When Police Are Victims: Marsy’s Law, Victim Privacy, and Public Records in State ex rel. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police Department

I. Introduction

In State ex rel. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police Department, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5243 (Nov. 25, 2025), the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed a sharp conflict between two powerful interests:

The public’s and the press’s interest in access to police bodycam and dashcam footage concerning a high-profile police shooting; and
Crime victims’ constitutional privacy rights under “Marsy’s Law” (Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a) as implemented by Ohio’s Victim Privacy statutes.

The relator, GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc., doing business as the Columbus Dispatch (“the Dispatch”), sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Columbus Police Department (“CPD”) to release unredacted body-worn camera and dashboard camera footage of a 2023 police shootout on Interstate 70. CPD had redacted the identities (faces, voices, and other identifiers) of two officers—referred to as Officer John Doe 1 and Officer John Doe 2—who were shot at (one seriously wounded) during the incident.

The central legal questions were:

Can on-duty police officers qualify as “victims” under Marsy’s Law and its implementing statutes?
If so, does the Victim Privacy Law permit (or require) CPD to redact their identifying information from otherwise public records?
Does the Ohio Constitution itself create a free-standing right of access to public records that would override statutory victim-privacy protections?
How far may the court go in ordering broader disclosure when the relator has framed its mandamus request narrowly?

The court, in a majority opinion by Justice DeWine, held that:

Police officers are “persons” within Marsy’s Law and may be crime victims when criminal offenses are committed against them, even while on duty;
These two officers were victims of statutorily defined “offenses of violence” (felonious assault and aggravated menacing);
Therefore, their identifying information in bodycam and dashcam footage was properly redacted under Ohio’s Victim Privacy Law, which in turn creates an exception to the Public Records Act; and
The Dispatch failed to establish a clear legal right to the unredacted recordings, so the writ of mandamus is denied.

Two justices concurred in part and dissented in part:

Justice Fischer agreed that the two officers are victims and that their identities may be redacted, but would grant a partial writ to compel release of additional non-exempt footage (including other officers’ video) and applied earlier versions of the statutes based on retroactivity principles.
Justice Brunner agreed that officers can be victims, but argued the Ohio Constitution itself protects a right to access governmental information and found the victim-privacy statute unconstitutional as applied to conceal the identities of on-duty police officers performing public functions in public space.

This decision establishes an important precedent mapping the interaction between Marsy’s Law, statutory victim-privacy protections, and Ohio’s Public Records Act—especially as applied to on-duty police officers and high-profile use-of-force incidents.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The I‑70 Shootout

In summer 2023, armed men robbed a Columbus Porsche dealership. Two CPD officers, later anonymized as Officer Doe 1 and Officer Doe 2, responded to a radio call and joined a vehicle pursuit along Interstate 70.

Key facts:

The suspects’ vehicle stopped in the middle lane of I‑70, blocking traffic.
Two suspects fled on foot. Officer Doe 1 exited his cruiser to pursue them.
A third suspect, previously hidden, emerged, firing at close range and shooting Officer Doe 1 five times.
While wounded, Officer Doe 1 returned fire. Officer Doe 2 took cover behind a civilian vehicle and also engaged.
The armed suspect moved toward Officer Doe 2, apparently aiming his gun; multiple officers eventually fired, killing him.
Officer Doe 1 required extensive medical treatment—at least seven surgeries, weeks in hospital and rehabilitation—but survived.

B. The Dispatch’s Public Records Request

On the day of the shooting (July 6, 2023), a Dispatch reporter requested under the Public Records Act:

“all body camera, dash camera and 911 calls etc.” from the incident.

Four days later, CPD’s media email denied release of bodycam/dashcam footage, citing:

R.C. 149.43(A)(17): Restrictions on release of bodycam/dashcam recordings depicting grievous bodily harm or severe violence;
R.C. Chapter 2930: The statutory implementation of Marsy’s Law (victims’ rights); and
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v): Exception for records whose release is prohibited by state or federal law.

