United States v. Yoo: Limiting Speedy Trial Act Dismissals to Pre‑Motion Delay and Enforcing Oral Pronouncement of Supervised Release Conditions

I. Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s published decision in United States v. Young Yoo (consolidated with appeals by Joseph Duk‑Hyun Lamborn, Peter Le, and Tony Minh Le) arises from a sprawling gang‑related prosecution of the “Reccless Tigers,” a Northern Virginia drug enterprise implicated in narcotics trafficking, violent retaliation, and the murder of Brandon White, a government cooperator.

The case presents a wide range of appellate issues: challenges to trial continuances and denial of substitution of counsel, sufficiency of the evidence on kidnapping and murder counts, Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claims, the use of acquitted conduct and enhancements at sentencing, and a technical—but outcome‑determinative—challenge to supervised release conditions.

Doctrinally, the opinion is most notable for two points:

• Speedy Trial Act scope: The court adopts, for the Fourth Circuit, the rule that a motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act only reaches delay that predates the filing of the motion; later delay is irrelevant to that motion.
• Supervised release conditions: The court strictly enforces its prior holding in United States v. Rogers that all non‑mandatory supervised release conditions must be orally pronounced or incorporated by reference at sentencing, vacating three life sentences solely to correct written‑judgment conditions that were never announced from the bench.

Ultimately, the court:

• Affirms all convictions for Lamborn, Yoo, Peter Le, and Tony Le.
• Affirms Tony Le’s 312‑month sentence against procedural reasonableness attacks (including the use of acquitted conduct at the time of sentencing).
• Vacates the sentences of Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter Le and remands solely to resolve inconsistencies between the oral pronouncement of supervised release and the written judgments.

This commentary analyzes the opinion’s reasoning, the precedents it relies on, and its implications for criminal procedure and sentencing in complex, multi‑defendant cases.

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II. Background and Procedural History

A. The Reccless Tigers Enterprise

The Reccless Tigers were a Northern Virginia‑based gang primarily dealing in marijuana and cocaine. Over time, two affiliated groups emerged:

• Tiger Side, an offshoot promising “more money and more drugs,” led by Tony Minh Le.
• Club Tiger, a prospect group for younger members, led by Peter Le.

Membership was fluid among the Reccless Tigers, Tiger Side, and Club Tiger. The gang enforced drug debts through violence and targeted suspected cooperators with law enforcement.

The defendants’ roles were:

• Joseph Duk‑Hyun Lamborn (“Joe Yu,” “Trigg”) – an early Reccless Tigers member.
• Young Yoo (“YG”) – involved in drug operations, and White’s primary creditor.
• Peter Le (“Savage,” “Loki,” “Lorton King”) – leader of Club Tiger.
• Tony Minh Le (“Sneaks,” “Tiger,” etc.) – leader of Tiger Side and tied to the California‑based Asian Boyz gang.

B. The Brandon White Kidnapping and Murder

Brandon White first met the Reccless Tigers in high school, when Yoo fronted him marijuana. White remained indebted for that drug front. After Reccless Tigers member David Nguyen assaulted White over the unpaid debt, White testified against Nguyen at a preliminary hearing. His cooperation made him a target.

The government’s narrative, credited by the jury and the Fourth Circuit, was that Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter conspired to retaliate violently:

• Peter offered to have two indebted associates, Abdulkadir and Sayf, forgiven if they brought White to a parking lot.
• Two cars waited there: Lamborn and Peter in one, Yoo in another. Lamborn and Peter forced White into their car.
• The cars drove to Richmond, Virginia, stopped near woods, and Lamborn and Peter took White into the woods; Yoo joined shortly thereafter.
• Witnesses heard gunshots; the three men returned without White.
• Lamborn later admitted shooting White; Yoo admitted stabbing White with a knife supplied by Peter and arranged for the disposal of bloodied clothes and the knife.

White’s body was later discovered wrapped in a tarp in the woods near where witnesses heard gunshots. Forensic evidence corroborated both gunshot and sharp‑force wounds.

C. Indictments and Continuances

The procedural posture was complex:

• Third superseding indictment (August 2019): Charged all four defendants with narcotics conspiracy and other drug‑related offenses. Trial was initially set for February 2020.
• COVID‑related continuances: Over two years, the district court continued trial multiple times due to:
  • Defense counsel’s limited access to clients during the pandemic.
  • Voluminous discovery.
  • New investigative developments, including the discovery of White’s body.
• Fourth superseding indictment (August 2020):
  • All four defendants: drug conspiracy.
  • Lamborn, Yoo, Peter: racketeering conspiracy (RICO), kidnapping conspiracy, kidnapping resulting in death, murder in aid of racketeering (VICAR), killing while engaged in drug trafficking, and (for Lamborn) using a firearm resulting in death.
  • Tony: added racketeering conspiracy and destructive device counts related to separate firebombing incidents.

In May 2021, Tony moved to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the Act claim but did not expressly analyze the Sixth Amendment.

