United States v. Sockey: Tenth Circuit Adopts the “Words Alone” Limitation on Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111–1112

Introduction

In United States v. Sockey (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a first-degree murder conviction arising from a fatal stabbing during a night of drinking and taunting in a shared home in Tahlequah, Oklahoma. The defendant, a member of the Choctaw Nation, admitted the killing but argued he acted in the heat of passion, seeking mitigation to voluntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). The district court, over the government’s objection, instructed on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and, over the defense’s objection, also instructed the jury that “words alone” cannot negate malice aforethought and create heat of passion.

On appeal, the central issue was whether the “words alone” instruction was a legally correct statement of federal law and whether its use improperly skewed the jury’s deliberations. In a published opinion authored by Judge Kelly, the court held that the instruction accurately stated the governing law, was properly given, and did not unfairly endorse the government’s position. The decision aligns the Tenth Circuit with other circuits and the Supreme Court’s longstanding recognition that mere verbal insults—even aggravating or abusive—do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. Applying its standard approach to jury instructions—reviewing legal accuracy de novo and the decision to give an instruction for abuse of discretion—the court concluded:

The “words alone” instruction correctly states federal law under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111–1112, which incorporate common-law concepts of murder, manslaughter, and heat of passion.
The instruction limited only the basis for adequate provocation (the objective component), not the jury’s ability to consider words as part of the defendant’s subjective state or any other evidentiary purpose (e.g., the defendant’s 9-1-1 statements).
The instruction did not “endorse” the prosecution’s case; the government’s reliance on the instruction in closing argument does not render a correct instruction improper.
Although the court acknowledged academic and judicial recognition that words imparting highly provocative factual information may, in some cases, suffice, the case involved mere name-calling, and the defense did not request a more nuanced instruction.

The court therefore held that the instruction was supported by precedent, appropriately configured, and not prejudicial in effect. The judgment was affirmed.

Background

The defendant, Isaac Newman Sockey, lived with relatives, including the decedent, Thurdis Tubby. The household had a history of teasing and name-calling. On the night in question, after drinking and “trash talking,” several housemates teased Mr. Sockey, calling him “chicken legs” and a “crybaby,” including translating the insult into Choctaw. After going to his room, Mr. Sockey re-emerged with a knife, confronted Mr. Tubby, and during the ensuing struggle stabbed him multiple times, causing death. Mr. Sockey called 9-1-1, admitted the stabbing, said he was sorry, and attributed his actions to Mr. Tubby “talking shit.”

At trial, Mr. Sockey did not dispute the killing but defended on heat of passion, seeking mitigation from murder (18 U.S.C. § 1111) to voluntary manslaughter (18 U.S.C. § 1112). The district court gave a manslaughter instruction and also instructed that “words alone” cannot negate malice aforethought and create heat of passion. The jury convicted of first-degree murder, and the court imposed life imprisonment. On appeal, Mr. Sockey challenged the “words alone” instruction as both legally incorrect and unfairly prejudicial.

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Supreme Court and Foundational Authority

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896): The Supreme Court approved an instruction that “mere words alone” are not sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter, characterizing this as a “well settled” principle. The Tenth Circuit leaned on Allen as directly supportive of the district court’s instruction and as evidence that the “mere words” limitation is deeply rooted in federal manslaughter doctrine.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952): Recognizes that when Congress borrows terms of art (e.g., “malice aforethought” and “heat of passion”) from the common law, courts presume Congress adopts the “cluster of ideas” attached to them. This supports looking to common-law understandings to flesh out § 1112(a).
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985): While emphasizing statutory text as the starting point, Liparota does not bar resort to common-law definitions for terms of art—thus harmonizing with Morissette and supporting the court’s approach.