Subsequently, CPD released portions of four videos:

Bodycam footage from Officer Doe 1
Bodycam footage from Officer Doe 2
Dashcam from the officers’ cruiser (the “Doe cruiser”)
Dashcam from another cruiser

But:

All footage of the actual shooting and its immediate aftermath was removed;
Faces, voices, and identifying details of officers involved were obscured; and
CPD asserted that eight involved officers were “victims” whose identities could not be released under Marsy’s Law and R.C. 2930.07.

C. The Mandamus Action

On October 19, 2023, the Dispatch filed this original action in mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking:

An order compelling CPD to “make all video footage responsive to the Video Footage Request available for inspection and copying” under R.C. 149.43(B)(1).

CPD answered, admitting:

The recordings are “public records” in general;
But asserting multiple exceptions: the “grievous-bodily-harm” and “act-of-severe-violence” sub‑exceptions to the bodycam/dashcam provisions, the Marsy’s Law / victim-privacy exception, and the general “prohibited by law” catch-all; and
That it had redacted the identities of eight officers it considered victims under Marsy’s Law.

The court granted an alternative writ, ordered full briefing, and required CPD to submit for in camera review “all records it has withheld or redacted,” which CPD did as to four videos plus under-seal officer affidavits. The scope of what was actually submitted, versus what the Dispatch originally requested, later became central to Justice Fischer’s partial dissent.

III. Summary of the Court’s Opinions

A. The Majority Opinion (DeWine, J.)

The majority frames the case around a single dispositive question:

Whether the two officers, who were targeted during the shootout, are “victims” under Marsy’s Law and, by extension, under the Victim Privacy Law (R.C. 2930.07) and the Public Records Act (R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(rr)).

The majority holds:

Textual interpretation of “victim”: Using original-public-meaning methodology, a “victim” is a “person” against whom a criminal offense is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by it. Police officers are plainly “persons,” and the suspect’s gunfire constituted felonious assault and aggravated menacing, both “offenses of violence.”
Police can be Marsy’s Law victims: When officers are personally and directly targeted by criminal conduct, they fall squarely within the constitutional definition of victim. The fact that they were on duty is irrelevant to the textual definition.
Victim Privacy Law applies: Because the bodycam/dashcam recordings are “case documents” and the officers are victims of an offense of violence, R.C. 2930.07(D)(1)(a)(i) requires redaction of their “name, address, or other identifying information” before public release. Those redacted portions are excluded from the statutory definition of “public record” by R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(rr).
No overriding constitutional right of access: The Dispatch’s attempt to derive a generalized right of public-record access from a cluster of constitutional provisions (Sections 1, 3, 11, and 16 of Article I) fails. The court has never recognized such a free-standing, non‑text‑specific right, and even if some generalized right existed, it would be trumped here by Marsy’s Law, a later-enacted, explicit, and more specific constitutional provision guaranteeing victim privacy.
Scope of the writ controlled by relator’s framing: The majority construes the Dispatch’s mandamus claim as seeking only unredacted identities of Officer Doe 1 and Officer Doe 2 in the four videos produced. Other potential records or theories of relief that the Dispatch did not clearly pursue in its complaint or briefing are treated as forfeited. On that narrowed framing, the Dispatch cannot show a clear legal right to unredacted footage.

Result: The court denies the writ of mandamus.

B. Justice Fischer’s Opinion (Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part)

Justice Fischer agrees with the majority on some core points:

On-duty officers can be “victims” under Marsy’s Law and R.C. 2930.01(H);
Officers Doe 1 and Doe 2 are such victims; and
Their identifying information may be redacted under the Victim Privacy Law.

However, he:

Applies earlier versions of R.C. 149.43 and R.C. 2930.07, anchored to the date of the public-records request (July 6, 2023), invoking statutory retroactivity rules (R.C. 1.48, 1.58) and Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution;
Analyzes in detail other exceptions to disclosure: the grievous-bodily-harm and act-of-severe-violence carve-outs for bodycam/dashcam recordings in former R.C. 149.43(A)(17)(f) and (g);
Concludes that these exceptions require redaction of footage showing the officer’s serious injuries and the suspect’s violent attack on the officer, but do not authorize redacting all footage of officers’ force used against the suspect, because the statute expressly states that harm caused by officers is not “restricted”; and
Reads the Dispatch’s request as seeking all responsive bodycam/dashcam footage from the incident (not just the four videos and not just the two officers’ identities), and finds CPD failed to justify withholding or not submitting other officers’ recordings and identities (who were not victims).

