When “Notwithstanding” Controls: Shapiro v. U.S. Social Security Administration and the Priority of Social Security Act § 1306(c) over FOIA’s Fee‑Preclusion Rule

I. Introduction

In Shapiro v. U.S. Social Security Administration, No. 22‑1191 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted a direct clash between:

the Freedom of Information Act’s (FOIA) 2007 fee‑preclusion amendment, which bars agencies from charging fees when they respond late to FOIA requests, and
an agency‑specific statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1306(c), which authorizes the Social Security Administration (SSA) to charge requesters the full cost of processing certain information requests, “[n]otwithstanding” FOIA “or any other provision of law.”

The plaintiff, neurologist and advocate Dr. Robert E. Shapiro, submitted a broad FOIA request seeking records about how SSA evaluates migraine and other headache disorders for disability benefits. SSA delayed its response beyond FOIA’s statutory deadlines but then billed Shapiro $2,908, invoking its cost‑reimbursement authority under § 1306(c) on the ground that the request was “non‑program‑related.”

The central legal questions were:

Does FOIA’s 2007 “no fees for untimely responses” rule, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(viii), override SSA’s earlier‑enacted cost‑reimbursement provision in § 1306(c)?
How narrowly or broadly should courts read the phrase “not directly related to the administration” of an SSA program, which triggers the SSA’s ability to charge full costs?
Did Shapiro “substantially prevail” in his FOIA litigation so as to be eligible for attorneys’ fees?

The Second Circuit’s answer places significant weight on the word “notwithstanding” in § 1306(c), treating it as an explicit, controlling override of FOIA’s fee limitations for a defined category of SSA requests. The court also adopts a relatively narrow conception of when a request is “directly related” to the administration of SSA programs. Finally, it tightens the showing needed to “substantially prevail” for FOIA fee‑shifting when the only relief obtained is a better explanation of withholdings.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Core Holding

The Second Circuit reverses the district court and holds:

Priority of § 1306(c) over FOIA fee‑preclusion. The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1306(c) is “crystal clear”: its “Notwithstanding section[] 552” and “any other provision of law” language unambiguously authorizes SSA to charge the full cost of processing FOIA requests that are not directly related to program administration, even when SSA has failed to comply with FOIA’s statutory time limits. FOIA’s 2007 fee‑preclusion amendment does not apply to such requests.
Shapiro’s request was not “program‑related.” Applying the statutory text, legislative history, and SSA’s implementing regulations, the court concludes that Shapiro’s request—aimed at general public education, scholarship, and advocacy concerning SSA’s treatment of migraine and headache disorders—was not “directly related to the administration” of SSA programs. SSA therefore properly charged him full costs under § 1306(c).
No “substantial” success for attorneys’ fees. Once the fee refund is reversed, Shapiro’s only remaining success was a district court order requiring SSA to provide a more detailed explanation of its withholdings. The Second Circuit holds this procedural relief does not materially alter the legal relationship between the parties and thus does not make Shapiro a “substantially prevailing” party. The award of attorneys’ fees and costs is vacated.

The result: SSA’s fee assessment stands; Shapiro receives no refund and no attorneys’ fees or costs, and FOIA’s timing‑based fee penalty is effectively inapplicable to the slice of SSA requests covered by § 1306(c).

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The FOIA Request

Shapiro, a neurologist and advocate for people with disabling headache disorders, submitted a FOIA request to SSA in October 2018. He sought:

All documents related to SSA’s assessment, evaluation, and decisions about including or excluding a proposed listing for migraine and other headache disorders in the SSA’s Listing of Impairments (the “Blue Book”), focusing on the 2013–2016 rulemaking on neurological disorders (listing 11.00); and
All documents pertinent to guidance on how existing listings, such as 11.02 (Epilepsy), are to be used and interpreted by SSA adjudicators and ALJs to assess medical equivalence for impairments due to migraine and other headache disorders.

The request sought a broad range of materials—including correspondence, emails, memoranda, drafts, cost‑benefit analyses, public comments, and inter‑agency communications—over an indefinite time period.

