Unreviewability of the Attorney General’s “Substantial Federal Interest” Certification Under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act

Introduction

This commentary examines the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Zamora, No. 23-2178 (10th Cir. May 13, 2025). The case arises from the tragic shooting of Jose Hernandez, a U.S. Postal Service worker, by seventeen-year-old Xavier Zamora in New Mexico. The central legal issue is whether the certification by the United States Attorney under 18 U.S.C. § 5032—that “there is a substantial Federal interest” warranting federal juvenile jurisdiction—is subject to judicial review. Xavier Zamora, prosecuted as an adult after transfer under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), challenged the facial sufficiency and reviewability of the certification. The Tenth Circuit affirmed federal jurisdiction, holding the certification is an unreviewable act of prosecutorial discretion.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit addressed two arguments on appeal:

• Whether the Attorney General’s certification under § 5032 is subject to judicial review.
• Whether the certification here was facially deficient because it merely recited the charged offenses without identifying an independent “substantial federal interest.”

After de novo review of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court held:

• The JDA’s plain language and structure commit the “substantial federal interest” certification to prosecutorial discretion and do not invite judicial scrutiny.
• Eleven circuits have concluded similarly; only the Fourth Circuit considered the substance of such certifications, but its reasoning was rejected as inapplicable.
• The certification need only “facially” comply—i.e., state that a substantial federal interest exists—which it did. No further factual showing or identification of a distinct interest is required by § 5032.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s exercise of federal jurisdiction under the JDA.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The Court surveyed a host of circuit decisions interpreting § 5032:

• First Circuit: United States v. Smith, 178 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 1999).
• Second Circuit: United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378 (2d Cir. 1975), and Rammelkamp, 270 F. App’x 35 (2d Cir. 2008).
• Third Circuit: United States v. Impounded Document, 117 F.3d 730 (3d Cir. 1997).
• Fifth Circuit: United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1997).
• Sixth Circuit: United States v. Doe, 226 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2000).
• Seventh Circuit: United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 1998).
• Eighth Circuit: United States v. Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 1998).
• Ninth Circuit: United States v. F.S.J., 265 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2001).
• Eleventh Circuit: United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507 (11th Cir. 1996).
• D.C. Circuit: In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

All but one of these decisions held § 5032 certifications nonreviewable. The Fourth Circuit (United States v. Juv. Male No. 1, 86 F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996)) alone reviewed substantive sufficiency. The Tenth Circuit joined the majority.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis unfolded in three main steps:

1. Textual Plain Meaning: Section 5032 requires only that the Attorney General “certify” a substantial federal interest after investigation. It contains no language conditioning federal juvenile proceedings on an independently demonstrated or judicially reviewable interest.
2. Statutory Structure: By contrast, § 5032(e)—the transfer-to-adult provision— expressly provides standards for judicial review. Under the canon of expressio unius, Congress’s omission of similar review language from the certification clause signals an intent to commit that decision to executive discretion.
3. Prosecutorial Discretion: The Supreme Court’s precedents (e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)) underscore that decisions to prosecute—and where to prosecute—are at the core of prosecutorial authority, ill-suited for judicial second-guessing.

The defendant’s reliance on the presumption of reviewability (common in administrative or immigration contexts—Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020)) was rejected. The Court distinguished Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno (Westfall Act context), noting that in Lamagno the certification of scope of employment conclusively determined the case and exposed potential misuse incentives—factors not present in a § 5032 juvenile certification.

3. Impact

This decision cements the rule that federal juvenile jurisdiction under the JDA turns on an unreviewable certification by the Attorney General or designee. Key implications include:

• Prosecutorial Prerogative: United States Attorneys retain wide latitude to decide which juvenile cases merit federal in lieu of state court prosecution.
• Judicial Role Narrowed: Courts need only check for facial compliance—that a certification exists—rather than probe underlying reasons.
• Consistency Across Circuits: Aligns the Tenth Circuit with eleven sister circuits, eliminating a potential split.
• Policy Consequences: May affect state-federal relations in juvenile justice, as states lose a check on aggressive federal juvenile prosecutions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA): Governs how juveniles accused of federal crimes are handled. Section 5032 allows federal jurisdiction only if the Attorney General certifies a substantial federal interest.
• Certification: A formal statement by the Attorney General (or delegate) that federal interests—such as the nature of the offense or national policy concerns—justify federal court proceedings.
• Prosecutorial Discretion: The executive branch’s authority to decide whether to bring charges, what charges to bring, and where (federal vs. state court).
• Presumption of Reviewability: A judicial presumption that courts may review certain administrative or executive actions unless Congress clearly precludes review.
• Expressio Unius Canon: The principle that listing specific items in a statute implies exclusion of others not mentioned.

Conclusion

United States v. Zamora establishes that the JDA’s “substantial federal interest” certification is an unreviewable aspect of prosecutorial discretion. By focusing on the statute’s text and structure—and drawing on Supreme Court precedent regarding prosecutorial choice—the Tenth Circuit ensures that judges need only verify certification exists, not its substantive justification. This decision strengthens federal prosecutorial autonomy in juvenile cases, unifies circuit law on the issue, and clarifies the boundaries of judicial oversight under the JDA.