Justice Fischer would therefore:

Grant a partial writ ordering disclosure of all non‑exempt footage (including additional videos and non‑victim officer identities), while preserving redactions for:
- Graphic footage of grievous harm to the officers; and
- Identifying information of Officers Doe 1 and Doe 2.
Deny statutory damages/fees as waived by the Dispatch.

C. Justice Brunner’s Opinion (Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part)

Justice Brunner concurs that:

Police officers, including those on duty, can fall within the definition of “victim” under Marsy’s Law and R.C. 2930.07.

But she diverges sharply by:

Articulating a state constitutional right to access government information, grounded in:
- Article I, Section 2 (all political power inherent in the people);
- Article I, Sections 3 and 11 (assembly, petition, and freedom of speech/press);
- Article I, Section 16 (open courts); and
- Structural principles of informed consent to be governed and democratic accountability.
Holding that this right to know is essential to meaningful self-governance and cannot be left entirely to legislative grace; the legislature may regulate but cannot extinguish it.
Concluding that on-duty police officers in public have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their names/identities when performing public duties in public spaces, especially given CPD policies requiring officers to identify themselves upon request.
Finding R.C. 2930.07 unconstitutional as applied to conceal the officers’ identities in this context, because it improperly restricts the public’s constitutional right to access governmental records and information about public officials performing public functions.
Agreeing that separate statutory exceptions validly allow redaction of particularly graphic footage of officers’ injuries, but not their identities.

Justice Brunner would thus grant a partial writ requiring production of the videos without redacting the officers’ identities, subject only to redactions justified by the grievous-bodily-harm and act-of-severe-violence provisions.

IV. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. Public Records Act – R.C. 149.43

Ohio’s Public Records Act embodies a strong presumption of openness:

A “public record” is a record “kept by any public office” unless a statutory exception applies (R.C. 149.43(A)(1)).
Public offices must promptly produce public records for inspection and copying (R.C. 149.43(B)(1)).
Exceptions are strictly construed against the custodian; the custodian bears the burden to prove that an exception applies and that the records “fall squarely” within it.
- State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79 (1988).
- State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 2008-Ohio-1770.
- Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2020-Ohio-5371.

Of particular relevance:

R.C. 149.43(A)(17) and (A)(1)(jj) (bodycam/dashcam restrictions) – carve out “restricted portions” showing, among other things:
- Grievous bodily harm to a peace officer while on duty (A)(17)(f);
- An act of severe violence resulting in serious physical harm to a peace officer while on duty (A)(17)(g);
- But exclude from “restricted portions” recordings showing death, grievous harm, or severe violence caused by a peace officer, (A)(17)(b), (d), (e).
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(rr) – excludes from “public records”:
“[r]ecords, documents, and information the release of which is prohibited under section 2930.04 or 2930.07 of the Revised Code.”
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) – general exception for records whose release is prohibited by state or federal law.

B. Marsy’s Law – Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a

Adopted by Ohio voters in 2017, Marsy’s Law amended the state constitution to establish enumerated rights for “victims” of crime, including:

“to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety, dignity and privacy” (Art. I, § 10a(A)(1));
and a definition of “victim” as:
“a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act.” (Art. I, § 10a(D))
It further states that its provisions “shall supersede all conflicting state laws.” (Art. I, § 10a(E)).

C. The Victim Privacy Law – R.C. 2930.07 and Related Provisions

R.C. 2930.07 (“Victim Privacy Law”) implements Marsy’s Law by:

Defining “victim” by reference to Article I, Section 10a (R.C. 2930.01(H));
Requiring that, upon a victim’s request, “case documents” be redacted before public release “to remove the name, address, or other identifying information of the victim” (R.C. 2930.07(D)(1)(a)(i)); and
Defining “case document” broadly to include audio or video recordings relating to an offense of violence and submitted to or held by law enforcement, prosecutors, or courts.

