United States v. Steven J. Hecke
Seventh Circuit Refines the Threshold for Franks Hearings, Re-emphasises the Contours of Constructive Amendment, and Upholds Sentencing Enhancements

1. Introduction

In United States v. Hecke, No. 23-2384 (7th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025), the Seventh Circuit confronted a familiar trilogy of post-conviction challenges—suppression, variance from the indictment, and Guidelines calculations—arising out of a large-scale methamphetamine and fentanyl prosecution in Fort Wayne, Indiana. The appellant, Steven J. Hecke, received a life sentence after a jury convicted him of multiple drug and firearm counts. On appeal he attacked:

• the district court’s refusal to grant a Franks v. Delaware evidentiary hearing regarding alleged omissions and inaccuracies in the search-warrant affidavits;
• an asserted constructive amendment of Count 7 (possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking); and
• three two-level enhancements—role in the offence (§3B1.1), obstruction of justice (§3C1.1), and credible threats of violence (§2D1.1(b)(2)).

The panel—Chief Judge Sykes, Judge St. Eve, and opinion author Judge Lee—affirmed across the board. Although the outcome is straightforward, the opinion meaningfully fine-tunes three doctrinal areas that recur in federal criminal litigation:

1. Material omissions under Franks: When does failing to disclose an informant’s criminal history and cooperation agreement become “material” and “reckless”?
2. Constructive amendment: How precise must jury instructions be when the indictment specifies a single date but the evidence spans multiple dates?
3. Sentencing enhancements: What quantum of evidence suffices to establish management of a single underling, obstruction through jail communications, and “credible threats” via cartel references?

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit held:

• No Franks Hearing Required. Omitting a confidential informant’s criminal record and cooperation agreement was immaterial because the CI’s information was “fresh, detailed, first-hand, and thoroughly corroborated.” There was no demonstration that Detective Compton acted intentionally or recklessly.
• No Constructive Amendment. The court’s instructions tethered the §924(c) firearm charge to the January 13, 2020 drug-possession count; the government’s arguments remained similarly confined. Thus, the jury could not have convicted on an uncharged factual basis.
• Sentencing Enhancements Upheld. The record supported findings that Hecke supervised Samuel Battell, attempted to intimidate the CI via jail messages, and issued credible threats referencing Sinaloa cartel fire-power. The district court’s life sentence—anchored to an offence level of 43—was procedurally and substantively sound.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.1.1 Franks Framework

• Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) – Established that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only upon a “substantial preliminary showing” of intentional or reckless falsehoods essential to probable cause.
• United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2018) & United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2016) – Both upheld warrants despite omitted CI impeachment data because independent police corroboration supplied reliability.
• United States v. Clark, 935 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2019) – Contrasting case where omission of credibility data was fatal due to frail corroboration; cited by Hecke but distinguished by the panel.

3.1.2 Constructive Amendment

• United States v. Penaloza, 648 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2011) – Clarifies that amendment occurs only when possible bases for conviction are broadened beyond the indictment.
• United States v. Phillips, 745 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2014) – Establishes plain-error standard for unpreserved amendment claims.

3.1.3 Sentencing Enhancements

• United States v. Garcia, 948 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2020) & United States v. Beechler, 68 F.4th 358 (7th Cir. 2023) – Interpret §3B1.1 control/organisation requirement.
• United States v. Barber, 937 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2019) – Notes that attempted witness intimidation triggers §3C1.1.
• United States v. Barker, 80 F.4th 827 (7th Cir. 2023) – Reiterates sentencing evidentiary reliability standards.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 The Franks Denial

The panel applied a three-step inquiry:

1. Identify the alleged falsity/omission. Hecke pointed to (i) CI’s criminal history; (ii) CI’s cooperation deal; (iii) implied existence of a second informant; (iv) GPS tracking before warrant issuance.
2. Evaluate intent/recklessness. The court found no direct or circumstantial evidence that Detective Compton meant to deceive; errors looked inadvertent.
3. Test materiality. Excising the challenged statements and adding the omitted impeachment data, the warrant still established probable cause because:
   • The CI supplied granular, first-hand observations.
   • Detectives corroborated every critical detail (address, vehicle, controlled buys).
   • The magistrate would have assumed “unsavory” motives regardless.

