Introduction

People v. Wright is a Fourth Department decision affirming the denial of a suppression motion following a police encounter that began with a radio run about an “assault in progress.” The case squarely addresses two recurring issues in New York’s De Bour framework for street encounters:

• When does a police officer’s verbal command to “stop” rise to the level of a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion?
• What additional circumstances, together with a suspect’s flight, suffice to transform a level-two inquiry into a level-three pursuit and detention?

The defendant, Lafayel Wright, pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03[3]) after officers recovered a pistol he discarded during a chase. He challenged the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the police escalated to a level-three seizure without reasonable suspicion and that his flight could not supply the missing justification. The Appellate Division rejected those arguments and affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The court held:

• The officers had a founded suspicion of criminality (level two, common-law right of inquiry) when they observed Wright, near in time and place to a reported assault in progress, matching the suspect description relayed via 911 dispatch and police radio. No one else nearby matched that description.
• The officer’s initial single, verbal command to “stop,” delivered in public, with his firearm holstered and without physical restraint, did not itself amount to a seizure (i.e., not a level-three stop).
• Wright’s immediate flight, combined with the specific circumstances indicating possible criminal involvement (close temporal and geographic proximity to the scene, detailed descriptive match, uniqueness of the match), furnished reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit and forcible detention.
• Because the police conduct was justified at inception and at each stage, suppression of the recovered firearm was properly denied, and the conviction was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court’s reasoning is firmly anchored in established New York law governing street encounters and seizures:

• People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 (1976), and People v. Moore, 6 NY3d 496 (2006): These decisions set out and reaffirm the “graduated, four-level” framework for evaluating police-citizen encounters. The Wright court faithfully applied this framework, analyzing justification at each step (initiation, verbal command, pursuit, physical detention).
• People v. Bora, 83 NY2d 531 (1994): Bora holds that a verbal command alone does not ordinarily constitute a seizure; the test is whether a reasonable person would believe their freedom was significantly curtailed, assessed by the totality of circumstances (guns drawn, blocking movement, number of commands, tone, number of officers, location, etc.). Wright leans heavily on Bora, finding that one “stop” command, in public, with the officer’s gun holstered and without physical restraint, did not cross into level-three territory.
• People v. Holmes, 81 NY2d 1056 (1993), and People v. May, 81 NY2d 725 (1992): These cases reiterate that police pursuit substantially impedes liberty and is a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion; they also make clear that flight alone does not create reasonable suspicion. Wright aligns with this baseline.
• People v. Cleveland, — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 02144 (2025): The Court of Appeals recently emphasized that flight from a level-one or level-two encounter, standing alone, cannot justify pursuit. Wright faithfully applies Cleveland but underscores that additional concrete factors can tip the balance.
• People v. Sierra, 83 NY2d 928 (1994); People v. Woods, 98 NY2d 627 (2002); People v. Parker, 32 NY3d 49 (2018): These cases recognize that flight plus particularized, articulable factors can create reasonable suspicion. Wright falls within this line: proximity to a reported violent incident, a detailed descriptive match, and singularity (no one else matched) combined with immediate flight justified pursuit.
• People v. Savage, 137 AD3d 1637 (4th Dept 2016): The “justified at inception and at every subsequent stage” formulation. Wright applies this sequencing rigorously.
• Appellate precedents on verbal commands not constituting seizures in comparable settings: People v. Moore, 93 AD3d 519 (1st Dept 2012); People v. Boland, 89 AD3d 1144 (3d Dept 2011); People v. Simmons, 149 AD3d 1464 (4th Dept 2017), affd 30 NY3d 957 (2017); People v. Brown, 67 AD3d 1439 (4th Dept 2009). Wright is consistent with these authorities, emphasizing how the body-worn camera evidence substantiated the low level of coercion at the initial command.
• Proximity/match cases in the Fourth Department: People v. Atkinson, 185 AD3d 1438 (4th Dept 2020); People v. Gayden, 126 AD3d 1518 (4th Dept 2015), affd 28 NY3d 1035 (2016); People v. Johnson, 189 AD3d 2145 (4th Dept 2020). These decisions support the conclusion that a detailed descriptive match near in time and place to a reported offense permits level-two inquiry and, when coupled with immediate flight, supports reasonable suspicion for pursuit.

Legal Reasoning and Application

1. Initial approach (Level Two — founded suspicion/common-law right of inquiry). Officers received a 911 report of an assault in progress, with a description including heritage, sex, age, clothing, and direction of travel. Within minutes and a few blocks of the location, the officer observed Wright, who matched that description, with no other similar individuals nearby. Under De Bour/Moore, this provided a founded suspicion — a non-forcible, common-law right to approach and inquire (see Atkinson; Gayden). The court specifically credited the contemporaneity and proximity of the report, the specificity of the description, and the uniqueness of the match.
2. The initial “stop” command was not a seizure. Applying Bora’s totality test, the court relied on hearing testimony and body-worn camera footage establishing: a single verbal command; public setting; no display of weapons (gun remained holstered); no physical restraint; no blocking of movement; and no overtly coercive tone or actions. These facts placed the encounter below the level-three threshold notwithstanding activated patrol car lights and the word “stop.” Consistent intermediate appellate authority (Moore, Boland, Simmons, Brown) supported this conclusion.
3. Flight plus particularized factors yielded reasonable suspicion (Level Three — pursuit and forcible stop). Wright immediately fled without acknowledging the command. Under Holmes, pursuit is a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion; under Cleveland, flight alone is insufficient. Here, the court identified the “plus factors”: close temporal and geographic proximity to the reported violent offense; detailed descriptive match communicated via 911 and radio; and the fact that no other individuals matched the description. Those combined with immediate flight provided reasonable suspicion, justifying pursuit and detention (Sierra; Woods; Parker; Atkinson; Johnson; Gayden).
4. Recovery of the pistol following lawful pursuit. During the chase, the officer saw Wright remove a black pistol from his waistband and throw it into a yard; the gun was recovered where it landed. Because the pursuit and detention were lawful, the recovery was not the product of an unlawful seizure. The motion to suppress was properly denied.

Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

Wright clarifies several practical points in New York search-and-seizure law under De Bour:

• Verbal commands in context. A lone, non-coercive “stop” command, in public and with a holstered weapon, does not by itself transform a level-two inquiry into a level-three stop. This refines how practitioners assess the “seizure” threshold, especially when patrol car lights are activated but no further coercive conduct occurs.
• Cleveland’s “flight-alone” rule, applied. Wright is a faithful application of the Court of Appeals’ recent pronouncement in Cleveland: flight alone is insufficient, but flight coupled with concrete, particularized circumstances (here, a unique and detailed descriptive match in tight temporal-spatial proximity to a violent crime) can create reasonable suspicion for pursuit.
• The role of body-worn cameras. The court expressly relied on BWC footage to assess tone, demeanor, and coerciveness — domain-specific facts that often decide whether a command is a seizure. Expect BWCs to play a growing role in De Bour-level disputes.
• 911 information as a springboard for level-two inquiry. Even where a 911 caller is unidentified, a prompt, detailed, and contemporaneous description of a suspect involved in an ongoing emergency can ground a founded suspicion sufficient for a non-forcible inquiry. To escalate further, police must obtain additional corroboration (e.g., observation of matching characteristics and behavior, flight, proximity).
• For law enforcement. Training should emphasize: verbal commands should be measured and non-coercive until reasonable suspicion exists; document the specificity of 911 descriptions; note proximity and uniqueness of the match; and preserve BWC footage that captures tone and context.
• For defense counsel. Scrutinize: the precision of the description (generic vs. detailed), temporal-spatial proximity, whether the command’s tone and context were coercive (guns drawn, blocking movement, multiple officers, repeated commands), whether any additional “plus” factors exist beyond flight, and whether other individuals in the area matched the description.
• For courts. Wright underscores the importance of a staged analysis — each step must be independently justified — and reaffirms that pursuit is a seizure demanding reasonable suspicion, which cannot be bootstrapped from flight alone.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• De Bour’s four levels:
  • Level 1 — Request for information: requires an objective, credible reason, not necessarily related to crime.
  • Level 2 — Common-law right of inquiry: permits more pointed questions based on a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; still non-forcible.
  • Level 3 — Forcible stop/pursuit: requires reasonable suspicion that the person committed, is committing, or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor.
  • Level 4 — Arrest: requires probable cause.
• “Seizure” under New York law: A person is seized when police action significantly interrupts their liberty of movement (De Bour; Bora). Pursuit itself is a seizure and must be justified by reasonable suspicion (Holmes).
• Founded suspicion vs. reasonable suspicion:
  • Founded suspicion (Level 2): Specific, articulable facts suggesting possible criminal activity; allows non-forcible inquiry.
  • Reasonable suspicion (Level 3): A higher, objective standard based on specific and articulable facts that a particular person committed or is committing a crime; authorizes pursuit and detention.
• Flight as a factor: Flight alone cannot create reasonable suspicion; it must be combined with other particularized circumstances (Cleveland; May; Holmes; Sierra).
• Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) and 911 tips: Information relayed via CAD/police radio can justify approaching and questioning when the report is timely, specific, and describes an ongoing event. Additional corroboration is needed before escalating to a stop or pursuit.
• Role of body-worn cameras (BWC): Video/audio evidence can be decisive in evaluating the coerciveness of police actions (e.g., tone, weapons drawn, physical blocking), which determines the De Bour level implicated.

Conclusion and Key Takeaways

People v. Wright reinforces and clarifies core elements of New York’s De Bour regime:

• A single, non-coercive verbal “stop” command, delivered with a holstered weapon and without physical restraint, is not automatically a level-three seizure.
• Flight from such a level-one/level-two encounter is insufficient by itself to justify pursuit, but when combined with particularized indicia of criminality — here, a detailed 911 description, unique match, and close temporal-spatial proximity to an ongoing violent incident — it can furnish reasonable suspicion for a forcible stop.
• Cleveland’s “flight-alone” rule remains a firm guardrail; Wright operates within that rule and illustrates the kind of “more” that transforms flight into reasonable suspicion.
• Practically, the decision underscores the evidentiary weight of BWCs in resolving whether and when a seizure occurred.

In the broader legal landscape, Wright provides a contemporary, BWC-informed application of De Bour and Bora that will guide both law enforcement and courts in calibrating non-forcible inquiries versus seizures, particularly in fast-moving, 911-driven investigations of violent offenses.