The majority relies on this framework but, as it notes, the Dispatch did not challenge whether the bodycam/dashcam videos otherwise met the “case document” definition, so the court focused on the disputed “victim” element.

D. Mandamus Standards and Precedents

A writ of mandamus is “extraordinary” relief. The relator must show:

A clear legal right to the requested relief;
A corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the respondent; and
No adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
(State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, 2015-Ohio-974, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Jones v. Ohio House of Representatives, 2022-Ohio-1909.)

In public-records mandamus, this translates to: if the record is a “public record” and no exception applies, the requester has a clear right to its release, and the custodian has a clear duty to produce it.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Majority: Textualist Interpretation of “Victim”

1. Original Public Meaning and the Plain Text

The majority situates its analysis in its broader jurisprudence emphasizing original public meaning:

State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Bloom, 2024-Ohio-5029 – applied text/history of open courts clause (Art. I, § 16).
Newburgh Hts. v. State, 2022-Ohio-1642 – reaffirmed duty to give effect to constitutional text.
Centerville v. Knab, 2020-Ohio-5219; Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 Ohio St. 473 (1913) – interpret constitutional text as understood at adoption.

The court quotes State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383 (1914), emphasizing that where the text is clear, courts lack authority to look beyond it:

“Where there is no doubt, no ambiguity, no uncertainty as to the meaning of the language employed by the Constitution makers, there is clearly neither right nor authority for the court” to look beyond the language.

Applying that method:

“Person” is given its ordinary meaning (a human being).
The officers were plainly subject to criminal offenses:
- Felonious assault on Officer Doe 1 (R.C. 2903.11(A)(2)) – causing or attempting to cause physical harm with a deadly weapon.
- Aggravated menacing as to Officer Doe 2 (R.C. 2903.21(A)) – knowingly causing another to believe serious physical harm will occur.
Each offense is statutorily an “offense of violence” (R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a)).
The criminal acts were plainly committed “against” the officers (directed force or threat of force).

Thus, the officers are:

Persons “against whom” criminal offenses were committed; and
At least one (Doe 1) is a person “directly and proximately harmed” by the offense.

The majority rejects the Dispatch’s argument that the definition is ambiguous because some crimes (e.g., false reporting, failure to obey) might be “against” the state rather than any individual:

This is not such an edge case; shooting an officer and marching toward another while armed is squarely covered.
Whether officers are victims in other, less obvious contexts is left open.

2. Rejecting Extratextual Policy Arguments

The Dispatch argued that voters did not intend to treat on‑duty officers as “victims” because:

Their injuries are already compensated via workers’ compensation; and
As state actors, they should not enjoy privacy rights overriding public scrutiny of use-of-force incidents.

The majority dismisses both as speculative and irrelevant where the text is clear:

Courts do not psychoanalyze the “secret desires” of voters; they apply what voters enacted.
Even if voters subjectively distinguished officers, the plain text does not—courts cannot smuggle such distinctions into the Constitution.

B. Application of the Victim Privacy Law and Public Records Act

Once the officers are recognized as Marsy’s Law “victims,” the rest of the majority’s analysis is relatively mechanical:

R.C. 2930.07 (Victim Privacy Law) mandates that, upon appropriate invocation, “case documents … shall be redacted prior to public release” to remove identifying information of the victim.
Bodycam and dashcam recordings of victims of offenses of violence submitted to law enforcement fall within “case documents.”
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(rr) then excludes from the definition of “public record” any “records, documents, and information the release of which is prohibited under [R.C.] 2930.07.”
Thus, CPD’s redaction of officers’ identities is compelled by statute and the Public Records Act’s definition of “public record” simply does not extend to the redacted information.

Because the Dispatch cannot show a right to obtain something that is not a “public record” under the statute, the mandamus claim fails.