Shortly before trial:

• At Lamborn’s request, his counsel moved to withdraw; the court denied the motion as untimely and unsupported by an irreconcilable conflict.
• Four days before trial, all defendants jointly moved for another continuance, citing a large, recent discovery production. The district court denied the request and commenced trial on April 11, 2022.

D. Trial, Verdicts, and Sentencing

At trial:

• Lamborn eventually discharged counsel and represented himself for closing argument.
• Yoo and Peter moved for acquittal under Rule 29; the court denied both motions.

The jury convicted:

• Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter of:
  • Racketeering conspiracy (RICO).
  • Murder in aid of racketeering.
  • Kidnapping conspiracy.
  • Kidnapping resulting in death.
  • Drug conspiracy.
  • Killing while engaged in drug trafficking (§ 848(e)).
  • Lamborn only: using a firearm resulting in death.
  • Peter additionally: maintaining drug premises, substantive drug distribution, § 924(c) firearm in relation to a drug offense, and money‑laundering conspiracy.
• Tony of:
  • Racketeering conspiracy.
  • Drug conspiracy, with special findings of at least 1,000 kg of marijuana and 500 g of cocaine.
  • Acquittal on destructive device counts.

Sentences:

• Lamborn, Yoo, Peter: life imprisonment plus supervised release terms.
• Tony: 312 months (26 years) imprisonment, driven by:
  • Drug quantity calculations (including 15 kg of cocaine in the PSR, above the jury’s 500‑gram finding).
  • Enhancements for:
    • Use of violence (§ 2D1.1(b)(2)).
    • Possession of a firearm (§ 2D1.1(b)(1)).
    • Aggravating leadership role (§ 3B1.1(a)).

All four defendants appealed. The Fourth Circuit “affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.”

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III. Summary of the Opinion

The court (Chief Judge Diaz, joined by Judge Gregory and Senior Judge Keenan) issued a comprehensive opinion rejecting nearly all challenges except one: a supervised‑release error that required resentencing for three defendants.

1. Denial of continuance: The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing a last‑minute continuance four days before trial, after multiple prior continuances. Defendants failed to show specific prejudice from the alleged lack of preparation time.
2. Denial of Lamborn’s motion to substitute counsel: The court properly denied the withdrawal motion as untimely and, in any event, there was no total breakdown in communication preventing an adequate defense. Any error would have been harmless given counsel’s performance.
3. Sufficiency of the evidence: The evidence was sufficient to sustain Yoo’s and Peter’s convictions for kidnapping conspiracy, kidnapping resulting in death, murder in aid of racketeering (as aiders and abettors), and killing while engaged in drug trafficking.
4. Speedy Trial Act: Tony’s trial did not violate the Act. The court:
   • Applied separate speedy‑trial clocks for the drug and RICO counts, consistent with United States v. Myrick.
   • Held that a motion to dismiss under the Act only reaches delay prior to the motion’s filing.
   • Upheld exclusions for ends‑of‑justice continuances and co‑defendant delay as reasonable.
5. Sixth Amendment speedy trial: Applying the Barker v. Wingo four‑factor test de novo (because the district court had not explicitly ruled), the court held no constitutional violation occurred: only the length‑of‑delay factor favored Tony; reasons for delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice all favored the government.
6. Tony’s sentencing challenges: The court rejected claims of procedural unreasonableness:
   • Acquitted conduct: The district court permissibly considered acquitted conduct at the time of sentencing, under then‑controlling Fourth Circuit law (Medley), and the new Guidelines amendment limiting acquitted conduct (§ 1B1.3(c)) is substantive and not retroactive.
   • Drug quantity: Any error in attributing 15 kg of cocaine was harmless, because marijuana quantity alone justified the same base offense level.
   • Firearm enhancement: Evidence that Tony kept a gun at a location where he received marijuana shipments supported the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement.
   • Leadership enhancement: Testimony that others acted under Tony’s direction and took orders from him in distributing drugs supported a four-level leadership role enhancement.
   • § 3553(a)(6) disparity: No procedural error in rejecting Tony’s co‑defendant disparity argument; § 3553(a)(6) focuses on nationwide uniformity, not co‑defendant parity, per United States v. Lawson.
7. Supervised release conditions: The written judgments for Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter included non‑mandatory “standard” and “special” supervised release conditions that were not announced at sentencing nor incorporated by reference. Under United States v. Rogers and United States v. Mathis, the court vacated their sentences and remanded for resentencing.

In summary, the convictions and Tony’s sentence stand intact; only the supervised release aspects of the three life sentences required correction.

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IV. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Continuances and the Right to Counsel

• Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) – establishes that denial of a continuance is reversible only where the court shows an “unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness” in the face of a justifiable delay request. It also clarifies that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a “meaningful relationship” with counsel.
• United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724 (4th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Hedgepeth, 418 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2005) – reaffirm that abuse of discretion in denying a continuance requires not just error, but specific resulting prejudice.
• United States v. LaRouche, 896 F.2d 815 (4th Cir. 1990) – rejects vague claims of unpreparedness absent a showing of how additional time would have materially changed the defense.

