United States v. Mosley: Post-Esteras boundaries on revocation sentencing—no § 3553(a)(2)(A) retribution, “ballpark” deference, and unified justification for prison and supervision

Introduction

In this unpublished, per curiam decision from the Eleventh Circuit, the panel affirmed a revocation sentence imposed on Karijmah Tremaine Mosley: 24 months of imprisonment followed by 12 months of supervised release. The appeal presented familiar issues in the revocation context—procedural and substantive reasonableness—informed by a recent Supreme Court decision that reshapes the boundaries of permissible sentencing considerations at revocation.

Mosley argued that the district court abused its discretion by inadequately weighing mitigation and by insufficiently explaining its imposition of the statutory maximum revocation imprisonment term. The panel rejected these arguments, holding that the sentence fell within the “ballpark of permissible outcomes,” that the court considered the appropriate 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and that no separate explanation was required for the added term of supervised release. Importantly, the opinion squarely situates Eleventh Circuit revocation review within the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Esteras v. United States (2025), which forbids reliance on the retributive purposes found in § 3553(a)(2)(A) when sentencing upon revocation.

Procedurally, the case also addresses mootness: although Mosley completed his 24-month prison term during the appeal, the court held the case was not moot because the timing of his incarceration affected the start—and therefore end—date of his supervised release.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s revocation sentence. It held:

The district court committed no procedural error: it correctly calculated the Chapter 7 policy-statement range (21–24 months), treated the Guidelines as advisory, expressly considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors listed in § 3583(e), and heard and implicitly considered Mosley’s mitigation arguments (including an inapplicable Guidelines amendment, his illness in prison, and a request for home confinement).
The sentence was substantively reasonable: the district court appropriately emphasized Mosley’s extensive criminal history, deterrence, and public protection—permissible considerations at revocation—and imposed a within-range 24-month term of imprisonment. The added 12 months of supervised release complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) because the underlying Class C felony (felon in possession) authorizes up to three years of supervised release; subtracting the 24-month revocation imprisonment left a permissible one-year term.
No separate, additional explanation was required for the supervised release portion; the court’s explanation for imprisonment sufficed to support both components of the sentence.
Anchored by the Supreme Court’s decision in Esteras (2025), the panel reiterated that a district court may not rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness of the offense, respect for the law, just punishment) when sentencing on revocation. The record here reflected permissible considerations only.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, a deferential standard. Irey frames the overall posture of appellate review and undergirds the court’s reluctance to “substitute [its] own judgment for that of the district court.”
United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014): Confirms that the same abuse-of-discretion reasonableness framework applies to revocation sentences. This continuity means revocation sentencings are assessed with the same bifurcated lens—procedural and substantive reasonableness—used in initial sentencings.
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): Supplies the “ballpark of permissible outcomes” articulation. If the district court’s sentence sits within that zone, appellate courts will not reweigh factors. The panel leans on this formulation to affirm both the 24-month prison term and the one-year supervised release term.
United States v. Boone, 97 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2024): Places the burden squarely on the appellant to show unreasonableness. Mosley’s arguments—largely inviting reweighing—could not overcome this burden, especially in light of the within-range sentence and the court’s on-the-record factor consideration.
United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016): Distills the review sequence: courts first check for procedural error (e.g., guideline miscalculation, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, ignoring § 3553(a) factors, relying on clearly erroneous facts, inadequate explanation), then assess substantive reasonableness in light of the totality of circumstances. Trailer provides the two-step template applied here.
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): Clarifies that a district court need not address each mitigating argument explicitly. This supports the panel’s rejection of Mosley’s claim that the court inadequately considered his mitigation (e.g., health issues, inapplicable Guidelines amendment, home confinement).
United States v. Ortiz-Delgado, 451 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 2006): The sentencing court is not required to recite or discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record. Combined with Amedeo, this insulates the sentencing explanation here from procedural attack.
United States v. Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2023): No separate explanation is required for the supervised release portion when imprisonment and supervision are imposed together; the same reasoning “inevitably” supports both. That principle forecloses Mosley’s argument that the added 12 months of supervision warranted additional, discrete justification.
United States v. Pla, 345 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2003): Explains that a new term of supervised release imposed after revocation is not limited by any previously imposed supervision term, but rather by the statutory maximum authorized for the original offense, subject to the subtraction rule of § 3583(h). The panel relies on this to confirm the legality of Mosley’s post-custody supervision.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998): Establishes that ongoing collateral consequences can prevent mootness in post-custody challenges. The panel uses Spencer to hold Mosley’s appeal live: the length of imprisonment affects the timing of supervised release.
Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025): The doctrinal centerpiece. Esteras holds that a district court may not rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A)—retribution concepts like “seriousness of the offense,” “respect for the law,” and “just punishment”—when sentencing after revocation. The opinion integrates Esteras into Eleventh Circuit practice, emphasizing that permissible revocation goals include deterrence, public protection, and the defendant’s rehabilitation needs—but not retribution.

Legal Reasoning

The panel proceeded along the familiar two-step reasonableness review.