C. Constitutional Right of Access vs. Marsy’s Law

The Dispatch tried to avoid the statutory bar by arguing that the Ohio Constitution itself guarantees a right to access government records rooted in:

Article I, Section 1 (inalienable rights);
Section 3 (assembly and petition);
Section 11 (speech and press); and
Section 16 (open courts and due course of law).

The majority’s response:

No generalized right recognized: The court has recognized constitutional rights of access only when grounded in specific text, e.g.:
- State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Bloom, 2024-Ohio-5029 – a qualified right to court transcripts derived from the open courts clause (Art. I, § 16).
It has not previously held that some amorphous combination of rights produces a free-standing constitutional right to all government records.
Specific over General: Even if a generalized right of access were inferred, Marsy’s Law is:
- More specific (victim privacy in criminal matters); and
- Later in time; and
- Explicitly declares that it “shall supersede all conflicting state laws.”
Applying ordinary canons of interpretation (lex specialis derogat legi generali), the specific victim-privacy guarantee would trump a more general implied right of access. The majority cites:
- State v. Pribble, 2019-Ohio-4808, ¶ 18 (specific controls general);
- Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994), quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 – where a particular amendment supplies the explicit basis for protection, courts should analyze under that amendment.
Legislative authority over public-record policy: The court has long treated the General Assembly as “the ultimate arbiter of policy considerations relevant to public-records laws” (Kish v. Akron, 2006-Ohio-1244, ¶ 44) and has allowed statutory exceptions unless clearly incompatible with the Constitution (Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville RR Co. v. Clinton Cty. Commrs., 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852)). No “clear incompatibility” is found here, given Marsy’s Law’s express privacy language.

D. Party Presentation and Judicial Restraint

A striking feature of the majority opinion is its extended critique of Justice Fischer’s approach. The majority insists on a strict adherence to the “party presentation” principle:

Citing Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev. Group, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-4989, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008), it stresses that courts should act as neutral arbiters of issues the parties present, not as self-directed “boards of legal inquiry.”
The court emphasizes that in mandamus, where the relator bears the burden to show a clear right to relief, it is particularly inappropriate for a court to invent or develop unargued theories of relief on the relator’s behalf.

The majority accuses the partial dissent of:

Conflating the broad scope of the original public-records request with the narrower relief clearly sought in the mandamus complaint (identifying information for two officers in four videos);
Construing the case as if it had been litigated about eight officers and numerous unsubmitted videos; and
Embarking on a series of legal inquiries (including retroactivity, other exceptions, completeness of CPD’s evidentiary submission) that the Dispatch did not actually raise and that CPD never had an opportunity to fully address.

In short, the majority grounds its refusal to go beyond the two officers’ identities in four videos in concerns about:

Procedural fairness (no “surprise” decisions on unbriefed issues);
Separation of powers (judicial restraint); and
Respect for the adversarial process.

VI. Justice Fischer’s Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent – Key Themes

A. Which Version of the Statutes Applies?

Justice Fischer treats as a threshold legal question: should the court apply the versions of R.C. 149.43 and 2930.07 in effect on:

July 6, 2023 (date of the public-records request); or
October 19, 2023 (date of the mandamus petition)?

He concludes:

Stare decisis and Ohio’s default rules on statutory temporal application compel using the law in effect at the time of the request (former R.C. 149.43 and 2930.07).
R.C. 1.48 presumes amendments are prospective absent express retroactivity; there is none here.
R.C. 1.58(A)(2) protects vested substantive rights from being impaired by later amendments. The Dispatch acquired a vested right to seek public records (a substantive right recognized in Rhodes v. New Philadelphia, 2011-Ohio-3279) when it submitted its request.
Retroactive application of later amendments would risk violating Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution (prohibition on retroactive laws affecting vested rights).

On this basis, he insists on interpreting the case under the earlier statutory definitions and procedural mechanisms, especially for “case document” and victim opt‑in processes.

B. Detailed Reading of the Public Records Exceptions

Justice Fischer methodically applies:

Former R.C. 149.43(A)(17) – grievous-bodily-harm and severe-violence bodycam/dashcam carve-outs; and
Former R.C. 2930.07 and 2930.04 – early version of victim-privacy “opt-in” and “automatic” protections.

