When Does a Non‑GTLA Statute Override Governmental Immunity? Chief Justice Cavanagh’s Proposed Four‑Factor Framework for CPL Mandatory‑Reporter Claims

Introduction

In Robert Brian Thomas Ruee Adams v. Amanda Lynn Skardoutos, et al., the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal from a February 13, 2025 judgment of the Court of Appeals. Although the denial leaves the lower court’s decision intact without establishing new binding precedent, Chief Justice Megan K. Cavanagh authored a separate concurrence that squarely spotlights a recurring and consequential question in Michigan public-law torts: Does the Child Protection Law (CPL), MCL 722.621 et seq., operate as a statutory exception to individual governmental immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., where a government-employed mandatory reporter allegedly fails to report suspected child abuse or neglect?

The parties include plaintiff-appellant Robert Brian Thomas Ruee Adams and several individual defendants-appellees. While the case posture is procedural—an order denying leave—the concurrence interrogates the Court of Appeals’ 2013 decision in Jones v. Bitner, 300 Mich App 65, which held that the GTLA’s individual immunity provision governed and foreclosed CPL liability against a police officer for failing to report suspected abuse. Chief Justice Cavanagh questions the reasoning and outcome in Jones, outlines a set of considerations for determining when a non-GTLA statute constitutes an exception to governmental immunity, and signals that the issue merits full review in a future case cleanly presenting it.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court denied the application for leave to appeal, concluding it was not persuaded that the question presented warranted review at this time.
Chief Justice Cavanagh concurred in the denial but wrote separately to highlight a jurisprudentially significant issue: whether the CPL should be construed as a statutory exception to individual governmental immunity under the GTLA in suits alleging a failure to report by a government-employed mandatory reporter.
While acknowledging Jones v. Bitner held that the GTLA’s individual immunity provision controls over the CPL, the concurrence questions Jones’s reasoning. It identifies material differences between the CPL’s liability and immunity standards and those in the GTLA, and canvasses case law where non-GTLA statutes have been treated as exceptions to governmental immunity.
Chief Justice Cavanagh articulates four nonexhaustive considerations to guide future courts in deciding whether a statute outside the GTLA creates an exception to governmental immunity:
1. Does the statute expressly reach governmental agencies or their actors?
2. Does it provide standards of liability or immunity that differ from the GTLA?
3. Does it include a general cause of action for its violation?
4. Which statute is more specific and which is more recently enacted?
The concurrence ultimately agrees that this case is not the vehicle to resolve the issue—both because the plaintiff did not seek to overrule Jones on this basis and because one defendant asserted absolute immunity as the “highest appointive executive official” under MCL 691.1407(5), a distinct immunity that may independently bar claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The concurrence situates the GTLA/CPL conflict within a broader line of Michigan decisions addressing whether and when statutes outside the GTLA operate as exceptions to governmental immunity.

Beals v. Michigan, 497 Mich 363 (2015): Reaffirms the GTLA’s broad grant of immunity to governmental agencies and employees for the exercise or discharge of governmental functions, subject to specified exceptions.
Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (2000): Interprets the GTLA’s “the proximate cause” standard in MCL 691.1407(2)(c) to mean the single most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding the injury, not merely “a” proximate cause. This strict standard tightens the pathway to individual liability under the GTLA by requiring both gross negligence and that such conduct be the one proximate cause.
Lavey v. Mills, 248 Mich App 244 (2001): Describes the CPL’s framework for reporting and investigating suspected child abuse and neglect. The statute imposes reporting duties on designated “mandatory reporters,” many of whom are public employees (e.g., law enforcement officers, school administrators, social workers).
Jones v. Bitner, 300 Mich App 65 (2013): Addresses the exact conflict at issue—whether a CPL failure-to-report claim against a police officer is barred by GTLA individual immunity. Jones held that the GTLA’s individual immunity provision (later and narrower) governs and limits CPL liability, thereby shielding the officer.
Ballard v. Ypsilanti Twp, 457 Mich 564 (1998): Clarifies that although the GTLA announces “except as otherwise provided in this act,” the Legislature may still create exceptions outside the GTLA. However, Ballard held the Recreational Land Use Act did not constitute such an exception because it neither included governmental entities within its coverage nor created a conflict requiring the GTLA to yield.
Malcolm v. East Detroit, 437 Mich 132 (1991): Holds the former Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA) operated as a limited exception to governmental immunity. Key features: the act expressly included governmental entities and set different liability/immunity standards than the GTLA, and it was later-enacted and more specific.
Anzaldua v. Band, 457 Mich 530 (1998): Holds the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) applies to governmental employers because the statute expressly includes the state and its political subdivisions within the definition of “employer,” thereby functioning as an exception to GTLA immunity for such claims.
Mack v. Detroit, 467 Mich 186 (2002) and Manning v. City of Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685 (1993): Recognize that the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) allows actions against governmental entities because the statute’s definitions encompass them—another example of exceptions arising outside the GTLA.
State Farm Fire & Cas Co v. Corby Energy Servs, Inc, 271 Mich App 480 (2006): Concludes the then-operative “MISS DIG” statute did not create an exception to governmental immunity because it did not specifically address governmental entities, did not establish a general cause of action, and did not set immunity standards different from the GTLA.