2. Tenth Circuit Authorities

United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005): Confirms that §§ 1111 and 1112 adopt common-law concepts and articulates the heat-of-passion definition used in federal prosecutions: a passion of fear or rage causing loss of self-control in circumstances that would provoke such a passion in an ordinary person, but which do not justify deadly force. The court used Serawop to anchor the doctrinal framework.
United States v. Currie, 911 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2018): Clarifies that heat of passion has both a subjective and an objective component (the defendant must actually be provoked, and the provocation must be adequate for a reasonable person). Sockey applies this bifurcation to explain the limited function of the “words alone” instruction—it addresses only the objective prong.
United States v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1987): Upholds the refusal to give a manslaughter instruction where provocation consisted of derogatory statements and even threats, signaling that verbal provocation typically is inadequate. Sockey cites Scafe as consistent with the “mere words” limitation.
Instructional Standards: United States v. Woodmore, 127 F.4th 193 (10th Cir. 2025); United States v. Freeman, 70 F.4th 1265 (10th Cir. 2023); United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2000); Jensen v. W. Jordan City, 968 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Benvie, 18 F.4th 665 (10th Cir. 2021). These cases supply the standards for reviewing instructions (de novo for accuracy; abuse of discretion for giving/refusing; harmless error applies), and emphasize that instructions need not be perfect but must fairly guide the jury.
Tenth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions: The court notes that pattern instructions carry no “adjudicative approval” and their silence on an instruction does not imply disapproval. This undercuts the defense’s reliance on the absence of a pattern “words alone” instruction.

3. Sister Circuit Authority

United States v. Slager, 912 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2019): Confirms that “mere words” are generally inadequate provocation.
United States v. Burns, No. 18-10083, 2023 WL 7876414 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2023) (cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1081 (2024)): Reiterates that words alone are usually insufficient and that insults do not suffice to arouse a reasonable person to kill.
United States v. Velazquez, 246 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2001): States the prevailing view that words can generate heat of passion only if they impart highly provocative factual information.
United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972): Both recognize the inadequacy of “mere words” to reduce murder to manslaughter.

Collectively, these authorities show a strong cross-circuit consensus and anchor the Tenth Circuit’s adoption of the “words alone” limitation within established federal doctrine.

Legal Reasoning

1. Incorporation of Common-Law Concepts into Federal Manslaughter

The court began with the text of § 1112(a), which does not define “heat of passion,” and looked to the common law (via Serawop and Morissette) to supply meaning. Because §§ 1111 and 1112 borrow traditional common-law frameworks for murder and manslaughter, the court could rely on the century-old principle from Allen that “mere words” do not constitute adequate provocation.

2. Clarifying the Objective vs. Subjective Components

The “words alone” instruction does not preclude a jury from considering the defendant’s words or statements as evidence of his subjective state of mind (e.g., whether he was actually enraged). Rather, it instructs that the objective adequacy of provocation cannot be satisfied by words alone, however insulting. In other words, a heat-of-passion defense fails if the only claimed provocation is verbal taunting.

3. Addressing Defense Mischaracterizations and Prejudice Arguments

Scope of the instruction: The court rejected the defense’s claim that the instruction precluded consideration of words entirely or foreclosed consideration of the defendant’s 9-1-1 call. The instruction merely limits the legal sufficiency of words as objective provocation.
Endorsement concerns: The court found no improper “endorsement” of the government’s argument because the instruction accurately stated the law; the fact that the prosecution highlighted a correct instruction in closing is not grounds for reversal.

4. Recognizing—but Not Deciding—Nuances

The court acknowledged modern discussions (e.g., LaFave) that words imparting highly provocative factual information (for example, sudden disclosure of spousal infidelity) may suffice. But the case presented only name-calling, and the defense neither requested a more nuanced instruction nor pointed to words conveying an actual fact or injury. The panel therefore did not adopt or elaborate on an “informational words” exception; it simply recognized the concept as a contemporary discussion without application here.

5. Standards of Review and Harmlessness

The court applied its usual framework: de novo to test legal accuracy, abuse of discretion to assess whether the instruction should be given, and harmless error to gauge whether any error affected substantial rights. Given the alignment with Allen and sister circuits, and given the case’s facts, the court found no error to assess for harmlessness.

Impact and Implications

1. Doctrinal Clarification in the Tenth Circuit

Sockey effectively adopts in the Tenth Circuit the “words alone” rule as a matter of federal law under §§ 1111–1112: verbal insults—even severe or repeated—do not, standing alone, constitute adequate provocation to negate malice aforethought. This brings the Tenth Circuit into clear alignment with Allen and the majority view across circuits.