He:

Agrees CPD properly redacted:
- Footage of Doe 1 bleeding/suffering from his wounds (grievous bodily harm);
- Footage of the suspect shooting Doe 1 (act of severe violence against a peace officer).
But reads the statutory exclusion in (A)(17)(b), (d), (e) to prohibit redaction of:
- Footage of the suspect being shot or killed by officers;
- Other acts of force by officers causing death or serious harm to the suspect.
In short: when officers inflict harm, that footage is not “restricted” under the bodycam/dashcam exception.

On victim privacy, he:

Agrees Doe 1 and Doe 2 are Marsy’s Law victims.
Concludes the videos are “case documents” under former R.C. 2930.07(A)(1)(a) because they are law-enforcement documentation “regarding a case” (criminal investigation/prosecution) submitted to a law-enforcement agency.
Finds no evidence that the officers submitted written redaction requests as contemplated by former R.C. 2930.07(D)(1).
However, after taking judicial notice of federal prosecutions against the suspects, he concludes that the “temporary automatic opt-in” period under former R.C. 2930.04 (which depends on contact with a state “prosecutor” as defined in state law) never closed for these officers, because prosecution occurred in federal court instead of Ohio state court. Therefore, he reasons the automatic victim-privacy protection remains in place, justifying redaction of Doe 1 and Doe 2’s identities.

C. Scope of Relief and Missing Records

Where the majority narrows the case to four videos and two officers’ identities, Justice Fischer reads the Dispatch’s mandamus petition more broadly:

The petition asks for “all video footage responsive to the Video Footage Request,” which itself requested “all body camera, dash camera … from the [July 6] police shooting on I-70.”
CPD admitted eight officers were treated as victims and acknowledged that “each of the officers and cruisers” at the scene had camera footage potentially deemed a public record.

Based on the unredacted videos and affidavits submitted, he finds that:

More than two officers fired shots or were present with bodycams active;
Some redactions obscured the voice of another officer not Doe 1 or Doe 2; and
Other responsive videos (from other officers’ bodycams/dashcams) were likely withheld despite being ordered submitted for in camera review.

He accepts CPD’s concession at oral argument that officers other than Doe 1 and Doe 2 are not victims under Marsy’s Law and thus cannot be shielded under the victim-privacy exception. Therefore, CPD must produce:

All responsive recordings from non‑victim officers, subject only to:
- Redaction of footage falling within the grievous-bodily-harm / severe-violence exceptions; and
- Redaction of Doe 1 and Doe 2’s identifying information in all records.

He finds the Dispatch has met its burden for a partial writ on that basis.

VII. Justice Brunner’s Partial Concurrence/Dissent – Right to Know and Limited Victim Privacy for Public Officials

A. Democratic Theory and the Right to Know

Justice Brunner grounds her analysis in first principles of democratic self-governance:

She quotes the Declaration of Independence and Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution (“All political power is inherent in the people”).
She cites James Madison and Thomas Jefferson on the need for public access to information to prevent government from becoming a “farce or a tragedy” and to equip the people with sufficient knowledge to be “their own Governors.”
She relies on scholarly work (e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, “Legal Foundations of the Right to Know”) arguing that the public, as sovereign, must have “all information available” to instruct the government.
She cites Kish v. Akron, 2006-Ohio-1244, describing public records as a “portal” for the people to observe government and guard against “sovereign mischief and malfeasance.”

From this foundation, she infers that:

The Ohio Constitution, read as a whole, implicitly but powerfully protects a right of public access to government records and information, beyond statutory grace.
Legislative regulation of this right is permissible but cannot nullify it in core democratic contexts.

B. Reconciling Victim Privacy with Public Access

Justice Brunner accepts that Marsy’s Law constitutionally protects crime victims’ privacy. The question is how that interacts with the constitutional right of public access when:

The “victims” are on‑duty police officers;
The relevant events occur entirely in a public setting (a crowded interstate); and
The public interest in oversight of police use of force is at its zenith.