Taken together, these decisions depict a nuanced landscape: some non-GTLA statutes plainly create avenues of liability against governmental actors (EMSA, WPA, ELCRA), while others do not (RUA, MISS DIG), depending on statutory text, structure, and the presence of conflict with the GTLA.

Legal Reasoning

Chief Justice Cavanagh’s concurrence proceeds in two major steps.

First, it sets out the points of tension between the GTLA and the CPL:

GTLA (MCL 691.1407(2)): Individual governmental employees are immune unless their conduct amounts to gross negligence and is “the proximate cause” of the injury. By Robinson, “the proximate cause” means the single most immediate and direct cause—an exacting threshold.
CPL (MCL 722.623; 722.633; 722.625): Mandatory reporters must immediately report suspected child abuse or neglect to centralized intake. A person required to report who fails to do so is civilly liable for damages proximately caused by the failure and may face misdemeanor criminal liability for a knowing failure. Good-faith reporters are granted immunity for actions taken to comply, but there is no immunity for failing to report.

The textual differences are stark: the CPL imposes liability for harms “proximately caused by” the failure to report, without a gross-negligence requirement, and affirmatively withholds immunity for non-reporting; the GTLA, by contrast, shields employees unless the plaintiff can show gross negligence that is “the proximate cause.” The concurrence underscores that these differences are not incidental drafting choices; they reflect distinct policy choices about child protection and accountability.

Second, drawing on Malcolm, Anzaldua, Ballard, and State Farm, the concurrence identifies four nonexhaustive considerations to determine whether a statute outside the GTLA should be treated as an exception to governmental immunity:

Express reach: Does the statute expressly reach governmental agencies or their actors?
Divergent standards: Does the statute provide liability/immunity standards that differ from the GTLA?
Cause of action: Does the statute include a general cause of action for its violation?
Specificity and recency: Which statute is more specific to the subject and which is later-enacted?

Applying this framework to the CPL (as the concurrence implicitly invites):

Express reach: The CPL’s mandatory-reporter roster explicitly includes many public employees (e.g., law enforcement officers, school administrators, social workers, friend-of-the-court employees). While the statute speaks in terms of “persons” required to report rather than naming “state” or “political subdivisions,” its duty plainly encompasses governmental actors in their individual capacities.
Divergent standards: The CPL imposes liability for harm “proximately caused” by a failure to report, without requiring gross negligence, and provides immunity only to those acting in good faith to comply. This materially diverges from the GTLA’s gross-negligence and “the proximate cause” regime, signaling a distinct legislative balance in the child-protection context.
Cause of action: MCL 722.633(1) expressly authorizes civil liability against a person who fails to report as required, establishing a cause of action tethered to statutory breach and causation.
Specificity and recency: Jones emphasized that the GTLA’s individual immunity provision post-dates the CPL and is narrower, concluding the later, narrower statute controls. The concurrence suggests recency is a factor but not dispositive—especially where the more specific statute (the CPL) has its own targeted liability and immunity scheme that could reasonably function as an exception for the class of harms it addresses.

In this light, the concurrence questions Jones’s categorical approach. Rather than treating recency and narrowness as outcome-determinative, courts should weigh the full set of considerations. Where, as with the CPL, the Legislature crafted a self-contained enforcement structure that both imposes liability for non-reporting and limits immunity to good-faith compliance, a strong argument exists that the CPL implicitly carves out an exception to individual governmental immunity for mandatory reporters who fail to report.

The concurrence also notes a further complicating factor in this case: one defendant invoked absolute immunity under MCL 691.1407(5) as the “highest appointive executive official” of an agency. That separate provision confers absolute immunity for acts within the scope of executive authority and may independently foreclose liability, regardless of how the CPL/GTLA interaction is resolved. The presence of this alternative immunity reinforces why the Court declined to use this case to reconsider Jones.

