United States v. Woods: The Eleventh Circuit Re-Affirms the “Keene Statement” Harmless-Error Rule and Clarifies Single-Conspiracy Analysis in Pandemic-Relief Fraud

Introduction

United States v. Shaquandra Woods, No. 24-11500 (11th Cir. May 14, 2025) is an unpublished but highly instructive decision that addresses three recurring questions in federal criminal practice:

When does evidence of multiple fraudulent transactions constitute one conspiracy rather than several?
How far may the government go in offering witness-threat evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)?
What happens on appeal if the district court arguably miscalculates the Sentencing Guidelines but expressly says it would impose the same sentence regardless?

In affirming Ms. Woods’ conviction and 75-month sentence for conspiring to defraud the Small Business Administration’s COVID-19 loan programs, the Eleventh Circuit re-affirmed the so-called “Keene statement” doctrine, under which Guidelines errors are harmless if the district court makes a clear alternative-sentence declaration and the ultimate sentence is substantively reasonable. The panel also offered a concise roadmap for distinguishing a single, rim-med “spoke-and-hub” conspiracy from multiple conspiracies—an issue that frequently surfaces in CARES Act fraud prosecutions.

Summary of the Judgment

After a four-day jury trial in the Southern District of Georgia, Woods—a practicing attorney—was convicted of conspiring to submit fraudulent Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) and Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) applications. She received a downward-variance sentence of 75 months (Guideline range 87–108 months). On appeal she raised three claims:

Material variance: the indictment alleged one conspiracy, but the evidence supposedly proved several.
Evidentiary error: the court admitted testimony that Woods threatened to “get rid of” a cooperating co-conspirator.
Guideline error: the court overstated loss, mis-applied a role enhancement, and employed the sophisticated-means increase.

The Eleventh Circuit (Rosenbaum, Lagoa, & Hull, JJ., per curiam) rejected each contention and affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1997) & United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2008) – supplied the three-factor test (common goal, nature of scheme, overlap of participants) for deciding single vs. multiple conspiracies.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) – discussed but distinguished; Kotteakos governs preserved errors, not plain-error review.
United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) – foundation for harmless-error analysis when a court pronounces it would impose the same sentence.
United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 1997) & United States v. Fey, 89 F.4th 903 (11th Cir. 2023) – allow admission of witness-threat evidence to show consciousness of guilt under Rule 404(b).
United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) – underscores that intent is automatically at issue once a defendant pleads not guilty, validating extrinsic-act evidence.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) – provides the overarching totality-of-circumstances test for substantive reasonableness.

Legal Reasoning

1. Variance / Single-Conspiracy Issue

Woods asserted that because each loan application involved distinct paperwork and participants, the proof depicted separate conspiracies. The Court disagreed:

Common Goal: silence SBA safeguards and channel pandemic money to conspirators.
Unified Scheme: Woods acted as the “key man,” directing all paperwork, coaching applicants, and fabricating documents through the same preparers.
Participant Overlap: familial and social ties linked every participant; the same accountant and tax preparer recycled forged bank statements and 1099s for multiple borrowers.

Consequently, no material variance existed. Even if there were, Woods could not show “substantial prejudice”—a prerequisite on plain-error review—because the indictment fully alerted her to the government’s theory.

2. Admission of Threat Evidence under Rule 404(b)

Rule 404(b) bars propensity evidence but permits proof of consciousness of guilt. Applying a three-part test (Edouard), the panel held:

Relevant to non-propensity purpose: Threatening a witness evidences knowledge of wrongdoing and intent to obstruct.
Sufficient proof: Cooperating witness Parker’s detailed firsthand account sufficed under the preponderance standard; corroboration is unnecessary (Dickerson).
Rule 403 balance: While inherently prejudicial, the probative weight on intent and knowledge outweighed any unfair prejudice—especially because Woods denied any fraudulent intent at trial.

3. Guidelines Computation and the “Keene Statement”

Woods targeted the 14-level loss bump, the 4-level organizer adjustment, and the sophisticated-means increase. Without deciding the merits, the panel found any error harmless because:

“This is the sentence I would give regardless of what the Guidelines say.”

This unequivocal declaration triggered Keene; thus appellate relief required proof that 75 months is substantively unreasonable even assuming a lower 46-57-month range. Because the district court painstakingly applied the § 3553(a) factors—particularly Woods’ “rampant perjury,” leadership role, and exploitation of pandemic programs—the sentence was upheld.

Impact of the Decision

Sentencing Appeals: The case deepens the Eleventh Circuit’s line of unpublished decisions confirming that a robust “Keene statement” insulates most Guidelines disputes from reversal. Counsel must therefore object and press for a clear not-withstanding-Guidelines statement to preserve meaningful appellate review.
COVID-relief Prosecutions: Prosecutors may charge widespread loan scams as one conspiracy when they can demonstrate a unifying mastermind, common paperwork pipeline, and overlapping actors. Defendants face an uphill battle in re-characterizing the same as “rimless wheel” conspiracies.
Evidentiary Strategy: The Court’s straightforward endorsement of threat evidence as “consciousness of guilt” encourages its continued use—provided the proponent can articulate a non-character rationale and survive Rule 403.
Practical Sentencing Consequences: District courts retain broad discretion to vary outside the advisory range, and appellants cannot depend on Guidelines technicalities if the sentencing judge indicates the same outcome independently of the range.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Material Variance: A mismatch between what the indictment alleges and what trial proof shows. It is reversible only if (1) the mismatch is significant and (2) it prejudices the defendant’s ability to defend.
Hub-and-Spoke v. Rimmed Wheel Conspiracy: In a “rimless” wheel, each spoke (participant) interacts only with the hub, not with other spokes—creating multiple conspiracies. When the spokes know of each other’s roles and pursue the same goal, the wheel has a “rim” and becomes a single conspiracy.
Rule 404(b): Allows evidence of “other acts” for purposes like intent, knowledge, or motive—but bans it solely to show bad character. Threats to witnesses typically show consciousness of guilt, a legitimate purpose.
Keene Statement: A clear statement by the sentencing judge that even if the Guidelines are wrong, the same sentence would be imposed. On appeal, any Guidelines error becomes harmless unless the ultimate sentence is substantively unreasonable.
Substantive Reasonableness: Asks whether the length of the sentence is defensible under the statutory factors. Appellate courts give “considerable deference” to district courts and will disturb a sentence only if it “defies logic” or is “shockingly high.”

Conclusion

Although unpublished, United States v. Woods offers three enduring lessons. First, pandemic-fraud schemes featuring a unifying mastermind and standardized paperwork will likely be treated as single conspiracies, minimizing variance challenges. Second, witness-threat evidence remains potent—so long as prosecutors frame it as consciousness of guilt and courts conscientiously apply Rule 403. Third, the Eleventh Circuit’s “Keene statement” doctrine continues to render most Guidelines-calculation errors harmless, underscoring the strategic premium on ensuring that district courts articulate how integral any disputed enhancement is to the final sentence. Together, these points refine the tactical landscape for both prosecutors and defense counsel in the wave of CARES Act prosecutions now working their way through the federal system.