Introduction

In Krohn v. Schultz Ford Lincoln, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 05072 (App Div, 2d Dept Sept. 24, 2025), the Appellate Division, Second Department (Dillon, J.P., Connolly, Christopher, and Warhit, JJ.) reversed a Supreme Court order that had set aside a defense-favorable jury finding on proximate cause and entered judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff on liability under CPLR 4404(a). The decision accomplishes three important things:

• It restates and sharpens the distinction between legal insufficiency and weight-of-the-evidence review under CPLR 4404(a), emphasizing their different standards and remedies.
• It clarifies the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine: negligence and proximate cause are not intertwined where there is a rational view of the evidence that the accident may not have occurred as claimed; in such cases, a verdict of negligence without proximate cause is permissible.
• It confirms that when the occurrence of the injury-producing event is genuinely disputed, a trial court does not err by instructing the jury—particularly in response to a deliberation note—that the jury may consider whether the accident occurred at all.

The parties were plaintiff-respondent Chanoch Krohn, a professional musician, and defendants-appellants Schultz Ford Lincoln, Inc., et al., a dealership and repair facility. The plaintiff alleged negligent repair work (specifically, improper torqueing of a pitman arm in the steering system) caused a highway collision. After a bifurcated trial, the jury found defendants negligent but not a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s accident. The Supreme Court set aside the no-causation finding and entered judgment for plaintiff on liability. The Second Department reversed.

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that the Supreme Court erred in, in effect, granting plaintiff judgment as a matter of law under CPLR 4404(a). Because there was a rational view of the evidence under which the jury could find defendants negligent in some respect yet conclude their negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the alleged accident (including the possibility that the accident did not occur as plaintiff described), the verdict could not be set aside for legal insufficiency. The court reinstated the jury’s finding of no proximate cause and remitted for entry of an appropriate judgment.

The court further stated that in personal-injury actions where the happening of the accident is legitimately disputed, it is not error to instruct jurors that they may consider whether the accident occurred, even when the verdict sheet lacks a separate interrogatory on occurrence. Responding to the jury’s note here by telling jurors they could find there was no accident was proper.

Analysis

A. The Facts Framing the Legal Questions

Plaintiff purchased a used van and brought it to defendants for repairs. He later alleged that after pick-up, while exiting the Whitestone Bridge toward the Van Wyck Expressway at about 50 mph, he heard a metallic clank, lost steering, and impacted the right-side concrete barrier multiple times. He and a friend were belted. Airbags did not deploy. A subwoofer allegedly broke a window. A flatbed towed the van to the day’s performance venue; plaintiff then performed. No police were called. No passenger, fellow musician, tow operators, or family witnesses were called at trial. No tow records or police report were in evidence. Photos of the van were introduced.

Plaintiff’s engineering witness, Victor Serby (also an attorney who had worked with plaintiff’s counsel in other matters), inspected the van months later and opined the pitman arm had not been properly torqued to Ford specifications, detaching from the steering box and causing steering failure. Defense counsel emphasized the lack of corroboration and told the jury it could decide whether the accident occurred as described.

The verdict sheet asked (1) whether defendants were negligent, and, if yes, (2) whether that negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s accident. During deliberations, the jury asked whether it should assume an accident occurred. The court, after conferring with counsel, told the jury it could credit or reject plaintiff’s account and could conclude there was no accident. The jury found negligence but no proximate cause.

B. The Court’s Core Holdings

• Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence under CPLR 4404(a) are distinct. Insufficiency asks whether there exists any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences to support the verdict; overturning for insufficiency results in entry of judgment as a matter of law without a new trial. Weight-of-the-evidence review asks whether the verdict could be reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence; overturning on that ground yields a new trial.
• Negligence and proximate cause are not necessarily “inextricably intertwined.” When the occurrence of the alleged accident is credibly disputed, a jury can logically find negligence but reject proximate cause. Here, there was a rational evidentiary basis for the jury to doubt that the accident happened as claimed.
• It is not error to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the accident occurred when the evidence raises that issue; indeed, verdict sheets and instructions should not be construed to remove that determination from the jury in such cases.

C. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion synthesizes longstanding New York standards on sufficiency, weight, and causation, while clarifying their application to disputed-occurrence cases:

• Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499–500: The benchmark for legal sufficiency—whether there exists “a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences” for a rational juror to reach the verdict. Krohn applies Cohen to hold that because rational jurors could conclude the accident did not occur as claimed (and therefore defendants’ negligence was not a substantial factor), the verdict could not be set aside for insufficiency.
• Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 132: The Second Department’s foundational articulation of the Cohen test. Krohn quotes and applies Nicastro’s formulation of the “harsh” sufficiency standard to reject judgment as a matter of law.
• Killon v Parrotta, 28 NY3d 101, 107–108; Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556; Campbell v City of Elmira, 84 NY2d 505, 510: These cases reiterate the strict deference owed to juries on sufficiency challenges (e.g., the “utterly irrational” gloss in Campbell), and the requirement to view the evidence most favorably to the nonmovant. Krohn relies on this framework to reject the plaintiff’s CPLR 4404(a) application.
• Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746; Thompson v Northwell Health, Inc., 234 AD3d 1006, 1007: Canonical weight-of-the-evidence standards, distinguishing that remedy from insufficiency. Krohn instructs bench and bar not to conflate these standards or their consequences.
• Cruz-Rivera v National Grid Energy Mgt., LLC, 190 AD3d 687, 688–689; Wilson v Philie, 107 AD3d 700, 702; Correa v Abel-Bey, 188 AD3d 641, 642–643; McKenzie v Southside Hosp., 163 AD3d 952, 953; McGloin v Austin, 89 AD2d 583, 583–584: These decisions recognize that negligence and proximate cause can be logically severable; juries may find negligence but no causation. Krohn fits within this line: because a rational juror could reject the occurrence or the causal link, the verdict stands.
• Evans v New York City Tr. Auth., 179 AD3d 105, 113; Alexander v City of New York, 21 AD3d 389, 390; Brewer v Ross, 188 AD3d 780; Swavely v Zhou, 86 AD3d 947: Examples where negligence and causation were truly inextricably intertwined (e.g., direct striking of a scaffold, surgical puncture causing death), justifying setting aside a verdict that found negligence but no causation. Krohn contrasts those scenarios with disputed-occurrence cases like this one.
• Duran v Temple Beth Sholom, Inc., 155 AD3d 690, 693–694: Held it was reversible error not to let the jury decide whether the plaintiff fell from a beam under Labor Law § 240(1) when the accounts conflicted. Krohn extends Duran’s logic to endorse instructions allowing the jury to decide whether an accident occurred where that issue is genuinely disputed.
• Annunziata v City of New York, 175 AD3d 438: An example where speculation impermissibly fueled a verdict. Krohn distinguishes Annunziata, finding a fair interpretation of the evidence here supports the jury’s verdict without speculation.
• Rubino v Scherrer, 68 AD3d 1090, 1092; Kirwan v New York City Tr. Auth., 199 AD3d 907: Cited to support the proposition that juries may reject an element where the plaintiff bears the burden and the proof is not persuasive; Krohn applies this to the causation element.
• Charalabidis v Elnagar, 188 AD3d 44, 48: Decision controls over order when inconsistent. Krohn uses this to explain treating the trial court’s ruling as based on insufficiency despite its weight-of-the-evidence language, because the decretal relief (entry of judgment without new trial) aligns with insufficiency.

D. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Distinct standards under CPLR 4404(a): The court carefully explains that “insufficiency” is a law-based inquiry—does any valid line of reasoning permit the jury to reach its conclusion? If not, the court may enter judgment as a matter of law without a new trial. “Weight” is a qualitative evidence balance; if the verdict is against the weight, the remedy is a new trial. The trial court’s decretal order (granting judgment and proceeding to damages only) placed its ruling in the “insufficiency” lane, triggering the most deferential standard.
2. Negligence vs. proximate cause: The Supreme Court assumed that because the repair was defective, causation necessarily followed—an “inextricably intertwined” scenario. The Second Department rejects that assumption on this record. When there is a rational evidentiary basis to conclude the accident did not occur (or did not occur as claimed), negligence and causation are separable, and a jury can consistently find negligence without causation.
3. The rational view of the evidence supporting the verdict: Several facts permitted rational jurors to doubt the occurrence as described and, thus, causation:
   • Alleged multiple “heavy” impacts into a concrete barrier at highway speed without airbag deployment.
   • Absence of corroborating witnesses (passenger, tow operators, musician colleague, family) despite availability.
   • No police call or report from a busy expressway scene.
   • No tow invoices or transport records in evidence.
   • Photographs of the van not commensurate, in a rational juror’s view, with the level of damage expected from the described series of impacts.
   Given these points, the jury’s “no” on proximate cause—after specifically asking if it could consider whether an accident occurred—was a permissible application of plaintiff’s burden of proof.
4. Jury instruction on the occurrence of the accident: The court holds it was not error to tell the jury they could find there was no accident, aligning with Duran. Verdict sheets and charges should not be drafted or read to remove the occurrence question from jurors where the evidence squarely raises it.
5. Even under a weight analysis, the verdict stands: The court adds that, even if the case were viewed through the weight-of-the-evidence lens, the evidence did not so preponderate in plaintiff’s favor that no fair interpretation could support the verdict. Annunziata is distinguished; the jury’s view here was not speculative.