B. SSA’s Response and Fee Assessment

More than six months later, in May 2019, SSA responded. It classified the request as “unusual” and “non‑program‑related” under its regulations and demanded $2,908 in processing fees under § 1306(c), offering Shapiro the option to narrow his request or cap the fees. Shapiro paid the amount in full.

In July 2019, SSA produced two memoranda, withheld 1,377 pages under FOIA Exemption 5 (the deliberative process/privileges exemption), and redacted personal information under Exemption 6 (privacy).

C. Administrative Appeal and District Court Litigation

Shapiro administratively appealed in August 2019, challenging:

SSA’s withholdings of responsive records; and
SSA’s imposition of the $2,908 fee, arguing that SSA’s failure to meet FOIA’s deadlines triggered FOIA’s fee‑preclusion rule and required a refund.

When SSA did not resolve the appeal within FOIA’s 20‑working‑day deadline, Shapiro sued in December 2019 in the District of Vermont. He alleged:

Failure to respond to his FOIA request within statutory timeframes;
Failure to produce all responsive records; and
Improper denial of his request for a fee waiver or reduction (including an asserted right to a fee refund under the 2007 FOIA amendment).

He also sought attorneys’ fees and costs.

D. Cross‑Motions in the District Court

SSA moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing:

The request was “unreasonably broad” and therefore not a “perfected” FOIA request that reasonably described the records sought.
SSA had no duty to respond further because the request was overly burdensome.
SSA had “clear authority” under § 1306(c) to charge full costs for non‑program‑related requests, “notwithstanding” any of FOIA’s fee provisions.

Shapiro cross‑moved for summary judgment, contending:

His request was “directly related to the administration of the SSA,” so § 1306(c) did not apply;
Even if § 1306(c) did apply, the 2007 FOIA amendment—enacted later in time—should control over § 1306(c), making SSA’s fee assessment invalid due to its untimely response.

E. The District Court’s Decisions

The district court issued three key rulings:

March 8, 2021 Order (Shapiro v. SSA, 525 F. Supp. 3d 528 (D. Vt. 2021)):
- Held the request was “unreasonably broad and burdensome,” so SSA did not have to respond.
- Nonetheless held that SSA could not retain the $2,908 fee because FOIA’s 2007 fee‑preclusion amendment barred any fee where the agency failed to comply with FOIA deadlines.
- Concluded that reading § 1306(c) to permit fees despite untimeliness would effectively impliedly repeal the 2007 FOIA amendment by rendering it a “nullity.” To avoid this, the court “harmonized” the statutes by reading the FOIA amendment as trumping § 1306(c) in cases of late responses.
- Ordered SSA to “specify a basis for withholding” the documents under Exemptions 5 and 6.
December 10, 2021 Order (2021 WL 8316784 (D. Vt.)):
- Held SSA properly withheld the disputed documents under Exemption 5 and therefore did not need to reach Exemption 6.
- Nonetheless found Shapiro had “substantially prevailed” by obtaining the fee refund and the order requiring explanation of withholdings and thus awarded partial attorneys’ fees and costs.
March 30, 2022 Judgment:
- Awarded $10,262.75 in attorneys’ fees, $444.50 in costs, and a refund of the $2,908 FOIA fee.

SSA appealed the rulings on fees and costs to the Second Circuit.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Second Circuit’s Reasoning

A. Statutory Framework in Conflict

1. FOIA and the 2007 Fee‑Preclusion Rule

FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, is the general federal transparency statute. It:

grants a broad right of access to federal agency records, subject to specified exemptions, and
requires agencies to determine within 20 working days whether to comply with a request and to notify the requester of its decision. See § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)–(ii).

In 2007, Congress enacted the OPEN Government Act, which added a critical enforcement incentive. Section 552(a)(4)(A)(viii) now provides that:

“[A]n agency shall not assess any search fees (or in the case of a requester described under clause (ii)(II) [certain media/educational requesters], duplication fees) under this subparagraph if the agency fails to comply with any time limit under paragraph (6) [the 20‑day decision deadlines], if no unusual or exceptional circumstances apply.”

