United States v. Wilson: Reaffirming the “Strong Inference of Trustworthiness” Standard under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Clarifying Evidentiary Sufficiency for “Use-of-Fire” Obstruction Offenses

Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Wilson, No. 23-6307-cr (2d Cir. June 17, 2025) resolves an array of post-trial challenges brought by Deandre Wilson following his conviction on narcotics, murder-in-aid-of-racketeering, obstruction-of-justice, and arson-related counts. Although issued as a non-precedential summary order, the decision delivers a highly instructive exposition of two recurring trial concerns:

• When out-of-court statements “against penal interest” may be admitted under Rule 804(b)(3), and
• What quantum of proof suffices to sustain jury findings on (a) obstruction counts predicated on the use of fire, and (b) threshold drug quantities in narcotics conspiracies.

The appellant contended that the district court (Chief Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford, W.D.N.Y.) erred in excluding grand-jury testimony of a key unavailable witness, and that the trial evidence was insufficient on several substantive counts. The Court of Appeals (Judges Kearse, Jacobs, and Lohier) unanimously rejected all arguments and affirmed the conviction.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Exclusion of Richard Brady’s Grand-Jury Testimony. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the unavailable witness’s statements because they lacked the “corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate trustworthiness” demanded by Rule 804(b)(3)(B). The order stresses that the corroboration must create a strong inference of reliability, echoing language from United States v. Salvador, 820 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1987).

2. Sufficiency of Evidence — Obstruction & Arson Counts. The panel found the Government’s proof “overwhelming.” Testimony and forensic evidence placed Wilson at two separate burn sites, directly tending to fires intended to destroy human remains and physical evidence, satisfying 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(h), 1512(c)(1), and 1512(k).

3. Sufficiency of Evidence — Drug-Quantity Element. Drawing on United States v. Pauling, 924 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2019), the Court upheld the jury’s five-kilogram cocaine finding, emphasizing that foreseeable quantities attributable to conspirators count toward § 841(b)(1)(A)’s threshold.

4. Disposition. All remaining issues were deemed meritless; the judgment of conviction was affirmed in full.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. DiMassa, 117 F.4th 477 (2d Cir. 2024) — restates the deferential “manifestly erroneous” standard for evidentiary rulings, framing the Court’s review of the Rule 804(b)(3) issue.
• United States v. Ojudun, 915 F.3d 875 (2d Cir. 2019) — supplies modern restatement of 804(b)(3)’s two-prong test.
• United States v. Salvador, 820 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1987) — quoted for the proposition that corroboration must produce “strong, not merely allowable,” inferences of trustworthiness.
• Wade v. Mantello, 333 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003) & Scrimo v. Lee, 935 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2019) — articulate the constitutional limits on evidentiary restrictions vis-à-vis the right to present a defense.
• United States v. Khalupsky, 5 F.4th 279 (2d Cir. 2021) & United States v. Santos, 541 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2008) — frame the basic conspiracy-liability doctrine applied to the obstruction and arson counts.
• United States v. Pauling, 924 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2019) — governs the attribution of drug quantities within a conspiracy and became the backbone of the Court’s affirmance on the narcotics count.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 804(b)(3) Exclusion
   • The district court found — and the Second Circuit agreed — that Brady’s statements were riddled with factual inaccuracies (wrong murder location, nonexistent rape, unsupported text messages).
   • Brady’s motive to curry favor for personal sentencing credit undermined reliability.
   • Absent “strong” corroboration, admission would contradict Rule 804(b)(3)’s purpose of admitting only inherently trustworthy statements.
   • Therefore, exclusion was not arbitrary or disproportionate under Scrimo; constitutional defense rights remain intact.
2. Sufficiency on Obstruction/Arson Counts
   • Evidence placed Wilson personally at both fire scenes—this satisfies the use of fire to commit a felony element under § 844(h).
   • His statements about eliminating a potential witness evidenced specific obstructive intent required by § 1512(c)(1).
   • Conspiracy liability arose from coordination with co-defendants Cobb and Reed (see Khalupsky).
3. Sufficiency on Drug Quantity
   • Under Pauling, Wilson is responsible for foreseeable drug amounts, even if not present at every purchase.
   • Testimony showed repeated three-kilogram buys plus Wilson’s broker role; two purchases alone approach or exceed five kilograms.
   • The Court viewed reasonable inferences in the Government’s favor (standard from Tran, 519 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2008)).

C. Potential Impact of the Judgment

• Re-emphasis on Trustworthiness Threshold. Practitioners should note the Court’s reliance on pre-2000 precedent (Salvador) to underscore that corroboration must do more than “permit” reliability; it must compel it. The clarification discourages tactical use of dubious penal-interest statements, especially in criminal defense scenarios.
• Guidance on § 844(h) “Use of Fire” Theories. The decision illustrates what factual record will qualify as “use of fire to commit a felony” and “conspiracy to use fire,” reinforcing that presence and active assistance at a burn site suffice.
• Drug-Quantity Attribution in Conspiracies. By applying Pauling to multi-kilogram cocaine transactions, the Court signals that foreseeability can quickly trigger § 841(b)(1)(A) penalties even for lower-tier conspirators.
• Non-Precedential Yet Persuasive. Although Local Rule 32.1.1 renders the order non-precedential, district courts (and counsel) within the Second Circuit often look to such orders for practical guidance, particularly where published authority is sparse.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary Order. A decision issued without full opinion; not binding precedent but citable under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
• Rule 804(b)(3). An exception to the hearsay rule allowing admission of an unavailable declarant’s statement that (a) was against his/her penal interest when made and (b) is corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating reliability.
• “Use of Fire to Commit a Felony” (§ 844(h)). A standalone federal offense triggered when a defendant employs fire or explosives while committing certain felonies, including obstruction of justice.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence. Appellate review asks whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.
• Drug-Quantity Element (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)). For conspiracies, the threshold amount can be met by quantities foreseeable to, though not personally handled by, the defendant.

Conclusion

United States v. Wilson reinforces two bedrock evidentiary and substantive principles in federal criminal practice. First, the Court forcefully re-affirms that out-of-court statements against penal interest are admissible only when buttressed by strong, clear corroboration, thereby safeguarding juries from untrustworthy hearsay. Second, it clarifies that active participation in destruction of evidence through fire, coupled with conspiratorial coordination, readily satisfies the elements of obstruction-of-justice and arson crimes, and that foreseeable drug quantities within a conspiracy remain attributable to each member. While technically non-precedential, the order offers persuasive guidance that litigants in the Second Circuit — and beyond — would be wise to heed when navigating Rule 804(b)(3) proffers, § 844(h) charges, and drug-quantity proofs.