E. Doctrinal Impact and Practical Implications

Krohn crystallizes trial and post-trial practice in disputed-occurrence personal injury cases:

• For judges:
  • Be precise in CPLR 4404(a) rulings. If granting judgment as a matter of law, apply the strict “valid line of reasoning” test and recognize that the remedy is entry of judgment without a new trial. If granting a new trial on weight grounds, say so and explain why the evidence so preponderates in the movant’s favor.
  • Where occurrence is contested, do not foreclose the jury from deciding that issue. Consider a specific special interrogatory (e.g., “Did plaintiff prove that the accident occurred as claimed?”) and/or clear instructions acknowledging that jurors may reject the occurrence.
  • Use care when the negligence and causation issues might be intertwined; genuinely intertwined scenarios (e.g., a single mechanistic medical or industrial event) differ from disputed-occurrence cases.
• For plaintiffs:
  • Expect that defendants will press the threshold occurrence issue. Corroboration matters: contemporaneous reports (police, incident), photographs, repair and tow records, telematics/dashcam data, and eyewitness testimony can be outcome-determinative.
  • Where negligence seems strong but occurrence may be questioned, anticipate a “negligence/no causation” verdict. Build a record that ties the negligent act directly to a proven event.
  • Expert selection and disclosure should anticipate credibility challenges, particularly where experts have overlapping roles or prior affiliations that may affect how jurors weigh their testimony.
• For defendants:
  • Disputed-occurrence is a viable, jury-facing defense that can defeat causation even where some negligence is found. Highlight gaps: absent witnesses, missing documents, inconsistency between claimed dynamics and physical evidence.
  • Request a specific instruction or interrogatory on occurrence, and preserve objections if the charge or verdict sheet could be read to presume an accident.
  • On post-verdict motions, resist CPLR 4404(a) insufficiency challenges by mapping the “valid line of reasoning” that rational jurors could have followed to reach a no-causation verdict.
• System-wide effect: Krohn will likely increase the frequency of explicit occurrence interrogatories, sharpen jury instructions in contested-occurrence cases, and reduce successful JMOL reversals of defense-favorable no-causation verdicts where the record supports a rational doubt about the happening of the accident.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• CPLR 4404(a): New York’s rule allowing a trial court to (a) set aside a jury verdict and enter judgment as a matter of law if the evidence is legally insufficient, or (b) order a new trial if the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.
• Legal insufficiency (judgment as a matter of law): The verdict cannot stand unless there exists any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences for rational jurors to reach it. If not, the court may replace the verdict with its own judgment—no new trial.
• Weight of the evidence (new trial): A qualitative balancing. If, on any fair interpretation, the verdict could not have been reached because the evidence so strongly favors the other side, the court may order a new trial. The jury is not overruled as a matter of law; the case is retried.
• Proximate cause / substantial factor: Even if a defendant is negligent, the plaintiff must prove that the negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident/injury. A jury may find negligence but no causation if the causal link is unproven.
• “Inextricably intertwined” negligence and causation: In some scenarios, finding negligence virtually compels finding causation (e.g., directly striking a scaffold causing a fall; a surgical puncture causing death). In such cases, a verdict finding negligence but no causation may be internally inconsistent. Krohn holds that disputed-occurrence cases are different; the elements are not necessarily intertwined.
• Disputed occurrence: When evidence permits rational doubt that the accident happened as claimed. In these cases, juries may conclude no accident occurred, which defeats causation without contradicting a finding of some negligent act elsewhere or at some other time.
• Bifurcated trial: Liability tried first, damages later (if necessary). In Krohn, the jury returned a liability verdict that ended the case on liability without reaching damages.
• Special interrogatory: A specific question on the verdict sheet (e.g., “Did the accident occur?”). Krohn suggests that including such a question is prudent where the occurrence is contested, but its absence does not prevent a proper instruction allowing jurors to consider occurrence.

Conclusion

Krohn v. Schultz Ford Lincoln, Inc. delivers clear guidance on three fronts. First, it reaffirms the rigorous legal-insufficiency standard under CPLR 4404(a) and distinguishes it from weight-of-the-evidence review, warning courts and counsel against conflation. Second, it narrows the reach of the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine: where a rational view of the evidence allows jurors to doubt that the accident occurred as claimed, negligence and causation are separable, and a verdict of negligence without proximate cause is not legally inconsistent. Third, it validates instructing jurors that they may consider whether the accident occurred in disputed-occurrence cases, even if the verdict sheet lacks an express occurrence interrogatory.

The decision’s practical message is straightforward. Plaintiffs should marshal corroboration of the accident’s occurrence; defendants can legitimately press the occurrence issue to defeat causation; and trial courts should calibrate verdict sheets and instructions to preserve the jury’s role in deciding whether an accident happened when that question is in play. By reinstating a verdict that found negligence but no causation and by declining to convert a contested-occurrence case into a strict liability one via CPLR 4404(a), the Second Department reinforces the central role of the jury in resolving credibility and factual disputes while maintaining analytic discipline in post-trial review.