These precedents underpin the court’s refusal to disturb the denial of a trial continuance on the eve of a long‑delayed, complex gang trial. The court emphasizes that prior continuances, extensive discovery access, and witness‑safety concerns meant the district court’s decision was far from “arbitrary insistence on expeditiousness.”

2. Substitution of Counsel

• United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 580 (4th Cir. 2011) – provides the three‑factor test governing motions to substitute counsel:
  1. Timeliness.
  2. Adequacy of the trial court’s inquiry into dissatisfaction.
  3. Whether conflict produced a “total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.”
• United States v. Horton, 693 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2012) – clarifies abuse of discretion review and that even erroneous denial can be harmless if counsel nonetheless provides an adequate defense.
• United States v. Blackledge, 751 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891 (4th Cir. 1994) – illustrate when communication breakdowns become constitutionally significant (e.g., where there is essentially no trial preparation or contact).
• United States v. Muslim, 944 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2019) – affirms the importance of a detailed on‑record inquiry into dissatisfaction with counsel.

These cases guide the court in upholding the denial of Lamborn’s late motion to replace counsel; his own admissions that counsel met with him weekly for months after his initial dissatisfaction, and that they discussed defenses and witnesses, were central to the finding of no “total lack of communication.”

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Conspiracy Principles

• United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) – articulates the heavy burden for sufficiency challenges and the requirement to view evidence in the government’s favor.
• United States v. Dennis, 19 F.4th 656 (4th Cir. 2021) – emphasizes that “potentially innocent” alternative explanations and credibility disputes are for the jury.
• United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2003) – prohibits appellate weighing of evidence or reassessing witness credibility.
• United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292 (4th Cir. 2024) – reaffirms that appellate courts assume the jury resolved testimonial conflicts in favor of the government.
• United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1985) – clarifies that “mere presence” at the crime scene is insufficient for conspiracy or aiding and abetting, but presence plus context can support an inference of participation.

On the substantive offenses, the court also draws on:

• United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2008) – sets out elements of kidnapping resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 1201.
• United States v. Camara, 908 F.3d 41 (4th Cir. 2018) – details the elements of conspiracy: unlawful agreement, knowing participation, and an overt act.
• United States v. Ortiz‑Orellana, 90 F.4th 689 (4th Cir. 2024) – provides the elements for murder in aid of racketeering (VICAR) under 18 U.S.C. § 1959.
• United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2003) – explicates aiding and abetting liability: knowing association with the venture and sharing the principal’s criminal intent.
• United States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 2013) – interprets § 848(e)(1)(A) (killing while engaged in drug trafficking) to require a “meaningful” nexus between the killing and the drug conspiracy, not mere temporal overlap.

These precedents allow the court to affirm the kidnapping and multiple murder convictions based on circumstantial inferences from coordination, roles in the plan, and post‑crime admissions, even though no witness saw the actual moment of killing.

4. The Speedy Trial Act

• Statute: 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., with key exclusions:
  • § 3161(h)(7)(A) – “ends of justice” continuances.
  • § 3161(h)(6) – reasonable delay attributable to co‑defendants.
• Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) – requires contemporaneous, on‑the‑record “ends of justice” findings; they cannot be supplied after the fact.
• United States v. Pair, 84 F.4th 577 (4th Cir. 2023) – treats COVID‑19–related continuances as legitimate “ends of justice” delays when courts consider case complexity and counsel’s preparation needs.
• United States v. Myrick, 150 F.4th 308 (4th Cir. 2025) – clarifies that a superseding indictment does not reset the clock for original or required‑to‑be‑joined charges; new, distinct offenses get their own clock.
• United States v. Carey, 746 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1984) – establishes that an exclusion applicable to one defendant applies to all co‑defendants under § 3161(h)(6).
• United States v. Hart, 91 F.4th 732 (4th Cir. 2024) – confirms no “magic words” are needed for an ends‑of‑justice continuance so long as the factual basis and balancing are on the record.
• United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390 (4th Cir. 2022) – discusses reasonableness of co‑defendant delay under § 3161(h)(6) and the need for particularized prejudice to challenge such delay.

On a novel point, the court also aligns the Fourth Circuit with several others in holding that a Speedy Trial Act motion to dismiss is effective only as to periods before the motion is filed, citing:

• United States v. Connor, 926 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1991).
• United States v. Wirsing, 867 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1989).
• United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1990).
• United States v. Sherer, 770 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2014).
• United States v. Mathis, 96 F.3d 1577 (11th Cir. 1996).
• United States v. Weidenburner, 550 F. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013).

This adoption is a key doctrinal contribution of the opinion.

5. Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial

• Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) – the four‑factor balancing test:
  1. Length of delay.
  2. Reason for delay.
  3. Defendant’s assertion of the right.
  4. Prejudice (with emphasis on impairment of defense).
• Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) – delays approaching one year are “presumptively prejudicial,” triggering the Barker analysis.
• United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445 (4th Cir. 2012) – describe how courts weigh Barker factors.
• United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2009) – recognizes that complex conspiracy cases can justify substantial delay.
• United States v. Pair, 84 F.4th at 589–91 – notes it is “unusual” to find a Sixth Amendment violation where the Speedy Trial Act is satisfied; also holds that pandemic‑related visitation constraints and “general prison conditions” are not specific Sixth Amendment prejudice.
• United States v. Ali, 991 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 2021) – confirms that an appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if not addressed below.

These cases enabled the Fourth Circuit to decide Tony’s Sixth Amendment claim de novo without remand, relying heavily on the factual findings the district court had already made in the Speedy Trial Act context.

6. Sentencing: Acquitted Conduct, Enhancements, and Disparity

• United States v. Medley, 34 F.4th 326 (4th Cir. 2022) – confirms that a sentencing court may consider acquitted or uncharged conduct proved by a preponderance of the evidence, under then‑existing Guidelines practice.
• New Guidelines amendment, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) – now disfavours use of acquitted conduct in Guidelines calculations. The court, relying on:
  • United States v. Goines, 357 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 2004) – only “clarifying” Guidelines amendments apply retroactively on direct appeal; substantive changes do not.
  • United States v. Shanks, No. 24‑12247, 2025 WL 1621179 (11th Cir. June 9, 2025) – classifies the acquitted‑conduct amendment as substantive and therefore not retroactive.
  The Fourth Circuit joins that view by holding the acquitted‑conduct amendment “substantive because it changed the law in this circuit,” and thus inapplicable to Tony’s earlier sentencing.
• Firearm enhancement:
  • United States v. McAllister, 272 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001) – requires a connection between the firearm and drug activity.
  • United States v. Mondragon, 860 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2017) – articulates the “temporal and spatial relation” test linking weapon, drug trafficking, and defendant.
  • United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905 (4th Cir. 2017) – possession of a firearm in a location where a drug conspiracy is conducted suffices to link it to the conspiracy.
• Leadership enhancement:
  • U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) & cmt. n.4 – list factors such as decision‑making authority, recruitment, share of profits, planning, scope, and control over others.
• Sentencing disparities:
  • United States v. Lawson, 128 F.4th 243 (4th Cir. 2025) – clarifies that § 3553(a)(6)’s principal concern is nationwide disparity, not co‑defendant‑to‑co‑defendant differences in a single case.
  • United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2015) – requires district courts to address non‑frivolous arguments and explain why they are rejected.

These authorities collectively support the court’s conclusion that Tony’s sentence was procedurally sound under the law at the time, even though the Guidelines have since evolved to restrict reliance on acquitted conduct.

7. Supervised Release Conditions

• United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020) – holds:
  • A defendant has a right to be present at sentencing, which includes the setting of non‑mandatory supervised release conditions.
  • Non‑mandatory conditions must either be orally pronounced at sentencing or expressly incorporated by reference (e.g., standard conditions as described in the Guidelines or standing orders).
  • Conditions appearing only in the written judgment but not orally imposed are invalid.
• United States v. Mathis, 103 F.4th 193 (4th Cir. 2024) – confirms the remedy: when a Rogers error occurs, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

The panel applies Rogers and Mathis strictly, vacating three life sentences (for Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter) because the written judgments contained “standard” and “special” conditions—such as prohibitions on incurring new credit charges, and a requirement that Lamborn make a good‑faith effort to obtain a GED—that were never imposed in open court.

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B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Last‑Minute Continuance Request

The defendants’ joint motion to continue, filed four days pre‑trial, cited the volume and recent timing of discovery. The Fourth Circuit emphasizes:

• The trial had already been continued four times, largely to accommodate defense needs amid COVID‑19 and voluminous discovery.
• Most of the evidence had been available for a year, and Jencks material and witness identifications had already been disclosed.
• The district court reasonably weighed witness safety, given the case involved retaliation against a cooperator.
• Much of the late discovery was peripheral to the charged overt acts.

On prejudice, the defendants pointed to the government’s forensic anthropology report, claiming its late disclosure deprived them of time to engage an expert. The court finds no prejudice because:

• The government had disclosed months earlier that it would use a forensic anthropologist, so counsel had ample notice of the need for expert review, regardless of the exact report date.
• Defense cross‑examination of the government’s expert was vigorous; defendants failed to identify specific shortcomings caused by the denied continuance.

Under Morris, LaRouche, and Williams, this combination of reasoned explanation and lack of demonstrated prejudice foreclosed reversal.

2. Substitution of Counsel for Lamborn

Applying the Smith factors:

• Timeliness: The withdrawal motion, filed four business days before trial, was plainly late. The court notes that appointing new counsel at that stage would jeopardize trial preparation in a complex RICO/murder case.
• Adequacy of inquiry: The district court held a detailed hearing, heard from Lamborn and counsel, and explored reasons for dissatisfaction (discovery access and limited visits). It also explored the timeline of prior communication breakdowns and counsel’s later efforts (weekly visits) to repair the relationship.
• Breakdown of communication: The key factual finding was that whatever breakdown existed months earlier had been addressed by increased contact; Lamborn discussed potential alibi witnesses and defense strategy with counsel. The court found no “total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.”

