When Foreign Residence Interrupts “Home-State” Status: Montana May Assert Significant-Connection Jurisdiction and Impose Temporary Child Travel Limits (Parenting of A.H.S., 2025 MT 57)

When Foreign Residence Interrupts “Home-State” Status: Montana May Assert Significant-Connection Jurisdiction and Impose Temporary Child Travel Limits (Parenting of A.H.S., 2025 MT 57)

Introduction

In Parenting of A.H.S., 2025 MT 57, the Montana Supreme Court addressed a multi-jurisdictional custody dispute involving a dual-citizen child whose recent residence straddled Montana, Brazil, and a brief stay in California. The Court affirmed: (1) the Montana District Court’s initial custody jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and Montana’s retained UCCJA-based statute; (2) a temporary restriction on the child’s travel out of Montana and the United States pending resolution of related California proceedings; and (3) the District Court’s best-interests analysis under § 40-4-212, MCA, in light of domestic violence allegations.

The case pits petitioner-appellee father, Chad Senechal, against respondent-appellant mother, Maira Horta Moss. After the parties moved to Montana with their child, the mother left for California without notice and pursued proceedings there while the father initiated a Montana parenting action. The decision clarifies how Montana courts navigate the UCCJEA when foreign-country residence interrupts the “home-state” calculus, how the significant-connection route to initial jurisdiction operates, and under what circumstances a court may impose temporary, child-centered travel limits to safeguard stability and deter forum shopping.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Initial jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA: Because the child had resided in Montana and Brazil (a foreign country) — and only four days in California — during the six months before commencement, no U.S. state qualified as the child’s “home state.” Montana could therefore make the initial custody determination based on significant connections and substantial evidence, § 40-7-201, MCA, and § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA. The District Court also properly rejected the mother’s inconvenient forum argument under § 40-7-108, MCA.
  • Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction: Once Montana properly exercised jurisdiction, it retained “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” under § 40-7-202, MCA.
  • Temporary travel restriction: The District Court did not abuse its discretion by temporarily prohibiting either parent from taking the child out of Montana or the United States while related litigation remained pending in California. The restriction was child-focused, temporary, and tailored to promote stability and deter renewed forum shopping.
  • Best interests and domestic violence: The District Court adequately considered evidence of past domestic conflict under § 40-4-212, MCA. On the record, there was no evidence the father posed a safety risk to the child; testimony from a treating social worker supported that both parents could safely parent. A 50/50 parenting schedule was affirmed.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Statutes Cited

The Court anchored its analysis in the UCCJEA (Title 40, Chapter 7, MCA) and Montana’s retained UCCJA-based provision, § 40-4-211, MCA, supported by prior decisions:

  • In re Marriage of Sampley, 2015 MT 121, ¶¶ 6, 22, 24, 26–27: Confirms subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed for correctness; recognizes Montana adopted the UCCJEA in 1999 without repealing the UCCJA but amending its language; discusses “temporary absence” and totality-of-circumstances when determining home state.
  • In re the Parenting of C.J., 2016 MT 93, ¶¶ 12–13: Reiterates district courts’ broad discretion in parenting matters and the presumption they properly considered the evidence; appellate review defers absent clearly erroneous findings or abuse of discretion.
  • In re Marriage of Williams, 2018 MT 221, ¶ 5: Parenting plan findings are reviewed for clear error.
  • In re Matter of A.F., 2003 MT 254, ¶ 24; Bock v. Smith, 2005 MT 40, ¶ 27: District courts resolve evidentiary conflicts; their determinations are upheld if supported by substantial credible evidence.

Key statutes the Court applied:

  • § 40-7-201, MCA: UCCJEA initial child custody jurisdiction – prioritizes “home state,” followed by significant-connection jurisdiction where no state qualifies as home state.
  • §§ 40-7-107, 40-7-139, 40-7-140, MCA: UCCJEA coordination — simultaneous proceedings, inter-court communication, and cooperative evidence-gathering to prevent competing orders.
  • § 40-7-108, MCA: Inconvenient forum analysis and statutory factors.
  • § 40-7-202, MCA: Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction once a state properly makes an initial custody determination.
  • § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA: Montana’s retained UCCJA-based “significant connection” jurisdictional route when it is in the child’s best interests and Montana has significant connections and substantial evidence.
  • § 40-4-212, MCA: Best interests of the child factors, including domestic violence, continuity/stability of care, parent-child relationships, and the child’s adjustment.

