts of prior abuse, especially when offered to illuminate the relationship between the victim and defendant and to connect the manner of death to the defendant’s conduct.

Summary of the Opinion

• Facts: After an evening of arguments and threats (“get out,” “I’m going to kill all of you”), Natalie and Cole were found unconscious in Natalie’s room; a towel was tied around Natalie’s neck. Autopsies concluded both deaths were homicides, with Natalie dying by asphyxia and Cole by asphyxia and blunt-force trauma. Williams’s DNA was on the towel.
• The contested evidence: The State introduced testimony from Natalie’s longtime friend, Brent Lenz, that about a week before the homicides Natalie said Williams had choked her to unconsciousness and revived her.
• Issue on appeal: Whether admission of Natalie’s statement under OCGA § 24‑8‑807 (the residual hearsay exception) was an abuse of discretion.
• Holding: No abuse of discretion. The statement:
  • Had sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness, particularly as a domestic‑violence disclosure made to a close friend;
  • Was evidence of a material fact because it shed light on the relationship between Natalie and Williams;
  • Was more probative than other reasonably procurable evidence regarding who killed Natalie and the manner of killing, as it uniquely evidenced prior strangulation by Williams.
• Disposition: Convictions affirmed; all Justices concur.

Analysis

I. The Residual Hearsay Framework (OCGA § 24‑8‑807)

Rule 807 permits admission of hearsay not covered by traditional exceptions when, under the totality of the circumstances, the statement:

• Has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to core exceptions (e.g., cross‑examined former testimony; dying declarations; statements against interest; personal or family history),
• Is offered as evidence of a material fact,
• Is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other reasonably procurable evidence, and
• Serves the general purposes of the evidence rules and the interests of justice.

Appellate review of Rule 807 rulings is deferential. The Court reiterated that it will not overturn a trial court’s 807 determination absent a “definite and firm conviction” that the trial court clearly erred in weighing the factors. See Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 544 (2017).

II. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Siders v. State, 320 Ga. 367 (2024): Emphasizes a totality‑of‑the‑circumstances approach for Rule 807 and confirms abuse‑of‑discretion review. Also supports that statements shedding light on the victim–defendant relationship satisfy materiality.
• Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533 (2017): Articulates the “particularly hesitant” standard for appellate reversal of residual hearsay rulings absent clear error in judgment.
• Smart v. State, 299 Ga. 414 (2016): Sets the benchmark that 807 statements must bear guarantees of trustworthiness “equivalent” to traditional, firmly rooted exceptions.
• Merritt v. State, 311 Ga. 875 (2021); Rawls v. State, 310 Ga. 209 (2020); Jacobs v. State, 303 Ga. 245 (2018); Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 771 (2021): These decisions collectively recognize that a victim’s descriptions of prior domestic violence made to family and friends possess an “increased level of trustworthiness,” especially where the relationship is close (e.g., “best friend,” “like sisters,” frequent communications).
• State v. Kenney, 315 Ga. 408 (2023): Illustrates the other side of the coin: without evidence of a close relationship, trial courts act within their discretion in excluding under Rule 807.
• Watkins v. State, 320 Ga. 862 (2025): Clarifies that a victim’s own words about her relationship with the defendant meet Rule 807’s materiality requirement.
• Shellman v. State, 318 Ga. 71 (2024): Supports the proposition that a victim’s own statement about the defendant’s prior violence can be “more probative” than other sources, even where other evidence touches the same topic.
• Merger/Vacatur authorities: Williams v. State, 312 Ga. 386 (2021); Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881 (2010); Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691 (2017). These address collateral sentencing issues (felony‑murder counts vacated by operation of law; improper merger of cruelty to children; discretion not to correct unchallenged merger errors where harmless to the defendant).

III. Legal Reasoning Applied to Williams

A. Trustworthiness: Domestic‑Violence Disclosure to a Close Friend

The Court held the trial court acted within its discretion in finding “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” Consistent with Merritt, Rawls, Jacobs, Ash, and Smart, Georgia law accords heightened reliability to a victim’s accounts of prior domestic abuse made to family and friends. Here, Lenz and Natalie:

• Had known each other since middle school;
• Were “good friends” who grew up together;
• Spoke about weekly;
• Confided about personal matters, including relationships.

Even if their relationship was not labeled “best friends,” the record supported a meaningful, longstanding friendship sufficient to sustain trustworthiness under the totality of circumstances. The Court contrasted this with Kenney, where there was no evidence of closeness and exclusion under Rule 807 was upheld.

B. Materiality: Statements That “Shed Light” on the Relationship

Relying on Siders and Watkins, the Court reiterated that a victim’s own statements about prior abuse “shed light on” the nature of her relationship with the defendant and thus satisfy the materiality prong. Natalie’s account of prior strangulation goes directly to the dynamics between her and Williams, illuminating motive, intent, and the plausibility that Williams killed her in the same manner later found by the medical examiner (asphyxia).

C. “More Probative” Than Other Reasonably Available Evidence

The Court emphasized that Natalie’s statement was uniquely probative in two ways:

• Uniqueness of the evidence: It was the only evidence that Williams had previously strangled Natalie to unconsciousness. Although there was strong circumstantial evidence of guilt (threats, presence in the home, DNA on the ligature, medical cause of death), none of it matched the explanatory power of the victim’s firsthand description connecting Williams to strangulation.
• Victim’s own words are special: Echoing Shellman, a victim’s direct account of the defendant’s prior violence is generally more probative than second‑hand or circumstantial alternatives.

