United States v. Johnson: Fourth Circuit Holds Warrantless Dog Sniff in a Common Apartment Hallway Is Not a Fourth-Amendment “Search”

Introduction

The published Fourth-Circuit decision in United States v. Eric Tyrell Johnson (No. 23-4255, Aug. 5 2025) resolves a recurring Fourth-Amendment question: does a warrantless narcotics-detection dog sniff at the threshold of an apartment door in a shared hallway constitute a “search” requiring probable cause and a warrant? The court—per Judge Harris, joined by Judges Richardson and Heytens—answers “no,” thereby:

• Reaffirming that a dog sniff revealing only the presence or absence of contraband does not offend any reasonable expectation of privacy (United States v. Place, Illinois v. Caballes); and
• Clarifying that a common hallway to which other tenants and building staff have routine access is not within the “curtilage” protected by the property-based test of Florida v. Jardines.

The ruling affirms Eric Johnson’s drug and firearm convictions, upholds the district court’s denial of his suppression motion, and now stands as binding Fourth-Circuit precedent on dog sniffs in multi-unit dwellings.

Summary of the Judgment

Agents, acting on wiretap intelligence, took a certified drug dog to the second-floor hallway of Johnson’s apartment building at 3 a.m. The dog “alerted” at the seam of Johnson’s door. Relying partly on that alert, officers obtained a warrant and later discovered fentanyl, heroin, cash, cell phones, and a handgun. The district court denied Johnson’s suppression motion; a jury convicted him on three counts; and he received a 150-month sentence.

On appeal Johnson advanced two Fourth-Amendment theories:

1. Expectation-of-Privacy Theory – The dog, a “super-sense” device, revealed details of the home otherwise unknowable absent physical entry (Kyllo) and thus was a search.
2. Property/Curtilage Theory – The hallway space immediately in front of the door constituted his curtilage, parallel to the front porch in Jardines; the physical intrusion with the dog was therefore a search.

The Fourth Circuit rejected both arguments and affirmed:

• Dog sniffs are sui generis: because they disclose only contraband, they never infringe a legitimate privacy interest, regardless of location (Place; Caballes).
• Hallway ≠ curtilage: Johnson lacked a right to exclude others from the common hallway; Dunn’s four-factor test and prior Circuit precedent (United States v. Jackson) confirm no curtilage exists.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Sui-generis nature of dog sniffs. Referencing Place and Caballes, the panel underscored that a canine alert communicates binary information (contraband present/absent). Because society does not recognize privacy in contraband, no “reasonable expectation” exists to shield it.
2. Rejection of Kyllo analogy. Thermal imaging can expose lawful private details (e.g., resident’s bathing habits); dog sniffs cannot. Thus Kyllo’s concern for technological surveillance of innocent activities is not triggered.
3. Curtilage assessment under Dunn.
   • Proximity: Hallway immediately borders apartment but belongs to building, not tenant.
   • Enclosure: No separate enclosure; hallway is part of larger building corridor.
   • Nature of use: Shared passage for all tenants, staff, and routine guests.
   • Steps to protect from observation: None; no mat, no sign, no obstruction.
   Aggregating the factors, the panel concluded Johnson could not treat the hallway as “part of the home itself.”
4. Right to exclude as decisive. Key to curtilage is dominion and control; without authority to exclude, the hallway remains common property outside constitutional shelter.

3. Potential Impact

• Binding circuit precedent. Investigators within the Fourth Circuit (MD, VA, WV, NC, SC) may now conduct warrantless dog sniffs in apartment hallways without Fourth-Amendment restraint—provided the hallway is genuinely common and entry is lawfully obtained.
• Suppression litigation. Defendants will need to show exclusive control or other curtilage-like attributes (private vestibule, restricted foyer, locked inner door) to gain suppression traction.
• Inter-circuit tension. The decision deepens a split with the Seventh Circuit’s United States v. Whitaker (2016) and Illinois Supreme Court’s People v. Bonilla (2018), enhancing the possibility of Supreme Court review.
• Property-rights framing. The court’s emphasis on the tenant’s exclusion power may influence broader curtilage analyses in multi-unit contexts (e.g., porches, semi-private stoops, gated courtyards).
• Law-enforcement protocol. Agencies may adopt hallway canine sniffs as a low-cost investigative tool prior to warrant applications, so long as officers stay within lawful common areas.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy (Katz Test)

Two-part inquiry asking (1) whether the individual expected privacy in the place/thing, and (2) whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. If yes, governmental intrusion is a “search.”

Sui Generis Dog Sniff

Latin for “of its own kind.” The Supreme Court treats canine sniffs as unique because they yield only a yes/no answer about contraband, unlike devices that might expose lawful private information.

Curtilage

The area immediately surrounding a home that harbors the “intimate activity of the household” and shares the home’s constitutional protection—think porch, backyard, or private side yard. Identified via Dunn factors.

Property-Based vs. Privacy-Based Tests

Property-based: Looks at physical intrusion on places/things the Fourth Amendment textually protects (“persons, houses…”) and whether the government lacked license to be there.
Privacy-based: Focuses on breached expectations of privacy, even in public spaces (Katz phone booth).

Right to Exclude

A hallmark of property rights. If you can legally keep others out, the area is more likely to be treated as protected curtilage.

Conclusion

United States v. Johnson crystallizes a clear Fourth-Circuit rule: a warrantless narcotics-dog sniff conducted in a truly common apartment hallway does not qualify as a Fourth-Amendment search. The case illustrates the court’s fidelity to the Place/Caballes doctrine regarding canine sniffs and its rigorous, property-rights-oriented application of curtilage principles. Practically, the opinion:

• Empowers law enforcement to employ canine sniffs in multi-unit environments without first seeking a warrant;
• Signals to litigants that future suppression claims must demonstrate either a legitimate expectation of privacy or a right to exclude the public from the searched area; and
• Contributes to an existing circuit split, positioning the Supreme Court to resolve conflicting interpretations of Jardines in the apartment-dweller context.

By firmly demarcating common hallways from protected curtilage, Johnson recalibrates the privacy landscape for millions of tenants within the Fourth Circuit, balancing investigative efficiency against constitutional guarantees in a manner the court deems consistent with prevailing Supreme Court doctrine.