2) Legal Reasoning

a) UCCJEA “home state” and foreign-country residence

The UCCJEA defines “home state” as the state where the child lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the proceeding, including periods of temporary absence. Here, the child had:

  • Four months in Montana (Apr–Aug 2020), then five months in Brazil,
  • Eight months in Montana (Feb–Nov 2021), then five months in Brazil,
  • Four months in Montana (Apr–Sep 2022), and
  • Four days in California before the Montana filing (Sept 8, 2022).

The Court emphasized that Brazil is not a “state” for the UCCJEA’s home-state calculation in this posture, and California plainly was not the home state (only four days of residence, and no six-month period there within two years). That left “no state” with home-state jurisdiction unless the Brazilian sojourn could be treated as a “temporary absence” from Montana. Importantly, the Supreme Court noted it did not need to decide the “temporary absence” question because even without counting the time in Brazil as a temporary absence, no U.S. state qualified as home state; thus, the analysis moved to significant-connection jurisdiction.

b) Significant-connection jurisdiction under § 40-7-201(1)(b), MCA and § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA

When no state is the home state, a court may exercise initial jurisdiction if:

  • the child and at least one parent have significant connections with the forum beyond mere presence, and
  • substantial evidence about the child’s care, protection, training, and relationships is available there.

The Court affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that Montana satisfied these criteria. Beyond the UCCJEA text, the Court expressly referenced § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA, reflecting Montana’s retained UCCJA-based “best interests/significant connection” jurisdiction. Relying on Sampley, the Court reiterated that Montana did not repeal the UCCJA; rather, it amended and retained it in a manner consistent with the UCCJEA framework. The opinion thus synthesizes the UCCJEA’s significant-connection prong with Montana’s parallel statutory authority, reinforcing a “belt-and-suspenders” jurisdictional foundation.

c) UCCJEA comity, communication, and the California proceedings

The District Court complied with §§ 40-7-107, -139, -140, MCA: it paused to communicate with the California court, held a UCCJEA conference on October 18, 2022, and allowed party participation. The California court declined to exercise jurisdiction at that time, finding no personal jurisdiction over the father and no abusive conduct conferring DV-based jurisdiction. Although the California Court of Appeal later remanded to clarify home-state or inconvenient-forum analyses, the Montana Supreme Court held that California’s ongoing proceedings did not preclude Montana from deciding its own jurisdictional question and proceeding to a final parenting plan. Once Montana properly exercised initial jurisdiction, it obtained “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” under § 40-7-202, MCA.

d) Inconvenient forum

The District Court carefully applied the eight statutory factors in § 40-7-108(2), MCA (domestic violence, time outside Montana, distance, finances, party agreement, location of evidence, ability to decide expeditiously, and familiarity with the case). It concluded Montana was not an inconvenient forum. The Supreme Court emphasized the lower court’s legitimate concern about incentivizing forum shopping — a crucial UCCJEA policy consideration — given mother’s unilateral move to California and pursuit of parallel proceedings. Substantial credible evidence supported the District Court’s weighing of the factors, and the decision was affirmed.

e) Temporary restriction on the child’s out-of-state and international travel

The District Court prohibited either parent from taking the child out of Montana or the United States while jurisdictional and related litigation remained pending in California. The mother framed this as a “right to travel” violation. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, stressing that:

  • The restriction was imposed on the child’s travel, not on either parent’s ability to travel personally.
  • It was temporary and tailored to preserve stability and continuity of care during active litigation and to deter additional forum shopping.
  • Under § 40-4-212(1)(h), MCA, continuity and stability of care is a valid best-interests consideration. The mother had previously removed the child from Montana without notice, evaded service, and delayed compliance with court orders, creating instability and a foreseeable risk of renewed flight.

On this record, the court’s safety- and stability-oriented restriction was within its broad discretion and not an abuse of that discretion.

f) Best interests and domestic violence

The District Court took evidence on domestic violence and parenting capacity, including testimony from a law enforcement officer and a licensed social worker treating the child. It concluded that, while the father had likely behaved inappropriately during a prior incident causing the mother to reasonably fear injury, there was no evidence he posed a risk to the child or that he was anything other than a patient, safe, and loving parent. The treating social worker had no concerns with either parent’s ability to safely parent. Applying § 40-4-212, MCA, the District Court found an equal-time plan best served the child’s interests, and the Supreme Court, deferring to the supported findings, affirmed.

