Upward Variances May Rest on Guideline-Accounted Facts, and Disparity Claims Require “Apples-to-Apples” Comparators — United States v. Anna Michelle La Rue (11th Cir. 2026)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Anna Michelle La Rue, the Eleventh Circuit (non-published, per curiam) affirmed a 96-month prison sentence imposed for bank fraud after the district court varied upward from an advisory guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The defendant, Anna Michelle La Rue, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud, with the government dismissing nine additional counts.

The central appellate issues were substantive reasonableness and the district court’s application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): whether the court (i) overemphasized aggravating facts already reflected in guideline enhancements (loss amount and abuse of trust), (ii) insufficiently credited mitigation (childhood abuse, caregiving responsibilities, acceptance of responsibility), and (iii) created unwarranted sentencing disparities by imposing a term above statistical averages for similar offenses.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held the 96-month sentence was substantively reasonable under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. It emphasized that (1) district courts may consider facts already accounted for by the guidelines when deciding to vary, (2) a sentencing court need not expressly discuss mitigating evidence so long as the record shows it considered the parties’ arguments and the § 3553(a) factors, (3) disparity arguments cannot rest on statistics alone and require a showing of similarly situated comparators, and (4) a sentence far below the statutory maximum (here, 30 years) is an indicator of reasonableness. The judgment was affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)
The foundational framework: appellate review of sentencing is for abuse of discretion and considers the “totality of the circumstances.” Gall also instructs that appellate courts may consider the “extent of the deviation” from the guidelines but must give “due deference” to the district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors justify the variance. This opinion uses Gall to anchor the high deference owed to an upward variance.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015)
Provides the Eleventh Circuit’s articulation of when a sentence becomes substantively unreasonable: failing to consider a relevant factor due significant weight, giving significant weight to an improper factor, or committing a clear error of judgment in weighing proper factors. It also underscores that the weight assigned to each § 3553(a) factor is within the district court’s discretion and need not be equal. The panel relies on Rosales-Bruno to reject La Rue’s “reweighing” arguments.
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022)
Supplies several key rules applied here: (i) a court may impose an upward variance when it concludes the guidelines are insufficient; (ii) no presumption attaches to outside-guidelines sentences; (iii) the district court must provide sufficiently compelling justifications for an unusually harsh sentence; and (iv) a court’s failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not mean it ignored it, particularly where it states it considered § 3553(a) and heard the parties’ arguments. The panel uses Butler to validate the district court’s explanation and to dismiss the “failure to discuss mitigation” claim.
United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014)
Central to the “double counting” contention: the panel quotes Dougherty for the proposition that a district court “may consider facts that were taken into account when formulating the guideline range for the sake of a variance.” This precedent directly answers La Rue’s argument that the court relied “too heavily” on guideline-accounted conduct.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
Supplies the stringent reversal threshold in substantive reasonableness review: reversal occurs only if the appellate court has a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court committed a “clear error of judgment” and chose a sentence outside the range of reasonable sentences. The panel uses Irey to frame why disagreement with the district court’s balancing is not enough.
United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015)
Addresses disparity analysis: “One needs to have more than the crime of conviction and the total length of the sentences to evaluate alleged disparities.” The panel relies on Azmat to reject La Rue’s statistics-only approach.
United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2009)
Provides the “apples to apples” formulation: a well-founded disparity claim assumes comparable defendants and comparable conduct. This is used to reinforce that generalized averages cannot establish unwarranted disparity without similarly situated comparators.
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008)
Supports an additional reasonableness indicator: a sentence below the statutory maximum suggests reasonableness. The panel notes 96 months is far below the 30-year maximum for bank fraud.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The standard of review controls the outcome. The court begins from Gall’s “totality of the circumstances” and abuse-of-discretion standard. Combined with Irey’s “definite and firm conviction” threshold, the framework makes clear that the panel is not deciding what sentence it would impose; it is deciding whether the district court’s sentence fell outside the wide band of permissible outcomes.

