Precedents Cited and Their Role

• RICO conspiracy framework:
  • United States v. Starrett (11th Cir. 1995): Articulates § 1962(d) conspiracy elements and supports linking local actors to national enterprises; court relied on its logic to reject Green’s “local-only” argument.
  • United States v. To (11th Cir. 1998): Confirms “enterprise” can be an association-in-fact; relevant to national structure of the Gangster Disciples.
  • United States v. Martino (5th Cir. 1981): Commission of racketeering acts supports inference of agreement—bolstering sufficiency against Green.
• Wiretap interception location:
  • United States v. Stowers (11th Cir. 2022) and Luangkhot v. State (Ga. 2013): Endorse the “listening post” and handset-location rule; the court harmonized federal and Georgia law.
  • Multicircuit alignment: Rodriguez (2d), Jackson (3d), Denman (5th), Ramirez (7th), Henley (8th), Luong (9th), Dahda (10th), Cano-Flores (D.C. Cir.)—confirming interception occurs where first heard and where the phone is located.
• Co-conspirator statements and withdrawal:
  • Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); United States v. Underwood (11th Cir. 2006): Prerequisites for co-conspirator statements.
  • United States v. Finestone (11th Cir. 1987) and Morton’s Market (11th Cir. 1999): Withdrawal is an affirmative defense; requires a clean, permanent break and communication of disavowal.
  • United States v. Rosenthal (11th Cir. 1986): Cooperation does not automatically equal withdrawal.
  • Confrontation: Crawford v. Washington (U.S. 2004) and United States v. Brown (11th Cir. 2025): Only “testimonial” statements trigger the Clause; informal inmate letter to a friend is non-testimonial.
• Evidence rules:
  • Relevance and prejudice: Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403; Finestone; United States v. Betancourt (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jamil (2d Cir. 1983).
• Trial management:
  • Continuances and manipulation: United States v. Verderame (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Fowler (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Graham (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Saget (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ross (11th Cir. 1997).
  • Anonymous juries: United States v. Bowman (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez (11th Cir. 2005)—no plain error for not issuing special precautionary explanations.
  • Shackling: United States v. Ahmed (11th Cir. 2023), United States v. Caldwell (11th Cir. 2023), Moon v. Head (11th Cir. 2002), United States v. Mayes (11th Cir. 1998)—no error where the jury does not see restraints.
• Concurrent-sentence doctrine and harmless error:
  • United States v. Bradley (11th Cir. 2011): Court may decline to review additional concurrent sentences if one valid sentence controls and there are no adverse collateral consequences.
  • Ray v. United States (U.S. 1987): Special assessments can be collateral consequences that defeat the doctrine.
  • United States v. Campa (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rivera (2d Cir. 2000): Life sentences can render other errors immaterial to time served.
  • Adopted alignment with Al-’Owhali (2d Cir. 2022), Duka (3d Cir. 2022), Ruiz (7th Cir. 2021), Oslund (8th Cir. 2019)—explicitly extending the doctrine to sentences consecutive to a life sentence.
• Double jeopardy and count merger:
  • Ball v. United States (U.S. 1985), Brown v. Ohio (U.S. 1977): Prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense; trial courts may vacate one conviction to cure multiplicity.
  • United States v. Julian (11th Cir. 2011): Expressed skepticism that punishing both § 924(c) and § 924(j) violates double jeopardy, but did not resolve the distinct interplay.
• MVRA interpretation and clarifying legislation:
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (pre-2024): Defined “victim” and “assumption of rights.”
  • Post-judgment 2024 amendment (new § 3663A(a)(4)): Explicitly authorizes restitution to a person who assumed the victim’s rights for that person’s own lost income.
  • In re Fielder (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Sepulveda (11th Cir. 1997); Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines (11th Cir. 1999); Red Lion Broadcasting (U.S. 1969): Courts may treat later amendments as clarifying original meaning where ambiguity or conflict existed and Congress says so in the text.
  • Contrary circuit authority before the amendment: United States v. Casados (10th Cir. 2022); United States v. Wilcox (8th Cir. 2007) (disallowing family-member lost income pre-amendment).