In short, FOIA generally forbids late‑responding agencies from charging certain fees (and in many cases any fees), even if they otherwise could.

2. SSA’s Cost‑Reimbursement Provision: 42 U.S.C. § 1306(c)

Section 1306(c), enacted in 1981 as part of the Social Security Act, allows SSA to recover its “full cost” of providing information in some circumstances. Critically, it begins:

“Notwithstanding sections 552 and 552a of title 5 or any other provision of law, whenever the Commissioner of Social Security or the Secretary determines that a request for information … is made … for any other purpose not directly related to the administration of the program or programs under this chapter to which such information relates, such Commissioner or Secretary may require the requester to pay the full cost … of providing such information.” (emphasis added)

SSA implemented this through regulations at 20 C.F.R. Part 402, including:

§ 402.170: Criteria for deciding whether a request is directly related to program administration (including whether information is needed to pursue a benefit, verify information, support an authorized program activity, or allow employers to fulfill FICA responsibilities).
§ 402.175(a): Explicitly authorizing SSA to charge the “full cost of supplying the information” for non‑program‑related requests, “notwithstanding the fee provisions of the FOIA … or any other provision of law.”

Thus, while FOIA created a general fee framework for all agencies, § 1306(c) and its implementing regulations carve out a special regime for non‑program‑related requests to SSA.

B. A Purely Textual Resolution: The Force of “Notwithstanding”

The Second Circuit centers its analysis on the statutory text of § 1306(c), in particular the opening “notwithstanding” clause and the phrase “any other provision of law.”

1. Plain Meaning of “Notwithstanding”

Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U.S. 288 (2017), the court notes that the ordinary meaning of “notwithstanding” is “in spite of” or “without prevention or obstruction from or by.” This is treated as a clear indicator of statutory priority:

“Notwithstanding” provisions are drafted precisely to specify which rule controls “in the event of a clash.”
They signal an intention that the “notwithstanding” section override conflicting provisions in other statutes.

The court also relies on Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10 (1993), which described similar language as a “clearer statement” of priority that “is difficult to imagine.” The Second Circuit’s own precedents—United States v. Shkreli, 47 F.4th 65 (2d Cir. 2022); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 609 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2010); and Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2009)—reinforce this view: a “notwithstanding” clause “clearly signals” that it is meant to override any conflicting statute.

Here, § 1306(c) does not merely say “notwithstanding FOIA”; it says “Notwithstanding sections 552 and 552a of title 5 or any other provision of law.” This gives it broad supremacy over:

FOIA’s provisions, including subsequent amendments, and
any other potentially conflicting legal rule.

2. No Need to “Harmonize” with FOIA

The district court had attempted to reconcile § 1306(c) and FOIA’s 2007 amendment by invoking the canon against implied repeals: courts should avoid reading a newer statute as implicitly repealing an older one unless there is a “clear and manifest” conflict. It concluded that allowing SSA to impose fees despite late responses would effectively erase the 2007 FOIA amendment as applied to SSA, and thus held the FOIA provision must control in late‑response scenarios.

The Second Circuit rejects this harmonization effort as unnecessary and misplaced:

The conflict is not accidental or implicit; Congress expressly wrote § 1306(c) to operate “notwithstanding” FOIA or any other law.
Because § 1306(c) explicitly prioritizes itself, there is no ambiguous overlap to reconcile and no risk of an “implied” repeal. The intended priority is express.
Thus, the court reads § 1306(c) as superseding FOIA’s fee‑preclusion rule within its domain—non‑program‑related requests to SSA—without disturbing FOIA’s application elsewhere.

3. Later‑in‑Time Statute Argument Rejected

Shapiro argued that because the 2007 FOIA amendment was enacted after § 1306(c) (last amended in 1994), it should reflect Congress’s more recent intent and thus override § 1306(c) where they conflict. The court disposes of this argument in a footnote:

The “later‑in‑time” rule only applies when two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict.
Here, there is no irreconcilable conflict because § 1306(c) explicitly carves out an exception “notwithstanding” FOIA. The statutes can—and do—coexist.
FOIA’s 2007 provision still governs all other agencies, and also SSA itself when the request is program‑related. Only the narrow slice of non‑program‑related SSA requests is governed by § 1306(c).

