Introduction

In Hansley v. DeJoy, No. 23-1426 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court failed to adjudicate all claims in the case—specifically, a Title VII disparate-treatment claim. The panel took the opportunity to clarify two important points:

• Final appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 attaches only when the district court resolves all claims as to all parties; labels such as “final judgment” do not control if a claim remains undecided.
• After the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), disparate-treatment claims under Title VII require only that a challenged action affect an identifiable term or condition of employment. They no longer incorporate the retaliation standard’s “significant harm” or materially adverse requirement. To the extent Fourth Circuit cases like Adams v. Anne Arundel County Public Schools, 789 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 2015), conflated the two standards, they are no longer good law.

Although unpublished and jurisdictional in posture, the opinion is a practical reminder to district courts and practitioners to ensure every pleaded claim is addressed and to recalibrate Title VII pleading and merits analyses in light of Muldrow.

Background and Procedural Posture

Plaintiff–Appellant Mamie Hansley, a United States Postal Service employee, alleged three Title VII claims:

• Race-based disparate treatment (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)),
• Race-based hostile work environment (HWE), and
• Unlawful retaliation (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).

The government answered and moved for judgment on the pleadings on the last day of discovery. The district court granted the motion and entered “final judgment,” holding:

• The hostile work environment claim failed because, in the court’s view, the complaint lacked facts tying incidents to race or protected activity and did not plausibly allege conduct “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter employment conditions.
• The retaliation claim failed because the complaint insufficiently identified protected activity or materially adverse actions; the court also concluded the identified actions (the alleged HWE, an unwanted schedule change, and a Letter of Discipline) were not materially adverse.

Crucially, the district court acknowledged the existence of a separate disparate-treatment claim but did not analyze or decide it. Hansley appealed.

Summary of the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion

The Fourth Circuit (Diaz, C.J., joined by Richardson and Heytens, JJ.) dismissed the appeal as interlocutory and remanded. The panel held:

• The district court’s order was not a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it failed to resolve one of Hansley’s claims—her disparate-treatment discrimination claim. Under Porter v. Zook, 803 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2015), finality requires resolution of all claims as to all parties.
• The court could not infer an implicit disposition of the disparate-treatment claim. The district court’s “severe or pervasive” analysis for HWE does not answer the distinct question in a disparate-treatment claim after Muldrow, which requires only an action affecting a term or condition of employment. Nor did the district court’s retaliation analysis control, because it applied a materially adverse “significant-harm” approach that Muldrow has foreclosed in discrimination cases.
• On remand, the district court should decide the disparate-treatment claim and apply Muldrow’s standard, recognizing that older Fourth Circuit cases equating the adverse-action standards for retaliation and discrimination (e.g., Adams) are no longer good law to that extent.

The panel also granted the government’s motion to file a supplemental appendix and dispensed with oral argument.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Courts of appeals have jurisdiction over “final decisions” of district courts. Finality is claim-complete: all claims, all parties.
• Porter v. Zook, 803 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2015): Labels do not control. Appellate jurisdiction is lacking if any claim remains unresolved, even if the district court believed it disposed of the entire case.
• Hixson v. Moran, 1 F.4th 297 (4th Cir. 2021): Pragmatic approach—an order may be final if the court “addressed the central component” of each claim, even implicitly. The panel found no such implicit resolution here.
• Conner v. Xfinity, No. 24-1145, 2024 WL 2768349 (4th Cir. May 30, 2024): Recent reiteration that decisions failing to adjudicate all claims are not final and are dismissed as interlocutory.
• Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024): The Supreme Court held that a Title VII disparate-treatment claimant need only show an action that “affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” Courts may not import retaliation’s heightened “significant harm” or materially adverse requirements into discrimination claims.
• MERITOR SAVINGS BANK v. VINSON, 477 U.S. 57 (1986): Hostile work environment claims must meet the “severe or pervasive” threshold because that standard delineates harassment that alters employment conditions from trivial slights.
• Adams v. Anne Arundel County Public Schools, 789 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 2015): Cited by the district court for treating “adverse employment action” similarly across discrimination and retaliation. The panel explains that, after Muldrow, such equivalence is no longer good law.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in two steps: jurisdictional finality and substantive standards.

1. Finality and appellate jurisdiction
   • The order was not final because it left a pleaded claim (disparate treatment) undecided. Under Porter and § 1291, that ends the analysis: the appeal must be dismissed as interlocutory.
   • The court acknowledged a pragmatic gloss: implicit resolution can suffice if the decision addresses the “central component” of each claim (Hixson). But that did not occur here. The district court neither recast the disparate-treatment claim as part of HWE nor analyzed an element unique to disparate treatment. It simply did not decide the claim.
   • Substance over form controls: calling an order “final judgment” cannot create appellate jurisdiction where a claim remains outstanding.
2. Why the merits discussion could not salvage finality
   • The district court’s HWE analysis applied the “severe or pervasive” test. That standard is necessary for HWE claims (Meritor) but is not the yardstick for disparate-treatment claims. Thus, rejecting HWE on “severe or pervasive” grounds does not resolve whether any discrete action affected a term or condition of employment for disparate-treatment purposes.
   • The district court’s retaliation analysis asked whether the schedule change and Letter of Discipline were “materially adverse” or imposed “significant harm”—an approach consistent with retaliation law but (after Muldrow) inapposite to discrimination claims. The panel underscores that equating the standards—an approach reflected in cases like Adams—does not survive Muldrow.
   • Consequently, neither the HWE nor the retaliation analysis impliedly resolved the disparate-treatment claim. The claim therefore remains pending, destroying finality.

