United States v. White: Sixth Circuit Re-Affirms the “Higher Bar” for Franks-Based Omissions and Clarifies Use of Third-Party Prior Convictions to Establish Knowledge in Money-Laundering Cases

Introduction

United States v. Teeauna White & Robin Herndon (6th Cir. July 30, 2025) stems from a sprawling narcotics and money-laundering investigation into the “Money Gang Meal Clique,” a coast-to-coast cocaine and heroin enterprise led by Maurice McCoy. White, McCoy’s partner, and Herndon, his cousin, were convicted by a jury of a single count of conspiracy to launder money (18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)). Each appealed on separate grounds:

White challenged (i) two search warrants, (ii) several evidentiary and expert-disclosure rulings, (iii) alleged prosecutorial misconduct for eliciting “false” testimony, and (iv) the trial judge’s impartiality.
Herndon claimed the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly joined the conspiracy.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board, issuing an opinion that, while designated “Not Recommended for Publication,” nevertheless provides fresh guidance on several doctrinal fronts—most notably:

Re-emphasising the “higher bar” defendants must clear when demanding a Franks hearing based on omissions rather than misstatements.
Approving the admission of a non-defendant’s prior conviction under Rule 404(b) for the limited purpose of proving a defendant’s knowledge of criminal proceeds.
Confirming that a law-enforcement expert’s “common characteristics” testimony satisfied former Rule 16(a)(1)(G) disclosure duties.
Re-affirming standards for due-process claims premised on allegedly false testimony and judicial bias.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court (McKeague, J., joined by Boggs & Mathis) rejected every argument. Key holdings include:

Search Warrants: Both warrants were supported by probable cause; information was not stale; omissions of “legitimate business” facts were immaterial; therefore no Franks hearing was warranted.
Rule 404(b): Evidence of McCoy’s earlier drug conviction was properly admitted to show White’s knowledge/deliberate ignorance; limiting instructions cured any prejudice.
Expert Testimony: DEA Agent Fitch’s cellphone-usage opinions were within the government’s pre-trial disclosure; even arguendo deficiencies, no prejudice because testimony was cumulative.
Prosecutorial Misconduct / False Testimony: Cooperating witness Hayward’s statements were not “indisputably false”; hence no Napue violation.
Judicial Bias: The trial judge’s critical remarks were routine courtroom management; no plain-error or § 455(a) violation.
Sufficiency (Herndon): Circumstantial evidence—including Herndon’s own admission, structured deposits, and “don’t want to know” comment—permitted a rational jury to convict.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): Established the right to challenge warrant affidavits containing intentional/reckless falsehoods. The panel reiterates post-Davis & Fowler line that omissions trigger an even steeper threshold for hearings.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): “Totality-of-the-circumstances” probable-cause test; repeatedly quoted.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994): Sets the “deep-seated antagonism” standard under § 455(a); relied on to dismiss bias allegations.
Sixth-Circuit staleness quadripartite test—Abboud, Hills, Rogers—used to uphold the residence warrant.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959): Due-process rule barring convictions founded on knowingly false evidence; applied yet found inapposite.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979): Governs sufficiency review; key to rejecting Herndon’s appeal.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Franks Hearings & Material Omissions

White framed the affidavits as “misleading” because they failed to mention her “legitimate” music and clothing ventures. The Court underscored that:

Omissions are inherently less suspect than affirmative misstatements (Atkin).
Defendants face a “higher bar” (Fowler)—they must show the omitted facts were necessary to probable cause and withheld with reckless disregard.
Even assuming inclusion, the suspicious pattern of sub-$10,000 deposits still established probable cause; omission thus immaterial.

2. Staleness Doctrine

Applying the four-factor test, the panel deemed information about cash and luxury items “enduring,” the conspiracy “continuous,” the residence an “operational base,” and the defendants “entrenched”—nullifying White’s staleness claim.

3. Rule 404(b) Use of Third-Party Convictions

The novelty here lies in admitting another person’s conviction (McCoy’s) to show White’s mental state. The Court approved because:

Purpose was knowledge/deliberate-ignorance, not propensity.
Limiting instruction sufficed; prejudice minimal compared to other proof of McCoy’s leadership.
Rule 403 balancing strongly favored admission.

4. Expert-Witness Disclosure

Under the pre-2022 Rule 16, the government’s disclosure listed “multiple phones,” “burners,” and “code words.” Agent Fitch testified to short calls, small contact lists, and frequent phone changes—held to be within the “complete statement” requirement, especially given cumulative corroboration from earlier witnesses.

5. Due-Process & Witness Truthfulness

Hayward’s statement that he faced no further criminal jeopardy, while technically omitting potential contempt exposure, was not materially or indisputably false; the prosecutor had no duty to correct.

6. Judicial Conduct

Applying Liteky, the panel branded the judge’s sporadic impatience “ordinary efforts at courtroom administration,” noting most comments occurred outside the jury’s presence and were precipitated by counsel’s interruptions.

7. Sufficiency of Evidence Against Herndon

The Court highlighted:

Structured deposits (<$10k) and inter-account transfers prima facie hallmarks of concealment.
Herndon’s own statements (“did not want to know where the money was from”) evidenced deliberate ignorance.
Joint travel with couriers and false statements to investigators corroborated participation.

C. Impact of the Judgment

Franks Jurisprudence: The opinion buttresses Sixth-Circuit precedent making omissions-based challenges exceptionally difficult, especially where independent indicia of wrongdoing exist.
Rule 404(b) Scope: Courts may more readily admit a confederate’s prior conviction to establish a defendant’s knowledge, provided limiting instructions and non-propensity rationale are clear.
Expert Disclosures: Reinforces that categorical, bullet-point disclosures of “common practices” can satisfy Rule 16 where testimony is within those categories and cumulative.
Courtroom Management: Affirms broad leeway for judges in admonishing counsel without risking § 455 or due-process violations.
Money-Laundering Proof: Reiterates that circumstantial evidence (structured deposits, luxury purchases, “wilful blindness”) is sufficient to meet § 1956 scienter in complex financial schemes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Franks Hearing: A mini-trial on whether a warrant affidavit contained intentional/reckless falsehoods or omissions; if granted and the tainted material is “set aside,” probable cause must still exist.
Staleness: Evidence is “stale” if too old to believe it still exists; long-running conspiracies & durable items (cash, documents, luxury goods) stay fresh longer.
Rule 404(b): Bars evidence of “other acts” to prove bad character, but allows such evidence for limited purposes (knowledge, intent, absence of mistake, etc.).
Deliberate Ignorance: Also called “wilful blindness”; a defendant can’t escape liability by intentionally avoiding knowledge of the illegal source of funds.
Structured Deposits: Breaking up cash deposits to stay below $10,000 triggers suspicion because banks avoid filing Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs).
Hard-Money Loan: High-interest, short-term financing often used when borrowers lack conventional credit; can be exploited to launder cash.

Conclusion

Although unpublished, United States v. White is a rich primer on modern money-laundering litigation. The Sixth Circuit’s meticulous opinion reinforces:

The stringent threshold for Franks hearings premised on omissions;
The permissibility—under careful Rule 403/404(b) balancing—of using a confederate’s prior conviction to prove knowledge;
The adequacy of concise expert-witness disclosures when testimony stays within disclosed “common-practice” themes;
The deference appellate courts afford trial judges in managing courtroom decorum;
And the continued potency of circumstantial financial evidence in securing money-laundering convictions.

Future litigants in the Sixth Circuit (and beyond) should heed these clarifications when crafting suppression motions, evidentiary objections, or sufficiency challenges in complex financial-crime prosecutions.