Walden v. Kosinski: Second Circuit Validates State Power to Ban “Independence / Independent”
from Ballot-Access Petitions and Affirms Minimal First-Amendment Burden

Introduction

Walden v. Kosinski, No. 25-764-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2025) is the Second Circuit’s most comprehensive treatment to date of whether—and how far—states may regulate the names of political entities that seek ballot access through independent nominating petitions. Plaintiff-appellant Jim Walden, a declared 2025 New York City mayoral candidate, wished to circulate petitions under the banner “Independence Party.” Two provisions of New York Election Law—§ 2-124(2) and § 6-138(3)(f) (“the Naming Provisions”)—bar the use of the words “Independence” or “Independent” by political parties and by independent bodies. The district court denied Walden’s request for a preliminary injunction; the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the restrictions are reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulations that impose only a minimal burden on First Amendment speech and association and that are justified by New York’s interest in preventing voter confusion.

Summary of the Judgment

• Applicability of § 2-124(2): The court held—after an extensive statutory analysis—that the statutory ban on certain words for party names also applies to independent bodies via § 6-138(3)(f).
• Standing & Sovereign Immunity: Walden had Article III standing because the State Board’s long-standing interpretations exert a “determinative or coercive effect” on local boards. Ex parte Young allowed suit against State Board officials notwithstanding sovereign immunity.
• Anderson-Burdick Framework Applies: The Naming Provisions regulate the mechanics of elections; therefore, burdens on First-Amendment rights are assessed on a sliding scale, not by automatic strict scrutiny.
• Burden Characterized as Not Severe: The ban does not limit Walden’s ability to campaign, gather signatures, organize, or appear on the ballot; it merely limits the label he may use. Under Timmons, the ballot (and the petition that feeds the ballot) is not a public forum for expressive messaging.
• State Interests Are Weighty: Preventing voter confusion—especially among unaffiliated voters historically misled by the defunct Independence Party—is a sufficiently important interest to sustain the restriction.
• Preliminary Injunction Properly Denied: Because Walden failed to show likelihood of success or irreparable harm, equitable and public-interest factors also tilted against relief.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) & Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) – Establish the balancing test for election regulations: weigh burden severity against state interests. The Second Circuit framed its entire merits analysis within this construct.
• Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) – Key authority for treating the ballot as a device for election, not a forum for political expression. The court analogized Walden’s petition/ballot-label request to Timmons’ ban on fusion voting.
• Meyer v. Grant (1988), Buckley v. ACLF (1999) & Lerman v. BOE (2d Cir. 2000) – Walden’s principal authorities. The court distinguished those cases because they restricted who could circulate petitions or how circulation occurred, severely shrinking the pool of potential speakers. By contrast, New York’s rule only limits a single word choice.
• Cornelius v. NAACP LDF, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) – Provides the doctrine for speech in nonpublic forums; the court relied on this to uphold the content-neutrality of the Naming Provisions.
• Washington State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) – Cited for the idea that alleged confusion can justify restrictions even when the confusion analysis is predictive rather than fully empirical.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Statutory Construction
The core threshold issue—whether § 2-124(2) reaches independent bodies—turned on the meaning and legislative history of § 6-138(3)(f). By reading historical enactments from 1976 and amendments in 1992, the court adopted a holistic interpretation: the conformity language applies to all nominating petitions no matter how the name is chosen. This holding, though technically dicta for First-Amendment purposes, is now authoritative in the Second Circuit and will bind state officials on remand.

b) Standing & Ex parte Young
The opinion clarifies that a state board’s published guidance—despite a professed no-enforcement stance—can create a live case or controversy because local boards credibly rely on it. The decision treats such guidance as “coercive effect,” reinforcing a fairly liberal standing doctrine in election cases.

c) Sliding-Scale Scrutiny
Because the burden on Walden was “not severe,” intermediate scrutiny sufficed. Critical factors were:

• He remained free to campaign and petition under any other name.
• The disallowed words affected neither ballot access signature thresholds nor timeframes.
• The restriction was viewpoint-neutral and applied to all entities equally.

The state’s interest, by contrast, was considered “important” and “coherent”: preventing voters from mistaking one independent body for a generic category of unaffiliated voters.

d) Nonpublic Forum Analysis
The court expressly classifies both the ballot and an independent nominating petition as nonpublic forums. Regulation of content is permissible so long as reasonable and neutral. This point may have wider implications for signature-gathering logistics nationwide.

3. Anticipated Impact

• Election-Law Drafting: States can more confidently prohibit words that historically lead to registration or ballot confusion (e.g., “Non-Partisan,” “Unaffiliated”) without triggering strict scrutiny so long as alternative channels of political communication remain open.
• Independent Candidates’ Strategies: Prospective candidates in New York will need to adopt distinctive—but permissible—labels early, or risk petition rejection. Names such as “People’s Independence Coalition” may still run afoul if deemed confusingly similar.
• Standing Doctrine: The precedent confirms that state-level officials who issue binding guidance cannot moot a lawsuit by disclaiming enforcement, thereby closing a potential loophole in pre-enforcement challenges.
• Forum Analysis Extension: By analogizing nominating petitions to ballots, the decision could be cited in future cases over disclosure requirements, petition formatting, or digital signature platforms.
• Legislative Drafting Guidance: The case demonstrates the evidentiary threshold for legislative findings about voter confusion. Anecdotal reports and a plausible nexus sufficed—empirical studies were not mandatory.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Independent Body vs. Political Party: In New York, a political party gets automatic ballot access because it met prior vote thresholds; an independent body is a one-off vehicle that must collect signatures to place its nominee on the ballot.
• Anderson-Burdick Test: A flexible balancing tool: the more a law burdens speech/association, the stricter the scrutiny; milder burdens receive deferential review.
• Nonpublic Forum: Government-owned property (or document) not traditionally open for public debate. Regulation must be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral, but not necessarily the least restrictive.
• Standing—“Determinative or Coercive Effect”: Even if a defendant will not directly punish the plaintiff, a credible ability to influence another actor suffices to tie the injury to the defendant.
• Ex parte Young Exception: Allows plaintiffs to sue state officers for prospective injunctive relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law, bypassing state sovereign immunity.

Conclusion

Walden v. Kosinski marks a significant reaffirmation of state authority to regulate electoral mechanics—including the semantics of party and body names—without necessarily infringing on First-Amendment rights. By characterizing nominating petitions as nonpublic forums and deeming the burden “not severe,” the Second Circuit applied a deferential tier of scrutiny that other jurisdictions may now follow. The ruling simultaneously clarifies the reach of New York Election Law § 2-124(2) and confirms that courts will not second-guess legislative judgments on voter confusion absent clear contrary evidence. For candidates, the decision underscores an old lesson: political speech is broad, but the ballot is not a billboard.