3) Impact and Practical Significance

  • Foreign-country residence and the “home-state” clock: When a child spends significant portions of the six-month pre-filing period in a foreign country and no U.S. state meets the six-month, consecutive home-state requirement, Montana courts can move directly to significant-connection jurisdiction. The Court underscored it did not need to decide whether the foreign stay was a “temporary absence” from Montana on the facts; however, it flagged that such an analysis can matter in other cases. Practitioners should therefore develop robust records on the purpose, duration, intent, and continuity of foreign stays if a temporary-absence theory is pivotal.
  • Dual statutory footing for initial jurisdiction: The opinion confirms Montana’s practice of reading the UCCJEA’s significant-connection provision in harmony with § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA, preserving a familiar best-interests/sufficient-evidence test once home-state jurisdiction is unavailable.
  • UCCJEA comity and communication work as intended: The courts’ inter-jurisdictional conference and coordinated approach prevented competing orders and enabled Montana to proceed. The fact of ongoing California proceedings (including a remand for clarification) did not preclude Montana’s proper exercise of initial and then exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.
  • Child-centered travel limits are permissible: Narrowly tailored, temporary restrictions on the child’s travel to ensure stability during pending jurisdictional disputes do not violate a parent’s right to travel. The focus on the child — not constraining the parent’s personal movement — is an important drafting and constitutional touchstone.
  • Domestic violence evidence is case-specific: Past abuse directed at a parent is relevant under § 40-4-212, MCA, but will not automatically reduce parenting time where the evidence shows the child’s safety and welfare are not compromised and both parents can safely parent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • UCCJEA: A uniform law used by nearly all states to decide which state’s court can make and enforce child custody decisions, aiming to avoid dueling orders and forum shopping.
  • Home state: The state where the child lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months before the custody case is filed. If none exists, courts look to other bases like significant connections.
  • Temporary absence: A short or purposeful absence from a state (e.g., extended visit) that still counts toward the six-month home-state period, depending on context and intent; assessed under a totality-of-circumstances test.
  • Significant-connection jurisdiction: If no state qualifies as home state, a court may take the case when the child and at least one parent have meaningful ties to the forum and there is substantial evidence about the child there.
  • Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction: Once a state properly takes a custody case, it keeps it until neither the child nor a parent has meaningful ties or everyone moves away, ensuring stability.
  • Inconvenient forum: Even if a court has jurisdiction, it can decline to hear a case if another state is clearly more suitable considering factors like domestic violence, location of evidence, and the child’s connections.
  • Right to travel vs. child travel limits: Courts can, in the child’s best interests, limit where the child travels — especially temporarily during litigation — without violating a parent’s constitutional right to travel, so long as the order does not restrict the parent’s own movement.
  • Best interests of the child: The central standard in custody cases, considering numerous factors such as each parent’s relationship with the child, safety, stability, and the child’s adjustment to home and community.

Conclusion

Parenting of A.H.S. reinforces core UCCJEA principles while providing practical guidance for cross-border custody disputes:

  • When foreign-country residence prevents any U.S. state from qualifying as the child’s home state, Montana may assert initial custody jurisdiction on the significant-connection/substantial-evidence basis, harmonizing § 40-7-201, MCA, with § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA.
  • Inter-court communication under the UCCJEA is essential and, when properly executed, allows Montana to proceed and then retain exclusive, continuing jurisdiction despite contemporaneous litigation elsewhere.
  • Temporary, child-focused travel restrictions designed to promote stability and deter forum shopping fall within the District Court’s broad discretion and do not infringe a parent’s right to travel.
  • Evidence of past domestic conflict is important, but absent proof of risk to the child or impaired parenting, it does not automatically curtail equal parenting time.

The decision is a clear, methodical application of the UCCJEA’s allocation-of-forum rules and Montana’s best-interests framework. It will be especially instructive in cases involving international stays, parallel out-of-state filings, and the need for calibrated interim measures to safeguard the child’s stability while jurisdictional questions are resolved.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Montana

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