What Muldrow Changes—and Why It Matters Here

The opinion’s most consequential signal is its instruction that the district court must apply Muldrow on remand. Muldrow holds that a Title VII disparate-treatment plaintiff need only show that the employer’s action “affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” It explicitly rejects importing the retaliation framework’s “significant harm” or “materially adverse” requirements into discrimination cases. The practical consequence in the Fourth Circuit is twofold:

• Older cases treating “adverse employment action” as a unitary, heightened threshold across retaliation and discrimination are abrogated to the extent they conflate the standards. Adams is named expressly.
• Discrete actions that fall short of tangible economic harm may still be actionable discrimination if they demonstrably change terms, conditions, or privileges of employment (for example, certain schedule changes, duty reassignments, or denial of training or opportunities that alter working conditions). Whether the schedule change or Letter of Discipline alleged by Hansley meet that standard is a merits question for the district court to address on remand.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although jurisdictional and unpublished, the opinion has notable practical effects:

• Finality discipline for district courts and litigants
  • District courts should expressly resolve each pleaded claim or, where appropriate, use Rule 54(b) to enter a partial final judgment. A “final judgment” label will not confer appellate jurisdiction if any claim remains undecided.
  • Practitioners should audit pleadings and orders for stray, overlapping, or re-labeled claims to ensure nothing is left unadjudicated before noticing an appeal.
• Recalibration of Title VII discrimination standards post-Muldrow
  • At the pleading and summary judgment stages, courts in the Fourth Circuit must apply Muldrow’s “terms or conditions” test to disparate-treatment claims, without demanding a showing of “significant harm” or an “ultimate employment decision.”
  • Retaliation retains the Burlington Northern materially adverse standard—what would “dissuade a reasonable worker”—but that is distinct from discrimination’s terms-and-conditions inquiry. Conflation is reversible error.
• Hostile work environment remains distinct
  • HWE claims still require “severe or pervasive” harassment that alters the conditions of employment. That test should not be used to decide disparate-treatment claims about discrete actions.
• Federal-sector cases
  • The opinion concerns a federal employee (USPS), but the core standards for discrimination and retaliation mirror private-sector Title VII. Muldrow’s recalibration applies equally in federal-sector cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291: An order is final only if the district court has resolved every claim for every party. If one claim is left undecided, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction unless there is a proper Rule 54(b) certification.
• Disparate treatment vs. hostile work environment:
  • Disparate treatment concerns discrete employment actions taken “because of” a protected characteristic. After Muldrow, the action must affect a term or condition of employment.
  • Hostile work environment addresses harassment that is “severe or pervasive” enough to alter the conditions of employment.
• Retaliation: Involves action taken because the employee engaged in protected activity (e.g., opposing discrimination). The standard asks whether the action would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination—often phrased as “materially adverse.” This is intentionally broader than the discrimination standard in some respects, but not importable into discrimination claims.
• Judgment on the pleadings (Rule 12(c)): A mechanism to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, typically applying the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6). Its timing (after the pleadings close) does not change the requirement to analyze each claim and element correctly.

Noteworthy Drafting Point

The panel notes that the district court did not pass judgment on Hansley’s “disparate impact” theory, but the context and the opinion’s earlier references make clear the outstanding claim is “disparate treatment.” This appears to be a minor drafting slip and does not affect the court’s jurisdictional analysis or remand instructions.

Conclusion

Hansley v. DeJoy reinforces two critical principles. First, appellate jurisdiction hinges on true finality: a judgment is not final under § 1291 if any claim remains undecided, no matter how the order is labeled. Second, and more prospectively significant, the Fourth Circuit directs district courts to apply the Supreme Court’s Muldrow standard to Title VII disparate-treatment claims: plaintiffs need only allege actions that affect a term or condition of employment; courts may not impose retaliation’s materially adverse or “significant harm” threshold on discrimination claims.

On remand, the district court must decide Hansley’s disparate-treatment claim under the correct standard. More broadly, litigants in the Fourth Circuit should recalibrate their Title VII strategies accordingly: plead and argue discrimination claims under Muldrow’s terms-and-conditions framework, analyze retaliation separately under its materially adverse standard, and ensure every claim in a complaint is expressly adjudicated before appealing.

Disposition: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and remanded; government’s motion for supplemental appendix granted; oral argument dispensed with.