Even if denial were erroneous, the panel holds any error harmless: Lamborn did not argue that counsel’s performance at trial was deficient, and the court focuses on counsel’s documented preparation and participation in the bulk of the defense. The later pro se closing and near‑physical altercation do not retroactively negate counsel’s performance prior to that point.

3. Sufficiency of Evidence: Yoo and Peter

a. Kidnapping Conspiracy and Kidnapping Resulting in Death

The court highlights multiple strands of evidence supporting Yoo’s and Peter’s participation:

• Peter’s deal with Abdulkadir and Sayf: forgiving their drug debts in exchange for luring White to the parking lot.
• Peter’s procurement of a vehicle for the abduction.
• Testimony from Aagesen that Yoo and Peter discussed a plan to “set up” White to “get fucked up” and described the two‑car pick‑up plan.
• Witnesses seeing Peter wearing latex gloves and physically forcing White into the car.
• Yoo driving in a second car, calling Peter’s car to coordinate the next meeting point on the interstate.

Under Camara and Dennis, this evidence goes well beyond “mere presence” and supports an inference of knowing and willing participation in an unlawful agreement to kidnap White, culminating in his transportation from Northern Virginia to Richmond and death.

b. Murder in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR)

The government proceeded on an aiding‑and‑abetting theory. The court reasons:

• Yoo bringing a gun to the kidnap site supports his active role.
• The three men together took White into the woods, despite Lamborn’s warning that he intended to shoot.
• Witnesses heard gunshots; the three emerged without White.
• Yoo told fellow gang member Spencer Pak that Peter gave him a knife in the woods and that he used it to stab White; later he arranged disposal of a suitcase of clothes and a knife.
• Autopsy findings confirmed sharp‑force injuries along with gunshot wounds.

The court acknowledges that Pak’s testimony could be questioned, but reiterates that credibility determinations are for the jury. At minimum, Yoo and Peter choosing to remain present and participate in the attack after Lamborn announced his deadly intent sufficed to show they shared his criminal purpose under Williams.

. Killing While Engaged in Drug Trafficking (§ 848(e)(1)(A))

The panel finds the “meaningful nexus” required by Hager easily met: White was targeted both for his drug debt to Yoo and for testifying against Nguyen, a gang member. Thus, the killing was directly tied to the gang’s drug enterprise, not an unrelated personal dispute.

4. The Speedy Trial Act: Complex Multi‑Defendant Application

a. Separate Clocks for Different Counts

Relying on Myrick, the court distinguishes between:

• Drug conspiracy count: Tony’s speedy‑trial clock started the day after his first appearance (November 20, 2019), and absent exclusions would have run January 29, 2020.
• RICO conspiracy count: Added in the fourth superseding indictment; not “the same offense” as drug conspiracy for Double Jeopardy purposes (Devine). The clock for this charge began on his September 2, 2020 appearance, expiring (without exclusions) November 11, 2020.

Thus, two separate 70‑day analyses were required, both of which turned on exclusions and continuances.

b. Pre‑Motion Cutoff for Speedy Trial Act Dismissal

The opinion’s clearest new precedent is its adoption of the majority rule that a Speedy Trial Act motion to dismiss only encompasses delay before the motion is filed:

“Following our sister circuits’ approach, we conclude that delays that postdate the filing of a motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act don’t matter.”

By aligning with First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit authority, the Fourth Circuit resolves an open question within the circuit and provides a clear cutoff: defendants must file their motions promptly, or else later delay (even if non‑excludable) will not be part of the motion under consideration.

c. Ends‑of‑Justice Continuances (§ 3161(h)(7)(A))

The court affirms that the district court’s continuances were properly excluded because:

• The case was “complex”: multi‑year conspiracy; several defendants; numerous counts, witnesses, and voluminous discovery.
• Counsel’s ability to prepare was significantly constrained by COVID‑19 restrictions on visits and logistical issues.
• Co‑defendants explicitly requested additional time to prepare; the trial court granted those continuances after balancing the public’s and defendants’ interests in a speedy trial against preparation needs.

The opinion underscores that no “magic words” are required. It is enough that:

• The court contemporaneously identifies on the record the factual reasons for the continuance.
• The record reflects implicit or explicit balancing between ends of justice and speedy‑trial interests, as required by Zedner and Hart.

d. Co‑Defendant Delay (§ 3161(h)(6)) and Reasonableness

Because this was a joint trial, exclusions for one defendant applied to all under § 3161(h)(6) (Carey). The question became whether the resulting delay was “reasonable” for Tony, analyzed under Robinson:

• Severance efforts: Tony did eventually seek severance, but only after agreeing to a trial date outside the 70‑day window and acquiescing in prior continuances. He did not appeal the denial of severance.
• Length of delay: Eighteen‑ and eight‑month delays, while substantial, are not per se unreasonable in complex multi‑defendant conspiracy cases—especially when Robinson tolerated up to 22 months.
• Particularized prejudice: Tony alleged that being tried alongside co‑defendants charged with murder prejudiced him, but that argument goes to joinder, not length of delay. He pointed to no lost evidence, unavailable witness, or impaired defense caused by the extra time.