Impact

Although not a holding, the concurrence has significant signaling value for litigants, lower courts, and policymakers.

Future litigation posture: Plaintiffs alleging harm from unreported suspected abuse by public employees may foreground CPL claims and argue the CPL’s liability provision operates as a statutory exception to GTLA individual immunity. Defendants will likely continue to invoke Jones, but trial and appellate courts may give weight to the concurrence’s framework in assessing motions for summary disposition.
Scope of exposure for mandatory reporters: If the Supreme Court ultimately holds that the CPL functions as an exception to GTLA immunity, public employees who are mandatory reporters could face liability on a standard closer to ordinary negligence causation (“proximately caused by”), without the GTLA’s gross-negligence and “the proximate cause” gatekeeping. That shift would materially affect schools, law enforcement, social services, and healthcare providers.
Compliance incentives: Recognizing CPL-based liability as an exception would strengthen incentives for prompt reporting and adherence to CPL procedures, aligning civil liability with the statute’s existing criminal misdemeanor for knowing failures to report.
Institutional risk management: Public entities may adjust training, reporting protocols, supervisory oversight, and documentation practices. Insurers and indemnitors for public employers may re-evaluate coverage and risk assessments for CPL exposure.
Doctrinal clarification: The four-factor framework provides a clear analytic path for courts confronting other potential conflicts between the GTLA and specific statutory regimes, enhancing coherence across disparate subject areas (employment retaliation, civil rights, emergency services, regulated safety regimes).
Persistent role for absolute immunity: Even if CPL claims are deemed exceptions to individual immunity under MCL 691.1407(2), absolute immunity under MCL 691.1407(5) for the highest appointive executive officials would continue to limit claims against agency heads acting within the scope of executive authority.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Governmental immunity (GTLA): A statutory shield that protects governmental agencies and employees from tort suits arising from governmental functions, subject to specified exceptions. For individual employees, immunity persists unless the conduct is grossly negligent and is “the proximate cause” of the injury.
“Gross negligence” vs. negligence: Gross negligence is substantially more than ordinary carelessness; it connotes conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether injury results. The GTLA requires gross negligence; the CPL does not.
“The proximate cause” vs. “a proximate cause”: Under Robinson, “the proximate cause” is the single most immediate and direct cause of the injury. By contrast, “proximately caused by” (as used in the CPL) refers to ordinary proximate causation—one or more substantial legal causes of the harm.
Mandatory reporter (CPL): Certain professionals (e.g., physicians, nurses, psychologists, social workers, teachers, school administrators, law enforcement officers, clergy, friend-of-the-court personnel, regulated childcare providers) must immediately report suspected child abuse or neglect to a centralized intake. Failure to do so can create civil liability for resulting damages and, if knowing, criminal liability.
Statutory exception to immunity: Even though the GTLA is the general immunity statute, the Legislature can create exceptions in other statutes. Courts identify such exceptions by analyzing statutory text, who it covers, whether it creates distinct liability/immunity standards, whether it creates a cause of action, and the relative specificity and timing of enactments.
Absolute immunity for highest appointive executive (MCL 691.1407(5)): A distinct, robust immunity for the top appointed executive official of a level of government, shielding them absolutely (when acting within executive authority), separate from the GTLA’s gross-negligence framework.

Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s order in Adams does not change the law; it denies leave and leaves the Court of Appeals’ result in place. But Chief Justice Cavanagh’s concurrence is noteworthy. It questions the foundation of Jones v. Bitner’s approach to CPL claims against public employees and proposes a structured, four-factor analysis for deciding when non-GTLA statutes operate as exceptions to governmental immunity. The concurrence underscores the CPL’s deliberate design: it imposes civil liability for harms “proximately caused by” a mandatory reporter’s failure to report, extends immunity only for good-faith compliance, and targets a sensitive sphere—child protection—where the Legislature has chosen strong enforcement mechanisms.

Going forward, litigants will likely test the concurrence’s framework in cases that more squarely present the issue, unencumbered by alternative absolute immunity claims and with arguments inviting reconsideration of Jones. If adopted in a future merits decision, the framework could recalibrate the balance between protecting governmental actors and ensuring accountability in child-abuse reporting, with practical consequences for training, supervision, and risk management across Michigan’s public institutions. Until then, Jones remains the operative appellate precedent, but its durability has been openly questioned, and a roadmap for reexamination has been sketched.