Legal Reasoning

1) RICO conspiracy and the “National” Enterprise

The panel rejected Green’s attempt to fence off his conduct as serving a local, not national, enterprise. The evidence showed a hierarchical national gang with uniform rules—most notably “silence & secrecy”—and a statewide enforcement team. Green’s killings were undertaken at the chief enforcer Chambers’s direction to handle “the business of the Nation,” which included punishing “snitches.” Under Starrett and Martino, the predicate murders allowed the jury to infer agreement to further the enterprise’s affairs; the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Green’s acts advanced the enterprise and were not merely personal favors for Chambers.

2) Wiretap Location: Interception at the Listening Post

Although data traveled through a carrier switch and Quantico before being relayed to Georgia, interception occurs where agents first listen and where the handset is located. Because the listening post was in Georgia, the statewide superior-court order satisfied both Title III and Georgia’s statute. The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis harmonizes federal and state frameworks, aligning the circuit with the unanimous “listening post” rule nationwide.

3) Co-conspirator Statement and Withdrawal

Chambers’s jailhouse letter criticizing co-members’ adherence to “the script” was admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Green failed to prove withdrawal: arrest/incarceration is not withdrawal; mere inactivity is insufficient; his proffer to authorities omitted the heart of the scheme (who killed Jackson and Ruff and how), and he later signed a disavowal with co-conspirators. The court thus found no clear error in concluding he remained within the conspiracy when Chambers wrote the letter. As to confrontation, the letter was non-testimonial informal correspondence, not a solemn, trial-substitute statement, and thus did not implicate the Sixth Amendment.

4) Relevance and Rule 403

The “E Team Jan. 2016” list in Chambers’s briefcase—naming both Chambers and Green—was probative of Green’s role on the enforcement team. Photos of ballistic vests and plates found with Green supported the inference he performed dangerous enforcement work. Under Rule 403, the probative value was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice; the evidence did not mislead but rather tended to show precisely what the government had to prove.

5) Continuance, Anonymous Jury, Shackling, and Cumulative Error

Chambers’s sustained sovereign-citizen tactics and late-stage efforts to convert standby counsel into counsel—coached by his father as a delay gambit—justified the denial of a continuance. He showed no specific, substantial prejudice from proceeding. His unpreserved complaints about anonymous juror procedures and shackling could not succeed under plain-error review—no binding authority required special precautionary instructions, and the jury never saw restraints. With no individual errors found, the cumulative error doctrine did not apply.

6) Sentencing: § 924(c) Minimum and the Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine

The jury found only “use or carry” (5-year minimum), not “discharge” (10-year minimum). The panel held the misapplied 10-year minimum was harmless because Chambers was serving two valid consecutive life sentences. Crucially, the court joined the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in holding that the concurrent-sentence doctrine applies equally when the challenged sentence runs consecutive to a valid life sentence. Given the abolition of federal parole, “life” and “life plus x years” are functionally indistinguishable for time-served purposes; no additional special assessment or other adverse collateral consequence turned on the extra term. This formal adoption is a significant doctrinal development in the Eleventh Circuit.

7) Count Merger and Double Jeopardy

All parties agreed VICAR murder and § 924(j) could not both be punished. The district court, after initially going the other way for co-defendant Browner, ultimately merged § 924(j) into VICAR murder for Chambers, both to avoid a second potential cumulative-punishment problem with § 924(c) and to reflect Chambers’s superior culpability under § 3553(a). The panel affirmed on two independent grounds: (a) no abuse of discretion in choosing a path that avoided constitutional doubt, and (b) any error would be harmless because the life sentence on the RICO count independently guaranteed that “life” controlled time served.

8) Restitution: MVRA and Family-Member Lost Income

The district court ordered $952.80 for the income lost by victim Ruff’s father while attending court. The panel recognized a pre-amendment split on whether a family member could recover their own lost income as one who “assume[s] the victim’s rights” when the victim is deceased or incapacitated. One month later, Congress added § 3663A(a)(4) (2024), explicitly authorizing restitution “to a person who has assumed the victim’s rights” to reimburse that person’s own lost income. The court treated the amendment as a clarification of the statute’s original meaning, given the preexisting conflict and Congress’s express “Clarification” caption and textual statement. The panel therefore upheld the restitution order and rejected the Ex Post Facto argument.

Judge Luck dissented from this portion, finding the original text unambiguous in limiting restitution to the victim’s own losses and not the representative’s, relying on the Tenth Circuit’s Casados. He would have vacated the lost-income award while otherwise affirming.

