United States v. Jumper: Tenth Circuit Affirms Statutory-Maximum Revocation Sentence & Refines Standards for Major Upward Variances in Supervised-Release Cases

1. Introduction

On 24 July 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided United States v. Jumper, an unpublished but potentially influential order affirming a 24-month sentence imposed after the revocation of Daniel Lee Jumper’s supervised release. Despite a recommended United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range of 5–11 months, the district court imposed the statutory maximum. Jumper challenged the sentence as substantively unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit rejected that challenge, clarifying the degree of justification required for large upward variances in revocation settings and re-emphasising the analytical framework district courts must follow under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) & 3553(a).

While designated “non-precedential,” the ruling distils and synthesises a growing body of Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court authority on revocation sentencing, deterrence, and judicial discretion. It is therefore an important guidepost for district judges, practitioners, and supervised-release defendants alike.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Issue on appeal: Whether a 24-month revocation sentence—more than double the top of the advisory 5-to-11-month Guidelines range—is substantively unreasonable.
Holding: The sentence is substantively reasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion because it articulated a sufficiently compelling justification—grounded in deterrence, protection of the public, and Jumper’s repeated non-compliance—for the upward variance.
Result: Conviction and sentence affirmed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

The panel anchored its reasoning in an interlocking set of Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedents:

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) – Established the abuse-of-discretion standard and the “significant-justification” requirement for major variances. Impact here: The court measured the 24-month sentence against Gall’s proportionality principle, asking whether the district judge’s explanation met the “more significant justification” threshold.
United States v. Salazar, 987 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2021) & United States v. McBride, 633 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2011) – Confirmed that, in revocation scenarios, courts must weigh specific § 3553(a) factors enumerated in § 3583(e). The panel used these cases to frame the scope of relevant considerations.
United States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2014) – Clarified that major variances demand robust explanations but left weighing of factors to district judges. The Jumper decision leans on this deference.
United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2019); United States v. Gieswein, 887 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2018) – Articulated the “totality of the circumstances” test and emphasised appellate deference to district courts' factor-weighing. Both were cited to resist Jumper’s invitation to re-weigh evidence on appeal.
United States v. Booker, 63 F.4th 1254 (10th Cir. 2023) – Cautioned that § 3553(a)(2)(A) is omitted from § 3583(e) considerations. The panel noted the district court properly avoided that forbidden factor.
Supportive unpublished opinions — e.g., United States v. Williams, 994 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2021) – Provided examples where identical 24-month variances were upheld, reinforcing consistency.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Standard of review. Substantive reasonableness challenges are gauged under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The appellate court asks only whether the sentence is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” (Friedman)
Major variance justification. A jump from 11 to 24 months is a “major variance,” but Gall rejects rigid mathematical formulas. The real question: Did the district court articulate a “sufficiently compelling” rationale? The panel concluded yes, because the lower court explicitly noted Jumper’s “repeated unwillingness” to comply, the need for individual and general deterrence, and public safety.
Factor-weighing deference. Appellate courts do not re-balance § 3553(a) factors; they check only that the judge considered the correct subset under § 3583(e) and did not rely on excluded ones. The district court checked every required box and avoided § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Individualised assessment. Echoing Koon and Gall, the panel found that the sentencing judge addressed Jumper’s personal history (bipolar diagnosis, methamphetamine addiction) yet reasonably prioritised deterrence and public protection over treatment-first arguments.

3.3 Likely Impact on Future Litigation

Although non-precedential, the decision provides a practical blueprint for district courts within the Tenth Circuit (and persuasive authority elsewhere) when:

Imposing statutory-maximum revocation sentences for repetitive, non-violent violations.
Crafting explanations sufficient to withstand appellate scrutiny for large upward variances.
Navigating the exclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A) in the revocation context.
Balancing addiction-treatment considerations against deterrence and public-safety imperatives.

Defense counsel will need to marshal concrete evidence showing why shorter sentences would better achieve deterrence or rehabilitation; mere disagreement with factor-weighing is unlikely to prevail on appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release: A post-incarceration period during which offenders must comply with court-imposed conditions. Violations can lead to re-imprisonment.
Revocation sentence: The new prison term a court sets after determining the defendant breached release conditions.
Guidelines Range (USSG § 7B1.4): An advisory sentencing window for revocation; not binding but normally the starting point.
Variance: A sentence outside the advisory range. An “upward variance” is longer than the top of the range.
Statutory Maximum: The longest lawful term Congress allows for the revocation offence (here, 24 months under § 3583(e)(3)).
Abuse-of-Discretion Review: A deferential appellate lens asking whether a decision was irrational or arbitrary, rather than whether the appellate court would have ruled differently.
§ 3553(a) Factors: Congressional checklist for sentencing. In revocations, some (e.g., seriousness of the offence) are expressly excluded, limiting the judge to those listed in § 3583(e).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jumper reinforces two core principles:

District courts possess—and the Tenth Circuit will respect—broad discretion to impose statutory-maximum revocation sentences when the record shows sustained non-compliance and articulated concerns over deterrence and public safety.
A “major variance” is sustainable so long as the judge articulates a case-specific, multi-factor justification tethered to the permissible § 3553(a)/§ 3583(e) considerations.

For practitioners, the decision underscores the necessity of building a detailed record—either to justify or to challenge upward variances—and of recognising the limited scope of substantive-reasonableness appeals. For supervised-release defendants, it is a stark reminder that repeated, even non-violent, violations can culminate in the statutory maximum if courts perceive an ongoing disregard for their authority.