The absence of “particularized prejudice” was decisive: co‑defendant delay remained reasonable and excludable.

5. Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Analysis

Despite the district court’s failure to address the Sixth Amendment argument explicitly, the appellate court decided it on the existing record.

• Length of delay: The post‑accusation delay exceeded eight months, long enough to be “presumptively prejudicial” (Doggett). This factor favored Tony.
• Reason for delay: Weighing heavily for the government:
  • Case complexity (multi‑defendant RICO/drug conspiracy with intertwined homicide).
  • “Unpredictable and unavoidable” COVID‑19–related constraints on preparation and trial scheduling.
  These are “valid reasons” under Barker, Hall, and Pair.
• Assertion of the right: Tony did assert his right, but not consistently: he failed to object to some continuances and did not promptly or repeatedly insist on a speedy trial. Delayed or inconsistent assertion undercuts the Barker claim.
• Prejudice: Tony alleged:
  • General difficulty in investigating and interviewing witnesses over time.
  • Constraints on attorney‑client meetings during pretrial incarceration in the pandemic.
  The court rejected these as generalized complaints not tied to specific lost evidence, unavailable witnesses, or impaired recollection. Under Hall, Robinson, and Pair, this fails to show the kind of concrete prejudice Barker prioritizes.

With three factors favoring the government and only the length factor favoring Tony, the court found no Sixth Amendment violation. The opinion also reiterates that it is “the unusual case” where the Speedy Trial Act is satisfied but the Sixth Amendment is violated (Pair).

6. Sentencing Issues for Tony Le

a. Use of Acquitted Conduct and the New Guidelines Amendment

Tony challenged two aspects of his sentence:

• The PSR’s attribution of 15 kg of cocaine, despite the jury’s finding of only 500 g.
• The use of acquitted destructive‑device conduct to impose a two‑level violence enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2).

At the time of sentencing, Medley permitted the consideration of acquitted conduct so long as proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Tony did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the court’s findings.

He instead relied on the fact that the Sentencing Commission has since amended the Guidelines (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)) to limit the use of acquitted conduct. The court holds:

• The amendment is substantive—it changes the law in the Fourth Circuit by restricting what conduct can affect guideline calculations.
• Under Goines, only clarifying amendments apply retroactively on direct appeal; substantive amendments do not.
• Thus, the new acquitted‑conduct rule cannot retroactively invalidate Tony’s lawfully imposed sentence under then‑controlling precedent.

This classification of the acquitted‑conduct amendment as “substantive” is itself an important doctrinal holding for the circuit.

On drug quantity, the court notes that Tony’s marijuana quantity alone (3,400 kg) independently justified a base offense level of 32. Even if cocaine quantity had been reduced to the jury‑found 500 g, the base level would remain unchanged. Any error was harmless.

b. Firearm Possession Enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(1))

The court affirms the two‑level firearm enhancement because:

• Witnesses testified that Tony possessed a firearm at his residence.
• The same residence was a site for receiving marijuana shipments.

This satisfies the “temporal and spatial relation” linking gun, drug trafficking activity, and defendant under Mondragon. Because the guideline commentary presumes the enhancement applies whenever a weapon is present, unless it is “clearly improbable” that it was connected to the offense, and Tony made no such showing, the enhancement stood.

c. Leadership Role Enhancement (§ 3B1.1(a))

The district court applied a four‑level enhancement for being an “organizer or leader” of criminal activity involving five or more participants. The appellate court points to:

• Evidence that Tony was an early Reccless Tigers member and founded the Tiger Side offshoot.
• Testimony that others took drug distribution orders from Tony and remitted proceeds to him.
• His central role in procurement and distribution of drugs within the organization.

These facts align with the § 3B1.1(a) commentary factors: decision‑making authority, recruitment, degree of planning, and scope of control. Thus, no clear error.

d. § 3553(a)(6) and Alleged Disparity with Co‑Defendants

Tony argued his 312‑month sentence was disproportionate compared to lesser sentences imposed on some co‑defendants for what he characterized as similar conduct. The court, citing Lawson, emphasizes:

• § 3553(a)(6) is primarily aimed at unwarranted nationwide disparities among similarly situated offenders, not at equalizing sentences within a single case.
• Different roles, conduct, and leadership responsibilities may legitimately justify harsher sentences, even among co‑defendants.

The district court explicitly addressed the argument at sentencing, noting Tony’s leadership and “epicenter” role in the gang’s drug enterprise. Under Bollinger, this explanation sufficed to show that the court considered and reasonably rejected the co‑defendant comparison.