In the court’s view, then, the question is not which statute impliedly repeals the other, but simply recognizing that Congress explicitly created a limited priority rule for SSA.

C. Legislative History: Protecting SSA Trust Funds

Although the court is fundamentally textualist, it briefly examines legislative history to confirm its reading. A 1981 House Report explains:

Section 1306(c) is designed so that “reimbursement of costs is not governed by the Freedom of Information Act or by the Privacy Act, which contain provisions limiting the extent to which the cost of furnishing information can be recovered.”
The SSA is given authority to recover the “full cost” of retrieving and transmitting information “for any other purpose not directly related to the administration” of SSA programs.
Critically, this authority “would not be used to recover the full cost of furnishing to individuals information requested for social security program purposes.”

This history confirms that Congress intended:

to protect SSA trust funds from subsidizing non‑program informational uses, and
to free SSA from FOIA/Privacy Act fee restrictions in this specific context.

Thus, far from conflicting with FOIA by accident, § 1306(c) was consciously designed to override FOIA’s fee limitations with respect to non‑program‑related SSA information requests.

D. Defining “Not Directly Related to the Administration” of SSA Programs

The next key step is deciding whether Shapiro’s request was program‑related. Section 1306(c) allows SSA to recover full costs when the request is “for any other purpose not directly related to the administration” of SSA programs. The phrase “directly related” does the limiting work.

1. Plain Language: The Weight of “Directly”

The court emphasizes Congress’s choice of the adverb “directly”:

“Directly” means “in a straightforward manner,” “immediately,” or “without anyone or anything intervening.”
By using “directly,” Congress signaled that the required connection to program administration must be tight and immediate—not merely plausible, tangential, or inferential.

Therefore, to avoid full‑cost reimbursement, a requester must show that the information is indisputably and immediately connected to the administration of SSA benefits, not that it may help inform or influence such administration at some general or policy level.

2. Legislative History on “Program Purposes”

The same 1981 House Report sheds light on this phrase. It distinguishes clearly between:

requests “directly related to determining an individual’s social security benefit,” which are subsidized; versus
requests made for other purposes (e.g., litigation, research, or general information) that are not directly related to administration and may be charged at full cost.

The legislative history thus confirms a narrow focus on:

individual beneficiaries’ efforts to obtain or manage benefits, and
employers’ efforts to meet payroll tax and reporting obligations,

as the core of “directly related” requests.

3. SSA’s Regulatory Criteria: 20 C.F.R. § 402.170

SSA regulations further articulate when a request is “needed” for a purpose “directly related” to program administration. The four “major criteria” include:

Is the information needed to pursue a benefit under the Social Security Act?
Is the information needed solely to verify the accuracy of information obtained in connection with an SSA program?
Is the information needed in connection with an activity authorized under the Act?
Is the information needed by an employer to carry out FICA or § 218 responsibilities?

Shapiro relied primarily on criteria (1) and (3), arguing:

The requested information “will educate the public,” enabling individuals to better pursue disability benefits for headache disorders.
The information is needed in connection with an activity authorized under the Act: SSA’s review, evaluation, and consideration of disability applications for migraine and headache disorders.

The Second Circuit finds these arguments unpersuasive and characterizes the connections as too attenuated.

4. Application to Shapiro’s Request

The court reasons as follows:

Not “needed to pursue a benefit.” Shapiro’s request does not seek information tailored to his—or any identifiable individual’s—benefits claim. Instead, he seeks broad policy and rulemaking materials to further “scholarly research on migraine disability” and public understanding generally. While such information might make it easier for some people to prepare better claims, that is a collateral benefit, not a necessity for pursuing a benefit within the meaning of § 402.170.
Not “needed in connection with” an authorized activity. Although SSA’s evaluation of disability claims is unquestionably an activity authorized under the Act, the court reads “needed in connection with” as requiring a more proximate and concrete tie than Shapiro’s generalized advocacy and educational goals. His request is directed at understanding and critiquing SSA’s overall approach and alleged inequities, not at carrying out a specific SSA function.
General public education ≠ direct program administration. The court characterizes the request as “routine”—designed primarily to further general scholarship and public awareness of government decision‑making. That is not “directly related” to the actual administration of benefits for any particular person or employer.