Her key points:

The concept of “privacy” must be contextually sensitive: whatever precise definition one uses, an on‑duty officer on a highway, surrounded by civilians, has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their identity.
CPD’s own directives require officers to identify themselves and display identification upon request—further undercutting any claim that officers’ names in such contexts are “private.”
Thus, while Marsy’s Law may validly protect certain aspects of victim privacy (e.g., addresses, contact details, mental health records), it does not constitutionally justify concealing the identities of on‑duty officers performing public functions in a public place.

Accordingly, she treats:

The bodycam/dashcam footage of officers’ injuries as legitimately subject to statutory restriction (grievous-bodily-harm / severe-violence exceptions); but
The officers’ names and identities as outside the legitimate scope of victim privacy in this particular context.

Thus, in her view, applying R.C. 2930.07 to conceal the officers’ identities is:

Unconstitutional as applied to these facts; and
Inconsistent with Ohioans’ constitutional right to access governmental information about police use of force.

VIII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a Writ of Mandamus?

A writ of mandamus is a court order directing a public official or body to perform a duty that:

Is clearly required by law; and
Is not discretionary.

In public-records cases, the requestor uses mandamus to ask the Supreme Court (or a court of appeals) to order a public office to produce documents that the requestor claims are public records. The requestor must prove:

They requested specific records;
The records qualify as “public records” under the law; and
No exception permits withholding or redaction beyond what has already been done.

B. What Is Marsy’s Law?

“Marsy’s Law” is a nickname for a victims’ rights amendment added to the Ohio Constitution in 2017. It guarantees crime victims:

Respect and dignity;
Notice of court proceedings;
Participation rights (such as being heard at certain proceedings); and
Privacy rights—including protection from having certain personal information publicly disclosed.

It also defines “victim” broadly and expressly states that it supersedes conflicting state laws.

C. How Does the Victim Privacy Statute Work?

R.C. 2930.07 (and R.C. 2930.04) implement Marsy’s Law by:

Creating procedures for victims (or their representatives) to request redaction of their personal identifying information from “case documents”;
Requiring law enforcement, prosecutors, clerks, and courts to remove this information before releasing records to the public; and
Linking to the Public Records Act, so that once a record is prohibited from release under these victim-privacy rules, it ceases to be a “public record.”

In practice, this can lead to:

Names, addresses, faces, and voices being obscured in police reports, audio/video recordings, and filings.

D. “Case Documents” and Bodycam/Dashcam Recordings

“Case documents” are broadly defined to include not just paper filings but also audio and video recordings held by law enforcement or the courts that relate to a criminal matter. That includes bodycam and dashcam clips if they:

Depict the victim of an offense of violence; and
Are part of the documentation of a criminal investigation or prosecution.

Thus, once someone (including a police officer) qualifies as a “victim,” bodycam footage of them in that role is subject to the victim-privacy redaction rules.

E. Party Presentation Principle

Courts in the American adversarial system generally:

Rely on the parties to frame the issues and arguments;
Avoid deciding issues that were not raised or briefed, except in narrow circumstances (like jurisdictional defects); and
Do not act as independent investigators or advocates for either side.

The majority opinion invokes this principle to avoid expanding the case to additional officers, videos, or statutory issues not expressly advanced by the Dispatch.

IX. Impact and Implications

A. For Police Transparency and Media Access

This decision has immediate consequences for media and public access to bodycam/dashcam footage:

When an officer is the victim of an “offense of violence,” their identity can be categorically shielded under Marsy’s Law and R.C. 2930.07, so long as the statutory processes are properly invoked.
That remains true even if:
- The officer was on duty;
- The incident occurred in a public location; and
- The incident involves controversial police use of deadly force.
The public and press may still receive footage showing the incident itself, but with officer identities (and often significant portions of the incident involving grievous harm to the officer) obscured.

At a minimum, media organizations and accountability advocates will have to adjust expectations when seeking footage in cases where officers have been assaulted or threatened:

Requests should anticipate Marsy’s Law redactions;
Litigation strategies may need to target non‑identity aspects of footage or challenge whether a person truly qualifies as a “victim” in borderline scenarios (e.g., certain “offenses against the state” type crimes);
Arguments about constitutional access rights will need to confront this precedent head‑on or follow Justice Brunner’s approach.