7. Supervised Release Conditions and the Rogers Error

At the sentencing hearings for Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter, the district court orally announced only a few “special” supervised release conditions. The written judgments, however:

• Included all non‑mandatory “standard” conditions recommended by the Guidelines.
• Added additional “special” conditions, such as:
  • A prohibition on incurring new credit charges (all defendants).
  • A requirement that Lamborn make a good‑faith effort to obtain his GED, among others.

Under Rogers, non‑mandatory conditions must be:

• Expressly announced at sentencing; or
• Expressly incorporated by reference (for example, “the standard conditions of supervised release set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)” or in a local standing order).

Here, the court did neither. As a result:

• The unannounced standard and special conditions are invalid.
• Per Mathis, the proper remedy is to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, not merely to modify the written judgment.

Notably, the panel applies this remedy even where defendants are serving life terms, underscoring that supervised release conditions—however academic they may seem in the shadow of life imprisonment—are legally significant and must be pronounced in open court.

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C. Impact and Future Significance

1. Speedy Trial Act Litigation in the Fourth Circuit

The opinion solidifies several important Speedy Trial Act principles:

• Pre‑motion temporal limitation: Defendants must challenge Speedy Trial Act violations promptly. A motion to dismiss will be evaluated only against delay before the motion is filed. This discourages “wait and see” strategies and promotes early assertion of statutory rights.
• Superseding indictments and multiple clocks: Following Myrick, the case illustrates in practice how separate speedy‑trial clocks may run for different counts added in a superseding indictment, depending on Double Jeopardy and joinder principles.
• COVID‑19 and complexity as valid grounds: The opinion confirms that pandemic‑related logistical constraints and case complexity continue to justify “ends of justice” continuances when properly explained on the record.
• Co‑defendant delay: The court reiterates that defendants must show “particularized prejudice” from co‑defendant delays to challenge § 3161(h)(6) exclusions, and that delays of up to 18–22 months may be reasonable in large conspiracy cases.

Future Speedy Trial Act motions in the Fourth Circuit will now have to grapple explicitly with this opinion’s pre‑motion cutoff and its robust acceptance of complexity‑ and pandemic‑based continuances.

2. Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Claims Post‑COVID

The decision continues the trend, exemplified by Pair, of courts deferring to pandemic‑driven delays when properly justified. It underscores:

• Defendants must do more than allege general hardship, anxiety, or difficulty meeting with counsel; they must identify specific prejudice: lost witnesses, degraded memories on critical issues, or evidence destroyed by passage of time.
• Failure to consistently and promptly assert the right weakens Barker claims.

In combination with Speedy Trial Act holdings, this will make Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial relief particularly challenging in complex, multi‑defendant post‑COVID prosecutions.

3. Sentencing Practice: Acquitted Conduct and Retroactivity

Although the Guidelines have now been amended to limit acquitted conduct, this opinion is significant because:

• It confirms that, for sentences imposed before the amendment’s effective date, courts may not retroactively apply the new rule on direct appeal if it is “substantive.”
• It classifies the acquitted‑conduct amendment as substantively changing the law, not merely clarifying it, thus foreclosing retroactivity under Goines.

This classification will govern numerous appeals in the Fourth Circuit involving pre‑amendment sentences where defendants seek to benefit from the new acquitted‑conduct limitation. Relief will likely require either a retroactive Commission decision or another vehicle (e.g., compassionate release arguments under § 3582(c)(1)(A))—not direct appeal.

4. Supervised Release Conditions: Rogers Enforcement in Life‑Sentence Cases

The opinion sends a strong signal to district courts:

• Even in cases involving life imprisonment and serious violence, strict procedural compliance with Rogers is required.
• Written judgments cannot silently import non‑mandatory “standard” or “special” conditions; they must be orally imposed or incorporated by reference at sentencing.
• Failure to do so warrants vacatur of the entire sentence and resentencing, not a minor correction.

Practically, sentencing judges in the Fourth Circuit may:

• Be more explicit at hearings about adopting the Guidelines’ standard conditions by reference.
• Read or describe any special conditions on the record.
• Be more cautious about “boilerplate” conditions in written judgments that were not verbalized in court.

Defense counsel will have strong incentives to check written judgments carefully for unannounced conditions, knowing that such discrepancies are now a reliable ground for vacatur and remand.

5. Evidence Sufficiency in Gang and RICO Murders

The case reinforces several themes in the Fourth Circuit’s approach to gang‑related prosecutions:

• Circumstantial evidence – Testimony about pre‑crime planning, coordinated actions, and post‑crime admissions can suffice to prove participation in conspiracies and aiding‑and‑abetting homicide, even when no one witnesses the precise moment of killing.
• Enterprise‑motivated violence – Where victims are killed due to drug debts or cooperation with law enforcement, the nexus to a racketeering or drug enterprise is generally straightforward, supporting VICAR and § 848(e) convictions.
• Credibility disputes – The court continues to emphasize that inconsistencies in witness testimony almost never yield reversal on sufficiency grounds; those are for the jury to resolve.