1) Procedural reasonableness

Guideline calculation and advisory posture: The district court confirmed with both parties the correct Chapter 7 policy-statement range (21–24 months). It also expressly treated the Guidelines as advisory and recognized the policy-statement nature of Chapter 7. This avoids any Tapia-style or Booker-era missteps and satisfies Trailer’s procedural inquiry.
Factor consideration and explanation: The court stated it had considered the § 3553(a) factors cross-referenced in § 3583(e), heard both sides’ arguments, and acknowledged Mosley’s mitigation. Under Amedeo and Ortiz-Delgado, a sentencing court is not required to address each mitigation argument explicitly, nor to tick through each § 3553(a) factor; the record sufficed.
Esteras compliance: The record reflects reliance on permissible factors—criminal history, deterrence, public protection—rather than retributive purposes under § 3553(a)(2)(A). That alignment avoids the Esteras error (consideration of seriousness, respect for law, or just punishment) at revocation.

2) Substantive reasonableness

Weighting the factors: Under Butler, the district court may attach great weight to one factor (e.g., prior criminal history) over others. The court underscored Mosley’s extensive criminal history in setting both the incarceration and the conditions of supervision (e.g., curfew). This is a classic and permissible emphasis tied to deterrence and community safety.
Within-range sentence and statutory cap: The 24-month term sat at the top of the advisory policy-statement range and at the statutory maximum term of imprisonment on revocation for a Class C felony. Appellate courts give substantial deference to within-range sentences, especially where the district court has articulated factor-based reasons.
Supervised release under § 3583(h): The panel confirmed a one-year term of supervision was lawful. For the underlying Class C felony (felon-in-possession), the statutory maximum supervised release term is three years; subtracting the 24-month revocation imprisonment leaves a ceiling of one year, which the district court imposed. No separate justification was required for adding supervision, per Hamilton.
“Ballpark of permissible outcomes”: Butler’s formulation functions as a backstop against reweighing. Given the permissible factors relied upon, the accurate Guidelines range, and the statutory framework, the sentence comfortably fell within that “ballpark.”

Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

Although unpublished, Mosley is consequential in at least four ways:

Operationalizing Esteras in the Eleventh Circuit: Mosley confirms post-Esteras practice by explicitly disallowing § 3553(a)(2)(A) retributive considerations during revocation sentencings. District courts should avoid language about “seriousness of the offense,” “just punishment,” or “promoting respect for the law” in revocation rationales. Parties should build records that likewise focus on deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation needs.
Deferential review continues to dominate: By reiterating Butler’s “ballpark” approach and the long-standing Amedeo/Ortiz-Delgado rule that courts need not discuss every argument or factor, Mosley underscores the high bar for reversal. Appellate challenges to revocation sentences will generally fail absent clear procedural error, reliance on an impermissible factor (post-Esteras), or a striking misalignment with the § 3553(a) factors.
Unified explanation for incarceration and supervision: Hamilton’s rule remains robust: one integrated explanation suffices for both components. Sentencing judges can streamline revocation hearings without risking procedural error by ensuring their stated reasons naturally support both the custody term and the supervision conditions/length.
Clarity on § 3583(h) calculations: Mosley exemplifies the arithmetic of revocation: the new supervised release term must not exceed the maximum authorized for the original offense, minus the aggregate term(s) of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. Practitioners should present—and courts should confirm—these calculations on the record to avoid post-judgment disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release vs. parole: Supervised release is a post-prison monitoring period authorized at sentencing and overseen by probation; it is not early release. If conditions are violated, the court can revoke and impose additional imprisonment and/or further supervision under § 3583.
Revocation sentencing: When a defendant violates conditions of supervised release, the court may revoke and impose imprisonment up to a statutory cap that depends on the class of the original felony. Policy statements in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines recommend ranges but are advisory.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: - Procedural: Did the court follow the right steps (correct Guidelines range, consider the legally relevant § 3553(a) factors, avoid clearly erroneous facts, explain its reasoning)?
- Substantive: Is the result reasonable given the totality of circumstances (i.e., lies within the “ballpark of permissible outcomes”)?
§ 3553(a) factors at revocation: Under § 3583(e), courts consider a subset of § 3553(a) factors—most notably deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation needs—but, after Esteras, may not rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive purposes (seriousness of the offense, respect for law, just punishment).
“Ballpark of permissible outcomes” (Butler): An appellate shorthand for deference. Even if another judge might sentence differently, the district court’s chosen sentence stands if it is a reasonable option supported by the record and governing law.
§ 3583(h) subtraction rule: The maximum new supervised release term after revocation equals the original offense’s maximum supervised release term minus all imprisonment imposed upon revocation(s). This ensures the combined deprivation of liberty remains tied to the original offense’s statutory limits.
Mootness and collateral consequences (Spencer): Even if a defendant finishes the prison portion of a sentence, an appeal is not moot if deciding it could affect ongoing supervised release (for example, by determining its start date or end date).

Conclusion

United States v. Mosley affirms a top-of-the-range revocation sentence and, more importantly, illustrates how revocation sentencing in the Eleventh Circuit now functions in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Esteras decision. The opinion reinforces several enduring themes: deference to the district court’s weighing of permissible § 3553(a) factors; the sufficiency of a unified explanation for both incarceration and supervised release; and careful adherence to § 3583(h)’s subtraction rule when imposing renewed supervision.

Going forward, district courts and practitioners should ensure revocation records emphasize deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitative considerations, scrupulously avoiding retributive rationales under § 3553(a)(2)(A). Appellate challenges will remain uphill where sentences are within the Chapter 7 range (or otherwise defensibly reasoned), the court’s explanation reflects the correct legal boundaries, and the outcome fits within the Butler “ballpark.” Mosley—though unpublished—provides a clear, practical template for compliant revocation sentencing in the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Esteras era.