Unlicensed Firearms Dealing as “Illicit Trafficking”: Fourth-Circuit Affirms § 922(a)(1)(A) as an Aggravated Felony under INA § 1101(a)(43)(C)

Introduction

Genovevo Alvarez Ronquillo v. Pamela Bondi marks the first published decision in the Fourth Circuit to squarely decide whether a conviction for unlicensed firearms dealing under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) constitutes the aggravated felony of “illicit trafficking in firearms” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C).

The petitioner, a lawful permanent resident from Mexico, purchased firearms in the United States between 2018 and 2019 and resold them in Mexico without the required federal firearms license. After receiving a 78-month sentence, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction was an aggravated felony that rendered him deportable. Both the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed; the Fourth Circuit now affirms.

The decision is significant because it cements—at least within the Fourth Circuit—the rule that § 922(a)(1)(A) is a categorical match to the generic aggravated felony “illicit trafficking in firearms,” resolving an issue only the Ninth Circuit had previously addressed (Chacon v. Wilkinson).

Summary of the Judgment

The court used the categorical approach, examining whether the elements of the federal firearms-dealing statute fit wholly within the generic definition of “illicit trafficking in firearms.”
Because the INA does not define that phrase, the panel looked to ordinary meaning, contemporaneous dictionaries, and internal statutory context.
“Illicit trafficking” was defined as “unlawful trading or dealing.” Applying that definition, § 922(a)(1)(A) (unlicensed importing, manufacturing, or dealing) necessarily describes unlawful trading or dealing in firearms.
Any potential statutory overbreadth—particularly the so-called “proof-of-profit” exception in § 921(a)(22)—did not undermine the match.
Thus, the court held categorically that a conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) is an aggravated felony, denied the petition, and left the removal order in place.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013); Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385 (2017) – Provided the general framework for the categorical approach: courts compare statutory elements, not underlying conduct, and assume the conviction rests on the least-culpable conduct criminalised.
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) – Reinforced that focus on the least act prevents removal based on facts never actually proved.
Matter of Davis, 20 I.&N. Dec. 536 (BIA 1992) – Early BIA decision defining “illicit trafficking” (in controlled-substances context) as “unlawful trading or dealing.” Although later limited on other grounds, its lexical analysis informed both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.
Chacon v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2021) – Only circuit precedent on the exact question; the Fourth Circuit adopted similar reasoning, lending persuasive (though not precedential) weight.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) – Chevron deference overruled. The Fourth Circuit expressly noted it was not deferring to the BIA under Chevron or even Skidmore; it reached its own independent construction.
Venue decisions: Herrera-Alcala v. Garland, 39 F.4th 233 (4th Cir. 2022) and Annor v. Garland, 95 F.4th 820 (4th Cir. 2024) – Clarified that immigration venue is non-jurisdictional; neither party requested transfer, so the Fourth Circuit decided the merits.

B. Legal Reasoning

Identify generic offense. The INA simply lists “illicit trafficking in firearms” without definition. The court therefore used “normal tools of statutory interpretation” to uncover Congress’s intended meaning.
Plain-meaning analysis. Dictionaries circa 1988-1994 (years of enactment/amendment) defined “illicit” as unlawful and “trafficking” as trading or dealing. Nothing in the statute signalled a special, narrower meaning.
Uniform meaning canon. The same phrase “illicit trafficking” appears in adjacent INA clauses relating to controlled substances. Absent textual clues, identical words presumptively have identical meanings (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez).
Rejection of external narrowing sources. The petitioner invoked Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(5) commentary (2006) and the 2022 Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, but these post-enactment sources were deemed too remote and unlinked by cross-reference to control the INA’s 1988 text.
No overbreadth found. The only arguable over-breadth was the “proof-of-profit” carve-out for firearms supplied for terrorism or crime (§ 921(a)(22)). The court reasoned that buying firearms for later criminal disposition still entails an exchange of value in the purchase itself and therefore fits within “trading or dealing.”
Categorical match conclusion. Because the least culpable conduct criminalised under § 922(a)(1)(A) (repetitive, profit-oriented unlicensed dealing) is still “unlawful trading or dealing,” the statutes match, the conviction is an aggravated felony, and removal is mandatory.

C. Impact of the Judgment

Fourth-Circuit precedent. Immigration judges within the circuit must treat § 922(a)(1)(A) convictions as aggravated felonies. Noncitizens with such convictions will be ineligible for most discretionary relief (cancellation, asylum, voluntary departure).
National influence. The Fourth Circuit joins the Ninth, creating an emerging consensus. Federal circuits with high firearm-trafficking caseloads (Fifth, Eleventh, etc.) may look to this reasoning, potentially creating uniformity and eliminating circuit splits.
Simplifies litigation. DHS trial attorneys need only present the conviction record; respondents cannot argue factual benignity (e.g., hobbyist sales) because the match is categorical and element-based.
Chevron fallout. The opinion is an early illustration of post-Loper Bright statutory interpretation in immigration law: courts will independently construe ambiguous INA language rather than deferring automatically to the BIA.
Criminal-immigration interaction. Defense counsel representing non-citizens in firearms cases must understand that plea bargains to § 922(a)(1)(A) will now almost certainly trigger removal; alternative counts (e.g., false statements on ATF forms) may be less damaging.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical Approach: A comparison of statutory elements, not actual facts, to see if every violation of the criminal statute fits within the generic federal definition. If the least culpable conduct covered by the statute still meets the generic definition, the match is “categorical.”
Aggravated Felony: A term of art in immigration law covering dozens of offenses that trigger mandatory removal and bar most relief. It is not limited to felonies as labelled under state law.
“Illicit Trafficking in Firearms”: As construed here, any unlawful trading or dealing in firearms, i.e., commercial-style transactions lacking statutory authorization (such as dealing without a license).
Skidmore vs. Chevron Deference: Skidmore grants weight proportional to an agency’s persuasiveness; Chevron (now overruled) mandated deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. The Fourth Circuit applied neither; it interpreted the statute independently.
Proof-of-Profit Exception (§ 921(a)(22)): Congress removed the need to prove profit motive if the firearms were repetitively “purchased and disposed” for crime or terrorism. The court held that the purchasing step still involves “consideration,” so the activity remains “trading or dealing.”

Conclusion

Alvarez Ronquillo decisively holds that unlicensed firearms dealing under § 922(a)(1)(A) constitutes the aggravated felony of “illicit trafficking in firearms.” Employing a rigorous plain-meaning analysis and the categorical approach, the Fourth Circuit aligned itself with the Ninth Circuit and fortified DHS’s power to remove non-citizens convicted of such offenses.

Beyond its immediate immigration consequence, the judgment exemplifies post-Chevron statutory interpretation: courts must now resolve ambiguities themselves. The decision therefore resonates in both immigration enforcement and administrative-law doctrine, and it furnishes clear guidance to criminal counsel, immigration practitioners, and lower tribunals alike.