B. For Law Enforcement and Crime Victims (Including Officers)

The decision affirms and clarifies:

Police officers have the same constitutional status as other crime victims under Marsy’s Law. Their employment status or being “on duty” does not strip them of victim privacy rights.
Agencies can rely on R.C. 2930.07 and R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(rr) to redact officer-victims’ names, faces, voices, and other identifiers from case-related recordings when proper processes are followed.
Other officers present but not qualifying as victims do not enjoy that same statutory privacy shield; how far agencies may extend redactions beyond victim officers remains open and fact-dependent (and was a point of tension between the majority and Justice Fischer).

Practically, this may:

Encourage more officers to invoke Marsy’s Law protections after assaults or threats;
Drive internal policy discussions about redaction standards and timetables; and
Generate future litigation about alleged overuse or misuse of victim designation to shield transparency.

C. For Constitutional Doctrine – Rights of Access vs. Specific Privacy Guarantees

The majority’s reasoning implies:

The court remains cautious about inferring broad constitutional rights of access to government records from general provisions (speech, press, petition, open courts).
Where a later constitutional amendment explicitly protects a category (here, victim privacy), it will typically override broader implied or generalized rights (such as access to documents) in that domain.

Justice Brunner’s separate opinion, however, keeps alive a competing vision:

That Ohio’s Constitution, taken as a whole, does protect a fundamental right to know what government is doing; and
That this right can limit how far victim-privacy statutes can be applied, especially to conceal information about public officials acting publicly.

Future cases may build on or contest this view, especially if the General Assembly enacts additional secrecy provisions or expands victim-privacy coverage in ways impacting transparency.

D. For Judicial Method and the Role of the Court

Finally, the decision underscores:

The court’s current majority commitment to strong textualism in constitutional interpretation and to the party presentation principle in case management;
A willingness to refrain from addressing unbriefed but potentially important questions (e.g., broader contours of a constitutional right to public access) when unnecessary to resolve the case; and
Ongoing intra‑court debate over:
- How aggressively to apply retroactivity doctrine in public-records cases;
- Whether and when to take judicial notice of external proceedings to resolve statutory conditions (as Justice Fischer did); and
- How much the court should independently identify and apply controlling law, versus relying on the parties’ framing.

X. Conclusion – Key Takeaways

Police Officers Can Be “Victims” Under Marsy’s Law, Even On Duty.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that on-duty officers who are personally targeted by criminal offenders fall squarely within Marsy’s Law’s constitutional definition of “victim.” Their status as public officials does not diminish their victim status.
Victim Privacy Trumps Public Records Access for Identifying Information.
When officers are victims of offenses of violence, the Victim Privacy Law (R.C. 2930.07) requires redaction of their identifying information from “case documents,” including bodycam and dashcam footage. Those portions cease to be “public records” under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(rr).
No Freestanding General Constitutional Right to All Government Records Was Recognized.
The court declined to derive a broad constitutional right of access from assorted provisions of Article I. Even if such a generalized right existed, it would not override the more specific victim privacy guarantees of Marsy’s Law.
Scope of Relief Depends on How the Relator Frames the Case.
The majority limited the mandamus analysis to the two officers’ identities in four videos, finding other potential issues forfeited. Justice Fischer would have construed the request more broadly and required production of additional records and non‑victim officer identities.
Internal Tension Between Transparency and Privacy Remains.
Justice Brunner’s opinion argues for a constitutional right to know and finds the application of victim privacy to conceal on-duty officers’ identities unconstitutional in this context. That vision could influence future challenges to secrecy statutes or expansive victim-privacy practices.

In the immediate term, GateHouse Media v. Columbus Police Department solidifies the protective scope of Marsy’s Law and the Victim Privacy Law for officers injured or threatened in the line of duty and signals that, in Ohio, constitutional victim privacy can significantly restrict what the public and press may learn about the identities of law-enforcement officers involved in violent encounters—even when those events occur on highways in full public view.