Wagner v. NYC DOE: Separating “Reasonably Described” from “Reasonable Effort” under New York’s FOIL for Electronic Records

Matter of Wagner v. New York City Department of Education, 2025 NY Slip Op 05783 (N.Y. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2025) — Opinion by Judge Troutman; Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Singas, Cannataro, and Halligan concur.

Introduction

This case squarely addresses a recurring problem in modern records access: how FOIL’s longstanding “reasonably described” requirement interacts with the practical realities of searching massive electronic repositories. Petitioner Jimmy Wagner sought “all emails between [DOE] and a certain domain name” over a roughly 16‑month period. The New York City Department of Education denied the request, asserting it was “not reasonably described” because DOE’s global email searches “failed to execute” across an environment exceeding one million accounts; DOE pressed Wagner to narrow the date range or provide additional search terms and deemed the request “withdrawn” when he declined.

After Supreme Court denied Wagner’s Article 78 petition and the Appellate Division affirmed—relying on a line of cases that merged the “reasonably described” and “reasonable effort” inquiries—the Court of Appeals reversed. The Court held that DOE, and the lower court, conflated two distinct FOIL requirements: (1) whether the request reasonably describes the records, and (2) whether the agency can retrieve those records with reasonable effort. The Court remanded for DOE to make a new determination under the proper, two‑step framework.

The decision clarifies statewide standards for electronic-records FOIL practice, resolves inconsistent Appellate Division approaches, and reaffirms FOIL’s pro-disclosure policy while recognizing practical limits on electronic retrieval.

Summary of the Opinion

• The “reasonably described” requirement ensures the agency can identify the records requested; it does not turn on whether the agency’s search tools can complete a particular search without timing out (citing Konigsberg v. Coughlin, 68 N.Y.2d 245).
• Here, DOE conceded it understood the request (emails to/from a specified domain within a defined date range) and knew where the records reside (DOE’s email systems). The request was therefore reasonably described.
• Separately, Public Officers Law § 89(3)(a) requires agencies to retrieve electronic records if they can do so “with reasonable effort,” a requirement rooted in Matter of Data Tree, LLC v. Romaine, 9 N.Y.3d 459 (2007) and codified in 2008.
• The Court disapproved Appellate Division decisions that merged the two standards and produced inconsistent outcomes (e.g., Puig; Pflaum; Goldstein).
• At the Article 78 stage, the agency bears the burden to demonstrate it cannot retrieve the requested electronic records with reasonable effort.
• The Court did not decide whether DOE can retrieve the requested emails with reasonable effort; it remanded for DOE to apply the correct standard and make a new determination. No exemptions were asserted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Konigsberg v. Coughlin, 68 N.Y.2d 245 (1986):
  The Court relied on Konigsberg to define the “reasonably described” standard. In Konigsberg, a broad request for “any and all” records under an inmate’s name or ID number was sufficient because the agency could identify and locate the records. The Court analogized Wagner’s request: DOE understood what was sought (emails associated with a particular domain) and where to find them (its email systems). That DOE’s search attempts “failed to execute” did not transform an otherwise intelligible request into an insufficiently described one.
• Matter of M. Farbman & Sons v. NYC Health & Hospitals Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 75 (1984):
  Cited for FOIL’s open-government purpose and reasonableness-based framework, reinforcing that “reasonably described” focuses on an agency’s ability to locate records, not on post‑location processing difficulties.
• Matter of Data Tree, LLC v. Romaine, 9 N.Y.3d 459 (2007):
  A cornerstone for electronic records. Data Tree held that copying data maintained in transferable electronic form is akin to copying paper and that agencies must disclose electronic information if retrievable with reasonable effort; they need not “create a new record.” Wagner extends Data Tree’s logic by situating “reasonable effort” as a distinct agency-side obligation after a request passes the “reasonably described” threshold.
• 2008 FOIL amendments (L 2008, ch 223, § 6) codifying aspects of Data Tree in Public Officers Law § 89(3)(a):
  The Court reads § 89(3)(a) to require agencies to “retrieve or extract” electronic records except where doing so would entail unreasonable efforts. Wagner clarifies that this statutory “reasonable effort” pertains to the retrieval stage and does not rewrite the “reasonably described” requirement.
• Appellate Division decisions merging the tests:
  Matter of Puig v. New York State Police, 212 A.D.3d 1025 (3d Dep’t 2023); Matter of Pflaum v. Grattan, 116 A.D.3d 1103 (3d Dep’t 2014); Matter of Goldstein v. Inc. Vil. of Mamaroneck, 221 A.D.3d 111 (2d Dep’t 2023).
  Wagner identifies that lower courts’ combined test—treating a search’s technological feasibility as a proxy for whether the request is “reasonably described”—has produced inconsistent results. Wagner explicitly disentangles these inquiries and supplies a uniform statewide approach, thereby curbing doctrinal drift.