2. Trial Practice: Jury Instructions and Strategy

Availability of the instruction: District courts within the Tenth Circuit now have clear authorization to give a “words alone” instruction in federal murder/manslaughter trials when the facts warrant. Counsel should anticipate and litigate its scope.
Defense strategy: Where a heat-of-passion theory is pursued, defense counsel should develop evidence of non-verbal provocation (e.g., physical aggression) or, if relying on words, be prepared to request a nuanced instruction where words communicated a highly provocative factual revelation. Failure to request nuance may forfeit it.
Pattern instructions: The opinion reminds practitioners that the absence of an instruction from the Tenth Circuit pattern set does not preclude its use; patterns are not binding and carry no adjudicative imprimatur.

3. Indian Country Prosecutions

Because murders in Indian country involving Native defendants fall under federal jurisdiction via the Major Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1153; see also § 1151), the decision has particular salience in Indian country prosecutions in the Tenth Circuit. Where interpersonal disputes escalate after verbal taunting, defendants should expect courts to instruct that such taunts alone cannot satisfy adequate provocation.

4. Future Litigation and Open Questions

Informational words exception: The court acknowledged but did not adopt or delineate an exception for words conveying highly provocative factual information. Future cases may present that issue directly, and parties should brief whether, when, and how to instruct on such scenarios.
Cumulative verbal abuse and “last straw” theories: Sockey signals that cumulative insults, without more, remain insufficient as a matter of law to meet the objective prong of provocation.
Rule of lenity: The defense raised this only in reply on appeal, and it was deemed waived. Whether lenity meaningfully interacts with heat-of-passion elements is unlikely, given the longstanding common-law incorporation and clear Supreme Court guidance in Allen.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Malice aforethought: The mental state required for murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111. In federal law, heat of passion operates as a mitigating factor that negates malice aforethought, potentially reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter.
Voluntary manslaughter (18 U.S.C. § 1112(a)): An unlawful killing “without malice,” including killings “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”
Heat of passion’s two parts: Subjective (the defendant actually acted under an overpowering passion like fear or rage) and objective (the provocation would cause an ordinary person to lose normal self-control). The “words alone” rule addresses the objective adequacy of provocation.
“Words alone” rule: Mere insults or abusive language, without more, cannot constitute adequate provocation. Some authorities recognize a nuanced possibility when words communicate highly provocative facts (e.g., sudden disclosure of a serious betrayal), but Sockey does not adopt such an exception.
Lesser-included offense instruction: An instruction that allows the jury to convict of a less serious offense included within the charged offense (here, voluntary manslaughter within murder). The court gave such an instruction and also clarified the limits of provocation via the “words alone” instruction.
Pattern jury instructions: Suggested model instructions used as drafting guides; they are not binding and do not carry judicial approval. Courts may craft instructions that are not in the pattern set if they accurately state the law.
Standards of review for instructions: Appellate courts review whether instructions accurately state the law de novo; decisions to give/refuse particular instructions for abuse of discretion; and apply harmless-error analysis to non-structural instructional errors.
Indian Country jurisdiction: Under §§ 1151 and 1153, certain crimes by Indians in Indian country are prosecuted in federal court, so federal definitions of murder and manslaughter and related instructions govern.

Conclusion

United States v. Sockey is a significant and clarifying decision in the Tenth Circuit’s federal homicide jurisprudence. It adopts and articulates the long-recognized rule that “mere words,” regardless of how insulting or abusive, cannot provide adequate provocation to negate malice aforethought and reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111–1112. The opinion harmonizes Tenth Circuit law with Allen and the prevailing approach in other circuits, grounds the doctrine in the common-law matrix incorporated by federal statutes, and carefully delineates the instruction’s function within the objective prong of heat-of-passion analysis.

For practitioners, Sockey underscores the importance of (1) distinguishing between subjective passion and objective adequacy of provocation; (2) recognizing that verbal taunts alone will not suffice; and (3) requesting appropriate nuanced instructions only where the record supports words conveying highly provocative factual information. The decision will influence charging, instruction, and trial strategy in federal murder cases across the Tenth Circuit—particularly in Indian country prosecutions—by narrowing the viability of heat-of-passion mitigation when the precipitating trigger is solely verbal insult.