United States v. White: The Sixth Circuit’s No-Remand Clarification and the Burden of Proving Non-Dangerousness in § 922(g)(1) Challenges

Introduction

United States v. Marlon Darrell White, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on 23 July 2025, is the court’s first published application of United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024). The case centers on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon-in-possession statute. Marlon White, with multiple prior felonies, was indicted after Kalamazoo officers recovered a stolen, loaded handgun (linked to a prior shooting) and ammunition from his car and person. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The district court denied the motion, and White entered a conditional guilty plea preserving appellate review.

On appeal, White contended that the district court did not have the benefit of Williams, which announced that felons are “people” within the Second Amendment but may nonetheless be disarmed if they are “dangerous.” He therefore sought a remand to make an individualized showing of non-dangerousness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that:

• Even under Williams, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to White because the record demonstrates his dangerousness.
• A defendant already had a “reasonable opportunity” to show non-dangerousness by raising an as-applied challenge; therefore, remand is unnecessary when the existing record suffices.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Boggs, McKeague, and Mathis, JJ.) unanimously affirmed. Judge McKeague’s opinion:

1. Reaffirmed that felon-in-possession laws remain “presumptively lawful” post-Heller, McDonald, Bruen, and Rahimi.
2. Applied Williams’ two-step framework:
   • Felons are protected by the Second Amendment, but
   • The government may disarm persons who are dangerous, and the burden is on the defendant to prove he is not.
3. Found the existing record—White’s repeated firearm offenses, drug involvement, probation violations, and the linkage of his stolen gun to a prior shooting—amply establishes dangerousness.
4. Adopted a procedural principle (what this commentary calls the “no-remand clarification”): if the record already demonstrates dangerousness, appellate courts need not remand for an evidentiary hearing even when the district court analyzed the case pre-Williams.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) & McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
  Recognized an individual Second Amendment right while labeling felon-possession bans “presumptively lawful.” The Sixth Circuit began from this presumption.
• N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
  Introduced the “text-as-informed-by-history” test for firearm regulation. Though Bruen did not directly address felons, its historical inquiry necessitated re-examination of § 922(g)(1).
• United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
  Confirmed that regulations may be upheld if “relevantly similar” to historical analogues, easing lower courts’ fear of requiring “historical twins.”
• United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024)
  Core Sixth-Circuit precedent establishing:
  • Felons are covered by the Second Amendment.
  • § 922(g)(1) survives if the individual is dangerous.
  • Defendant bears the burden of proving non-dangerousness.
  White argued that Williams entitled him to remand; the court, however, interpreted Williams to allow immediate affirmance when the record is clear.
• Post-Williams Sixth Circuit unpublished opinions (Fordham, Henson, Poe, etc.)
  These cases, cited for support, had already declined remand in similar circumstances, foreshadowing the rule crystallised here.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step One – Constitutional Text The court accepted, per Williams, that White—though a felon—is part of “the people.”
2. Step Two – Historical Tradition History allows disarming the “dangerous.” The court equated repeated illicit gun possession, drug activity, stolen weapons, and probation violations with dangerousness.
3. Burdens of Proof The defendant must produce evidence of non-dangerousness; silence or mere argument is insufficient. White offered no contrary evidence.
4. No-Remand Clarification Because White had already raised an as-applied challenge and the record was fully developed via the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) to which he did not object, remand would waste judicial resources. This creates a procedural refinement: appellate courts may dispense with remand when (i) the defendant had a chance to build a record, and (ii) that record conclusively shows dangerousness.

C. Impact of the Judgment

1. Procedural Impact
White sets a pragmatic benchmark: district courts need not revisit pre-Williams denials if the extant record satisfies the dangerousness inquiry. Appellate panels can affirm summarily, avoiding redundant hearings.

2. Substantive Impact
The opinion further entrenches the “dangerousness” screen in the Sixth Circuit, making it difficult for most felons to succeed in as-applied Second-Amendment challenges unless they present affirmative, compelling evidence of reform and a non-violent history.

3. Strategic Implications for Defense Counsel
Defense attorneys now know they must:

• Object to the PSR if it contains damaging facts.
• Present affirmative evidence (e.g., expert risk assessments, rehabilitation records, community testimony) at the district-court stage.
• Develop a robust record early, as appeals courts will not grant a remand merely because Williams post-dated the district-court ruling.

4. Broader Jurisprudential Significance
While limited to the Sixth Circuit, White’s reasoning may persuade other circuits grappling with Bruen-era as-applied challenges. The decision signals a tightening of practical avenues for felons seeking firearm rights restoration via litigation rather than statutory relief.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• As-Applied vs. Facial Challenge A facial challenge attacks a statute in all circumstances; an as-applied challenge argues the statute is unconstitutional for this particular person under these facts. White pursued the latter.
• “Presumptively Lawful” Coined in Heller, it means a regulation is assumed valid unless a challenger shows otherwise. Williams maintained this presumption for § 922(g)(1).
• Historical Tradition Test After Bruen, courts ask: does the modern regulation resemble historical regulations accepted at the founding? An exact match isn’t needed—only a “relevantly similar” analogue (Rahimi).
• Dangerousness Standard The Sixth Circuit equates “dangerousness” with conduct suggesting a propensity for violence or risk to public safety—repeated gun offenses, drug trafficking, violent acts, or behavior creating a likelihood of confrontation.
• Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (Michigan) A state diversionary program that allows youthful offenders to avoid a criminal conviction upon successful probation. White violated this probation, reinforcing the court’s dangerousness finding.
• Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) A document prepared by probation officers detailing a defendant’s background. If unchallenged, its factual assertions are deemed admitted and can be used on appeal.

Conclusion

United States v. White cements two critical propositions in the post-Williams Second-Amendment landscape of the Sixth Circuit:

1. The burden squarely rests on felon-defendants to prove they are not dangerous when challenging § 922(g)(1) as applied to them.
2. Appellate courts may affirm without remand if the existing record already establishes dangerousness, even where the district court ruled before Williams.

By tightening procedural expectations and reiterating the substantive “dangerousness” bar, the decision narrows the path for felons seeking constitutional relief from firearm disabilities. It also clarifies litigation strategy: to prevail, defendants must build an affirmative, well-documented record of rehabilitation and minimal risk at the earliest stage, or risk foreclosing relief on appeal.