To illustrate the dividing line, the court notes SSA’s own examples:

Requests to verify an individual’s earnings record or compute a person’s Social Security taxes are program‑related and provided free or at subsidized cost.
Requests for more detailed earnings reports or information for civil litigation are non‑program‑related and subject to full cost recovery under § 1306(c).

Shapiro’s request, in the court’s view, falls on the latter side: it is essentially policy‑oriented and research‑driven, not a direct step in administering a benefit for a particular claimant.

Accordingly, the court holds that Shapiro’s request is not “directly related to the administration of” an SSA program. Section 1306(c) therefore applies, and SSA may charge him the full cost of processing his request “notwithstanding” FOIA’s fee‑preclusion provision.

E. FOIA, Timing, and Fees: Why the 2007 Amendment Does Not Control

With § 1306(c) found applicable, the remaining question is whether FOIA’s 2007 fee‑preclusion amendment still bars fees due to SSA’s late response. The court’s answer is no, for two main reasons:

Express override. The “notwithstanding section[] 552” language in § 1306(c) is a direct, unambiguous override of FOIA’s provisions—including subsection (a)(4)(A)(viii)—within its specified scope. It is not limited to fees charged in timely responses.
Limited carve‑out. Recognizing the override does not nullify the FOIA amendment; it merely creates a narrow carve‑out. FOIA’s no‑fees‑for‑late‑responses rule still governs:
- all non‑SSA agencies, and
- SSA requests that are directly related to program administration.
The 2007 amendment therefore continues to have substantial force.

As a result, SSA’s untimeliness does not strip it of its § 1306(c) authority to charge the full cost of a non‑program‑related request. The district court’s fee refund order is reversed.

F. Attorneys’ Fees: What It Means to “Substantially Prevail”

FOIA includes a fee‑shifting provision at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i), allowing a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs to a complainant who has “substantially prevailed.”

1. The Legal Standard

A FOIA plaintiff “substantially prevails” if they obtain relief through:

a judicial order, or
an enforceable written agreement or consent decree.

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), and Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), guide the analysis:

A plaintiff “prevails” when they secure “actual relief on the merits” that “materially alters the legal relationship of the parties.”
Not all court orders suffice; the relief must be substantive, not merely procedural.

The Second Circuit’s FOIA decisions, such as Pietrangelo v. U.S. Army, 568 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2009), and Wilson v. FBI, 91 F.4th 595 (2d Cir. 2024), apply the same principles: the plaintiff must show they obtained meaningful relief—typically disclosure of records or a change in the agency’s withholding position.

2. Shapiro’s Partial Success in the District Court

The district court concluded that Shapiro had “substantially prevailed” because:

He obtained a fee refund (now reversed on appeal), and
He secured an order requiring SSA to provide a more detailed explanation of its withholdings.

It saw these as altering the legal relationship sufficiently to justify some attorneys’ fees and costs.

3. The Second Circuit’s Reversal

Once the Second Circuit reverses the fee refund, the only remaining “win” for Shapiro is the order requiring SSA to explain the basis for its withholdings. The court holds this is not enough:

The order did not compel release of any additional documents.
It did not require SSA to change its withholding decisions.
It did not provide concrete relief on the merits of Shapiro’s FOIA claims.

At most, it required SSA to offer a more detailed justification for Exemption 5, which ultimately resulted in the district court upholding all 1,845 pages of withholdings.

Under Buckhannon and Farrar, this kind of procedural or explanatory order—without any substantive change in disclosure—is insufficient to make a plaintiff a “prevailing” party. As the Second Circuit summarizes:

“[W]hile Shapiro may have obtained a judicial order, he did not obtain meaningful relief on the merits of his FOIA claim.”