Impact and Significance

A) The Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine—Now Encompassing Life-Plus Sentences

• New Eleventh Circuit precedent: The court explicitly joined multiple circuits in holding that the doctrine applies when the challenged sentence runs consecutive to a valid life sentence.
• Practical effect: Appellate courts in the Eleventh Circuit can decline to review sentencing errors on counts that do not affect time served or impose additional collateral consequences where at least one valid life sentence stands. Appellants should anticipate the government invoking this doctrine in “life plus” cases.
• Strategy: Defense counsel should identify concrete collateral consequences (e.g., special assessments, restitution calculation changes tethered to specific counts, supervised-release conditions with independent effects) to defeat application of the doctrine.

B) MVRA Restitution for Family Members—Pre-Amendment Cases in the Eleventh Circuit

• Clarification doctrine: The panel treats Congress’s 2024 amendment as a clarification, not a change, of existing MVRA meaning. Within the Eleventh Circuit, deceased or incapacitated victims’ family members (or representatives) may recover their own lost income incurred while attending proceedings, even for pre-amendment conduct.
• Ongoing debate curtailed: Judge Luck’s dissent underscores a textualist counterargument, but the majority’s approach, joined to Congress’s clarification, practically resolves the issue going forward. For pre-2024 cases still on direct review, Eleventh Circuit district courts should award such restitution where supported by the record.

C) RICO Prosecutions and National Enterprises

• The decision reinforces the viability of enterprise-wide theories against local actors when a hierarchical structure and uniform rules link local conduct to national objectives. Evidence of roles (e.g., enforcers), internal rules (e.g., “silence & secrecy”), and directives from higher-ups can bridge local acts to the national enterprise.

D) Wiretap Practice

• Listening-post rule reaffirmed: Agents and prosecutors operating in the Eleventh Circuit may rely on state orders with statewide application where calls are first listened to in-state, despite routing through out-of-state telecom infrastructure.
• Record-building tip: Establish where agents first listened to calls and handset locations during intercepted communications to ensure territorial jurisdiction under Title III and state law.

E) Co-conspirator Statements and Withdrawal

• High bar for withdrawal: Defendants must show a clean, permanent break and communication of disavowal to co-conspirators or disclosure to law enforcement that is complete and truthful. Partial or misleading cooperation does not suffice.
• Confrontation Clause: Informal letters to associates are generally non-testimonial; admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) remains a potent tool to prove ongoing agreement and roles.

F) Trial Administration

• Continuance requests that follow months of self-representation and disruptive tactics may be denied without violating the right to counsel; defendants may not weaponize the right to manipulate the schedule.
• Anonymous-jury procedures and shackling practices, if properly managed and not visible to the jury, are unlikely to succeed on appeal absent preserved, specific objections and demonstrable prejudice.

G) Unresolved Questions

• § 924(c) and § 924(j) cumulative punishment: The panel reiterated reservations that punishing both may not violate double jeopardy but did not decide the question. Future cases may squarely present that issue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• RICO conspiracy (§ 1962(d)): An agreement to conduct an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering; proof can be inferred from the commission of predicate crimes and the enterprise’s structure and rules.
• Title III “interception”: Occurs where agents first listen to the call (the “listening post”) and where the phone is located—not where telecom servers route data.
• Rule 801(d)(2)(E) co-conspirator statements: Statements by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy are non-hearsay. Withdrawal requires a clean break and meaningful communication of disavowal.
• Confrontation Clause: Bars admission of testimonial hearsay (formal statements made to substitute for trial testimony), not casual communications like an inmate letter to a friend.
• Rule 403: Relevant evidence may be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; the balance favors admission.
• Concurrent-sentence doctrine: Appellate courts may decline to review challenges to additional sentences when one valid sentence (now including a valid life sentence, even when others are consecutive) controls time served and no additional collateral consequences turn on the challenged count.
• Double jeopardy and “merger”: Courts prevent multiple punishments for the same offense by vacating or merging overlapping convictions; judges may choose the merger direction based on law, facts, and sentencing considerations.
• MVRA: Requires restitution to the “victim.” When the victim is deceased or incapacitated, a family member or representative may assume the victim’s rights. The Eleventh Circuit treats the 2024 “Clarification” amendment as confirming that such a person can recover their own lost income incurred to attend proceedings.