This strengthens prosecutors’ hands in complex gang cases reliant on cooperating witnesses and circumstantial narratives, while reminding defense counsel that appellate sufficiency challenges will face a formidable standard.

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V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. The Speedy Trial Act vs. the Sixth Amendment

Both the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment deal with the timing of criminal trials, but they are different:

• Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161):
  • A statute passed by Congress.
  • Sets specific deadlines (usually 70 days) for beginning trial after indictment or first appearance.
  • Lists precise categories of “excludable” delay (e.g., certain motions, continuances, co‑defendant delays).
  • Remedy: dismissal of the indictment (with or without prejudice) if non‑excludable delay exceeds the limit and the defendant moves to dismiss.
• Sixth Amendment:
  • A constitutional right to a speedy trial, without fixed day counts.
  • Uses a four‑factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo (length of delay, reasons, assertion, prejudice).
  • Focuses on fairness and actual harm to the defendant and the defense.
  • Remedy: dismissal of charges, but courts are more reluctant to find a violation when the statutory Act has been satisfied.

2. “Ends of Justice” Continuances

Under § 3161(h)(7)(A), a judge can stop the Speedy Trial Act clock if:

• The judge finds that granting a continuance (delay) serves the “ends of justice” better than sticking rigidly to the 70‑day deadline; and
• Those reasons are put on the record, either in writing or orally, before or when ruling on the continuance/dismissal motion.

Factors include:

• Case complexity (many defendants, lots of evidence, complex charges).
• Need for more time so counsel can effectively prepare.
• Unusual circumstances (such as COVID‑19 lockdowns) making normal preparation impossible.

3. Co‑Defendant Exclusions

When multiple defendants are indicted together, the Speedy Trial Act recognizes that:

• It is often more efficient to try them together.
• Delays that are justified for one (e.g., more time to prepare) are generally justified for all, so long as they are reasonable.

Under § 3161(h)(6), a “reasonable period of delay” attributable to one co‑defendant is excluded from the speedy‑trial calculation of others, unless severance is granted.

4. Conspiracy vs. Aiding and Abetting

• Conspiracy:
  • An agreement between two or more people to commit a crime.
  • Requires:
    1. Agreement.
    2. Knowing and voluntary participation.
    3. At least one overt act to further the conspiracy (for some federal conspiracies, including § 1201 kidnapping conspiracy).
• Aiding and abetting:
  • No formal agreement is necessary.
  • A person is liable if he:
    1. Knows about the crime.
    2. Intends to help it succeed.
    3. Does something to assist the principal (not just being present).

In Yoo, conspiracy principles explained the kidnapping convictions; aiding‑and‑abetting doctrine explained Yoo’s and Peter’s liability for VICAR murder.

5. Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing

Historically, federal courts could:

• Consider conduct underlying charges of which the defendant was acquitted.
• Use that conduct to increase Guidelines ranges, as long as a judge found it proven by a “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not).

This practice was controversial because it seems at odds with a jury’s not‑guilty verdict. The Sentencing Commission’s recent amendment to § 1B1.3(c) instructs courts not to use acquitted conduct (with narrow exceptions). However:

• The amendment did not yet exist when Tony was sentenced.
• The Fourth Circuit now classifies the amendment as changing, not clarifying, the law, so it does not apply retroactively on direct appeal.

6. Rogers Errors and Supervised Release

A Rogers error occurs when:

• The judge at sentencing does not mention a particular (non‑mandatory) supervised release condition; but
• The written judgment later includes that condition.

Because a defendant has the right to be present and to hear his sentence, and because some conditions may be burdensome or even criminalize everyday conduct (travel, finances, drug testing, associations), the Fourth Circuit requires that:

• All such conditions either be spoken aloud in court; or
• Be explicitly incorporated by reference using clear language.

If that does not happen, the entire sentence must be vacated and the case resentenced.

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VI. Conclusion

United States v. Yoo is a comprehensive opinion that:

• Upholds convictions and sentences in a complex gang‑murder and drug‑trafficking case against a battery of procedural, evidentiary, speedy‑trial, and sentencing challenges.
• Clarifies several features of the Speedy Trial Act:
  • The pre‑motion temporal limit on dismissal motions.
  • How superseding indictments affect speedy‑trial clocks.
  • The breadth of “ends of justice” and co‑defendant exclusions in complex, pandemic‑era prosecutions.
• Reinforces the stringent standard for Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial violations when statutory requirements are satisfied.
• Determines that the Sentencing Commission’s new bar on acquitted conduct is substantive and non‑retroactive, preserving pre‑amendment sentences that relied on acquitted conduct.
• Vigorously enforces Rogers by vacating three life sentences due to discrepancies between oral and written supervised release conditions, underscoring the procedural importance of sentencing colloquies even in severe cases.

Taken together, the decision strengthens the doctrinal framework governing multi‑defendant federal prosecutions in the Fourth Circuit—particularly in the areas of speedy trial rights and sentencing procedure—while signaling that appellate courts will insist on precise observance of defendants’ rights to be present and to hear the full terms of their punishment.