United States v. Russell & Williams: The Seventh Circuit Demands Precision in “Third-Party-Risk” Supervised-Release Conditions and Clarifies Competency-to-Stand-Trial Assessments

Introduction

On 11 June 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a consolidated opinion in United States v. Terrance Williams (Nos. 24-1652 & 24-1685), affirming Falandis Russell’s conviction and 180-month sentence but vacating a challenged supervised-release condition imposed on co-defendant Terrance Williams. The decision is doctrinally significant for two reasons:

It forcefully reiterates that a district court’s competency finding survives appellate scrutiny when grounded in a comparative evaluation of expert testimony, collateral records, and behavioral evidence—especially where malingering is documented.
It establishes a clearer, more rigid requirement that “third-party risk notification” conditions on supervised release must be narrowly drafted, sufficiently definite, and judicially determined rather than delegated wholesale to probation officers.

The ruling thus shapes future federal sentencing, competency litigation, and the drafting of community-supervision conditions within the Seventh Circuit, while also offering persuasive authority nationally.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit (Lee, J.) issued three principal holdings:

Competency Affirmed. The district court did not clearly err in finding Russell competent to stand trial after hearing three experts and reviewing voluminous records. The appellate court emphasized the deference owed to credibility determinations and the sufficiency of evidence indicating Russell’s malingering rather than genuine cognitive incapacity.
Sentence Upheld. Russell’s 180-month, above-Guidelines sentence was procedurally sound. The court expressly considered mitigating evidence of intellectual disability and adequately explained the § 3553(a) factors driving the upward variance.
Supervised-Release Condition Vacated. A condition requiring Williams—at his probation officer’s discretion—to notify any person of “the risk he poses” was deemed impermissibly vague. The panel remanded for the district court to reassess the necessity and scope of the condition, referencing United States v. Kappes and United States v. Bickart.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) – The foundational test for competency: a defendant must have (1) a rational as well as factual understanding of proceedings and (2) the ability to consult with counsel.
United States v. Wessel, 2 F.4th 1043 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Nichols, 77 F.4th 490 (7th Cir. 2023) – Reaffirmed “clear error” review of competency findings and the two-prong Dusky standard.
Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2011) – Mental illness alone does not equal incompetence; used here to counter Russell’s “intellectual disability” argument.
United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2016) – Found certain open-ended third-party notification conditions vague; provided controlling authority for vacating Williams’s condition.
Sentencing cases (Tounisi, Garcia-Oliveros, Jerry) – Instructed on procedural-reasonableness review and the need to address principal mitigation arguments.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Competency Determination

The panel meticulously applied the “clearly erroneous” standard, underscoring that appellate courts must accept a district court’s fact-based competency finding unless a definite and firm conviction of error exists. Key steps in the reasoning:

Weighting Conflicting Expert Testimony. Three experts disagreed. The district judge discounted Dr. Jajko’s opinion as under-informed (lack of Social Security review, inadequate malingering analysis) and favored Drs. Muhkin and Dinwiddie, who:
- Reviewed broader records (including Social Security and BOP data).
- Documented evidence of deliberate suppression (“Feigning”) on testing.
- Observed Russell’s functional communication skills in real-world settings (prison calls).
Corroborating Evidence Beyond Experts. Telephone-call transcripts and school records displayed Russell’s ability to engage in logical conversation, strategize with associates, and manage basic tasks—behaviors inconsistent with incompetence.
Legal Principle Restated. Mental illness/intellectual disability is not dispositive. Only incapacity to consult counsel or understand proceedings triggers incompetence (Price v. Thurmer).

2. Sentencing Procedure

Russell alleged the court ignored his cognitive impairment. The panel rejected this, identifying multiple explicit references by the district judge to:

The impairment’s potential to make incarceration harder.
How the impairment factored into the § 3553(a) calculus and moderated the ultimate sentence below the Government’s 300-month request.

The existence of a 66-month sentencing disparity with Williams did not prove neglect; differences stemmed from Russell’s broader robbery portfolio and prior adult convictions.

3. Vagueness of the Supervised-Release Condition

The pivotal doctrinal development is the court’s treatment of Williams’s special condition: “If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person… the probation officer may require you to tell the person about the risk…”

Defects identified:

Indeterminate Trigger: “Poses a risk” affords no objective criteria, leaving the supervisee unsure when the duty arises.
Open-Ended Content: Scope of information to disclose (“substance abuse,” “record of convictions”) is unclear and potentially limitless.
Delegation to Probation: Quasi-legislative power is ceded to the probation officer, raising Article III non-delegation concerns.
Compelled Speech: Without narrow tailoring, the condition risks violating the First Amendment.

Relying on Kappes and Bickart, the panel concluded that such vagueness “invites arbitrary enforcement” and fails to give fair notice. The remedy—vacatur and limited remand—signals that district courts must:

Specify who is at risk (e.g., minors, intimate partners, specific individuals).
Set objective triggers (e.g., new violent offense, protective-order violation).
Define content and method of disclosure (written notice, personal meeting, probation-mediated contact).
Make an on-record necessity finding under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and § 3553(a).

C. Impact on Future Cases and the Law

Competency Litigation: The decision strengthens the evidentiary value of collateral records and real-world behavioral evidence when competency is in doubt. Defense counsel will likely redouble efforts to counter malingering findings with equally holistic proof. Prosecutors gain a roadmap for supporting competency via multidisciplinary data.

Supervised-Release Drafting: The opinion will induce probation offices and sentencing judges to:

Use standardized language vetted after Kappes/Bickart/Williams.
Create narrowly tailored, offense-specific third-party-notification provisions.
Articulate findings on the record, minimizing appellate reversal risk.

Non-Delegation & First-Amendment Groundwork: While the panel resolved the matter on vagueness, its allusion to non-delegation and compelled-speech doctrines foreshadows broader challenges to supervised-release conditions nationwide.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Competency to Stand Trial. A constitutional safeguard ensuring a defendant can understand what is happening and assist the lawyer. Think of it as verifying someone is “mentally present” enough to participate meaningfully.
Clear-Error Review. An appellate standard: the trial judge’s factual finding stands unless it is obviously wrong—like believing a coin landed “tails” when video clearly shows “heads.”
Supervised Release. A period of community supervision after prison. Conditions can resemble probation rules but must be clear, reasonable, and tied to statutory goals.
Vagueness Doctrine. Constitutional rule: laws and conditions must be specific enough to inform ordinary people what conduct is prohibited and to prevent arbitrary enforcement.
Non-Delegation Principle. Courts, not executive agents, must impose terms restricting liberty; broad hand-offs of sentencing power to probation threaten separation of powers.
Compelled Speech. Government forcing an individual to speak. Can violate the First Amendment unless narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
Malingering. Feigning or exaggerating symptoms for secondary gain (e.g., avoiding trial). Clinicians detect it through inconsistent performance and validity tests.

Conclusion

United States v. Russell & Williams cements two practical directives for federal courts within the Seventh Circuit:

When facing contested competency, judges should scrutinize the completeness of expert evaluations, seek corroborative records (e.g., Social Security files, recorded calls), and explicitly address malingering.
“Third-party risk” supervised-release conditions must be written with precision—identifying who is at risk, what triggers notification, and how disclosure occurs—lest they be struck for vagueness, unconstitutional delegation, or compelled speech.

By affirming Russell’s conviction and sentence while vacating Williams’s nebulous condition, the Seventh Circuit both protects defendants’ procedural rights and equips district courts with clear drafting guidance. The opinion’s rigorous analysis is poised to influence competency hearings and supervised-release jurisprudence far beyond the circuit’s boundaries.