United States v. Martin: Sixth Circuit Re-Affirms the “Dangerousness” Standard for Disarming Felons and Domestic-Violence Misdemeanants After Bruen

1. Introduction

In United States v. Da Shawn Lee Martin, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed yet another round of Second Amendment attacks on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) and § 922(g)(9) (misdemeanor-crime-of-domestic-violence in possession). Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s recent firearms jurisprudence — most notably New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) and United States v. Rahimi (2024) — Defendant-Appellant Martin argued that the two subsections are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to him. The Sixth Circuit (Judges Clay, Thapar, and Readler; opinion by Judge Clay) rejected those arguments, thereby re-affirming its “dangerousness” framework first articulated in United States v. Williams (2024) and applied in United States v. Gailes (2024). The decision keeps intact the federal prohibition on firearm possession by both felons and domestic-violence misdemeanants within the Circuit and further clarifies how lower courts should evaluate Second Amendment challenges post-Bruen.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Facial challenge to § 922(g)(9): Rejected. The panel relied on United States v. Gailes, which had already applied the two-step Bruen methodology and upheld § 922(g)(9).
As-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1): Rejected. By virtue of a prior burglary conviction (an “inherently dangerous” felony), Martin falls within the class of persons that may be disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment under Williams.
As-applied challenge to § 922(g)(9): Rejected. Martin’s domestic-violence conviction, which involved physically assaulting the mother of his children, likewise demonstrates “dangerousness” under Williams, justifying disarmament.
Outcome: District court’s denial of the motion to dismiss is affirmed; 40-month sentence and 3-year supervised release term stand.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen (2022)
Introduced the current two-step test for Second Amendment challenges: (1) text–coverage inquiry, (2) historical analog. Though the panel did not redo the test, it relied on prior Sixth Circuit cases that had.
United States v. Rahimi (2024)
Clarified the Bruen framework and the demanding standard for facial challenges: defendant must show no set of constitutional applications. The panel quotes Rahimi’s use of the longstanding Salerno rule.
United States v. Gailes (6th Cir. 2024)
Re-evaluated § 922(g)(9) under Bruen and upheld it. Gailes is treated as binding, foreclosing Martin’s facial attack.
United States v. Williams (6th Cir. 2024)
Adopted “dangerousness” as the key limiter on Congress’s power to disarm. The present panel extends Williams by confirming that burglary and domestic-violence battery qualify.
Stimmel v. Sessions (6th Cir. 2018)
Earlier case upholding § 922(g)(9) under pre-Bruen intermediate-scrutiny analysis. Cited to show doctrinal continuity.
United States v. Salerno (1987)
Sets the “no set of circumstances” rule for facial challenges; integrated through Rahimi.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Judge Clay’s opinion proceeds in two major steps:

Facial attack on § 922(g)(9)
The panel deems itself bound by Gailes, which already performed the requisite Bruen historical analysis, concluding that historical tradition supports disarming those convicted of domestic-violence misdemeanors. Under the rule of inter-panel stare decisis, only an en banc court or an intervening Supreme Court decision can revisit Gailes, neither of which exists.
As-applied attacks
a. § 922(g)(1): Under Williams, a person may be disarmed if (i) they have a felony conviction for an offense that “inherently poses a significant threat of danger.” Burglary is expressly identified as such an offense. Martin’s 2012 burglary satisfies the criterion.
b. § 922(g)(9): Williams also observes that crimes “against the body of another human being” demonstrate dangerousness. Martin’s 2021 domestic-violence battery qualifies.

Throughout, the panel emphasizes that no Supreme Court case undermines this Circuit’s dangerousness-based framework, so it remains binding.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and the Second Amendment Landscape

Reinforces Circuit Stability Post-Bruen
Many district courts confronting § 922(g) challenges have awaited clear appellate guidance. Martin supplies a consolidated answer: both subsections survive under the Sixth Circuit’s dangerousness theory.
Clarifies “Dangerousness” Categories
Williams provided exemplary but non-exhaustive categories (e.g., burglary, violent offenses). Martin concretizes that burglary and misdemeanor domestic violence sit squarely within the umbrella, making future as-applied challenges by burglars or domestic abusers unlikely to succeed.
Narrows Room for “Bruen-Driven” Dismantling of § 922(g)
Some circuits have splintered over how far Bruen reaches; the Sixth Circuit’s adherence to its own dangerousness doctrine likely deters district courts from experimenting with broader invalidation.
Sets Up a Potential Circuit Split
Other circuits (most notably the Fifth Circuit in pre-Rahimi iterations) have expressed deeper skepticism toward § 922(g). If those courts read Rahimi differently, a split may ripen for Supreme Court review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge
A facial challenge attacks the law itself, claiming it is unconstitutional in every application. An as-applied challenge concedes the statute may be valid generally but argues it cannot be constitutionally applied to the particular defendant. Facial attacks are harder to win because the challenger must negate all plausible applications.
“Dangerousness”
The Sixth Circuit uses “dangerousness” as a shorthand for crimes that, by their nature, threaten physical harm (e.g., burglary, violent assault). If a person has such a conviction, the government may disarm them without violating the Second Amendment.
Two-Step Bruen Test
1) Does the Second Amendment’s text cover the person’s conduct? 2) If so, is the regulation consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation? Under Martin, previous panel decisions already answered “yes” for the government regarding §§ 922(g)(1) and (9).
Salerno “No Set of Circumstances” Standard
To declare a statute facially unconstitutional, one must show it lacks any constitutional application, an exceptionally high bar rarely met.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Martin is less about forging new doctrine than about cementing the Sixth Circuit’s post-Bruen approach to firearm-possession prohibitions. By adhering to precedent (Gailes, Williams) and invoking the Supreme Court’s recent clarifications (Rahimi), the panel underscores that individuals with burglary convictions or domestic-violence misdemeanors remain squarely within the class of “dangerous” persons who may be disarmed. The judgment provides district courts in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee with a clear, predictable roadmap for evaluating future § 922(g) challenges and signals to litigants that, absent intervening Supreme Court direction or en banc reconsideration, the “dangerousness” framework is here to stay. For the broader constitutional dialogue, Martin illustrates how lower courts can harmonize expansive Second Amendment rhetoric with longstanding public-safety regulations without inviting doctrinal chaos.