(b) Reliance on guideline-accounted facts is permissible in variance analysis. La Rue’s principal claim was that the district court over-weighted the loss amount and deceit/manipulation—facts already reflected by U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) (18-level loss enhancement) and U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (abuse of position of trust). The panel rejects this by invoking Dougherty and Butler: guideline calculations do not exhaust what a sentencing judge may consider under § 3553(a). The judge may decide that guideline scoring does not adequately capture the seriousness, duration, impact, or character of the conduct, and may therefore vary.

(c) Consideration of mitigation need not be explicit to be real. Although the district court did not expressly discuss La Rue’s childhood trauma, family responsibilities, and acceptance of responsibility when explaining the upward variance, the panel found the record sufficient: the judge heard lengthy mitigation arguments and stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors. Under Butler, the absence of an explicit mitigation discussion does not establish that the court ignored it.

(d) Disparity arguments require similarly situated defendants, not averages. La Rue cited sentencing statistics suggesting average prison terms of roughly 33 to 36 months for similar crimes. The panel treats this as inadequate under Azmat and Docampo: without identifying specific similarly situated defendants (similar records and similar conduct, including relevant offense circumstances), statistics alone cannot establish an “unwarranted” disparity under § 3553(a)(6).

(e) The district court’s stated § 3553(a) rationale was adequate to support the variance. The sentencing judge grounded the upward variance in the “nature and circumstances” of the offense and concluded the guidelines did not “adequately reflect the seriousness” of La Rue’s conduct. The judge emphasized enrichment at the expense of others, described La Rue as “depraved, mendacious, and manipulative,” and invoked core statutory purposes: seriousness, respect for law, deterrence, and protection of the public. The panel deemed those justifications sufficient and within the court’s discretion to prioritize.

3.3 Impact

Reinforcement of broad variance discretion in white-collar cases. Even where loss amount and abuse of trust are already heavily scored, sentencing courts in the Eleventh Circuit retain latitude to vary upward if they conclude the guidelines understate seriousness in context (e.g., prolonged duration, elaborate concealment, collateral harm, betrayal of workplace trust).
Practical constraint on statistics-driven disparity challenges. The opinion signals that defendants who argue § 3553(a)(6) disparities should come prepared with fact-specific comparators (defendants with similar records and demonstrably similar conduct), not generalized averages.
Mitigation preservation strategy. Because the court reiterates that explicit discussion is not required, defendants seeking appellate traction should focus on building a record showing the sentencing judge misunderstood, excluded, or affirmatively refused to consider mitigation—rather than arguing the judge failed to mention it.
Continued reliance on statutory maximum as a “reasonableness signal.” The panel again uses the below-maximum point (via Gonzalez) as supportive, which may influence how parties frame proportionality arguments in future appeals.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Substantive reasonableness”: Whether the length of the sentence makes sense given all circumstances and the § 3553(a) goals—not whether the process was technically correct (that would be “procedural reasonableness”).
“Abuse of discretion”: The appellate court gives the sentencing judge a wide range of acceptable choices and will reverse only when the sentence is outside that range.
“Upward variance”: A sentence above the advisory guideline range based on § 3553(a) considerations (as opposed to a guideline “departure,” which is a guideline-authorized adjustment).
“Double counting” concern (in plain terms): The claim that the same fact is being used twice to increase punishment. This opinion underscores that, for variances, courts may reconsider guideline-accounted facts when evaluating the overall § 3553(a) picture, so long as the ultimate sentence is reasonable.
“Unwarranted sentencing disparities”: The law aims for consistency among similarly situated defendants; it does not require conformity to averages without accounting for differences in conduct, harm, and personal history.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Anna Michelle La Rue affirms a substantial upward variance in a long-running bank fraud case and consolidates several recurring Eleventh Circuit sentencing principles: district courts may rely on facts already incorporated into the guidelines when varying; appellate review will not reweigh § 3553(a) factors absent a clear error of judgment; mitigation need not be expressly discussed to be considered; and disparity claims require “apples-to-apples” comparators rather than generalized statistics. The decision’s practical lesson is that, in complex fraud sentencing, the narrative detail of the offense and the specificity of any disparity comparator will often be outcome-determinative.