Legal Reasoning

The Court frames FOIL’s text and history as deploying “reasonableness” at discrete stages. First, “reasonably described” (Public Officers Law § 89[3][a]) asks whether the agency can identify and locate the records. That inquiry is met when, as in Wagner, the agency concedes it knows what is sought and where it resides. Failures of particular search executions, timeouts, or software limits do not retroactively render a request opaque.

Second, the “reasonable effort” requirement—codified in § 89(3)(a) following Data Tree—obligates an agency to retrieve or extract electronic records maintained in its systems unless doing so would be unreasonably burdensome. This is an agency-side duty triggered after a valid request arrives. It is distinct from the requestor’s drafting obligation and focuses on the practicalities of retrieval: infrastructure, personnel time, available tools, and the feasibility of alternative approaches. The Court underscores that what counts as “reasonable effort” is case-specific and that an effort is not unreasonable merely because the agency declines the requestor’s preferred retrieval method.

Procedurally, the Court clarifies burdens. While FOIL imposes no administrative-level duty to catalog or narrate an agency’s retrieval efforts in correspondence with the requestor, the Court notes it may be “beneficial” for agencies to do so. Critically, once litigation ensues in an Article 78 proceeding and the agency justifies denial on the ground that retrieval cannot be accomplished with reasonable effort, the agency bears the burden to demonstrate that inability—analogous to its burden when invoking statutory exemptions (cf. Konigsberg, 68 N.Y.2d at 251).

Applying these principles, the Court holds that DOE improperly collapsed the two steps: it equated its search timeouts with a failure by the requestor to “reasonably describe” records. That misstep infected the administrative and appellate outcomes below. The Court therefore reverses and remands for DOE to determine, under the correct standard, whether it can retrieve the requested emails with reasonable effort and, if so, to produce them (subject to any lawful exemptions, none of which DOE asserted here).

Impact and Practical Consequences

1) Doctrinal clarification and statewide uniformity

• Wagner supplies a clear two-step framework for electronic-records FOIL requests:
  1. Reasonably described? Focus on whether the agency can understand what is sought and where it is located.
  2. Reasonable effort? If so, the agency must retrieve; if not, it must substantiate why retrieval would be unreasonably burdensome.
• This framework supersedes Appellate Division decisions that conflated the tests, resolving inconsistent outcomes across departments.

2) Effects on request drafting and agency responses

• Requests that identify a data source and a defining characteristic (e.g., emails to/from a specified domain for a defined timeframe) will ordinarily be “reasonably described” because the agency can identify the collection and its location.
• Agencies cannot reject such requests as “not reasonably described” simply because a global search “times out” or returns large result sets. Those are retrieval issues to be analyzed under “reasonable effort.”
• Agencies remain free to propose clarifications or narrower parameters, but they may not condition the validity of a sufficiently described request on the requestor’s agreement to narrow.
• At the litigation stage, agencies should be prepared to provide detailed, non-conclusory evidentiary showings of why retrieval cannot be accomplished with reasonable effort (e.g., technical constraints, system limitations, estimated processing time, costs, available alternative methods and why they are impracticable).

3) Electronic records beyond email

Although the Court notes it is addressing electronic records specifically (footnote 2), § 89(3)(a)’s “retrieve or extract” language is general. Wagner’s two-step approach will guide requests for diverse electronic datasets—file shares, databases, logs, messaging platforms—while reinforcing that “creating” new records is not required. Agencies must assess whether existing tools and exports can retrieve data with reasonable effort without bespoke software development.

