Washington v. State: Temporal-Proximity Sufficiency & the Narrow Scope of Corpus Delicti in Delaware Concealed-Firearm Prosecutions

Introduction

On 2 July 2025 the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed Malik Washington’s convictions for (1) carrying a concealed deadly weapon (CCDW) under 11 Del. C. § 1442(a) and (2) possession of a firearm by a person prohibited (PFBPP). The appeal turned exclusively on the CCDW count. Washington argued that the State adduced insufficient evidence of concealment and that, under the “corpus delicti” rule, his own post-arrest confession could not be considered absent independent corroboration of a concealed weapon.

The Court—Valihura, Traynor, and Griffiths, JJ.—disagreed, holding that:

Evidence showing the weapon was “about” the defendant in the period immediately preceding the arrest satisfies § 1442, even if the gun is not found on the defendant’s person at the moment of arrest; and
The common-law corpus delicti doctrine demands only “some evidence” of the crime’s occurrence independent of the confession, not proof of each statutory element. Here, a 911 call and recovery of the gun near the flight path sufficed.

Summary of the Judgment

Applying plain-error review (because no Rule 29 motion for acquittal was raised below), the Court held:

No plain error. A reasonable juror could infer that Washington carried the hidden firearm—stowed in a black bag—while fleeing and discarded it moments before police apprehended him.
Corpus delicti satisfied. Independent corroboration existed through the eyewitness-911 call describing an armed, shirtless man and the discovery of the bagged firearm exactly where Detective Starke observed Washington running.
Therefore, the Superior Court’s judgment was affirmed in full.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Gallman v. State, 14 A.3d 502 (Del. 2011) and Dubin v. State, 397 A.2d 132 (Del. 1979). Furnish the operative test for whether a weapon is “about” the person: immediate availability, ease of access, and minimal positional change.
Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 188 (Del. 2008) & Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124 (Del. 1975). Clarify Delaware’s version of corpus delicti—only “some” independent evidence needed.
Bailey v. State, 925 A.2d 503 (table) (Del. 2007). Explains the purpose of corpus delicti: shielding against false confessions.
Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560 (Del. 1995); Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1986); Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127 (Del. 1982). Articulate the plain-error standard applied when no contemporaneous objection is raised.

The Court synthesized these authorities to hold that the combination of a real-time 911 report, visual pursuit, and proximate recovery of the weapon meets both:

the “about the person” criterion for CCDW, and
the independent-evidence requirement of corpus delicti.

Legal Reasoning

Statutory Interpretation of § 1442(a). The Court reaffirmed that concealment need not continue through the moment of arrest. What matters is whether the firearm was immediately available to the defendant shortly beforehand. Here, Washington’s flight with a black bag, followed by the gun’s recovery within bushes along that exact path, justified an inference that the weapon remained accessible until discard—thus about the person.
Application of Plain-Error Review. Because defense counsel failed to move for a directed verdict, Washington had to show an error so clear as to undermine the trial’s fairness. The Court concluded that the jury’s inference of concealment was reasonable, precluding any plain error.
Corpus Delicti Doctrine. The Court rejected Washington’s proposal to expand the doctrine to require independent proof of concealment specifically. Delaware precedent—Johnson and Wright—demands only evidence that a crime occurred. The State satisfied this by: (a) the 911 caller’s report of an armed individual, and (b) locating the firearm in a hidden bag minutes later. These facts corroborated the confession without addressing each statutory element.

Impact

The decision has several forward-looking consequences:

Prosecution Strategy. Prosecutors handling concealed-firearm cases may rely on circumstantial evidence illustrating accessibility immediately before arrest. Physical possession at the arrest moment is not indispensable.
Corpus Delicti Scope Clarified. Defense attempts to exclude confessions will face a low threshold: any independent evidence of criminal activity, even if it does not prove every element, suffices.
Investigative Techniques Validated. Real-time civilian 911 calls and quick area searches can constitute corroboration, encouraging expedited response protocols.
Appellate Preservation. The case underscores the peril of omitting a Rule 29 motion—plain-error review is dauntingly narrow.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapon (CCDW)” – Illegally having a hidden weapon on or near one’s person without a permit.
“About the person” – The item does not have to be literally on the body; it must be within quick reach, usable without significant movement.
Corpus Delicti Rule – Before a confession can convict, the State must show some evidence that a crime actually happened, preventing convictions based solely on potentially false confessions.
Plain-Error Review – An appellate standard applied when an issue was not preserved below; relief is granted only for egregious, obvious errors that impugn trial integrity.

Conclusion

Washington v. State fortifies two doctrinal pillars in Delaware criminal law: (1) concealment for CCDW may be established through evidence of immediate accessibility just prior to arrest, and (2) the corpus delicti doctrine remains modest—some proof of a crime independent of the confession suffices; proof of every element is unnecessary. The ruling thus streamlines prosecution of concealed-weapon offenses while reminding defense counsel of the imperative to preserve sufficiency arguments at trial. Beyond its immediate facts, the case provides authoritative guidance on how circumstantial evidence, rapid police response, and limited independent corroboration intersect to sustain firearms convictions under Delaware law.