Against this backdrop, the trial court could reasonably find that no other reasonably procurable evidence equaled the probative value of Natalie’s own statement on the key points of identity and manner of killing.

D. Appellate Deference and the Abuse‑of‑Discretion Standard

Framing its review through Thompson, the Court underscored the high level of deference owed to trial judges on Rule 807 calls. It refused to displace the trial court’s weighing of trustworthiness, materiality, and probative value absent a “definite and firm conviction” of clear error—an exacting standard not met here.

E. 404(b) Interplay and Preservation

Williams suggested on appeal that the substance of the statement might run afoul of OCGA § 24‑4‑404(b) (other‑acts evidence). The Court noted:

• Williams did not object on 404(b) grounds at trial and did not develop a separate 404(b) argument on appeal;
• He cited no authority integrating 404(b) analysis into Rule 807’s gatekeeping inquiry;
• OCGA § 24‑1‑105 contemplates limiting evidence to proper purposes upon request, underscoring that admissibility can be purpose‑ and party‑specific.

The takeaway is practical as much as doctrinal: challenges under Rule 807 do not automatically subsume Rule 404(b) objections. Parties must preserve and brief 404(b) arguments distinctly, and trial courts can cabin evidence to permissible purposes with proper limiting instructions.

F. Collateral Sentencing Notes: Vacatur and Merger

The Court also flagged that:

• Felony‑murder counts were vacated by operation of law;
• The cruelty‑to‑children count should not have merged with malice murder;
• But without a State cross‑appeal and because the error did not harm Williams, the Court declined to correct it (citing Dixon).

This reflects the Court’s restrained approach to unpreserved or harmless merger issues, emphasizing party presentation and the absence of prejudice to the defendant.

Impact and Implications

• Reaffirmed pathway for domestic‑violence hearsay: Williams reinforces a well‑developed Georgia line allowing admission under Rule 807 of a victim’s prior abuse disclosures to close friends or family. The decision underscores that “best friend” or constant contact is not required; a documented, meaningful friendship can suffice.
• Materiality clarified: Statements that illuminate the victim–defendant relationship satisfy Rule 807’s materiality requirement, especially in domestic‑violence homicides where the manner of death mirrors the prior abuse described.
• “More probative” in practice: Courts may deem a victim’s own account uniquely probative on identity and modus/manner when alternative evidence, though strong, does not as directly connect the defendant to the specific lethal method.
• Standards of review matter: Given the pronounced deference to trial courts on 807 decisions, future appellants face a steep hill absent a robust record undermining trustworthiness, materiality, or relative probative value.
• Preservation and compartmentalization: Williams highlights the need to raise and brief Rule 404(b) objections separately from hearsay objections. Limiting instructions remain an important tool to confine evidence to proper purposes when admissible under one rule but potentially problematic under another.
• Practical guidance for trial courts: Build a clear record on:
  • The nature and closeness of the declarant–recipient relationship;
  • Why the statement is material (what aspect of the relationship or manner of death it illuminates);
  • Why no other reasonably procurable evidence is as probative (what alternatives were sought or are available and why they fall short).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hearsay: An out‑of‑court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts. Generally inadmissible unless an exception applies.
• Residual hearsay exception (OCGA § 24‑8‑807): A safety‑valve for trustworthy hearsay not fitting other specific exceptions, requiring trustworthiness, materiality, superior probative value, and service of justice.
• Circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness: Features of the statement and its context (e.g., who it was told to and why) that make it as reliable as statements admitted under traditional exceptions.
• Material fact: A fact that matters to deciding the case—here, the nature of the relationship and linkage to the method of killing.
• More probative than other evidence: The statement must be more informative and convincing on the key point than other evidence the proponent could reasonably obtain.
• Abuse of discretion: A deferential standard of review. The appellate court will not reverse unless firmly convinced the trial judge made a clear error in judgment after weighing the relevant factors.
• OCGA § 24‑4‑404(b): Limits use of “other acts” to prove character; such evidence may still be admitted for other purposes (e.g., motive, intent) if properly noticed and justified—distinct from hearsay admissibility.
• Vacated by operation of law: A conviction (e.g., felony murder) nullified automatically due to the presence of another conviction (e.g., malice murder) covering the same homicide.
• Merger: Combining convictions for sentencing when one offense is included in another; mismerger can occur, but appellate correction may depend on preservation and prejudice.

Conclusion

Williams v. State entrenches a pragmatic, victim‑sensitive application of Georgia’s residual hearsay exception in domestic‑violence homicides. By affirming the admission of Natalie’s statement to a longtime friend about prior strangulation, the Court:

• Validates trial courts’ reliance on established markers of trustworthiness in domestic‑violence disclosures;
• Clarifies that such statements are material when they shed light on the victim–defendant relationship;
• Confirms that a victim’s own words can be uniquely probative in linking a defendant to the manner of death.

The decision does not announce a radical new rule; rather, it harmonizes and fortifies existing precedent, while offering concrete guidance on record‑building and preservation. For prosecutors, it underscores the value of carefully documenting relationship context and the unavailability of comparably probative alternatives. For defense counsel, it spotlights the importance of contesting trustworthiness with specific facts, proposing alternative sources of proof to undermine the “more probative” prong, and preserving discrete Rule 404(b) objections. In the broader landscape, Williams will likely be read as an affirmation of robust, though not boundless, use of Rule 807 to address the evidentiary realities of domestic‑violence homicide cases.