United States v. Papke: Reinforcing Judicial Deference to Pure “Charge Bargains” in Federal Plea Practice

Introduction

On 12 August 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit published United States v. Papke. The appellate panel—Judges McHugh (author), Eid and Federico—reviewed a Northern District of Oklahoma judge’s rejection of two plea agreements offered by the parties in a child-sexual-abuse prosecution. Their opinion: (1) upholds the district court’s discretion to refuse the first Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement (“sentence bargain” component), but (2) finds an abuse of discretion in the refusal of the second agreement, a pure Rule 11(c)(1)(A) “charge bargain.” Key issues included: how to categorize plea agreements; the scope of judicial discretion versus prosecutorial discretion; and whether reassignment of the case was warranted.

Summary of the Judgment

First plea (Rule 11(c)(1)(C) hybrid) – Court properly rejected because the stipulated 13–15-year cap inadequately reflected seriousness under §3553(a).
Second plea (Rule 11(c)(1)(A) charge bargain) – Court mis-labelled it a hybrid bargain and failed to show “due deference” to the prosecutor’s charging decision; therefore, rejection was an abuse of discretion.
Third plea (Rule 11(c)(1)(C)) – Accepted only after earlier rejections; case now remanded to vacate all convictions and sentences and require reconsideration of the second plea under proper standards.
Reassignment – Not ordered; although the district judge displayed hostility to binding plea caps, the panel considered a fresh look feasible once classification error was corrected.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1995) – The touchstone Tenth-Circuit taxonomy of plea bargains: charge, sentence, hybrid. Papke re-affirms Robertson but clarifies that dicta from Robertson and predecessor Carrigan should not be read to convert every bargain that limits maximum exposure into a “hybrid.”
United States v. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2015) – First case to reverse a district court for rejecting a charge bargain without sufficient deference. Papke extends Vanderwerff, applying its logic to a mis-categorised agreement.
United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1985) – Earlier hybrid-bargain decision. District court relied on it, but the panel explains Carrigan’s holding is limited to its facts; it did not redefine charge-bargain doctrine.
United States v. Hurst, 94 F.4th 993 (10th Cir. 2024) – Cited to illustrate when a district court may reject a (C) agreement for inadequacy of penalty.
Several out-of-circuit cases (e.g., Sixth Circuit’s In re United States, Ninth Circuit’s Miller) underscore separation-of-powers concerns, reinforcing the need for deference in charge bargaining.

2. Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Correct Taxonomy of Plea Agreements

Rule 11 foresees four categories; accuracy of classification matters because it calibrates deference:

Charge bargain, Rule 11(c)(1)(A) – Dismissal/promise not to bring counts. Court’s sentencing discretion only incidentally affected; high deference to prosecutor.
Sentence bargain, Rule 11(c)(1)(B) or 11(c)(1)(C) – Recommended or binding sentencing limits; broad judicial discretion to accept or reject.
Hybrid – Elements of both; discretion closer to sentence bargains.

The Second Plea dismissed Count 3 in exchange for guilty pleas to Counts 1–2 and contained no sentencing cap. That is a pure charge bargain irrespective of its indirect effect in lowering theoretical exposure.

b. Abuse-of-Discretion Framework

A district judge abuses discretion when ruling rests on (i) legal error, (ii) clearly erroneous factfinding, or (iii) reliance on improper factors. The panel found:

Legal error: mis-classification of Second Plea as hybrid.
Improper factor: personal frustration with losing sentencing control instead of deference to executive charging authority.

c. Separation-of-Powers Theme

Charging decisions lie at the core of executive power. While judges safeguard due-process values, they may not “second-guess prosecutorial choices” absent illegality or bad faith. Rejecting a charge bargain simply because the judge could not “live with” the resultant maximum conflicts with that principle.

d. Reassignment Standard

Applying Mitchell v. Maynard factors, the panel weighed judicial hostility, appearance of justice, and administrative efficiency. Counsel conceded reassignment unnecessary if remand limited to Second Plea. Court therefore left case with same judge but instructed on proper deference.

3. Impact of the Decision

Clarifies precedent: Any plea solely exchanging a dismissal for a plea, without a sentencing promise, must be treated as a charge bargain.
Practical guidance for district courts:
- Identify plea category on the record.
- Articulate prosecution’s reasons and court’s reasons when rejecting.
- Show “hesitancy” before substituting judicial views for executive charging decisions.
Effect on prosecutors and defence counsel: Encourages confidence that properly crafted charge bargains will receive deferential review; informs drafting strategy (avoid sentencing caps if charging flexibility is paramount).
Future appellate litigation: Provides template for challenging rejections; likely to be cited in circuits confronting similar mis-classification.
Institutional balance: Re-emphasises constitutional limits on judicial interference—salient amid increased judicial scrutiny of plea practices nationwide.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11(c)(1)(A) “Charge Bargain” – Prosecutor trades away some charges; judge retains full authority to sentence on remaining counts. Like a restaurant menu where the chef (government) removes dishes before the customer (judge) chooses size of meal.
Rule 11(c)(1)(C) “Sentence Bargain” – Parties agree to bind the judge to a specific sentence/range. Think of it as a prix-fixe dinner; customer must accept the set course or walk away.
Hybrid Bargain – Combination deal: some dishes removed and prix-fixe price attached. Judge scrutinises heavily.
Separation of Powers – The Constitution divides authority among branches. Charging crimes = Executive kitchen; sentencing discretion = Judicial dining room. One cannot seize the other’s utensils without upsetting the balance.
Abuse of Discretion Standard – Appellate test: Did the lower court make a legal mistake, rely on wrong facts, or act arbitrarily?

Conclusion

United States v. Papke is now the leading Tenth-Circuit authority on the judicial role in reviewing charge bargains. It re-affirms that while district judges wield broad power over sentencing, they must not override prosecutorial decisions about which charges survive, absent exceptional circumstances. The opinion also demonstrates how precise plea classification—and clear articulation of reasons—guards both defendants’ rights and the structural integrity of the federal criminal system. Practitioners should read Papke alongside Vanderwerff and Robertson when negotiating pleas or litigating their acceptance, and district courts should ensure that personal discomfort with sentencing outcomes does not eclipse constitutional limits on judicial authority.