Thus, under Bradford and Hancock, no hearing was warranted.

3.2.2 Constructive Amendment

The panel dissected the jury instructions:

• Count 7’s elements directed the jury to “the drug trafficking crime as alleged in Count 6,” which itself was pinned to January 13, 2020.
• Government rebuttal clarified that firearm liability was linked only to the January 13 search, not the December 5 buy.

Because the charge’s temporal limitation remained intact, the indictment was not broadened. Any variance was, at worst, a variance rather than an amendment, and it failed plain-error review.

3.2.3 Sentencing Enhancements

Role (§3B1.1). Texts calling Battell his “right hand man,” instructions to procure vehicles, firearms, and merchandise, and evidence of debt-for-labor arrangements sufficed to show Hecke “managed or supervised” at least one participant.

Obstruction (§3C1.1). Two jail e-messages addressed directly to the CI—labeling him “RAT” and foretelling forced testimony—constituted an attempt to intimidate a witness. Hecke waived authenticity arguments by conceding them below.

Credible Threats (§2D1.1(b)(2). Hecke’s cartel-laden texts (“calling south,” “big guns,” “vested up”) conveyed violent enforcement capacity, made recipients fearful, and therefore qualified as “credible.” The court accepted expert testimony on cartel intimidation to reinforce credibility.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

The opinion crystallises several practical rules for future litigation within the Seventh Circuit:

1. “Fresh, detailed, corroborated” tips override CI-credibility omissions. Defense counsel seeking a Franks hearing must demonstrate not merely impeachment material but material impeachment whose inclusion would negate probable cause.
2. Date-locked firearm counts withstand multi-date evidence. Prosecutors can safely introduce earlier or later firearm evidence if jury instructions firmly tether §924(c) liability to the charged predicate event.
3. Low-level hierarchy can trigger §3B1.1(c). Managing even a single helper, if coupled with directive texts or tasks, justifies the enhancement.
4. Digital messages are fertile obstruction territory. Jail e-mails or texts, even if bluster, may support §3C1.1 and §2D1.1(b)(2) so long as they “could reasonably be perceived” as attempts to influence or threaten.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Franks Hearing: A mini-trial to test whether police lied or recklessly omitted key facts in a warrant affidavit. You get one only if you can preliminarily show intentional/reckless falsity that would erase probable cause.
• Constructive Amendment vs. Variance: An amendment changes the crime charged; a variance merely proves the same crime differently. Amendments violate the Grand Jury Clause; variances usually don’t.
• Guidelines “Enhancement”: A numerical increase to the offence-level score, which drives the advisory sentencing range.
• §3B1.1(c) (“manager/supervisor”): Requires proof that the defendant exercised some control over another participant—direction, payment, or tasking is enough.
• §3C1.1 (“obstruction”): Punishes attempts to interfere with justice—threats, perjury, evidence tampering, etc.— even if the effort fails.
• §2D1.1(b)(2) (“credible threat”): Adds levels when drug crimes are greased with violence or believable threats of violence. “Credible” means a reasonable person would take the threat seriously.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Hecke adds incremental but important clarity to several high-frequency doctrines. The Seventh Circuit underscores that:

• Probable-cause analyses remain holistic; well-corroborated CI tips survive even notable impeachment omissions.
• Jury instructions anchored to the indictment’s predicate conduct shield convictions from constructive-amendment attack.
• Text-message bravado can and will carry real sentencing consequences when it believably evokes violence or intimidation.

Practitioners should heed the evidentiary thresholds confirmed here—both for attacking warrants and for insulating convictions and sentences on appeal. While Hecke’s life sentence stands, the broader lesson is doctrinal: materiality, specificity, and credibility continue to be the fulcrums on which Fourth-Amendment, Fifth-Amendment, and sentencing arguments pivot in the Seventh Circuit.