4) Relationship to exemptions and costs

• Wagner does not address FOIL exemptions; DOE asserted none. On remand, DOE’s analysis centers on reasonable effort. If production proceeds, exemptions may be assessed in the ordinary course (with the agency bearing the burden to justify with particularity).
• FOIL’s cost provisions permitting recovery of “actual cost of reproduction,” including certain personnel or vendor time for electronic reproduction, remain available. While fees do not negate the “reasonable effort” duty, they may shape how agencies plan retrieval workflows.

5) Administrative practice and records management

• Agencies should document retrieval options and constraints contemporaneously: system architecture, indexing capabilities, query limits, export formats, batching strategies, and de‑duplication options.
• Because “efforts are not unreasonable solely because the agency declined to execute the requestor’s preferred method,” agencies may select reasonable alternatives (e.g., staged custodian-based searches rather than a single global query), but must still make a bona fide effort and be able to substantiate why other methods are impracticable.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• FOIL (Public Officers Law art. 6): New York’s statute ensuring public access to government records, subject to enumerated exemptions and reasonable procedural rules.
• Reasonably described: The request must be clear enough that the agency knows what records are sought and where to locate them. It does not require naming specific file titles or custodians if the agency can identify and locate the records (Konigsberg).
• Reasonable effort (for electronic records): After a valid request, the agency must retrieve or extract records from its systems unless doing so would require unreasonable efforts (Data Tree; POL § 89[3][a]). This considers technical limits, available tools, time, and resources.
• No duty to create a new record: Agencies need not write new software or compile new data that does not already exist as a record. Exporting or copying existing electronic data is typically considered analogous to copying paper records.
• Article 78 proceeding: A New York special proceeding used to challenge government agency actions or inactions, including FOIL denials. In this context, the agency bears the burden to justify withholding or, per Wagner, to show that retrieval cannot be achieved with reasonable effort.

What the Court Did Not Decide

• Whether DOE can, on the facts, retrieve the requested emails with reasonable effort. That remains for DOE to determine on remand under the correct standard, subject to further judicial review if necessary.
• The precise contours of “reasonable effort” in quantitative terms (e.g., number of mailboxes, processing hours, cost thresholds). The Court emphasizes a case-specific analysis.
• Any FOIL exemptions potentially applicable to responsive emails; none were asserted, so the decision focuses exclusively on description and retrieval.

Practice-Oriented Takeaways

• For requestors:
  • Identify the data source and a clear selector (e.g., domain, sender, recipient, date range). That typically satisfies “reasonably described.”
  • Be open to collaborative scoping discussions, but understand that you are not required to narrow a reasonably described request simply because a global search is difficult.
• For agencies:
  • Evaluate description and retrieval separately. Do not deny as “not reasonably described” based solely on search execution issues.
  • Document retrieval efforts, alternatives considered, and technical constraints; these will be crucial if litigation ensues.
  • Consider staged or alternative retrieval methods (e.g., by custodian groups, date batching, gateway logs, or journaling archives) and explain why particular approaches are or are not feasible.
• For courts:
  • Apply Wagner’s two-step framework and require agencies to carry the evidentiary burden when asserting that retrieval cannot be accomplished with reasonable effort.

Conclusion

Matter of Wagner v. NYC Department of Education is a significant clarification of New York FOIL practice in the electronic age. The Court of Appeals separates two analytically distinct concepts that lower courts had sometimes merged: a requester’s obligation to “reasonably describe” the records and the agency’s obligation to retrieve them if it can do so with “reasonable effort.” Wagner confirms that a technically challenging search does not render a request insufficiently described when the agency understands what is sought and where it resides. At the same time, it preserves a pragmatic safety valve: if retrieval would be unreasonably burdensome, the agency may deny access—but only after carrying its burden to demonstrate that fact in litigation.

By restoring a clean two-step analysis, grounding it in Konigsberg and Data Tree, and aligning it with the 2008 statutory codification, Wagner both advances FOIL’s transparency mandate and provides practical guidance for managing the realities of large-scale electronic information systems. Its impact will be felt across email and other electronic records requests, promoting consistency, encouraging detailed administrative records of retrieval efforts, and ensuring that technological friction does not erode the public’s right to know.