Accordingly, Shapiro did not “substantially prevail” on any significant issue, and the award of attorneys’ fees and costs is vacated.

G. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The opinion anchors its reasoning in a well‑established body of case law:

NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U.S. 288 (2017) – defining the ordinary meaning of “notwithstanding” and recognizing such clauses as signals of statutory priority.
Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10 (1993) – emphasizing that “notwithstanding any other law” language is a strong expression of congressional intent to supersede conflicting statutes.
United States v. Shkreli, 47 F.4th 65 (2d Cir. 2022); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 609 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2010); Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2009) – Second Circuit cases interpreting “notwithstanding” clauses as giving overriding effect to the subject statute.
Maine Community Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296 (2020); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) – articulating the canon against implied repeals and the requirement of clear and manifest intent or irreconcilable conflict before finding a repeal by implication; cited to distinguish implied repeal from the express priority in § 1306(c).
Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142 (2005); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991); Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506 (2012); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990) – stressing that Congress is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of existing law and that courts must give effect to clear statutory text, even if later developments were not foreseen.
United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2000) – reaffirming that statutory interpretation begins with plain meaning.
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) – defining what it means to “prevail” in fee‑shifting statutes and requiring a material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship.
Pietrangelo v. U.S. Army, 568 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2009); Wilson v. FBI, 91 F.4th 595 (2d Cir. 2024) – applying Buckhannon/Farrar to FOIA fee‑shifting.
Eleventh Circuit cases, such as Castro v. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 472 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2006), and United States v. McLymont, 45 F.3d 400 (11th Cir. 1995) – cited to underscore that “notwithstanding any other law” language is understood to apply even to later‑enacted statutes.

These authorities collectively fortify the Second Circuit’s central conclusion: Congress’s use of a strong “notwithstanding” clause in § 1306(c) must be given full effect, even when it displaces more general remedial mechanisms like FOIA’s fee‑preclusion rule.

V. Impact and Implications

A. Practical Consequences for FOIA Requesters at SSA

For those seeking information from SSA, Shapiro has significant consequences:

No timing leverage for non‑program‑related requests. FOIA’s 2007 sanction—no fees for untimely responses—no longer provides leverage against SSA when the request is deemed non‑program‑related. Even if SSA misses FOIA’s deadlines, it may still bill the requester full costs under § 1306(c).
Heightened stakes in “program‑related” classifications. Whether a request is “directly related to the administration” of SSA programs becomes the critical threshold. Requesters will have strong incentives to:
- Frame their requests so they clearly fit within one of the § 402.170 program‑related criteria; and
- Challenge classifications of their requests as non‑program‑related where the connection to benefits, verification, or program activities can be shown to be direct.
Potential chilling effect on research and watchdog inquiries. Journalists, advocates, academics, and policy researchers—like Shapiro—often seek broad, program‑wide information and historical internal deliberations. Under Shapiro, such requests are likely to be treated as non‑program‑related and subject to full cost recovery, with limited recourse based on FOIA’s timing rules.

B. FOIA’s Systemic Enforcement Mechanisms

FOIA’s fee‑preclusion rule was designed to encourage agency compliance with deadlines by providing requesters leverage: agencies that respond late cannot collect fees, especially from media, educational, and public‑interest requesters. Shapiro partially undercuts that mechanism:

Within SSA, the timing penalty is inapplicable whenever § 1306(c) is triggered. SSA’s primary concern shifts to correctly classifying requests rather than meeting FOIA’s timing thresholds for those requests.
Beyond SSA, Shapiro sends a signal: agency‑specific statutes with robust “notwithstanding FOIA” language may likewise be interpreted to sidestep FOIA’s timing‑based fee sanctions (and potentially other FOIA constraints) within their defined scope.

The decision thus illustrates how a government‑wide transparency statute like FOIA can be partially disempowered by specific override provisions tailored to individual agencies or programs.

C. Strengthening of “Notwithstanding” Clauses in Statutory Interpretation

Shapiro is also significant as a statutory interpretation precedent:

It affirms a robust reading of “notwithstanding” clauses as priority rules, not merely interpretive hints.
It confirms that such clauses can supersede later‑enacted general statutes, absent an express amendment of the earlier, specific statute.
It underscores that the canon against implied repeals does not limit the effect of a clear, express “notwithstanding” directive.

As a result, other agencies and litigants may be more inclined to invoke “notwithstanding” clauses to argue that specialized statutory schemes control over FOIA or other cross‑cutting transparency or procedural statutes.

D. FOIA Attorneys’ Fees Litigation

On the attorneys’ fees front, Shapiro tightens the standards for FOIA plaintiffs who only obtain process‑oriented relief:

Orders compelling an agency to provide a more detailed justification for withholdings—common in FOIA practice—will not, by themselves, ordinarily support fee awards unless they lead to additional disclosure or a substantive change in position.
FOIA plaintiffs aiming for fee recovery should recognize that courts will look for a material alteration of the legal relationship, such as the release of previously withheld records or enforceable commitments to change withholding practices.

This may deter some marginal FOIA suits where the only realistic near‑term relief is improved explanations, rather than actual disclosure.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. FOIA Deadlines and Fee‑Preclusion

FOIA usually requires agencies to decide, within 20 working days, whether they will comply with a request and to notify the requester.
If the agency misses that deadline (absent special circumstances), the 2007 amendment says it generally cannot charge the requester fees for search (and for some requesters, not even duplication fees).
This rule is meant to pressure agencies to respond on time by tying delay to financial consequences.

B. What Is a “Notwithstanding” Clause?

A “notwithstanding” clause in a statute is a strong way of saying: “This rule applies even if another law would normally say otherwise.”
When Congress writes “Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5 or any other provision of law,” it is explicitly telling courts to let that statute override FOIA and any other conflicting statutes within the specified area.

C. “Directly Related to the Administration” of SSA Programs

“Program‑related” FOIA requests at SSA are those that are closely and immediately connected to:
- pursuing an individual’s benefit claim,
- verifying information used in administering benefits,
- carrying out a specific program activity authorized by the Social Security Act, or
- complying with payroll tax and reporting obligations.
Requests for general policy information, research purposes, or broader public education are likely to be treated as non‑program‑related, even if they help people understand SSA better.

D. “Substantially Prevail” for FOIA Attorneys’ Fees

To recover attorneys’ fees under FOIA, a plaintiff must more than just file a lawsuit; they must “substantially prevail.”
This typically means they obtain:
- actual disclosure of records that had been withheld, or
- an enforceable order or agreement that materially changes the agency’s legal obligations.
A court order requiring better explanations or clarifications—without any new disclosures or change in position—normally does not suffice.

VII. Conclusion

Shapiro v. U.S. Social Security Administration establishes a clear, three‑part precedent:

SSA’s cost‑reimbursement authority in § 1306(c) prevails over FOIA’s 2007 fee‑preclusion rule for non‑program‑related requests. The “Notwithstanding section[] 552 … or any other provision of law” language is treated as an explicit, controlling override that survives later FOIA amendments.
“Directly related to the administration” of SSA programs is interpreted narrowly. Requests aimed at broad public education, scholarship, or scrutiny of SSA policies—even when focused on a particular medical condition—are not program‑related unless they are concretely and immediately tied to the administration of a particular benefit or authorized program activity.
Procedural victories alone do not make FOIA plaintiffs “substantially prevailing.” Absent actual disclosure or a substantive change in agency position, orders demanding better explanations of withholdings are insufficient for FOIA attorneys’ fees.

The decision underscores the power of “notwithstanding” clauses to create agency‑specific exceptions to FOIA’s remedial regime and signals to requesters that the characterization of their requests as program‑related or not can be outcome‑determinative for fee exposure. More broadly, Shapiro exemplifies a strongly textualist approach to conflicts between general transparency statutes and specialized funding‑protection provisions, with potentially far‑reaching implications wherever similar “notwithstanding FOIA” clauses appear in federal law.